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SECURING A CAREER PLACEMENT EDGE:

HIRING FOR POTENTIAL,

AN ADVANCED APPROACH TO STUDENT STUDY ABROAD, ALIGNING PURPOSE

WITH EXPERIENCE

CHINA IMPACT 2012 – 2025

中国冲击 2012 - 2025

一部综合性的关于中国政治，经济，国际化领导力及本国经济政策之调查分析与建议

Volume 1

1st Edition

APPLYING THE SPELIT MODEL AS A FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY AND EXPLORE

CRITICAL LITERATURE SO AS TO ADVANCE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING BY FOCUSING ON

IN-COUNTRY RESEARCH AS A PRELUDE TO INTEGRATING THE SALDANA AND DELPHI MODELS

By: Patrick. D. Huff

PUBLICATION INFORMATION

Huff, P. D. (2015). Securing A Career Placement Edge: Hiring for Potential, An Advanced Approach to Student Study Abroad, Aligning Purpose With Experience (1 ed., Vol. 1). (C. Zabilski, E. B. Huff, J. L. Huff, J. L. Huff, Eds., & P. D. Huff, Trans.) Woodland Hills, CA, USA: GPS-AG, Inc. doi:ISBN-13:978-1508426882

Key Words: Student, Study, Abroad, Advanced, SPELIT, Saldana, Delphi, University, Collegiate, Employment, Potential, Leadership, Social, Political, Economic, Legal, Intercultural, Technology, Infrastructure, Teaching, Methods, Instructional, Personal, Development, Ethics, Organizational, Behavior, International, Global, Language, China, Pepperdine

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired-out, or circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published with these conditions being imposed on subsequent purchasers. The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated. While the author(s) have made every effort to provide accurate telephone numbers, Internet addresses, and other contact information at the time of publication, neither the publisher nor the author(s) assume any responsibility for errors, or for changes that occur after publication. Further, publisher does not have any control over and does not assume any responsibility for author(s) or third-party websites or their content.

Copyright © 2012 by GPS-AG, Inc. Publishing Division, All rights reserved, no part of this work covered by the copyright may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means except as permitted by the authors or its publisher. The authors may be contacted at the email addresses provided in this document. Permission is hereby granted to professors and their students to photocopy Appendix A for use only in classes in which this study guide is a required text supplement. Except for Appendix A, no portion of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the author or this publisher.

Printed in the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America

ISBN-13: 978-1508426882

ISBN-10: 1508426880

xvii

ABSTRACT

The author undertakes an analysis of China’s political, economic, legal, and technology environments in the context of leadership and policy developments. The research design is a bound longitudinal study with the initial immersion occurring 21 May to 31 May 2012. The research covers a total of four immersions of relatively equal duration. The study and supporting research is based on a mixed-method approach that touches on an ethnological phenomenon (Wolcott, 1999) within China. The approach is weighted 83 percent on qualitative literature reviews and 17 percent on original quantitative data. The purpose of the study is to assist in closing a gap in the literature on China, act as a collegiate (post-graduate level) primer in support of in-country studies and experiential learning with a focus on an empirical investigation into the country’s future direction and priorities.

Original data is collected using face-to-face open-ended surveys or narrative interviews conducted during each immersion. Each immersion focuses on observations of China’s environment through the lens of ethnic differences within each of its regions or provincial sovereigns. Background survey participants include academic scholars, government officials, industry leaders, faculty advisors, and common Chinese “worker class”. These surveys assist in determining the study’s initial focus, significance, development of preliminary inquiries, and the final direction of the research.

Stage one of this study includes the initial discoveries pertaining to environmental factors identified by using the SPELIT Power Matrix Model as a process to frame the in-country research and analysis of phenomena. In this stage a total of 4 cities, 5 provinces, and 7 organizations were visited and observed. These form the domains from which all in-country data was designed to be collected. A total of seven surveys (N=7) are designed with a total sampling of (n = 26) in-country participants taken in different locations. This stage includes the development of 19 Structured Literature Reviews (SLRs) in accordance with Pan’s Relevant Literature Review Model. This series of SLRs are focused on four areas of interest (factors) in order to identify the relevancy of the study’s core research questions.

Stage two of the study design examines the in-country data and literature by subjecting it to assessment and analysis for critical reoccurring themes and codes using Saldana’s Model and by applying a weighted Likert scale to determine each elements degree of significance.

Stage two requires the identification of a panel of (n=12) survey participants in order to apply the Delphi Policy Model. Hegelian Theory is utilized as an underlying and controlling dialectic process throughout all stages of the SLR and subsequent Delphi survey process. Each participant will be selected on the basis of cultural bias and subject matter expertise (SME). The model includes a three-round survey series which integrates subsequent round evaluations by the participants to identify, validate, and determine the significance of findings. The series of surveys (N = 3) represents a total sample population (n = 36) necessary to acquire a relevant body of evidence. This stage concludes with the assessment of findings, and conclusions derived from the process.

Stage three of the study will summarize the conclusions and concise recommendations for future study and offered for the consideration of policy decision-makers. Key to this study’s findings is the estimate of China’s top priority and the direction its leadership will set over the next 10 years.

xix

ABSTRACT

These recommendations will subsequently be tested using Wheatley’s Complexity

(Grobman, 2005) and Trompenaars’ Change Across Cultures Theory (Hampden-Turner, Trompenaars, 2000) as methods of analysis and evaluation of China’s leadership through the lens of Quinn’s Competing Values Model so as to formulate corollaries between the study’s findings, China’s leadership characteristics, behavior, and probable actions that will define China’s Impact on the international community between 2016 and 2025.

Keywords: Student, Study, Abroad, Advanced, SPELIT, Saldana, Delphi, University, Collegiate,

Employment, Potential, Leadership, Social, Political, Economic, Legal, Intercultural, Technology, Infrastructure, Teaching, Methods, Instructional, Personal, Development, Ethics, Organizational, Behavior, International, Global, Language, China, Pepperdine

xx

CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions

There is no body of methods; or comprehensive methodology for the study of the impact of public

policy as an aid to future policy. James Samuel Coleman, 1972

Introduction

This study emphasizes exploring four aspects of China’s society. Each aspect paints a

distinct picture about the Middle Kingdom. This investigation included a review and assessment

of individual political, economic, legal, technology, and infrastructural environmental factors.

The study endeavors to discover the potential impact of these factors within a time and space bias

as a set of potential influencers. These influencers will drive the future direction of mainland

China as it navigates its needs, objectives, goals, and desires. These will in turn drive the

priorities of its leadership. Further, these priorities will serve to impose a series of significant and

disruptive innovations and change in the global community over the next decade.

Since the 1990s, China has achieved incredible success in its economic development.

However, this author’s survey shows there are still potential risks to the country should it sustain

its current pace of development. Evidence surfaced in China as well as in contemporary literature

during this investigation that suggests there is a shift in the country’s growth trend. These new

trends infer China is now attempting to slow its internal economic development. These trends are

being signaled by the emergence of a set of priorities that are focused on enhancing and growing

China’s global external interests, image, competency, and authority as a new world leader.

Moreover, China is rapidly learning from the errors inherent in past reforms. As an example,

China has discovered the adverse effects from imposing its one-child policy. Due to these

discoveries, the government has reassessed and is undertaking a series of reforms to overhaul the

policy due to its negative impacts on China’s continuing economic growth goals. The original

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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

policy effectively created an aging problem in the country that is contributing to a substantial

reduction in China’s workforce, production, and manufacturing strengths. These traditional

Chinese laborers and associated work ethics are representative of many of the drivers of the

country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Since 1990 foreign investment in mainland China’s

industrial manufacturing complex and pursuit of its domestic markets has been surging.

When the strength of China’s traditional labor force and its work ethics are fully

considered as significant growth factors, it is clear that the government of China will need to

place a considerable effort into dealing with this shrinking and highly productive resource.

Further, departures of the aged population from the workforce continue to impose an ever-

increasing burden to the national economy. This study’s SLR analysts suggest labor resources are

additionally challenged due to China’s lack of a comprehensive social security and pension

system for retirees which are adding to reductions in the productivity of the younger workforce.

Collectively these conditions may become influential factors that drive the country’s priorities

towards increasing national spending for a health care system that serves the entire population in

the near future. Such social programs that are focused on serving this growing aged population

will serve the government’s interests as these programs will free the younger generation (family

members) from commitments to provide care and support of its aging and infirm members. As

China begins to focus on monitoring the effects of these conditions, few government officials

argue against them being social-economic detractors that are undermining the productivity of

younger Chinese workers. These observations were additionally confirmed as extracted from this

study’s in-country surveys and SLR research.

Absent the attention of the government towards providing relief in this area, ever-

increasing internal burdens on young Chinese entering the workforce may serve to additionally

reduce their productivity as they strive to care for the needs of their extended families. In many

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of this author’s interviews and surveys with national Chinese working class these concerns were

expressed as significant. Many argued the government’s one-child policy has resulted in placing

burdens on the family unit that are unprecedented in recent history.

China’s rapidly changing social-economic and workforce demographics are likely already

influencing the country’s leadership and future priorities. The environmental factors this author

explored in this area of interest provide indicators of China’s recent Five Year Plan to shift the

country’s economic focus away from being the manufacturing hub of the world to one of being a

leader in innovative design, research, and development of unique Chinese brands and products.

This shift is significant when placed in the context of the country’s future demand for large

quantities of unskilled laborers. Given the country’s change in direction, the need for such a

large labor force in the future is substantially reduced. This shift in strategy, however, does not

serve to effectively ensure bridging the economic growth gap during China’s manpower transition

from a hard working labor force to one representative of advanced technological research,

development, innovation, and production when assessed within a highly competitive global

economy. This shift represents a transformation from a system driven by a planned economy to

one instead driven by a uniquely Chinese socialistic market economy. Many economic scholars

and historians view China’s present stage of development as one that represents a duality between

an “economic system and economic growth method” (Ruogu, 2008, pp. 424-425).

Rubric for Policy Development: Ethics, Values, and Goals

It is inherent to the nature of policy development and decision making that a wide range of

multidimensional and interdisciplinary factors are considered in the process of designing and

applying an appropriate Inquiring System (IS) (Turoff M. , 2002). Collectively, when applied to

social, political, economic, legal, and technology environmental strategies that support a policy

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development process that may additionally touch on and be influenced by ethnography. By

applying this author’s rubric as a part of the pre and post Delphi Policy process reviewers should

be reminded that both are simply tools for the analysis of relevant issues and not mechanisms for

final policy decisions. They are only used to facilitate the discovery of significant factors,

influencers, and drivers that can be synthesized to provide a simplified structure that is supportive

of identifying a consensus (Turoff M. , 2002). In Rist’s paper on the topic of policy research and

its related decisional processes he offers the following observations.

“Research is but one (and often minor at that) among a number of often contradictory and

competing sources that seek to influence what is an ongoing and constantly evolving

process.” Rist stresses, the term "process" because he chooses to describe policy

decision making as more or less an “unbounded” process, as characterized by actors who

arrive on the scene (often unannounced)… “delimited by clearly defined constraints of

time and location,” purpose, or calculation. Such a description suggests the antithesis of

the conventional understanding of decision making. In the latter, a more traditional

approach to decision making is understood as a discrete event. One that is undertaken by

a defined set of actors that are working in "real time" and moving to a decision that is

based on their analysis of a list of alternatives (Rist, 1983).

Ultimately the objective of this research is to present to the Delphi Policy Subject Matter

Expert (SME) panel a completed assessment and evaluation rubric that will allow each participant

to view a synthesized summation of the findings pertaining to each research question. Moreover,

this study’s findings and recommendations will serve to assist each SME in their ability to quickly

evaluate, assess, and determine an opinion as to a definitive set of priorities and sense of the

future direction of China as pertaining to each category of interest or controlling environmental

factor. The resulting degree of consensus or lack thereof, will allow this author to offer a

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predictive judgment as to the priorities and direction China’s strategies and system of priorities

may take over the next 10 to 15 years.

The following rubric is presented as an interpretive tool to summarize the range of

potential outcomes related to each environmental factor and associated research inquiry as a set of

“predictive elements” (Mitroff & Turoff, 1975).

Figure 7: Rubric Model Conceptual

Rubric Model

Policy Development Conclusions

During the author’s exploration into China’s strategies, policies, and development he

discovered the government’s approach and consideration of social, political, economic, legal,

intercultural, and technology factors are undertaken with a considerable male bias. This bias is

not unique to other eastern cultures this author has studied. In fact, he has found it to be quite

commonplace. As one of this study’s SLR analysts observed, this gender bias makes being a

female in certain areas of China similar to being subject to a death sentence. This bias is

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considerably lesser when compared to many developed countries in the Western Bloc. When

viewed in the context of the Chinese people, the CPC, and their government, all are in agreement

when gender bias is considered as an influencer to the direction of the country’s social, political,

economic, legal, and technology strategies, policies, and development. As such, China’s future

policy development and resulting direction will continue to be heavily influenced by this bias and

its strong sense of nationalism, exceptionalism, and interest in increasing its power, authority, and

presence. Collectively, these are supportive of a set of esoteric or pure strategies that are

designed to lead China to becoming the new global leader.

Pure Strategy’s Role in Policy Development

China’s economic strategies are relatively transparent and reasonably well defined within

its different five year plans and series of documents that provide supporting arguments in favor of

the adoption of these plans. Some of this study’s SLR scholars define strategy as a plan, method,

or series of maneuvers or stratagems that are applied to achieve a specific goal or result.

Strategies are often employed during periods of peace and war by a nation or society by focusing

its total powers and force structure to achieve large-scale, long-range developmental desires and

goals. To ensure the security and victory of a nation in the achievement of its most challenging

goals, it is necessary that its society supports its government with the strength and commitment of

an equally strong public will.

Discovery of these strategies is relatively easy as many of the arguments associated with

the different aspects of each plan are available on the worldwide Internet. These are either

authored by the elite “insiders” within China’s government or by world class subject matter

experts and/or historians that have followed China’s economy for several decades. Most of these

SMEs or Sino-analysts have a common approach to gaining a full understanding of these factors,

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influencers, and drivers of China’s economic priorities, strategies, and resulting policies. Many of

this study’s history, social-geography scholars, and scientists argue that it is essential to become

knowledgeable and understanding of China’s ancient cultural origins, language, icons, and

ideologies before a researcher can break the code pertaining to how China really works (Bol,

2009; Diamond, 2005).

To this extent then, Sino-scholars, academics, and experts investigating various categories

of China’s environmental factors believe researchers must first understand the ideology of

China’s most influential philosophers. Once this is achieved, these scholars argue it is necessary

to fully understand and appreciate the nature and impact that China’s geographic placement plays

in its development and influence within the global community (Bol, 2009). Next, these scholars

and SMEs would argue it is necessary to investigate, appreciate, and understand the role a

country’s natural resources and material requirements play as influencers in the global

community (Diamond, 2005).

Once these pure factors are understood, a researcher can better assess and evaluate the

following:

• China’s social culture, controlling philosophies

• ideological believes and collective internal and external worldviews

• established and tested trade and commerce traditions and customs

• shifting needs

• desires within the global community

Once understood, only then can a researcher begin to be empowered with sufficient

insight and the tools necessary to begin to identify relevant relationships, trends, and the possible

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causations or origins of forces at play in a society or sovereign government that are driving its

desires, priorities, strategies, and ultimately its internal and external policies.

Ultimately, it is the objective of any policy analyst that is focused on assessing the future

direction of a particular society to be able to identify the “pure strategy” of the society being

investigated. By decoding this pure strategy a researcher can pose a hypothetical statement of

how a study subject is playing the game to achieve its primary objectives and long-term goals

(Nash, 1928; Neumann & Morgenstem, 1953). Once deciphered the analyst can better predict

each move a society will make given a variety of situations it is likely to confront.

This research attempts to discover and identify key factors within China’s strategies that

represent its “strategy set” or pure strategies that are associated to the country as it acts to achieve

its internal and external desires. This research attempts then to ultimately identify and assign a

probability to each of the environmental factors as categories directly or indirectly associated with

dependencies to each pure strategy as an influencer in driving China’s future priorities, policies,

and direction.

Strategy Sets and Priorities

China’s set of pure strategies are highly complex and integral to the achievement of a

myriad of national needs and desires. In fact, during the conductance of the initial research the

author discovered and identified a specific set of pure strategies in association with China’s

political, economic, legal, technology and infrastructural policies. Each of these is presented and

explored within this Chapter. The author provides a list that represents a few of the strategies that

are being applied to achieve China’s present national objectives and goals as a strategy set.

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Among the strategies that have been adopted by China that pertain to this area of interest

are the following:

• Monitor internal and external environments so as to adopt a slow and calculated pace of

continuing reforms to ensure the least disruption to the stability, authority, and the power

of the CPC and central government.

• Strengthen China’s internal ideologies in ways that will best achieve the people’s desires,

long-term interests, nationalism, and exceptionalism.

• Increase the country’s unity and focus towards achieving and securing its long-term

national interests as a dominant force and leader within the global community.

• Strengthen the country’s power, authority, and influence towards achieving its national

security goals and the protection of its global trade routes and commerce.

• Transform the country’s image, sense of value, control, and authority by assuming global

leadership in the areas of innovation, change, research, development, and the creation of

intellectual property and patents.

• Utilize this image and authority to gain international acceptance and approval of its

ideologies so as to influence other sovereigns to act on behalf of China’s best interests,

needs, and desires.

• Ensure the CPC and government “adamantly” serve the people and their “working

interest” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).

• Ensure the system of “democratic centralism” promotes trust and supports a “speed and

stability” during the course of reforms and development; a balanced “relationship

between the central…and local governments”; and, the public as “a collective and as

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individuals”. These are to be “coordinated” as a paced process during the achievement

of China’s development and economic goals (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).

• Transform China’s current “planned economy” to one that is driven instead by a uniquely

Chinese “socialistic market economy” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 424-425).

• Promote Confucian ethics, values, and behavior through: education and tradition;

tolerance and assimilation; and, by “advocating frugality” (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 417-428).

• Utilize the acceptance of China’s ideologies, image, and power as a basis for partnering

with developing and undeveloped countries in beneficial areas of sustainable major

infrastructure, trade, and commerce.

• Utilize global partnering as a significant force for disruptive innovation and change; and,

as an alternative to the Western hegemony.

• Demonstrate a national ideology that encourages any country to select its own

development path and create suitable institutions that support its national needs and

desires to achieve success within the global community.

• Demonstrate China’s core ideologies and development strategies are applicable to all

countries. Specifically emphasize that those countries that believe their institutions,

political ideologies, and forceful strategies that require developing and undeveloped

countries change and adopt their form of governance as the best can be proven to be

ideologically flawed and destructive (Ruogu, 2008, PP. 430-431).

Researcher’s Observations

Background

For decades after the 1949 rise of communism, China has been known for its poverty and

social repression. During this rise China’s has expressed its aggression primarily along the lines

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of its internal national development, manufacturing power, the harvesting of its natural resources,

and its accumulation of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) or trade reserves (Richards, 2012). This

journey has proven to be one that has involved the country’s embrace of a number of significant

transformations, innovative experiments, and disruptive change. Some of these reforms have

proven to be successful over the years, but others have proven to be steps in the wrong direction.

Many of the reforms ultimately proved to be devastating to the country and its people. Many of

these failed reforms were adopted as ideologically associated with Maoist principles. As a result,

a popular saying in China is that Mao’s reforms got it 70 percent right and 30 percent wrong.

Over time the CPC has attempted to correct these errors with more liberal reforms in some areas

and more restrict reforms in others. That said, China and its leadership must be credited with the

ability to recognize their errors in favor of rapidly shifting to policies that correct the country’s

future course and priorities.

More recently, China’s experimentation with innovative changes to Maoist writs and

doctrine are shifting its aggressive passions and national interests in the direction of external

political-economic expansion and a transformation of its internal educational and research

systems so as to empower the country to become a world leader in the development of intellectual

property and technology. This shift is coupled with China’s interests in building and

strengthening its global partnerships; external foreign direct investments; securing natural

resources and minerals; and collecting the best intellectual minds in the world; in short, focusing

the country on what it needs most to ensure its future growth. This transformation is shifting

China’s internal and external policies so as to secure its ability to maintain the lowest possible

manufacturing costs and its access to as much of the world’s inexpensive natural and human

resources as possible. As such, China is entering an era of significant challenges in order to

sustain its future economic growth, power, and authority.

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Challenges

In order for China to successfully implement its national strategies and related policies, it

will need to address challenges on the following levels:

Internal:

• Improve the efficient utilization of its natural resources, and methods of extraction so

as to be more environmentally sensitive;

• Introduce increased reforms pertaining to the distribution of wealth between its four

classes (to include the grey class); and, enforce its trading and investment market

regulations so as to reduce corruption by increasing transparency and trust;

• Approach sweeping changes in ideologies and innovation reforms that will allow the

country to become more align with the Western Bloc, given some of these changes will

include a further liberalization and divergence from China’s rich cultural history,

traditions, and social structure;

• Integrate reforms in the areas of trade, property, and legal writs into the country’s

five year plan that favor increases in entrepreneurism, capitalism, foreign direct

investment, education, research, and development;

• Address the ever-increasing Western Bloc and European cultural influences that are

emerging internally due to cultural, trade, and commerce that are in conflict with

China’s traditions.

External:

• China will need to develop of a worldview that embraces an aggressive pursuit of

natural and human resources outside its borders;

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• Expand the country’s leadership influence in other regions of the world to include the

West and Europe;

• Grow exceptionalism and pursue aggressive financial and monetary systems,

international trade and commerce, debt management, increased capitalism, and

exploitation as a fierce competitor in the global marketplace;

• Focus on self-determination and the desire to assume global leadership through

influence, authority, and control by establishing a new spirit of entrepreneurism,

brand of capitalism, to include intellectual and real property reforms that will serve to

influence and lead Western and European cultures.

As China is confronted with internal and external challenges that pertain to its national

objectives and goals it will need to be centered on sustaining its GDP growth. As such, China

will need to consider the implications of its strategies, policies, and plans on its undeveloped,

developing and developed global stakeholders that are struggling with financial solvency and

economic viability. These stakeholders will need to be provided financial and infrastructural

development investments in order to grow their markets in order to become stronger trade and

commerce partners with China.

In fact, China's decision to continue its economic expansion at the rate of approximately 8

percent per year may need to be downwardly revised if it is to concern itself with having a viable

base of customers and stakeholders in which to continue to build an economy. As recommended

by numerous global economic analysts, scholars, and historians, China may need to seriously

consider adjusting its GDP growth to 3 or 4 percent per year (Beardson, 2013; Madjidi,

International policy experience: China., 2013). This may be necessary for China to continue to

develop and achieve its political and economic goals in the long term. Absent any adjustments to

its current strategies and policies, China is likely to experience significant repercussions in these 178


areas as a result of the financial crisis being experienced in the West and Europe and as associated

with the financial stresses many undeveloped, developing, and developed countries are

experiencing.

Today approximately, 60 to 70 percent of America’s financial stability is based on credit

and consumer buying power as directly supported by trade and commerce debt holdings. “Most

of America's buying power is based on credit from China” (CNN, June, 18, 2012). Presently,

China is providing 75 to 85 percent of the credit or monetary supply necessary to support the

financial stability and the purchasing power of the United States. As a result, the U.S. closely

monitors and assesses China’s pure strategy sets and leading indicators.

The consequences of China's actions should the country cease to continue this financial

support (considering a change in economic and/or monetary policy) would impose liquidity,

credit, and debt considerations that would likely result in reducing the GDP of the U.S.. These

changes would likely deepen the financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe. In fact, many of the

economic analysts and historians that were examined in this study’s SLRs argue such a series of

events would increase the degree of financial stress being experienced across the entire global

community. Additionally, these experts argue such a negative shift in China’s policy would, at

the very least, serve to prolong the collective financial recovery of the global community as well

as leave many countries open to deepening social stresses that would result in critically disrupting

their political and governmental stability.

This poses a question. What would keep China from offering a greater level of financial

support to the Western Bloc and Eastern Europe so as to assist recovery? This author argues that

his research indicates China is being confronted with significant internal and external social,

political, economic, legal, intercultural, technology, and infrastructural challenges that represent a

set of substantial transformational problems the country will need to address before it can offer

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any additional assistance to the global community. So to a degree facing these challenges will

limit China’s ability to take a more aggressive stance towards providing the additional support

many in the Western Bloc and Eastern Europe would like. Instead, China needs to carefully

measure and balance its external involvements in favor of successfully managing its internal

affairs. The speed and care in which this transformation is implemented is critical to China

achieving its goals and objectives while at the same time maintaining the critical level of stability

the CPC and the government desires.

In this author's view China's internal and external political-economic policies, technology,

and educational shifts will impose significant challenges to China’s current and future leadership

to include a close examination of their future ethical behavior. China’s environmental factors

will continue to require close monitoring and the degree of responsiveness necessary to accurately

assess and adjust reforms to achieve the country’s goals while maintaining stability.

Moreover, this will require the careful construction of strategies and the implementation of

policies over the next decade. Due to China’s internal and external transformational stresses, the

country is not likely to pursue a policy of significantly increasing its economic and financial

support of the global community short of a few exceptions. These exceptions will be in the areas

where foreign sovereigns are willing to join its new trade and commerce league and its financial

and monetary investment banking systems as members eligible to receive foreign direct

investments in major infrastructure projects. In these countries, China’s Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB) with its $100 billion in authorized capital together with the $40 billion

allocated to the Silk Road Fund, when coupled with a “well designed financial framework that

can connect countries along the Belt and Road Initiative to jointly raise funds for infrastructure

construction will strengthen the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) ability to successfully offer

bonds and financial instruments necessary to fill an $8 trillion gap in financing needed to develop

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regional sovereigns between 2014 and 2020” (Bank, 2015; Jia, 2015). Once accomplished, the

ADB will contribute in ways that will best serve China’s political, market, resource, monetary,

credit, and debt balancing interests, to include its other goals.

Policy Summary

China’s internal and external growth goals are transforming communism to a uniquely

Chinese form of capitalism, resource acquisition, commerce, and international trade debt

management. It appears this new form of communism [socialism] is bent on exploiting capitalism

to the point that it gains dominance or defeats all global competitors to include “Mother Russia”

(Roger Le Roy Miller, Benjamin, & North, 2010, p. 194).

Hypotheses

The author’s initial research and supporting evidence offers the following hypotheses for

further examination and testing pertaining to China’s policy priorities and the direction the

country will take over the next 10 to 20 years:

• Hypothesis No. 1: The people of China are accepting the CPC’s priorities to move the

country’s policies further to the right of traditional Maoist writs and doctrine.

• Evidence:

o The CPC priorities are focused on increasing the liberalization of its internal and

external reforms that include the country’s education system, financial and

monetary markets, international trade, and commerce. These reforms will bring

the country into better alignment with the West in certain areas of mutual interest.

Additionally, the policy shifts are designed to gain wider appeal and global

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acceptance of China’s political ideologies, and improve the worldview of its

leader’s ethics, authority, and power.

• Hypothesis No. 2: China has begun to experience signs of a slowed economic

expansion however the CPC has placed new priorities on increasing the country’s

future economic growth and ability to build and sustain higher levels of real GDP

income in the future from its FDIs.

• Evidence:

o The CPCs priorities are focused on internal and external reforms that are designed

to increase its FDI programs in order to strengthen and grow its global economy,

influence, dominance over and access to natural and human resources.

o These FDI reforms are focused on strengthening the members of China’s

international monetary, finance, investment banking, and debt management

initiatives (e.g., BRICS, AIIS, NDB, and the ADB) that have been chartered to

build significant and enduring infrastructure in member countries that have

stakeholder interests. Capital financing of these countries is designed and

structured to be in the form investments with direct returns as oppose to being

Western styled budget and debt financing assistance with trade, commerce, and

governance overtones. In time, China’s FDI initiatives will provide substantially

high economic (GDP) growth with a sustained return on its investments that is

realized through trade and commerce with the stakeholders in these initiatives.

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• Hypothesis No. 3: China’s laws are protective of intellectual property rights however

there is little or no priority for enforcement.

• Evidence:

o The CPCs priorities are focused on continuing all aspects of its highly aggressive

and unique form of capitalism which includes an open, transparent marketplace

with few restrictions.

o These priorities include the transformation of China’s education, research, and IP

development systems. Moreover, these reforms are focused on building an

intellectual property capability that will produce the world’s most advanced

technologies, and patents that will represent uniquely Chinese products.

• Hypothesis No. 4: China’s Internet services are sufficiently secure to conduct

confidential corporate transactions however these are prioritized to remain as shared

communications with the government.

• Evidence:

o The CPCs priority is to ensure all corporate enterprise and related digital

transactions remain structured, operated, and monitored. This priority is in

keeping with the government’s viewpoint that the State is an active partner with

full visibility and the ability to authorize, manipulate, or control all electronic

communications and corporate transactions.

o These policies are widely accepted by the people of China and those enterprise

operators that are accustom to the Asian business culture.

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The CPC and the government will continue to closely monitor these policies as priorities

that are setting the direction of the country. If successfully implemented, these policies will

ensure China and its leader’s ethics serve to increase the country’s nationalism, exceptionalism,

authority, and advancement towards gaining global dominance.

The above hypotheses are subject to the added examination, data collection, analysis,

evaluation, and determination of significance as indicators (predictors) of those priorities that are

related to establishing the future direction of China over the next 10 to 20 years.

These hypotheses and underlying assumptions although supported by this author’s initial

research, in-country surveys, SLRs, narratives, and data remain subject to confirmation and

validation by consensus through the application of the Delphi process.

The next section of this chapter explores this study’s central political research question.

The section includes the presentation and analysis of additional data as a collective body of

evidence supportive of increasing the significance of this study’s initial observations and findings

pertinent to the related hypothesis.

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Political Policy

“The core of the Chinese development mode is institutional suitability, which, in the final analysis, is not a certain kind of specific mode, but a method, idea, and philosophical idea,

emphasizing that change is eternal.” Li Ruogu, Chairman,

China Import & Export Bank, 2008, Institutional Suitability and Economic Development, p.430

Research Question No. 1

Are the Chinese people accepting the CPC’s policy changes that are moving the country

to the right of its traditional Maoist writs and doctrine?

Overview

China is continuing to undergo a considerable degree of change and innovation in an

effort to position itself as a new political leader within the global community.

This interest is supported by the country’s general population, its local and regional

provincial officials, and its central government as a goal that is driven by a strong sense of

exceptionalism (EX1), nationalism (NA), and institutional suitability (IS) [Saldana analysis

coding].

These interests are so strong within China that the CPC and the central government are

given great latitudes in timing, the use of resources, and acceptance of continuing restrictive

social-political reforms in order for the governing elite and officials to get it right. So far, the

People of China have been tolerant and appreciative of the degree of complexity that is

confronting its government in light of its new strategies, associated policies, and goals. However,

this author’s initial research indicates this degree of tolerance is rapidly being played out.

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The series of findings pertaining to the political environment are presented in the

following order: empowerment (EM), stability and security (SS), availability and access (AA),

civil rights (CR1), property ownership (PO1), and right of enjoyment (RE1). All have been

identified as significant in the context of the SPELIT matrix framework and analysis methods

selected for this study. Each of the words, phrases, and/or themes has been coded using

Saldana’s Method of relevant data discovery, incident measurement, and determination of

significance related to reoccurrences. As such, this section provides a summary of the outcomes

derived from the author’s SLRs, in-country surveys, accompanying analysis, and assigned coding.

Current Policy

The current CPC political policies represent a shift in Maoist writs and doctrine towards

the support of a form of socialistic capitalism objectives and goals that are uniquely Chinese

(Ruogu, 2008). This shift in political strategies and policies are focused to right of traditional

Maoism.

As a result, the CPCs political ideologies are moving the country from traditional

communism to one that favors a more contemporary or liberal socialistic society. This shift has

been expressed by the adoption of limited rights and reforms. These include encouraging open

social and political forums; and, town meetings as a means for gauging and assessing popular

consensus, as well as many others that are referenced in this section of the study.

As the CPC shifts its political ideologies, the scholars and analysts reviewed in this study’s

SLRs argue the CPC will need to successfully address transitions in the areas that have been

mapped and analyzed by applying Saldana’s word, phrase, and theme codes as indicated:

• Empowerment (EM) : increased public access to government processes and

empowerment;

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• Stability and Security (SS): increased stability and security of the people and the

government through equalized and improved standards;

• Access and Availability (AA): adopt a shared and more fairly balanced access and

availability to social, political, economic, legal, and technological advancements

and benefits;

• Civil-Rights (CR1): increase working class property rights to include fair and

equal distribution of the nation’s wealth, retirement, and health care benefits;

• Property Ownership (PO1): ensure all classes share a more fair and balanced

ownership in the country’s increased standard of living;

• Right of Enjoyment (RE1): ensure all mainland Chinese are sharing fair and

balanced increases in their level of enjoyment of the country’s achievements such

as increased:

o access to higher education (EU1);

o access to better, more skilled, and higher paying jobs (EB1);

o health care and retirement benefits (EB2);

o Environmental responsibility, management, care, and conservation of

natural resources (ER)

Although many of these reforms appear to be connected to the country’s political

strategies and policies, they all influence or drive the CPC’s economic strategies as well. Deng

Xiaoping stated, “the correct attitude” should be that first, “we should let [the people and foreign

investors] make money” and then second, a belief in China’s ideologies and, “patriotism” will

follow. “We should not require them to love the country first, and make money…second.”

(Ruogu, 2008, p. 415). That said, this author’s investigation into Deng’s strategy of allowing the

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people and foreigners to first accumulate wealth and then become accepting of China’s political

ideologies and system are leading to the emergence of numerous disruptive trends specific to

social, political, and economic fairness and equalities.

Currently, the CPCs policies are creating a substantial middle and upper class with

significant degrees of disparity in the level of empowerment, access, availability, rights,

ownership, and enjoyment. Over time these disparities will force a distinction between classes

that will increase the cultural stresses between the lower classes in the west, northwest, and

central rural regions of the country with the urban regions in the north and southern coastal

areas.

Unless the CPC creates a series of reform policies that successfully address and enforce a

rebalancing of these disparities in ways that are perceived to be fairer and more balanced,

stresses between the classes in these diverse regions will continue to grow. Ultimately, these

stresses will cause significant stability issues between the local, regional, and the national

government to include the CPC if they remain unaddressed (Li, Qiang, & Jie, 2008; Luo & Mary,

2010).

As these differences increase and force even greater separation between classes some of

the constructs that are fundamental to the foundation of Marx, Engels, and Lenin that drove

Russia's social revolution and subsequently influenced China will serve to renew the symptomatic

causes of social unrest and conflict that were causational to China’s original adoption of

communistic ideologies and doctrine. Given the emergence of such a condition, the CPC could

be faced with a degree of instability that would force the party and central government to enact

sweeping reforms in order to reverse its course. Such a reversal would no doubt have significant

implications pertaining to the achievement of many of China’s publicized future internal and

external desires, expectations, and goals.

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ASAP OBSERVATION POINT 40:

OBSERVING THE CULTURAL EXPECTATIONS OF A COUNTRY’S PEOPLE: When designing your ASAP be sure to include observations of the cultural expectations of the host country and its people. This deeper inquiry should be conducted into how the country and its people view themselves in the context of their position, power, authority, and dominance within their geographic region and within the global community. Identifying these worldviews will assist you in understanding the influences, characteristics, and drivers of their culture and offer insight and perspective when comparing their culture and ideologies to your own.

The CPCs shifts in strategies and policies as argued by the scholars and analysts reviewed

in this study’s SLRs are validated when compared to the author’s in-country discoveries as

reflected in the data offered by its Chinese respondents. The surveys indicated this group feared a

distinct possibility that once the CPC reaches its goal of overtaking the U.S. GDP (placing China

1st among the global community) the central government may reverse its present economic and

political strategies and policies. If this concern holds true, the policies that are allowing the

country’s classes to accumulate wealth may be reformed in favor of nationalizing these new

assets so as to capture and redirect them towards better serving the needs and interests of the

central government and the CPC.

In summary, China's political and economic policies are coupled and focused towards a

national agenda. Presently, the CPC’s political strategies are aggressive and appear to some

extent to be centered on addressing the risks associated with the stability of the People’s

Communist Party of China as it pushes to expand its external interests through the application of

capitalist and economic mechanisms.

This author would argue that these shifts in political strategy are focused towards

increasing China’s external influences that are beneficial to the country and its people. However,

should these strategies prove to lose public support or the “willing consent” of the people in the

future, the policies could result in placing the stability of the country at “risk” (Smith, 2013, pp.

35, 53-59).

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Pure Strategy

The current political strategies being applied in support of the CPC’s policies are complex

and address a number of environmental factors in an attempt to influence the future direction of

the country over the next few years.

It is important to note that the CPC continually monitors, assesses, and evaluates the

effectiveness of these policies. In fact, the CPC and central government revise and adjust national

policies regularly on a five year basis and often issues writs to reform those that are ineffective or

not suitable.

The present CPC strategy is to find an acceptable balance between its present internal

focus and one that places emphasis on increased external or outwardly aggressive expansion.

This change in strategy is being expressed in terms of the development of strategies and policies

that support the country’s increasing external objectives, needs, and goals that must be achieved

in order for China to continue its internal development and expansion (at least for now).

This author argues it is critical for China to strike a successful balance between these

internal and external strategies and supporting policies in order for it to continue to meet or

exceed its growth needs, goals, and desires.

Does this mean the global community may be facing the emergence of another

colonial hegemony? Evidence collected to date does not support this assumption. Over its

extensive history, China has never demonstrated a continuing outward expression of imperialism

or the desire to create a global colonial empire. It has, however, been deeply involved from time

to time in global inquiries and experiential learning as a way of seeking self-improvement and

advancement. To this extent at one time in China’s history it maintained the world’s largest

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maritime fleet. However, after a short period of discovery and service to the country this fleet

was retired.


LEARNING THROUGH GLOBAL TRAVELS AND CULTURAL EXPERIENCES: Throughout history many cultures have journeyed to distance lands to study the cultures, characteristics, and the unique advantages enjoyed by others. Often these journeys were tasked by the sovereign to seek treasures, commodities, minerals, or inventions that would add value and wealth to its government. In the case of China, this approach has been used frequently throughout its history as a means of assessing and comparing its wealth, values, knowledge, and dominance against other sovereigns. Often these experiential learning journeys have served to introduce disruptive change and innovation into China’s culture, expectations, and goals to include reshaping the suitability of its governance.

One component of the CPC’s pure strategy-sets is to pursue a significant degree of change

and innovation in an effort to position the country as a new political leader within the global

community. As such, its political policies are coupled to a strategy of expanding the country’s

political strengths to the point that it achieves global dominance through economic means as

measured by GDP and as recognized by international institutes and organizations that monitor

and evaluate index performance.

Another of the CPC’s pure strategy-set components is to address and effectively reduce

social and political stresses due to the rapid degree of innovation, change, and restructuring of

China’s local, provincial, and central governments. This strategy is aimed at reducing regional

tensions between the lower and middle classes so as to better align them with the goals and needs

of the upper (ruling-elite) class. This realignment strategy is ultimately intended to reinforce the

stability of the CPC and the central government. Conditions of unfair and unequal distribution of

social and political liberties and influence between classes have in China’s past history created

significant unrest and revolution that have led to highly disruptive change and innovation.

China’s history of rebellions over social and political injustice is similar to those that have taken

place in Russia. (See Russia’s Red Rebellion.) Moreover, it could be argued that the CPC and the

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central government have excellent memory retention pertaining to the implications of dealing with

highly-disruptive social activism.

Last, this study focuses on an argument that China’s pure political strategies and policies

have greater significance and increased utility when they are best align and applicable to the

greater global community. This pure strategy applies a construct wherein any country that

believes its thinking and institutions are the best and do not need change will inevitably lead to

becoming rigid if not backward. Accordingly, China’s leaders believe that over time any country

that embraces these characteristics will ultimately experience social, political, economic and

leadership failures if not the collapse of their entire system of governance (Ruogu, 2008, pp. 430-

431).

In short, the CPC embraces a pure mixed-strategy that is continually subject to change

and innovation in order for its political objectives and goals to be achieved.

This study’s initial SLRs and in-country survey data provide findings and observations are

supportive of positive outcomes related to many of China’s political strategies and policies. These

can be summarized as mixed-strategy priorities that significantly characterize and influence the

development of policies that are shaping the course of desired events and outcomes that are

driving the direction of the country towards achieving its objectives and goals in ways that are

uniquely Chinese. These pure strategies include China strengthening its long term prospects for

success by adapting to regional diversities and by spreading its risks over an ever-increasing

network of global partners or stakeholders that hold similar ideological, economic, development,

trade and commerce interests (worldviews) that are supported by dominant strategies and inter-

dependency.

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Other scholars and analysts examined in this study’s SLRs argue that by China continuing

the present high-rate of growth, it is rushing towards a negative outcome or a “point of eventual

collapse by design” due to increased complexity and scale (West, 2011).

Mixed-Strategy Priorities

China’s present pure mixed-strategy priorities are highly complex and integral to the

achievement of a myriad of national needs and desires. However, this author has placed limits on

this research by identifying a short list of the country’s pure strategy components that have been

identified in the initial research as relevant. These limitations assist in reducing and simplifying

those components of each mixed-strategy that are associated with each area of interest or

environmental factor that infers significance (Turoff & Linstone, 2002). As such, the study

explores only those mixed-strategies and components that meet this study’s relevancy criteria.

These mixed-strategy components were used to measure and assess the validity of each of the

associated hypothesis. Each of the pure mixed-strategy components that have been determined to

be significant from the SLRs and in-country data analysis supports the following CPC policies

that include:

• Monitoring internal and external environments so as to adopt a slow and calculated pace

of reforms that are suitable to the Chinese people in order to maintain the stability,

security, authority, and power of the CPC and the central government.

• Strengthening China’s nationalism, exceptionalism, and suitable institutional ideologies.

• Increasing China’s long-term internal and external interests so as to achieve a dominant

role within the global community.

• Strengthen its political and social power, authority, and influence so as to achieve the

country’s national goals and leadership dominance within the global community.

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• Building the country’s image and sense of value, ethics, trust, control, and authority with

it stakeholders, partners, and the broader international community.

• Utilize China’s new image and authority to gain international acceptance and approval of

its ideologies so as to induce its stakeholders and partners to act on its behalf.

• Utilize the power of China’s ideologies, image, and value as a global stakeholder with

undeveloped, developing, and developed countries through large-scale infrastructure

programs, beneficial trade, and commerce partnering as a significant force for disruptive

innovation and change as an alternative to Western hegemony.

Issue(s)

China’ path of aggressive expansion has and is continuing to raise the attention and

concerns of many of the developed sovereigns in the global community. These concerns

primarily range in the area of China’s developing interests in: (1) expanding its ideological

alliances and partnerships; (b) the equitable treatment of its people, civil-rights, liberties,

empowerment, and standard of living; (c) the stability of the people and government due to rapid

reforms, policy changes, and innovations; and, (d) the political liberalization of a uniquely

Chinese form of aggressive market capitalism. These are better defined in the following:

1. Expanding ideological alliances and partnerships: China is facing new challenges in its

role as a global leader considering the ever-increasing strength of its international partners as it

succeeds in realigning traditional allies of the West with its ideological strategies and policies in

the areas of political, economic, development, trade, and commerce.

2. Equitable treatment of the people: Mainland Chinese view their life circumstances as

improving under these new policies. This may become an issue as China’s internal and external

successes inspire its people to increase their proportional share in the liberties and social

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empowerment that are commonly coupled with improved living standards. The challenge of these

new policies that are considerably to the right of Mao’s original doctrine will be to control the

redistribution of wealth and empowerment between the classes while maintaining political and

social stability.

3. Stability of the people and government: Continuing reforms or modifications to the

present political policies will need to be developed by the CPC in order to accomplish its goals.

These changes represent additional challenges to the country’s political stability. As such, the

continuing reforms will require careful monitoring during the development of policy,

implementation, enforcement, and measurement of the reforms. Once accomplished, the CPC

will need to ensure effective reevaluations and readjustments to these policies. To successfully

accomplish this, the CPC will need to exercise extreme caution in adopting the appropriate

reforms so as to ensure they are properly synchronized, measured, continuously re-evaluated,

adjusted, and properly paced in order to maintain public suitability, acceptance, and stability.

4. Political liberalization: The present CPC strategies and policies support a form of

decentralized communism (socialism) that exploits market capitalism to the point that it defeats or

gains dominance over its global competitors to include “Mother Russia”. This study’s SLR

scholars and analysts argue that over time this style of liberalized aggressive capitalism will

increase stress among many developed countries. In fact, stresses between China and Russia in

the past have now shifted to impose new challenges that are centered on the West. Presently

China and Russia find if mutually beneficial to hold a common course of interests that are unique

from those held by the Western Bloc.

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Overall, China's political strategies and policies as established by the CPC are aggressive

and set to a timeline that appears to be risking the stability of the government as it presses to

expand its form of market capitalism. This includes opening the country to increased foreign

cultural influences and the integration of their positive characteristics into China’s culture in

unique ways that will either strengthen the country and increase the empowerment of the CPC

through a series of planned reforms so as to ensure China’s desire for exceptionalism and long

term goals are achieved; or, these influences will serve to drive ever-increasing challenges and

disruptive stresses internal to China and external to the country with its developed partners.

High-Value Objective(s) (HVOs)

These issues would appear to shape pure a mixed-strategy set that is focused on

developing policy reforms that emphasize slowing China’s political expansionism in favor of

increasing its international leadership and diplomacy in ways that are less aggressive. Given

these considerations, this study identifies HVOs that provide for increased alignments with the

Western Bloc and Eastern European that will increase mutually dominant dependencies by

applying mixed-strategies that are supportive of embracing established standards, mechanisms of

diplomacy, and the mutual global interests of each.

In addition, the suggested HVOs for China support increasing its level of ethics, trust, and

confidence to include validating its true intensions and commitments to contribute positively to

the Asian region and the broader global community.

Analyses were conducted of this study’s SLRs and HISS data to determine the

significance and or relevance of the HVOs and related VARs. It was determined that “on a high

level, the corpus is focused on China and country-level policy strategies for shifts and changes in

its development along political, economic, social, cultural, legal, technology, and environmental

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verticals.” Further, goals and priorities for China's government were analyzed “across lines of

potential reforms and their implications on the global community, as well as other internal and

external factors. Transformational trends are also analyzed, as well as their bearings on

innovation, ideologies, and resources” (Dimkpa, 2025). Impact on the study’s research and the

suggested approach to experiential learning for international students was also explored and

examined.

Figure 8: Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes (Saldana applied)

Note: Each of the HVOs mapped in the figure above have been assigned estimated utility (EU) or payoff values (EUPs) based on the constructs Nash’s Equilibrium Theory of gaming. The EUPs assigned to each to the pure strategy components represents the highest and best payoff for each player group. The game is designed to assist the level of significance in a determination of finding given the significant data and relevance discovered from conducting Saldana Method of pattern analysis.

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HVO Significance and Determination of Findings

1. A classification performance score of 67 percent was determined from the

analysis. This indicates the DMS experiments and testing validated the code and theme

classifications used by this author to define each HVO. “This proves, beyond reasonable doubt,

that the approach of the author in selecting the said classification is both scientific and

appropriate” (Dimkpa, 2025).

2. A higher score would have indicated a higher degree of binding between the

research focus (research ideas) and the selected classification codes and themes; however, the

calculated score suggests a strong binding exists between the research focus, variance inquiries,

and the codes and themes identified.

After identifying the significance of the words, phrases, and themes discovered by

applying Saldana’s Method of analysis to this study’s SLRs, in-country surveys, narratives, and

data this author argues the following HVOs are sufficiently relevant for additional examination by

applying Nash’s Equilibrium or Gaming Theory:

1. Global Profile (HVO1): Improve trust, ethics, and the integration of diverse

worldviews. Lower global concerns and reactions over implications related to China’s

interests. To accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be

assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {3, 0, -3, -3, 4, -1}

and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻1 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {3, 1, 3, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or

estimated utility and -3 equaling the lowest for each player group related to the pure

strategy. See Table 9, Mixed-Stategy Outcome Probabilities: Political, p. 202 (Castro,

2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).

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2. Nationalism (HVO2): Increase nationalism and goals that are internally suitable. To

accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned

within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {0, 0, -1, 0, 2, 0} and

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {1, 1, 2, 1, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or



2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).

3. Dominance (HVO3): Increase political leadership, power, authority, and global

dominance. To accomplish this an estimated utility or player outcome value must be

assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻3 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {-3, -1, -2, -5, -4,

-3} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻3 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {3, 2, 2, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or



2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).

4. Alliances (HVO4): Create political stakeholder alignments supportive of China’s

expansion strategies, agreements, and sovereign partnerships. This includes creating

alliances with countries that are closely associated with the Western Bloc and Western

Europe. [The West views China’s political expansionism as intrusive on these

relationships and disruptive to the policies they have in place.] To accomplish this an

estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned within a given range

(RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻4 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {-3, 0, -5, -3, -3, -3} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻4 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅

= {5, 1, 5, 5, 4, 4} with 5 equaling the highest payoff or estimated utility and -5 equaling

the lowest for each player group related to the pure strategy. See Table 9, Mixed-

Stategy Outcome Probabilities: Political, p. 202 (Castro, 2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015). 199


5. Transformation (HVO5): Transform political and economic focus from manufacturing

to one of creating intellectual property, patents, and advanced technology production.

To accomplish this an estimated utility or best player outcome value must be assigned

within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻5 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {4, 2, -4, -3, -2, -2} and

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻5 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or



2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).

6. Exceptionalism (HVO6): Transition educational systems to increase access and focus on

science, research, and the development of advanced discoveries, exceptionalism, and

production. To accomplish this an estimated utility or player outcome value must be

assigned within a given range (RNG) where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻6 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {-1, 0, -3, -3, -2,

4} and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2 ∪ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻6 ∪ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = {4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4} with 4 equaling the highest payoff or



2015; Chao, 1969; Huff, 2015).

Classification Performance Score Significance

The HVO analysis, testing, and associated significance determination and findings

indicated a Classification Performance Score (CPS) of (4/6) x 100 = 67 percent (See Appendix

R).

1. The classification performance score of 67 percent (B+) signifies that the experiment

validated the classification used by the author in the definition of the HVOs. This proves, beyond

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reasonable doubt, that the approach of the author in selecting the said classification is both

scientific and appropriate (Dimkpa, 2025).

2. A higher score would have indicated a higher degree of binding between the research

focus (research ideas) and the selected classifications; however the logical score calculated

suggests strong binding between the research focus and selected classifications (Dimkpa, 2025).

The value ranges of the HVOs allow the EUPs to be assigned proportionally so as to

represent the best outcome of each opposing player. In this case: Player Group One, or the

Western Bloc and Eastern Europe sovereigns; and, Player Group Two, or the Asian Bloc, Middle

and Far East, Africa, Latin America, and the Western European sovereigns.

Given this, a third player group was additionally identified. Player Group Three or other

sovereigns that impose influence on political strategy and policy play. This group consists of

developing and undeveloped sovereigns that are essentially non-committed to any long-term

alliances or agreements with either the East or the West. This group of fence setters is relatively

powerless. Due to this group’s small size and relative influence or dominance as related to their

potential impact on Player Group One and/or Player Group Two; Player Group Three was

marginalized as related to the detailed game play analysis that follows (See Figure 9: Mixed-

Strategy Multidimensional Interpretative, paragraph B. Adaptive Notes (1-4)).

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Mixed-Strategies, Game Play, and Estimated Utility Outcomes (Nash applied)

Table 9: Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities: Political

Factors, Findings, and Implications

Source: Mitroff, 1975; Nash, J., 1928; Spaniel, W., 2015; Turoff, M., 2002. Adaptation and original data: Huff, P.D., 2015; MS PPT, Graphics chaps-1-5 rev 150829-01. Determining Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcomes:

Solving for: 1. Any tuple represents a pure strategy that can be selected and expressed as (x,y),(x*,y), (x*,y*), or (x,y*)

which represents an ordered set of structured data consisting of comma-separated values that constitute a given mixed-strategy that can in turn be utilized in a program or mathematical expression and computed in an operating system that assists in conducting outcome analysis.

2. The outcome probabilities for any two tuples or mixed-strategies may be different. 3. Total number of tuples generated from this study’s initial data = 36 4. Total number of players considered = 3 5. Total number of players assessed that infer significance to game outcome = 2 6. Number of game players represented in the matrix analysis = 2 7. (X*) or (Y*) indicates the best response (BR) and estimated highest utility or payoff among those outcomes that are

align in the vertical axis of each category or HVOn for either Player Group 1 (X) or Player Group 2 (Y).

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Testing Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities:

Test for two tuple outcomes representing any randomly selected pure mixed-strategy. Given PG2 and Pjpn or estimated highest or best payoffs:

EUHVO1,1

= EUHVO3,1

EU

HVO1,1 (3)

= 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,2 (1) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,3 (3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,4 (5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,5 (4)

+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,6 (4)EU

HVO3,1 (3)

= 𝜎𝜎HVO3,2

(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,3 (2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,4 (5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVOE

3,5 (4) + (1 – 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,6 (4)

P2pn = Player Group 2 probability for tuple {HVO1, HVO1} EU: 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,1 (3)

+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,2 )(1) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,3 )(3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,4 )(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,5 )(4)

+ (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO1,6 )(4)

= 𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1

(3) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎HVO3,2

)(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,3 )(2) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,4 )(5) + (1 - 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,5 )(4) + (1 – 𝜎𝜎

HVO3,6 )(4)3𝜎𝜎

HVO1,1 + 1 - 1𝜎𝜎

HVO1,2

+ 3 - 3𝜎𝜎HVO1,3

+ 5 - 5𝜎𝜎HVO1,4

+ 4 - 4𝜎𝜎HVO1,5

+ 4 - 4𝜎𝜎HVO1,6

= 3𝜎𝜎

HVO3,1 + 2 - 2𝜎𝜎

HVO3,2 + 2 - 2𝜎𝜎

HVO3,3 + 5 - 5𝜎𝜎

HVO3,4 + 4 - 4𝜎𝜎

HVO3,5 + 4 – 4𝜎𝜎

HVO3,6 20𝜎𝜎

HVO1,1 + 17

= 20𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1

+ 17𝜎𝜎 HVO1,1

= 𝜎𝜎 HVO3,1

= 1/1 ∴ The probability of tuple HVO

1,1 occurring is equal to tuple HVO

3,1

Pure Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probability Finding:

Resultant Outcome: • If Player Group 2 engages in a Global Profile strategy move, there is a 1/1 probability that Player Group 2 will also

engage in a Dominance strategy move; with the additional observation that the dominant (HVO3,1) move will be highly resisted by Player Group 1 representing a mixed-strategy dependency.

Theory Adaptation, Definitions, and Guidance:

A. Table 9, IESDS Codes: 1. Green Outlined Tuples: Identifies the most sensible maximum payoff (Ppn ) strategies for each player. A total of

four have been identified in the analysis table. 2. Blue Outlined Tuples: Identifies dominant strategy moves that are the most favorable for each player but are not

necessarily the most efficient. The objective of these moves is to achieve the highest estimated utility or player payoff ( Pipn, Pjpn, or Pkpn ) as noted in Nash’s theory. For example: HVO3 and HVO4 are weakly dominated strategies for player 1, so we can remove them from the analysis.

3. Special Note: Blue outlined tuples should be removed immediately from further play consideration and analysis. In these cases Player Y’s optimal strategy infers dependency on player X’s choice (e.g., both groups best response (BR)). This results in the denial or blocking of the opposing player’s ability to achieve their desired strategic goals. No basis of finding in this study’s initial data validates the assumptions that the dominant strategy tuples represent the BR or EUP as shown in the table, or that these are strictly dominated strategy moves for each of the player groups (See M.1.-4.). However, such evidence may be discovered upon further investigation.

4. (*) Asterisks indicate Player Group’s BRs within each tuple in a given category: These are indicated in each pair of HVO tuples or pure strategies for each Player Group within a vertical HVO category, e.g. for Player Group 2 (PG2) BRs = {HVO1 = 5*, HVO2 = 4*, HVO3 = 5*, HVO4 = 5*, HVO5 = 4*, and HVO6 = 4*}

5. BR: Best responses are color coded to Player Group1 (PG1) or Player Group 2 (PG2). 6. MBR: Indicates mutual best response for both Player Groups as associated with a given mixed-strategy (See J.1.-6.),

e.g. where PG1 and PG2 MBRs = {HVO1,5 = 4*, 4*; and HVO6,6 = 4*,4*}. 7. ZSG: Indicates zero sum game plays (See P.1.-2.). 8. NE: Indicates conditions that meet the criteria for Nash’s Equilibrium (See I.1.-2.).

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Figure 9: Mixed-Strategy Multidimensional Interpretative: (Plotted Outcomes)

Tuples: (HVO1 ,HVO5) = Global, Transformation (HVO5 ,HVO1) = Transformation, Global (HVO6 ,HVO6) = Exceptionalism, Exceptionalism

n Tuples = 7 Nonresistive Neutral strategies + 4 Low resistive strategies + 4 Moderately resistive strategies + 18 Highly resistive strategies = 36

Source: Mitroff, 1975; Nash, J., 1928; Spaniel, W., 2015; Turoff, M., 2002. Adaption and original data by: Huff, P.D., 2015;MS PPT, Graphics chaps-1-5 rev 150829-01. Also see Carrol, Douglas J., and Wish, Myron, Multidimensional Scaling: Models, Methods, and Relations to Delphi, or (MDS) as a technique to deal with problems of measuring and predicting human judgment (Carrol, 1979). Given: 1. Pi,jpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11) 2. P1p0 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p0 = 1 Tuple = 1/1 3. P2p0 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p0 = 0 Tuples = 0/1 4. P1p0 + P2p0 = 1 Tuple outcomes Given: 1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11) 2. P1p1 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p1 = 1 Tuple = 1/3 3. P2p1 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p1 = 2 Tuples = 2/3 4. P1p1 + P2p1 = 3 Tuple outcomes Given: 1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Dominant-High Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11) 2. P1p2 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p1 = 1 Tuple = 4/10 3. P2p2 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p1 = 6 Tuples = 6/10 4. P1p2 + P2p2 = 10 Tuple outcomes Given: 1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Dominant-High Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11) 2. P1p3 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p1 = 1 Tuple = 0/8 3. P2p3 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p1 = 2 Tuples = 8/8 4. P1p3 + P2p3 = 8 Tuple outcomes Given: 1. Pi,kpn = Total BR Outcomes; or total Nondominant-Medium Quadrant outcomes; (See notes: C.9-11) 2. P1p4 = (x*,y) Tuplesn = P1p1 = 0 Tuple = 0/3 3. P2p4 = (x,y*) Tuplesn = P2p1 = 3 Tuples = 3/3 4. P1p4 + P2p4 = 3 Tuple outcomes

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B. Adaptation Notes: 1. The proposed high-value objectives (HVOs) are examined for significance by applying a modified form of Nash

Equilibrium Theory as a test of each pure strategy. 2. Player Group One = Partners in the Western Bloc; Eastern European; North, Central, and Latin (South) America. 3. Player Group Two = Partners in the Asian Bloc, Middle & Far East, Western European, South Africa, and Latin

America. 4. Player Group Three = International sovereigns without standing partner or stakeholder commitments to either

Player Group One or Player Group Two. As such, PG3 represents (sovereigns) that have split alliances between PG1 and PG2 with little or low collective global impact due to the scale of their economy, geographic location, or natural resources. (After assessment and evaluation PG3 was omitted from play.)

C. Player Groups and Other Coding: 1. Player Group One = PG1 2. Player Group Two = PG2 3. Player Group Three = PG3 4. PG1 = X strategies (Coded Blue) 5. PG2 = Y strategies (Coded Red) 6. IESDS = Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies. 7. EU = Estimated utility of a player’s given strategic move. 8. EUP = Estimated utility of a player’s best response (BR) payoff value. 9. Pi = PG1, so that PG1’s maximum payoff = Pip (Nash, 1928) 10. Pj = PG2, so that PG2’s maximum payoff = Pjp (Nash, 1928) 11. Pk = PG3, so that PG3’s maximum payoff = Pkp (Nash, 1928)

D. Estimated Utility (EU) or Player Estimated Utility Payoff (EUP) or Pnp Value Relationships: (Values associated with each player group’s strategy move; See Table for Minimax move ranges to include paragraph E below.) 1. EU Max. (positive) move = 5 2. EU Indifferent (neutral) move or a pass = 0 3. EU Mini. (negative) blocks the opposing player’s move, neutralizing or defeating the opposing player’s desired

outcome = -5 E. Strategy Coding and Estimated Utility (EU) or Estimated Utility Payoff (EUP) Minimax ranges within the sample space:

1. HVO1 = Global Profile = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3} = Sample space, or range (RNG) possible outcomes. 2. HVO2 = Nationalism = {4, 3, 2, 1 ,0, -1} 3. HVO3 = Dominance = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5} 4. HVO4 = Alliances = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4, -5} 5. HVO5 = Transformation = {4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, -4} 6. HVO6 = Exceptionalism = {4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3}

F. Extensive Advanced Strategic Form Game (EASFG): Theory and rules as defined that limited this study and the examination of strategically interdependent organizational behavior: 1. Strategic Interdependence: what one player does effects the outcome of the other player(s). 2. Player Outcomes: The game is not just about winning and losing (although it could be). 3. Finite Players: The game is considered to have a finite number of players that have been identified as Player

Groups. In this case the game involves three such player groups that have been identified as PG1, PG2, and PG3. However, PG3 is not included in the game for the reasons listed in B.4. PG3s strategic moves do not significantly affect any probable outcomes related to those made by PG1 or PG2.

4. Finite Strategy Sets: The number of proposed pure strategy-sets is considered finite. 5. Finite Games: Finite games always have at least one equilibrium point (EP). 6. Mixed-Strategy: A mixed-strategy is a probability distribution over two or more pure strategies. This game is a

mixed-strategy game with what are considered to be a finite set of strategies coded as high-value objectives (HVOs). There are six HVOs defined in the game for analysis and testing.

7. Design: The game design provides a methodology to identify significant factors, influencers, drivers and potential implications or outcomes that are associated with each player group’s strategy moves and supporting policies.

8. Functionality: The game assists in identifying the logic and strategy of interdependent or situational dependencies that are extremely complicated and at times require fast decision making. Given the nature of the influencers and drivers of international strategies and supporting policies, the game can be applied to assist sovereign actors in determining pure strategy sets that best achieve the highest estimated utility, payoffs, and desired outcomes.

9. Measurement and Analysis: By global sovereigns applying Nash’s theory they have an opportunity to assign accounting tools to measure, track, assess, and analyze potential global strategies for the purpose of determining an estimated level of significance or utility related to each move and its potential implications.

10. Interactive Behavior: The applied theory offers policy makers and researchers the ability to draw parallels from one situation to another within the domain of the interactive behaviors associated with the assumed HVOs (In this case the HVOs associated between PG1 and PG2 as represented in the table).

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11. Pure strategy: Under Nash’s Equilibrium (Game Theory) this condition is met when the players do not randomize between two or more strategy moves. In short, the strategy move of one player is dependent on the move of the other. This design and assumption is critical to setting the game. In the case of this study the assumptions, EUPs, and analysis are predicated on this study’s SLRs, narratives, and in-country surveys. All HVO category strategies are essentially influenced if not driven by what the opposing player does.

12. Non-pure strategies (NPS): These conditions are indicated in the table where a stated value is equal to zero (NPS = 0). The table identifies seven instances of occurrence where this condition is met, e.g. tuples {HVO1,HVO2; HVO2, HVO1}.

13. Limitations: The applied theory, rules, and game limitations are covered in the following paragraphs: H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q.

G. Purpose: 1. Determine the most probable strategies with the highest payoffs associated with each player’s moves. In this case

the focus is on PG2 or China as related to identifying the most probable priorities and direction the country will take in the future.

2. Assess the probabilities associated with the pure and mixed-strategies applied by players and related outcomes. 3. Determine a finding by analyzing potential outcomes from a unique perspective as represented by antagonistic

(negative), indifferent (neutral), or protagonistic (positive) interests which affect an opposing player group or in this case Player Group (PG1) or the Western Bloc; and, Player Group (PG2) or China’s ability to maximize its EUP by acting out strategy sets or moves that can minimize/maximize China’s desired outcomes.

4. Analyze a finite number of competitive influencers that may affect player outcomes (See table). The analysis is designed to identify, assess, and evaluate the desired outcomes of the two controlling players in the game, and to additionally assess the effect of outside third party (player) interests. These interests can represent critical influencers to each player’s strategies, leading priorities, and the direction each player will take.

5. The game is integrated into this study’s assessment of the HVOs as related to determining the direction China will take as it is influenced by its government, people; and, by outsider interests in the global community (See figure below). By applying Nash’s Theory, this study undertakes an examination of what effect these forces will have in determining China’s future priorities and its direction over the next ten years.

Figure 10: Nash’s Equilibrium Theory (A Three-Player Game)

Source: Nash, J.F., 1928, A Comparsion of Treatments of A Duoploy Situation, p. 141-153; adapted by Huff, P.D., 2015 as associated with this study’s analysis of a noncooperative two player game situationally conditional to Nash’s best-reply analysis under Von Neumann’s minimax theorem. “As a minimum requirement for a pair of strategies to be a candidate for the solution of a two-person (player) game, Von Neumann required that each player’s strategy [move must] represent the best reply to the other. Such a pair of strategies…called a Nash Equilibria, is basic to noncooperative game theory” (Nash, 1928, p. x-xi). Nash describes aspects of the above three player model in his Simple Three-Person Poker Game constructs as applied under the conditions of a non-cooperative game that utilizies a set of strategy choices that are pure and/or mixed (Nash, 1928, p. 105-295)

Indifferent Influencers (Experts/Scholars/Analysts)

II

NI Positive Influencers (Controllers/

Leaders)

Negative Influencers

(Users/ Consumers)

PI

Stability & Analysis: The game must include the following player/group interests/desires as potential EUPs or outcomes: PI = Positive influencers NI = Negative influencers II = Indifferent influencers

Protagonist Player Group

(PG1)

Antagonist Player Group

(PG2)

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H. Rules, limits, and assumptions: 1. Non-Cooperative Gaming: Player Groups take turns moving as in war, invasion plans, and other competitive

games where the other player group views the moves as potentially threatening or non-cooperative. 2. Cooperative Commitments: The game assumes player group moves are consistent with their member’s strategies or

desires and supported by alliances, commitments, and agreements. 3. Comparative Statics: The game is not designed to identify comparative statics or comparative outcomes before and

after a change in some exogenous parameter or a pure-strategy that has origins outside of the modelled limits. 4. Player Characteristics and Organizational Behavior: The analysis assumes both player groups are very smart,

strategy savvy, and not subject to emotional influences or related errors. 5. Independence: Each player group can accomplish their desired outcomes without the help of the other player group. 6. Symmetry: The game’s decisional matrix constructs HVO tuples or strategy sets that are not symmetrical. The

payoffs for Player Two (PG2) do not represent a mirror image of Player One’s (PG1s) payoffs. 7. Finite Strategies: The strategies listed are considered finite in number. They have all been determined as

significant from this study’s SLRs, narratives (scholars and analysts); and, in-country surveys as the most probable HVOs.

8. Finite Players: The game identifies a total of three player groups that are coded: PG1 or Pi , PG2 or Pj , and PG3 or Pk as adapted from Nash’s Non-cooperative Three Player Games (Nash, 1928, p. 286-297).

9. Player Group Three (PG3): This group’s strategy moves are included in game play consideration. However, after analysis, the group’s payoff values are too small to impose significance in the game’s outcome.

10. Other rules, limits, and assumptions: These are continued as outlined in the following paragraphs: I-Q I. Nash Equilibrium (NE) modifications, limits, assumptions, and Equilibrium Point (EP):

1. Nash’s Equilibrium (NE): No player has any incentive to change their strategy move in the absence another law. In short, the move must be completely logical under the circumstances and in accordance with the stated player’s characteristics (See H. 4.).

2. Inherent Stability: All strategies are assumed to be inherently stable given the following conditions: what one player does is optimal given what the other is doing is optimal as well; in short, neither player has any regrets regarding their strategy move.

3. Equilibrium Point (EP): An equilibrium point is defined when each player’s mixed-strategy maximizes his payoff given the strategies of the other player(s) are held firm and not changed. “Thus each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the others” (Nash, 1928, p. 287).

J. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE): 1. There must be at least one Nash Equilibrium for all finite games (See F. 5.). 2. Pure versus Mixed-Strategy: There are no equilibria within a pure strategy; however, this is not the case with a

mixed-strategy. 3. Game Play: At least one equilibrium must exist in a mixed-strategy game. 4. Strategy Conditions: A mixed-strategy represents a probability distribution when it involves two or more pure

strategies. 5. Game Play Example: An example of a mixed-strategy and implication analysis is represented by comparing the

tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5}. In this comparison the player or observer is able to identify the significance of the EUPs associated with PG2s (China’s) moves as it potentially impacts PG1 (the Western Bloc’s) efforts to minimize PG2s (China’s) attempt to maximally achieve alliances to gain dominance in parallel with other moves China is making to maximize transformation to gain dominance. As indicated in the table both moves by PG2 (China) may appear to be a zero-sum game. That said, the end-state of the game is viewed by all players as inherently a non-zero sum game. There are four HVOs with ZSGs as defined in the game’s outcomes (See table).

6. Players may choose randomly among pure strategy options that are in equilibrium. An example of this condition is again represented in the tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5} which indicates each is the mutual best response (MBR) for both PG1 and PG2.

7. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium: This condition is met when each player’s strategy set(s) or move(s) represent the mutual best responses for each.

K. Operation of Game Concept: 1. Inherent Stability: Assumes each group’s membership will align with and commit to supporting the group’s

strategy decisions as each member will benefit better if their individual actions conform to their group. 2. Under these conditions, player group moves may not represent the best utility or profit outcomes for themselves or

the other player group. For example, one player group may choose to move to proceed with an action or directional achievement that in turn would require the opposing player group to choose to discontinue or stop its action or directional achievements related to the same HVO so as not to cancel-out or block the move. Nash notes that under some conditions blocking moves need to operate logically even when the moves do not maximally benefit them. Absent this logic, the actions or moves of each player in the same direction to achieve a commonly desired outcome results in a disruptive collision or negative EUP for both. Such illogical moves make the game inherently unstable. The tuples {HVO3, HVO4: HVO3, HVO5} may be viewed as examples of inherent instability.

L. Member Deviations Within Player Groups: 1. Individual member deviations within the two player groups have been considered. As such, each of the player

group’s members are assumed to be stable and committed to their respective group’s pure and mixed-strategies.

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2. Only deviations or random illogical acts between PG1 and PG2 are considered significant in the game. M. Best Response (BR): Nash Equilibria is determined by identifying player best responses (*)

1. This assumes each player is competing against the other in a non-cooperative game (See H. 1.). 2. The game can only have equilibrium if all players are applying strategies that are “best responses” to achieve their

desired goals. 3. This condition is met when a strategy move is a best response if and only if a player cannot gain more utility from

switching to a different strategy or move. 4. Game play meets the conditions of Nash Equilibrium if and only if all players are playing best responses to what

the other players are doing. 5. Best responses are defined as those that yield the greatest utility or payoff to a player.

N. Mutual Best Responses (MBR): 1. Mutual best responses for each of the players are indicated by any box that contains an (X*, Y*) asterisk beside

each X and Y estimated utility or value within a given strategy set. (See tuples {HVO1, HVO5}; and, {HVO6, HVO6}).

2. These are coded (MBR) where they occur in the Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities: Political Factors, Findings, and Implications table.

O. Pure Strategy (PS): 1. Pure strategies exist anytime the Nash Equilibrium exists. 2. The game, in this case, assumes non-randomized pure strategy moves.

P. Dominant Strategy (DS): 1. Strict dominance: This condition is met when the best outcome is associated with each of the player’s moves.

However, strict dominance is eliminated from the final analysis due to Nash’s rational player construct. This elimination is also due to the assumption that the players will communicate their strategies to each other prior to making their move.

2. This assumption includes the dynamic that each player group’s membership will commit and comply with the strategy set selected by the leading members of the group.

3. Under these conditions each player group will inform the opposing group what strategy moves are about to occur next.

Q. Zero-Sum Game (ZSG): 1. A player’s strategy or move cancels out the opposing player’s move. 2. This condition is met when one player’s strategy or move(s) defeat(s) the opposing player’s strategy move(s). 3. Under this condition if all strategy actions or moves result in zero sum gains, the sum of winning versus loosing

actions or moves of both player groups as could be related to all HVO outcomes could be zero which would characterize a zero-sum game. This study’s gaming of the represented HVOs assumes PG2 or the Chinese do not view their pure strategy moves as components of “a zero-sum game in the manner of the Cold War” (Jacques M. , 2009).

R. Mixed-Strategy Algorithm(s): 1. Allows the determination of an Estimated Utility (EU) or payoff. 2. An EU can be determined for a specified player group mixed-strategy move in the game. 3. In this case an EU can be determined for the tuple [HVO1, HVO1}. 4. Example: As applied to this game EU

HVO1,1 = f (𝜎𝜎HVO1,1 ) or sigma function of HVO1,1 will allow an observer to

assess the probability that PG2 will play a given strategy-set related to the associated tuple {HVO1, HVO1} which in turn when compared with another move or tuple an estimated utility or payoff can be calculated. The objective in the game is to win by playing the strategy-sets or tuples that will yield the maximum player payout or Ppn . Therefore, EU

HVO1,1 = f (𝜎𝜎HVO1,1 ) represents a component that is necessary to calculate the maximum/minimum

payoff probability for a given mixed-strategy move of a player group. 5. Given:

The following basic algorithms represent 36 HVO tuple outcomes that can be applied towards determining a probability for a particular strategy-set or pair of tuple (HVO) moves given the matrix generated from the study’s initial data illustrated in the prior table. Basic strategy-set algorithms for select HVO tuples:

(1) EUHVO1,1 = EUHVO1,2 + EUHVO1,3 + EUHVO1,4 + EUHVO1,5 + (1 - EUHVO1,6)(1) (2) EUHVO1,2 = EUHVO1,1 + EUHVO1,3 + EUHVO1,4 + EUHVO1,5 + (1 - EUHVO1,6 )(1) (3) EUHVO1,3 = EUHVO1,1 + EUHVO1,2 + EUHVO1,4 + EUHVO1,5 + (1 - EUHVO1,6 )(1) (4) EUHVO1,4 = EUHVO1,1 + EUHVO1,2 + EUHVO1,3 + EUHVO1,5 + (1 - EUHVO1,6 )(1) (5) EUHVO1,5 = EUHVO1,1 + EUHVO1,2 + EUHVO1,3 + EUHVO1,4 + (1 - EUHVO1,6 )(1) (6) EUHVO1,6 = EUHVO1,1 + EUHVO1,2 + EUHVO1,3 + EUHVO1,4 + (1 - EUHVO1,5 )(1) (7) EUHVO2,1 = EUHVO2,2 + EUHVO2,3 + EUHVO2,4 + EUHVO2,5 + (1 - EUHVO2,6 )(1) (8) EUHVO2,2 = EUHVO2,1 + EUHVO2,3 + EUHVO2,4 + EUHVO2,5 + (1 - EUHVO2,6 )(1) (9) EUHVO2,3 = EUHVO2,1 + EUHVO2,2 + EUHVO2,4 + EUHVO2,5 + (1 - EUHVO2,6 )(1)

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(10) EUHVO2,4 = EUHVO2,1 + EUHVO2,2 + EUHVO2,3 + EUHVO2,5 + (1 - EUHVO2,6 )(1) (11) EUHVO2,5 = EUHVO2,1 + EUHVO2,2 + EUHVO2,3 + EUHVO2,4 + (1 - EUHVO2,6 )(1) (12) EUHVO2,6 = EUHVO2,1 + EUHVO2,2 + EUHVO2,3 + EUHVO2,4 + (1 - EUHVO2,5 )(1) (13) EUHVO3,1 = EUHVO3,2 + EUHVO3,3 + EUHVO3,4 + EUHVO3,5 + (1 - EUHVO3,6 )(1) (14) EUHVO3,2 = EUHVO3,1 + EUHVO3,3 + EUHVO3,4 + EUHVO3,5 + (1 - EUHVO3,6 )(1) (15) EUHVO3,3 = EUHVO3,1 + EUHVO3,2 + EUHVO3,4 + EUHVO3,5 + (1 - EUHVO3,6 )(1) (16) EUHVO3,4 = EUHVO3,1 + EUHVO3,2 + EUHVO3,3 + EUHVO3,5 + (1 - EUHVO3,6 )(1) (17) EUHVO3,5 = EUHVO3,1 + EUHVO3,2 + EUHVO3,3 + EUHVO3,4 + (1 - EUHVO3,6 )(1) (18) EUHVO3,6 = EUHVO3,1 + EUHVO3,2 + EUHVO3,3 + EUHVO3,4 + (1 - EUHVO3,5 )(1) (19) EUHVO4,1 = EUHVO4,2 + EUHVO4,3 + EUHVO4,4 + EUHVO4,5 + (1 - EUHVO4,6 )(1) (20) EUHVO4,2 = EUHVO4,1 + EUHVO4,3 + EUHVO4,4 + EUHVO4,5 + (1 - EUHVO4,6 )(1) (21) EUHVO4,3 = EUHVO4,1 + EUHVO4,2 + EUHVO4,4 + EUHVO4,5 + (1 - EUHVO4,6 )(1) (22) EUHVO4,4 = EUHVO4,1 + EUHVO4,2 + EUHVO4,3 + EUHVO4,5 + (1 - EUHVO4,6 )(1) (23) EUHVO4,5 = EUHVO4,1 + EUHVO4,2 + EUHVO4,3 + EUHVO4,4 + (1 - EUHVO4,6 )(1) (24) EUHVO4,6 = EUHVO4,1 + EUHVO4,2 + EUHVO4,3 + EUHVO4,4 + (1 - EUHVO4,5 )(1) (25) EUHVO5,1 = EUHVO5,2 + EUHVO5,3 + EUHVO5,4 + EUHVO5,5 + (1 - EUHVO5,6 )(1) (26) EUHVO5,2 = EUHVO5,1 + EUHVO5,3 + EUHVO5,4 + EUHVO5,5 + (1 - EUHVO5,6 )(1) (27) EUHVO5,3 = EUHVO5,1 + EUHVO5,2 + EUHVO5,4 + EUHVO5,5 + (1 - EUHVO5,6 )(1) (28) EUHVO5,4 = EUHVO5,1 + EUHVO5,2 + EUHVO5,3 + EUHVO5,5 + (1 - EUHVO5,6 )(1) (29) EUHVO5,5 = EUHVO5,1 + EUHVO5,2 + EUHVO5,3 + EUHVO5,4 + (1 - EUHVO5,6 )(1) (30) EUHVO5,6 = EUHVO5,1 + EUHVO5,2 + EUHVO5,3 + EUHVO5,4 + (1 - EUHVO5,5 )(1) (31) EUHVO6,1 = EUHVO6,2 + EUHVO6,3 + EUHVO6,4 + EUHVO6,5 + (1 - EUHVO6,6 )(1) (32) EUHVO6,2 = EUHVO6,1 + EUHVO6,3 + EUHVO6,4 + EUHVO6,5 + (1 - EUHVO6,6 )(1) (33) EUHVO6,3 = EUHVO6,1 + EUHVO6,2 + EUHVO6,4 + EUHVO6,5 + (1 - EUHVO6,6 )(1) (34) EUHVO6,4 = EUHVO6,1 + EUHVO6,2 + EUHVO6,3 + EUHVO6,5 + (1 - EUHVO6,6 )(1) (35) EUHVO6,5 = EUHVO6,1 + EUHVO6,2 + EUHVO6,3 + EUHVO6,4 + (1 - EUHVO6,6 )(1) (36) EUHVO6,6 = EUHVO6,1 + EUHVO6,2 + EUHVO6,3 + EUHVO6,4 + (1 - EUHVO6,5 )(1)

Recommended Future Policy (RFP)

This study’s SLR’s, narratives, and in-country survey data indicate the future political

strategies and policies of the CPC need to be revised in light of the current global financial crisis

and the rise in competition for natural resources that are essential not only for China’s continued

growth but for all other sovereigns in the global community.

The following statements pertain to the CPC’s policies specifically related to this study’s

set of political research questions. This author’s policy findings, conclusions, and

recommendations are framed by applying: (1) the SPELIT model; (2) Saldana’s Coding and

Themeing analysis; (3) Nash’s Equilibrium (Gaming) Theory; and, (4) Linstone, Mitroff, and

Turoff’s Policy Evaluation Rubric specific to this area of interest.

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Each statement is offered by the author as a recommendation to the CPC for consideration

related to China’s future strategies and policies. Each identifies what this author argues is

supportive of the working hypothesis regarding China’s political priorities and the direction the

country will take over the next decade. Each of the primary recommendations (PRs) and the

secondary recommendations (SRs) will be provided to the Delphi Policy panel for review and

consideration during that stage of this research.

Primary Recommendations (PRs)

This study’s initial research findings indicate the following adjustments to China’s

political mixed-strategies and policies are supported although they fall in a range of positive,

neutral, and negative as related to potential impacts to the sovereign groups (PG1 and PG2) that

have differing ideologies and worldviews. These findings suggest China should consider:

1. Adopting a slower pace of internal expansion in favor of focusing its leadership on

resolving the country’s (mainland) social and political issues; as extracted from the tuple

(HVO2, HVO3), where P1p1= (HVO2,3 / EUPn*) , given (x*,y) = (-1*,2), and where n = 3

representing a total of 3 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the resulting

probability = 1/3 as a Nondominant-Medium move with a negative potential outcome

wherein a BR for PG1 is one that includes the West minimizing the move by limiting

PG2 or China’s pure strategy move to maximize its desired nationalism and dominance

outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and, Figure 9, p. 204).

2. Pull-back its policy of openness with the West and Europe in order to reduce the

associated level of disruptive internal social and political influences; as extracted from

the tuple (HVO2, HVO4), where P1p0= (HVO2,4 / EUPn*) , given (x*,y) = (0*,1), and

where n = 1 representing a total of 1 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the

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resulting probability = 1/1 as a Nondominant-Low move with a neutral potential

outcome wherein a BR for PG1 is one that includes the West offering little or no

resistance to minimizing the move by allowing PG2 or China’s pure strategy move to

maximize its desired nationalism and alliance outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and,

Figure 9, p. 204).

3. Increase its aggressive external political strategies and policies that are causing

increased levels of regional and global tensions with the West and Europe; as extracted

from the tuple (HVO4, HVO3), where P2p3= (HVO4,3 / EUPn*) , given (x*,y) = (-5, 5*),

and where n = 8 representing a total of 8 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the

resulting probability = 8/8 or 1/1 as a Dominant-High move with a negative potential

outcome wherein a BR for PG1 is one that includes the West minimizing the move; and,

for the West to offer high resistance in order to minimize PG2 or China achieving its

desired alliances and dominance outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and, Figure 9, p. 204).

4. Provide marginal external social and political support, integration, and continuity with

the West and Europe to better assist these countries in resolving the internal challenges

they are facing due to the present global financial crisis; as extracted from the tuple

(HVO4, HVO3), where P2p3= (HVO4,3 / EUPn*) , given (x,y*) = (-5,5*), and where n = 8

representing a total of 8 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the resulting

probability = 8/8 or 1/1 as a Dominant-High move with a negative potential outcome

wherein a BR for PG2 or one that includes the West minimizing the move; and for PG1

or the West to offer high resistance in order to limit PG2 or China’s pure strategy move

to maximize its desired alliances and dominance outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and,

Figure 9, p. 204).

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Secondary Recommendations (SRs)

As discussed by Linstone, Turoff, and Mitroff in their papers pertaining to policy creation,

design, and development this author provides alternative recommendations for consideration. As

a result SRs that represent mixed-strategies with pure, dominant, nondominate characteristics

with positive, neutral, or negative potential outcomes have been assessed and integrated as

follows:

1. Little or no regard should be considered pertaining to changing China’s present

internal social and political strategies and policies. Instead the CPC and government

should simply accept higher levels of risk pertaining to any potential negative outcomes

associated with continuing instabilities. As extracted from the tuple (HVO2, HVO1),

where P2p0= (HVO2,1 / EUPn*) , given (x,y) = (0, 1), and where n = 1 representing a total

of 1 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the resulting probability = 0/1 as a

Nondominant-Low move with a neutral potential outcome wherein a BR for PG1 or PG2

to maximize/minimize the move associated with China’s desired nationalism and global

profile outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and, Figure 9, p. 204).

2. Move to rapidly achieve political supremacy within the global community so as to

secure China’s interests, influence, authority, control, and dominance as quickly as

possible as a means of blocking the West and its European partner interests. As

extracted from the tuple (HVO1, HVO3), where P2p3= (HVO1,3 / EUPn*) , given (x,y*) =

(-3, 3), and where n = 8 representing a total of 8 Estimated Utility Payoffs (EUPs)

outcomes, the resulting probability = 8/8 or 1/1 as a Dominant-High move with a

negative potential outcome wherein a BR for PG1 or PG2 with PG1 offering high

resistance to PG2 to maximize/minimize the move associated with China’s pure strategy

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move to maximize its desired nationalism and global outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202;

and, Figure 9, p. 204).

3. Ignore the political and financial challenges and implications of the Western Bloc and

Western Europe during this time of crisis. Focus on only China’s best interests by

adopting a modified form of isolationism, self-development, nationalism, and

exceptionalism. As extracted from the tuple (HVO3, HVO6), where P2p3= (HVO3,6 /

EUPn*) , given (x,y*) = (-3, 4*), and where n = 8 representing a total of 8 Estimated

Utility Payoffs (EUPs) outcomes, the resulting probability = 8/8 or 1/1 as a Dominant-

High move with a negative potential outcome wherein a BR for PG2 or China to

maximize the move, and for PG1to offer high resistance from the West to minimize

China’s desired dominance and exceptionalism outcomes (See Table 9, p. 202; and,

Figure 9, p. 204).

The secondary or alterative recommendations proposed represent options that may be

considered broad and suggestive of China engaging in high risk strategies. However they are

none-the-less options that should be considered if this study is to consider the gaming strategies

that are implied as a result of the initial research findings. The SRs perhaps could be viewed in

the context of an observation shared by a US politician and White House Chief of Staff to

President Barack Obama, “Never let a good crisis go to waste” (Rahm, 2010). That said, this

author considers US President John F. Kennedy’s observations. He stated that when crisis is

written in Chinese it is composed of two characters. One represents danger and the other

represents opportunity (Starr, 2004, p. 143). Considering the Chinese culture is judged by many

to be one composed of master gamers and strategists, the matter of predicting which PR or SR

outcome is the most probable will likely fall to the strategies that are the most cunning, least

apparent, or obvious from a Western or European viewpoint. Moreover, a mixed-strategy that

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yields a high estimated utility or payoff in the long-term will likely represent a high-priority to

China’s planners and leadership. That said, as can be observed from the previous analysis those

PRs and SRs that range between 1/1 and 1/2 probability or {1/1 ≥ 1/2} are the most likely to

occur.

Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER)

Having explored the HVOs by applying Nash’s theorems this study turns to assessing the

opinions of the mainland Chinese people regarding their country’s future direction. The

following policy rubric has been designed by this author to illustrate this study’s in-country

survey (HISS) findings related to how the Chinese people are accepting the CPC’s present policy

changes that are moving the country to the right of its traditional Maoist writs and doctrine.


EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AND EVALUATION RUBRICS: All ASAP designs must include a means of focused data collection, measurement, assessment, analysis, and a determination of findings. As such, a rubric must be carefully designed and applied as an approach to keeping the learning objectives and discovery goals on track. Absent such a rubric, identifying the clear direction of the study and a determination of finding is be extremely difficult if not impossible.

The graphic indicates findings in the following areas: (a) Political empowerment, (b) Domestic

stability, (c) Government availability and public access, (d) Property rights or ownership (e) Civil

rights, and (f) Enjoyment and living standards. The survey questions were presented to each

participant for consideration and response. The corresponding data is provided in the Rubric

Table Data (RTD-A) that is associated with the political inquiries and findings that follow. The

interpretive indicates the initial data inferences (IDDIn), hypothesis (Hyp), and the traditional

range of distribution (TRODn) associated with the survey’s core and subordinate inquiries.

The Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER-A) was specifically designed to assist in the analysis

of the CPCs political environmental factors (coded “A”) so as to distinguish these observations

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from other SPELIT category influences and outcomes. The approach is similar to those modelled

by Linstone, Mitroff, and Turoff in their efforts to measure, evaluate, and assess policy outcomes

(Mitroff & Turoff, 1975; Turoff M. , 1975).

Figure 11: Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER-A) for Combine Group Segments

Source: Policy Evaluation Rubric Technique (PERT) © Patrick D. Huff, 2015; Student Study Abroad Objectives and Goals 150530-01 MS PPT/Political Environment; Turoff, M., 2000, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications, III.B.1. The Policy Delphi, pp. 38; [Extensive illustrations are intended to enable the reader to develop a feel for the importance of details of the style and tone in presenting materials to panelists.]; http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/ch3b1 .html. Timmerman, B.E., Strickland, D., Johnson, R.L., 2010, Development of a universal rubric for assessing [scientific reasoning] (Timmerman, 2010). Also, see Table 14, In-Country Survey Data (HISS), Group Frequency Data, p. 236. Notes: 1. Initial Data (IDDIn) = The initial in-country survey data extracted from the HISS. Each IDDI is coded to the variable associated with the area of inquiry specific to each of the SPELIT categories. 2. Hypothesis (Hyp) = The given working hypothesis associated with each of the areas of interest within each SPELIT category. 3. Traditional Range of Distribution = (TRODn) = The range of distribution of the data set as extracted from the sampling that expresses the traditional cultural dispositions, beliefs, or opinions pertaining to the specific variable or inquiry. In this case the range represents a qualitative assessment of the information extracted from this study’s SLRs and scholarly assessments of China’s traditional ideologies, opinions, or positions as related to contemporary cultural shifts in strategy or policy. The index allows the research observer to determine the degree of significance and or the relevancy of emerging strategies or policies so as to evaluate, measure (quantify), track, and assign numeric references that represent the degree of change between accepted ideologies when compared to those representing change. The range assists in identifying the potential impact of an emerging strategy or policy by predicting social or organizational behavior outcomes. The purpose of the rubric is to assist as another decision analysis process tool that is consistent with and supportive of Mitroff’s Delphi Policy Process (Turoff M. , The policy delphi: General applications. The delphi method: Techniques and applications, 1975, pp. 84-101).

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Category Hypothesis

RTD-A contains responses to the core research question (coded VAR1a) together with

responses to subordinate inquiries (coded VAR2a through VAR6a). Each participant’s response

has been recorded by age and work class segment.


RECORDING AND TRACKING DATA: In many instances when conducting a ASAP in-country it is difficult to anticipate when and where surveys, interviews, or narratives can be conducted. As a result, it is important to always have the ability to implement the collection of information wherever and whenever the opportunity occurs. This considered, it is wise to be well rehearsed on the key inquiries specific to each area of interest your study is focused on. In many cases, the collection of information occurs spontaneous with traveling and enjoying the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and feel of the host-country. It is a good business practice to have your basic survey questions ready to deliver in much the same way you would deliver an elevator speech.

The RTD-A indicates survey participant responses to each of the following simplified

rubric variables discovered as HVOs with significance: (See Range of Potential HVOs and

Outcomes, Figure 8, p.197; the In-Country Survey Data (HISS); PER-A; and, the Rubric Table

Data (RTD-A) w/VARs, Table 14, p. 239)

1. Empowerment (EM), coded VAR1a in the RTD-A;

2. Stability (SS), coded VAR2a in the RTD-A;

3. Availability and Access (AA), coded VAR3a in the RTD-A:

4. Ownership (PO1), coded VAR4a in the RTD-A;

5. Civil Rights (CR1), coded VAR5a in the RTD-A; and,

6. Enjoyment (RE1), coded VAR6a in the RTD-A.

Codes assigned to the same words, phases, or theme references used in this study’s

Saldana Analysis were changed when applied to the Rubric Analysis.

The individual age segments as represented in Table 14, p. 239 are scaled range values

where: “1” is equal the lowest degree or level of satisfaction within each age segment category;

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and, “5” is equal to the highest degree or level of satisfaction as shown in each age segment

category.

Survey respondents were requested to indicate a scaled preference that best defined their

“feelings or beliefs” as related to each category variable. The individual age segments represent

scaled category responses where: (a) “Less”, a negative indicator is represented in the scale range

from 1 to 2); (b) “No” “Indifferent” or “Neutral”, is indicated in the scaled range as 3; and, (c)

“More”, a positive indicator is indicated in the scaled range from 4 to 5 (See Table 14, p. 239).

When the data is weighted by Combine Group Segments (CGS) over the total sample space

the ranges are factored for application to the Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER-A) as follows: (0.0 to

3.3) = Less Empowerment; (3.4 to 6.6) = No Difference or Neutral Empowerment; and, (6.7 to 10.0)

= More Empowerment. As such, Linstone, Mitroff, and Turoff’s interpretative rubric offers an easy

method of visualizing the data. One may also convert the CGS combine values to a total sample

range basis of 5 wherein each range is calculated as follows to align with the rubric: ((0.0 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 3.3)/

2) = (0.0 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 1.66) = “Less”; ((3.4 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 6.6)/2) = (1.67 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 3.33) = “Indifferent” or “Neutral”;

and ((6.7 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 10.0)/2) = (3.34 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 5.0) = “More” respectively. This conversion allows the values

extracted from the HISS data in Table 14, p. 239 to be more readily align, compared, and analyzed

against the PER-A Policy Evaluation Rubric, Figure 11, p. 215; and, the Nash Equilibrium tuples

and resultant predictive gaming outcomes related to each variable or inquiry as illustrated in Table 9,

Mixed-Strategy Outcome Probabilities-Political, p. 202.

Sampling Stratification Standards

The in-country survey (HISS) data was collected over a broad range of age segments and

worker classes in an attempt to ensure that each segment was proportionally represented in

relation to the country’s demographic distribution.

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GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY WITIN A COUNTRY: When designing your ASAP be sure to include plans to visit several different regions of the country. In many cases there is wide-ranging internal cultural diversity between areas that are along a country’s outer borders, coastlines, mountains, plains, and deserts. In the case of China, these regional cultures and dialects are significantly different. Absent experiencing the people and the diversity in these different areas or regions it is easy to mistake the true complexity, nature, ideologies, values, ethics, and organizational behavior of the people. This author often discovers extreme differences in the opinions of those that have traveled to only select areas or regions of a country versus those that have experienced these diversities. To achieve a clear and concise appreciation of a country’s people it is necessary to visit these areas frequently over a number of years.

No attempt was made to specifically identify or focus on class affiliations between

government and non-government work classes. Responses were tracked and recorded within each

of the following three sub-groups: (a) Ages ranging between 20 to 35 years; (b) Ages ranging

between 36 to 55 years; and, (c) Ages ranging between 56 to 75 years. When reviewing this data,

researchers should consider that in 2012 China’s total population was estimated at 1.35 billion of

which approximately 767 <= W <= 788 million where reported to be in the workforce (W).

Moreover, researchers should note the age of these workforce segments ranged from 15 to 59

years. China’s Labor Committee (CLC) divides the working population into four age segments

(China Labour Bulletin , 2013; Nation Master, 2015). These segments differ from those defined in

this study as referenced in Huff’s in-country survey stratifications (HISS). The CLC’s

stratifications are: (a) “16 to 20 year olds”; (b) “21 to 30 year olds”; (c) “31 to 40 year olds”; (d)

“41 to 50 year olds”; and, (e) “51 year olds and above.” Therefore, the following analysis

attempts to adjust for the variances between the 5 segments in the HISS versus 4 segments in the

CLC stratification.

Of these age segments the “21 to 30 year olds” were shown to make up approximately 32

percent of the workforce, while “31 to 40 year olds” were shown to represent 22.5 percent of the

workforce, and “41 to 50 year olds” represented 25.5 percent of the workforce. Surprisingly, the

“51 years old or above” segment made up 15 percent of the workforce according to the CLCs

National Bureau of Statistic’s China Labour Bulletin (CLB), (See Table 10, p. 219).

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Table 10: China Labour Figures, Estimated for 2012

ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 16-20

Yrs. Old 21-30

Yrs. Old 31-40

Yrs. Old 41-50

Yrs. Old 51 & Above

Yrs. Old 5% 32% 22.5% 25.5% 15%

Source: China Labour Bulletin, 2013. CLBs estimated figures for 2012 as shown in employment by age segment interpretative, indicating a significant drop in the ws1 segment over the availabilities indicated in ws2, ws3, ws4, and ws5, Where: W1 = ws1 + ws2 + ws3/2; and where W2 = ws3/2 + ws4 + ws5. Also of interest, is that the “16 to 20 year olds” made up the smallest workforce group

representing only 5 percent of the total. The author believes it is significant that the data for age

segments (16-20), (21-30) and (31-40) all have trend-tails that are sloping slightly upward during

2013-2014 in the context of the total workforce after exhibiting significant downward trends for

the period 2008-2012 (See Employment Trends by Age Segments, 2008-2014 interpretative,

Figure 13, p. 218). The variances in the three younger work segments (ws1, ws2, and ws3) reflect

the pre and post single-child policy era impacts on China’s population when it was experiencing

rapid increases.

Many analysts argue that despite the slight upward tails in the 2013-2014 the overall

workforce available to support China’s continued manufacturing sector demand is showing initial

signs of stress.

Additionally, the CLC data confirms this study’s SLR evidence that China’s leadership

has growing concerns over its aging workforce and the coming reduction in the availability of

workers in the 16-20 and 21-30 year old segments. Moreover, these younger segments are

considered to lack the hard-working culture, ethics, and acceptance of sparse working

environments, to include lower living standards that are characteristic of the older worker

W1 W2

W3

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segments. As a result, China analysts and its leadership believe the upper aged segments are

going to need to continue to be active in China’s workforce in order to support the country’s

continued growth in the manufacturing sectors.

Given China’s leadership is interested in extending the useful employment of its aging

workforce segments, the data supports the leadership’s concerns that a considerable reduction in

the workforce is going to occur over the next twenty years.

When the percent of the total workforce (W) represented by the 16-20 year old segment

(ws1) is compared to those in the 21-30 year segment (ws2) it is clear a significant drop in the

number of available workers over the next several years will occur (See Table 10, p. 219).

The following table provides reported and estimated labor segments in the total workforce

(W) as projected to 2023. In this table, it should be noted that the number of laborers in the

younger segments (ws1 and ws2) continue to be significantly lower when compared to the older

segments (ws3, ws4, and ws5). These observations are additionally confirmed by the World

Bank’s analysis of China’s emerging labor trends as reported in their study of the 15-24 age

segments for the periods 2005-2015 when they are projected to 2023 (See Figure 12, p. 221).

Table 11: China Labor Figures Estimated for 2023

ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 16-20

Yrs. Old 21-30

Yrs. Old 31-40

Yrs. Old 41-50

Yrs. Old 51 & Above

Yrs. Old 6%* 32.5% 22.5% 24% 15%

Source: China Labour Bulletin, 2013; (*) Study’s estimate. CLBs estimated figures for 2023 as shown in employment by age segment interpretative, with implications of future labor availability reductions in the ws1 and ws2 age segments continuing, and ws5, Where: W1 = ws1 + ws2 + ws3/2; and where W2 = ws3/2 + ws4 + ws5.

W1 W2

W3

220


Figure 12: Dropping Labor Resources in the 15-24 Age Segment, 2005-2015

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

China 54.1 53.4 53.0 51.8 51.0 50.3 50.7 50.8 50.7 50.6 50.1

Source: http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=china+employment&language=&format= Employment to population ration, ages 15-24 total percent, Code: SL.EMP.1524.SP.ZS; Database: WDI; Labor & Social; also see Huff’s data file Chap IS tables 15017-01 MS Excel-Political Survey-B (ebk) Analysis. The interpretative provides additional support of the CLCs findings as related to the ws1 and ws2 age segments trends.

Figure 13: Employment Trends by Age Segments, 2008-2014

2008 10.5 35.0 24.0 18.5 12.02009 9.0 35.5 23.0 20.0 12.52010 6.5 35.5 23.5 21.0 13.52011 7.0 32.4 22.5 24.0 14.12012 5.5 32.0 22.0 25.5 15.02013 6.0 32.5 22.5 24.0 15.02014 6.6 33.1 23.1 24.1 13.1

221


Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_150606-01 MsExl/CLC employment data. The data indicates sharply declined slopes (a) in the data (ws1, ws2, and ws3) trended age segments; with what appears to be stabilized or flat tails (b) indicated in the same segments. Interestingly, these trends are completely reversed when compared to the trends and tails (a, and b) in the (ws4, and ws5) age segments data. The downward trend tails (b) in these segments support the growing concerns of China’s leadership that a significant labor shortage is coming that will begin to influence the country’s social, political, and economic strategies over the next twenty years.

Could it be that over the next ten to twenty years China is going to experience a drop in

the workforce percentage as represented in the 35.5-51 year old segments? (See age segments

sw1, sw2, sw3, sw4, and sw5 provided in Figure 13, p. 221; to include the computations below)

Test One: This inference is tested by applying the following calculation to the CLCs China

Labor Figures Estimated for 2012 (Table 10, p. 219) data for W1 and W2: Given all age segments or

the total workforce = W1,2 and where W1 = (RNG (16 → 35.5)) and where W2 = (RNG (35.5 → 51));

and where, percent = P given PW1 = (P(ws1) + P(ws2) + P(ws3 / 2)) or PW1 = (5 + 32 + 22.5 / 2) =

48.25; and, where PW2 = (P(ws3 / 2) + P(ws4 ) + P(ws5)) or PW2 = (22.5 / 2 + 25.5 + 15) = 51.75;

where PW2 = 51.75 percent or where PW1 ≤ PW2 , or when 48.25 is equal to or less than 51.75 as a

percentage of the total workforce (PW1,2) the result indicates the future available workforce is in

contraction or decreasing.

Test Two: When compared to the CPCs leadership’s inferences as tested by applying the

following calculation using the CLCs China Labor Figures Estimated for 2013-2023 data (Table

11, p. 220) for W1 and W2: Given all age segments or the total workforce = W1,2 , and where W1 =

(16 → 35.5) and where W2 = (35.5 → 51); where PW1 = (P (ws1) + P(ws2 ) + P (ws3 / 2)) or PW1 = (6

+ 32.5 + 22.5 / 2) = 49.75; and, where W2 = (P (ws3 / 2) + P (ws4 ) + P (ws5)) or W2 = (22.5 / 2 + 24

+ 15) = 50.25. Given PW1 = 49.75 percent or whereas PW1 ≤ PW2 , given PW2 is equal to or less

than 50.25; again as a percentage of the total workforce (PW1,2) the calculation of the (ws1, ws2, and

ws3) age segments support the total workforce (W1,2) is in contraction or decreasing as presumed by

China’s leaders. Given these initial assessments China’s concerns appear, at least from this study’s

initial data analysis to be confirmed. 222


Finding: This author argues the answer to the initial question is “Yes”; or, at least during

the next eleven years as indicated for periods 2012-2023. However, after these initial periods

lapse the next ten year period is a different matter.

Figure 14: Employment Trends by Age Segments, 2008-2033

Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_150606-01 MsExl. When the CLC extended data is analyzed (sw2 (c), sw3 (c), sw4 (c), and sw5 (c)) indicate major downward trend slopes as related to a consecutive series of lowering available workforce percentages in each of these segments. Given this, the data infers a labor shortage is on the horizon in China for periods

2008 10.5 35.0 24.0 18.5 12.02009 9.0 35.5 23.0 20.0 12.52010 6.5 35.5 23.5 21.0 13.52011 7.0 32.4 22.5 24.0 14.12012 5.5 32.0 22.0 25.5 15.02013 6.0 32.5 22.5 24.0 15.02014 6.6 33.1 23.1 24.1 13.12015 6.6 33.3 23.0 24.1 13.02016 7.0 33.2 22.9 24.0 12.92017 7.9 33.1 22.6 23.8 12.62018 8.5 32.8 22.5 23.8 12.42019 8.9 32.7 22.5 23.7 12.22020 9.0 32.7 22.4 23.7 12.22021 9.6 32.5 22.4 23.5 12.02022 10.2 32.4 22.3 23.3 11.82023 11.3 32.1 22.0 23.1 11.52024 11.8 31.9 21.9 23.0 11.42025 12.0 31.9 21.8 23.1 11.22026 12.8 31.8 21.5 22.8 11.12027 14.2 30.8 21.4 22.6 11.02028 14.9 30.7 21.3 22.5 10.62029 15.0 30.6 21.4 22.4 10.62030 15.4 30.6 21.3 22.2 10.52031 15.3 30.4 21.5 22.2 10.62032 15.3 30.0 20.7 22.4 11.62033 15.4 28.7 22.0 23.2 10.7

223


2012-2027. That said, given the additional indicators as noted in (sw1 (d), sw2 (d), sw3 (d), sw4 (d), and sw5 (d)) slight increases in each of the segments percentages can be predicted during periods 2028-2033. Given the CLC extended data, beginning in late 2027 all workforce age segments (sw1 (d), sw2 (d), sw3 (d), sw4 (d), and sw5 (d)) begin to slightly recover. In short, China’s concerns pertaining to a decreasing workforce is warranted for the periods 2012-2027. However, during 2028-2033 the trend tails in each segment are upward indicating increases in percentages across all segments.

The answer turns to a “No” when the extended estimated data is applied and analyzed for

the periods 2023-2033. As inferred by the CLCs employment studies China will be facing a

significant expansion or labor increase for the period 2023-2033 as indicated in the CLBs

Employment Trends by Age Segments, 2008-2033 (See Figure 14, p. 223, flattened tail (d) for

segment sw1 and sw5; and, an upward tail (d) in segment sw3, as related to each which indicates

a workforce segment PERC shift or slight workforce expansion that is projected to occur

beginning 2023 continuing through 2033.

As projected in the interpretative; an expansion or slight recovery in China’s future labor

force is predicted to occur beginning 2023. This assumes China will continue to successfully

address reforms in its child policies, retirement, and health care benefits during 2015-2028. All

three are highly significant in terms of China’s future mixed-strategies, direction, and political

policy priorities over the next 10 years.

Next this author compares Huff’s in-country sampling (HISS) to China’s Labor

Committee (CLC) China Labour Bulletin (CLB) Sampling Stratifications Standards. The HISS

work classifications were proportionally distributed as follows: (a) Agricultural and

manufacturing workers or Primary Stratification = 24 percent; (b) Government enterprise

cohorts, or Secondary Stratification = 39 percent; and, (c) SOE and private professionals, and

technical staff, or Tertiary Stratification = 37 percent. All unidentified classes were reported as

agricultural and manufacturing workers (See Table 14, p. 239, cumulative totals for work

stratifications, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary).

224



POPULATION STRATIFICATIONS, AGING WORKFORCE: When designing the ASAP you may wish to include making casual or informal observations of the work environment, worker appearances and characteristics, hours of employment, access or communing distances, housing, compensation and benefits, health care, retirement benefits, and age. By recording these observations as you travel the various regions of the country you can began to visualize the nature of the social and political environment of the country. In the case of China, largely due the its one-child policy, the country is beginning to experience a labor shortage within its largest worker segment that forms the backbone of its inexpensive, ethical, and hard-working manufacturing sector. Labor losses related to this large worker segment carry significant concerns associated with the country’s ability to sustain the production of goods and services at the renowned Chinese Price.

This author aligned his in-country survey sampling (HISS) participants with the primary,

secondary, and tertiary categories established by China’s Labor Committee (CLC). By doing this

he was able to more directly compare the HISS sampling proportionalities and findings against

those of the CLC.

The alignments were coded as follows:

(a) All CLC primary industry workers associated with agriculture and mining were coded

in the HISS as agricultural and manufacturing workers. This worker segment in 2012 made up

approximately 33.6 percent of the workforce as shown in the WPS. When compared to HISS, the

variance in sampling proportionality was calculated using the formula (DIFF = HISS – WPS)

which equated to (33.6 – 24.0) for a differential of 9.6 percent; where WPS = Working Population

Segments, as reported by the CLB.

(b) All CLC secondary industry workers associated with manufacturing and heavy

industry were coded in the HISS as government enterprise cohorts. This worker segment in 2012

made up approximately 30.3 percent of the workforce as shown in the WPS. When compared to

the HISS, the variance in sampling proportionality was calculated in the same manner or (DIFF =

WPS – HISS) or (30.3 - 39.0) for a differential of -8.7 percent.

(c) All CPC tertiary industry workers associated with services, finance, information,

technology, sales and general services, medical, legal, etc., were coded in the HISS as SOE and

private professionals or technical staff. This worker segment in 2012 made up approximately

225


36.1 percent of the workforce as shown in the WPS. When compared the HISS sampling

proportionally as calculated using the referenced formula the result was (DIFF = WPS – HISS) or

(36.1 – 37.0) for a differential of -.9 percent (See Table 12, p. 227; and, Figure 15, p. 226).

Table 14, p. 239 provides the (WPS-HISS) mean DIFF for VAR1a as an isolated trend

interpretative for each age segment or (WPS/HISS) DIFF = -13.9 percent; (WPS/HISS) DIFF =

25.8 percent; and, (WPS/HISS) DIFF = -11.9 percent as noted in trend lines 1, 2 and 3.

Sampling Stratification Standards Summarized

The HISS proportional representations achieved were not consistent with the CLC’s

mainland population statistical data. This variance was due: (a) to the age and class distributions

within each of the rural and urban areas surveyed; and, (b) the number of rural and urban areas

surveyed not being proportional to the total number of rural and urban areas present in mainland

China.

Figure 15: Working Population Segments (WPS)

Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_15060-01 MsExl/ CLC Advanced Estimates

Although these variances are significant, they are not considered by this author to be

relevant as related to this study’s purpose, focus, or core investigation. However, the data does

226


place the HISS data in a proper context when viewed against the CLC’s information (See Figure

15, p. 226).

In short, when the WPS and HISS proportionalities respectively (24.0, 39.0, and 37.0)

were compared for agreement with the CLC and CLB data (and extended data) respectively (33.6,

30.3, and 36.1) as represented in Figure 15, p. 226; the variances between each pertaining to the

primary, secondary, and tertiary categories respectively (WPS – HISS = DIFF) or ((36.1 - 24.2) =

9.6; (30.3 - 39.0) = -8.7; and, (36.1 - 37.0)) = -0.9 percent) were not viewed by this author as

significant for the purposes of effectively applying both data sets towards the development of

uniform quantitative or qualitative analysis and findings common to both sets.

Table 12: Stratification Proportionality Analysis: (Sample Size Differentials)

Sampling Segments WPS (Perc) HISS (Perc) Difference (Perc)

1. Primary 33.6 24.0 9.6

2. Secondary 30.3 39.0 -8.7

3. Tertiary 36.1 37.0 -0.9

Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_15060-01 MsExl/CLC Advanced Estimates (Also, see Figure 15, p. 226).

As such, this author argues that any differences between the HISS and CLC data sets as

based strictly on variances in proportionality is not sufficient to question the significance or

validity of any of this study’s findings or discoveries resulting from exploring the interests in this

area of the investigation.

227


Table 13: WPS vs HISS Response Stratification Scale Analysis and Outcome

Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_150417-01 MsExl/HISS Sample Scale Proportionality Analysis. Data extracted from: Table 14, for grouped analysis of Work Force Stratifications, Column representing Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary values, p. 239. Notes: 1. Adjustment and subsequent outcome analysis is to account for differentials in the sample population, response scales, and size proportionalities. 2. The analysis assumes the WPS (CLC) sample population was 100 percent responsive. Detailed sample response data was not available from the CLC. 3. The largest adjustment needed to align the HISS with the WPS (CLC) sample. 4. Adjustments were not considered significant as related to the analysis outcome after assessment. 5. Adjustment differentials are large enough to conduct additional reviews for potential impact to analysis outcomes and subsequent determinations. 6. Mean differential between the WPS and the HISS sample space outcomes or data sets. 7. Data extracted from Table 14, Work Force Stratifications Column representing Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary weighted segment values.

That given, this analysis and the findings associated with the RTD-A and PER-A are

considered valid and relevant.

Segment(s): Primary Secondary Tertiary CumVAR1a 3 6 3 12VAR2a 5 4 3 12VAR3a 5 4 3 12VAR4a 5 3 2 10VAR5a 4 3 3 10VAR6a 4 3 3 10Cum 26 23 17 66Total No. of VARs 6 6 6Median VAR 4.333 3.833 2.833 11.0HISS Segment Response Scale (Perc) 0.394 0.348 0.258 1.0

(HISS-WPS) Perc Response Differential(s)WPS 0.361 0.303 0.336 1.0 Δ Correction(s) (+,-) -0.033 -0.045 0.078 0.17

AdjustmentsVAR1a 2 6 4 12WPS Response Scale Correction 1.934 5.727 4.314

Adjusted Comparative 2 6 4 12Comparative Response Scale Analysis

Sampling DifferentialsWPS 33.600 30.300 36.100 100HISS 24.000 39.000 37.000 100Population Differential(s) 9.600 -8.700 -0.900 0.00

6

Lesser Significancewhen HISS response outcome is compared to WPS sample

Greater Significancewhen HISS response outcome is compared to WPS sample

2

1

3

7

228


HISS, PER-A, and RTD-A Results

After collection of the initial SLRs, narratives, and in-country data, this author formulated

the following hypothesis pertaining to the range of potential outcomes related to each variable.

He predicts that after the collection of the final data from the Delphi Policy Panel (DPP),

the findings will be reasonably consistent with those extracted from the in-country surveys

specific to the political environment inquiries and findings as indicated in the PER-A, HISS and

the RTD-A. These findings are predicted to be as follows:

The PER-A, HISS, and RTD-A results indicate the range of variables and outcomes that

are associated with this author’s informal evaluation of the SLRs and narratives that were

investigated in Chapter Two of this study. For the purpose of assessment continuity the outcomes

were analyzed using inter-quartile ranges that were calculated using the following formula: Q or

IQR = (Q3-Q1); where Q2 = the median (Mdn); and, Q1 = the lower quartile range of the data set

given the category variable. Inter-quartile ranges that are equal to or less than ≤ 1.0 were

considered significant; those that are equal to or greater than ≥1.0 are considered less significant

(See Table 15, Consensus Quantile Profiles (CQP), p. 234.) (Chao, 1969, p. 97-140)

1. Empowerment (VAR1a): Are the Chinese people accepting the CPC’s policy changes that

are moving the country to the right of its traditional Maoist writs and doctrine?

• The PER-A and RTD-A results as informally estimated from the SLRs fall

within the TROD1 RNG of 3.0 to 8.7. Given this, it is expected the Delphi Policy Process

(DPP) or Hyp1 results will fall inside the RNG (See Figure 11, Policy Evaluation Rubric

(PER-A) for Combine Group Segment (CGS), p. 215; and, Table 14, In-Country Survey

Data (HISS), p. 239).

229


• The HISS indicated that 25 percent of those in the 36-55 age segments responded

that the CPCs policy changes are moving the country to the right of traditional Maoist

writs and doctrine “more”. Also of note is the 16.7 percent of those in the 36 - 55 age

segments responding “somewhat more” (See Table 14, p. 239). Collectively, the

segment’s and associated responses represent (16.7 + 25.0) or a 41.7 percent response that

is inside the significant range of standard of deviation (SD) or the IDDI1 = 4.5 (See Table

14, p. 239) of the total sample space for VAR1a (See Figure 11, Policy Evaluation Rubric

(PER-A) for Combine Group Segment (CGS), p. 215; In-Country Survey Data (HISS),

PER-A, and the RTD-A, Weighted Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent Voting; and,

Table 14, p. 239 to include the IQRs for each VAR, Table 15, p. 240).

• Given this analysis, the author estimates the hypothetical tendency (Hyp) or

consensus pertaining to this variable will equal 4.7 as based on the RTD-A and HISS

findings (See Figure 11, p. 215; and, Table 14, p. 239), meaning the stated hypothesis

pertaining to this variable is likely to be confirmed in the DPP finding.

• This indicates the in-country survey participants believe the CPCs reforms are

providing “more empowerment” given the ordered RNG = {2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5}

with 11/12 responses within an average deviation (AD) = 1.0 or less, or a 𝑋𝑋 with a Mdn =

4.0; and a Q, or IQR = 2.0. In this case, the author finds the AD = 0.75 given the IQR =

2.0 IQR is significant. (See Table 15, Consensus Quartile Profiles (CQP), p. 240.)

[Therefore, political empowerment, as referenced in the Saldana analysis (code = EM) is

considered significant, see Figure 8, Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes, p. 197.]

230


Table 14: VAR1a, Ordered Sample Space Data RNG

Source: Http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment -china; MOHRSS, China eBook data_150417-01 MsExl/HISS Pol Survey-B Variable AD Calcs. Data extracted from: Table 14, for grouped analysis of Work Force Stratifications, Column representing Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary values, p. 239.

2. Stability (VAR2a): How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family’s

stability?


within the TROD of 4.3 to 9.5. Given this, it is expected the DPP or Hyp2 results will fall

inside this range (See Figure 11, p. 215; and, Table 14, p. 239).

• The HISS indicated that 25 percent of those in the 36-55 age segments responded

that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s stability “more”. Also of note is the

16.7 percent of those in the 56-75 age segments responding “somewhat more”.

Collectively, the two segments and associated responses represent a (25 + 16.7) or a 41.7

percent response that is outside the significant range of standard of deviation (SD) or

IDDI2 = 4.0 (See Table 14, p. 239) of the total sample space for VAR2a (See Figure 11,

Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER-A) for Combine Group Segment (CGS), P. 215; In-

Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-A, Weighted Segment Sampling, 231


Scaled Value Percent Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the IQRs for each VAR, Table 15, p.

237).


consensus pertaining to this variable will equal 5.9 as based on the RTD-A and HISS




providing “more stability” given the ordered RNG = {2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5} with

11/12 responses within an average deviation (AD) = 1.0 or less, or a 𝑋𝑋 with a Mdn = 4.0;

and a Q or IQR = 2.0. In this case, the author finds the AD = 1.08 given the IQR = 2.0 is

significant. (See Table 15, Consensus Quartile Profiles (CQP), p. 240.) [Therefore,

stability and security, as referenced in the Saldana analysis (code = SS) is considered of

significant, see Figure 8, Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes, p. 197.]



n SD AD

1 5 3.9 12 5 3.9 13 5 3.9 14 5 3.9 15 4 3.9 06 4 3.9 07 4 3.9 08 4 3.9 09 3 3.9 1

10 3 3.9 111 3 3.9 112 2 3.9 112 47

= 47/12 4 = 4 = 47/12

0.73

3.92

= Median = X

X

= AD = Average Deviation

Calculations of a sorted even set: VAR2a

= SD or standard deviation

232


3. Availability and Access (VAR3a): How have the CPC’s political policies influenced

your/family’s availability or access?


within the TROD range of 4.3 to 5.7. Given this, it is expected the DPP or Hyp3 results

will fall inside this range (See Figure 11, p. 215; and, Table 14, p. 239).

• The HISS indicated that 16.7 percent of those in the 36-55 age segments

responded that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s availability and access

“more”. Also of note is the 16.7 percent of those in the 20-35 age segment responding

“neutral-don’t know”. Collectively, the two segments and associated responses represent

a (16.7 + 16.7) or a 33.4 percent response that is outside the significant range of standard

of deviation (SD) or IDDI3 = 4.0 (See Table 14, p. 239) of the total sample space for

VAR3a (See Figure 11, Policy Evaluation Rubric (PER-A) for Combine Group Segment

(CSG), p. 215; In-Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-A, Weighted

Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the IQRs for each

VAR, Table 15, p. 240).


consensus pertaining to this variable will equal 4.6 as based on the TRD-A and HISS




providing “more availability and access” given the RNG = {2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5}

11/12 responses outside a 1.0 average deviation (AD) = 1.0 or less, or a 𝑋𝑋 with a Mdn =

4.0; and a Q or IQR = 2.0. In this case, the author finds the AD = 1.08 given the IQR =

233


2.0 is of little significance. [Therefore, availability, access, and voting referenced in the

Saldana analysis (code = AA) were also considered of little significance, see Figure 8,

Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes.]



4. Property Rights (VAR4a): How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family’s

property rights?




• The HISS indicated that 20 percent of those in the 36-55 age segment responded

that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s property rights “more”. Also of note

is the 20 percent of those in the 20-35 age segment responding “somewhat more”.

Collectively, the two segments and associated responses represent a 40 percent response

n SD AD

1 2 3.9 1.92 3 3.9 0.93 3 3.9 0.94 3 3.9 0.95 4 3.9 0.16 4 3.9 0.17 4 3.9 0.18 4 3.9 0.19 5 3.9 1

10 5 3.9 111 5 3.9 112 5 3.9 112 47

= 47/12 4 = 4 = 47/12

0.75

3.92

= Median = X

X




234


that is outside the significant range of standard of deviation within the total sample space

for VAR5a (See In-Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-A, Weighted

Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the IQRs for each

VAR, Table 15, p. 240).

• The HISS indicated that 20 percent of those in the 20 - 35 and the 36-55 age

segments responded that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s property rights

“more”. Collectively, the two segments and associated responses represent a 40 percent

response that is outside the significance range of the standard of deviation for the total

sample space for VAR4a (See In-Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-A,

Weighted Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the IQRs

for each VAR, Table 15, p. 240).

• This author estimates the hypothetical tendency (Hyp) or consensus pertaining to

this variable will equal 5.1 (See Figure 11, p. 215; and, Table 14, p. 239).


providing “more ownership” given the ordered RNG = {2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5} with an

Mdn = 4.0; and a Q or IQR =1.0.

235


In this case, the author finds the IQR is significant. [Therefore, property ownership rights

referenced in the Saldana analysis (code = PO1) were also considered significant, see

Figure 8, Range of Potential HVOs and Outcomes, p. 197.]



5. Civil Rights (VAR5a): How have the CPCs political policies influenced your/family’s civil

rights?


within the TROD6 RNG {6.5 to 9.5}. Given this, it is expected the DPP or Hyp5 results


• The HISS indicated that 30 percent of those in the 20 - 35 and the 36-55 age

segments responded that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s civil rights

“more”. Also of note is the 20 percent of those in the 56-75 age segment responding

“somewhat more”. Collectively, the three segments and associated responses represent a

70 percent response that is inside the significant range of standard of deviation within the

n SD AD

1 5 4.1 0.92 5 4.1 0.93 5 4.1 0.94 5 4.1 0.95 4 4.1 0.16 4 4.1 0.17 4 4.1 0.18 4 4.1 0.19 3 4.1 1

10 2 4.1 1

10 41

= 47/12 4 = 4 = 47/12

4.10

0.60

= Median = X

X




236


total sample space for VAR5a (See In-Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-

A, Weighted Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the

IQRs for each VAR, Table 15, p. 240).


this variable will equal 7.7 referring agreement with the TROD6 RNG (See Figure 11, p.

215; and, Table 14, p. 239). Considering the IDDI5 = 4.7, is outside or not in agreement

with the TROD6 RNG, the IDDI5 infers the SLR findings are outliers to the Hyp6 .


providing “more ownership” given the RNG = {4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5} with an Mdn =

5.0; and a Q or IQR =1.0. In this case, the author finds the IQR is significant. [Therefore,

civil rights referenced in the Saldana analysis (code = CR1) were also considered




n SD AD

1 5 4.6 -02 5 4.6 -03 5 4.6 -04 5 4.6 -05 5 4.6 -06 5 4.6 -07 4 4.6 18 4 4.6 19 4 4.6 1

10 4 4.6 1

10 46

= 47/12 5 = 4 = 47/12

0.08

4.60

= Median = X

X




237


6. Enjoyment (VAR6a): How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family’s

enjoyment or living standards?




• The HISS indicated that 30 percent of those in the 20 - 35 age segment

responded that the CPCs policies have influenced their family’s enjoyment or living

standards “more”; with, 20 percent of those in the 56 – 75 age segments responding

“more” CPC influence as well. Also of note is the 20 percent of those in the 36-55 age

segment responding “somewhat more”. Collectively, the three segments and associated

responses represent a 70 percent response that is inside the significance range of standard

of deviation within the total sample space for VAR6a (See In-Country Survey Data

(HISS), PER-A, and the RTD-A, Weighted Segment Sampling, Scaled Value Percent

Voting, Table 14, p. 239 and the IQRs for each VAR, Table 15, p. 240).


this variable will equal 7.7 (See Figure 11, p. 215; and, Table 14, p. 239). The IDDI6

indicates the SLRs in this case are outside or at variance to the TROD6 RNG which

represents an outlier to the Hyp6.


providing “more enjoyment” given the RNG = {4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5} with a Mdn =

5.0; and a Q or IQR =1.0. In this case, the author finds the IQR is significant. [Therefore,

right of enjoyment referenced in the Saldana analysis (code = ER1) were also considered


238




n SD AD

1 5 4.6 -0.42 5 4.6 -0.43 5 4.6 -0.44 5 4.6 -0.45 5 4.6 -0.46 5 4.6 -0.47 4 4.6 0.68 4 4.6 0.69 4 4.6 1

10 4 4.6 1

10 46

= 47/12 5 = 4 = 47/12

0.08

4.60

= Median = X

X




239


Table 20: In-Country Survey Data (HISS), PER-A, and Rubric Table Data (RTD-A) w/VARs

A. Political Environment Tota

l Par

ticip

ants

Tota

l Res

pons

es

Less

Som

ewha

t Les

s

Neu

tral

- Do

n't K

now

Som

ewha

t mor

e

Mor

e

Less

Som

ewha

t Les

s

Neu

tral

- Do

n't K

now

Som

ewha

t mor

e

Mor

e

Less

Som

ewha

t Les

s

Neu

tral

- Do

n't K

now

Som

ewha

t mor

e

Mor

e

Hypo

thes

is (H

yp) R

elev

ance

1. G

over

nmen

t Ent

erpr

ise

Coho

rts

2. S

OE

and

Priv

ate

Prof

essio

nals/

Tech

nica

l Sta

ff

3. A

gricu

ltura

l, M

anuf

actu

ring

Cum

ulat

ive

Clas

s Res

pons

es

Central research question: Key Words/Themes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 51. Are the Chinese people accepting the CPC's policy changes that are moving the country to the right of its traditional Maoist writs and doctrine?

VAR1 a: Political, Empowerment 12 12 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 12 3 6 3 12

4 8.67 3 = 3.0-8.7

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 9 - - 3 4 5 - - 3 8 15 - 2 3 4 - 4.7 (3)

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 16.7 25.0 0.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 0.0 100.0 = 4.5Subordinate inquiries:

2. How have the CPC's political policies influenced your/family's stability?

VAR2 a: Domestic, Stability

12 12 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 2 0 12 5 4 3 12

4.25 9.5 5.5 = 4.3-9.5

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 8 - 2 6 4 5 - - - 4 15 - - 3 8 - 5.9 (3)

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 16.7 0.0 100.0 = 4.03. How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family's availability or access?

VAR3 a: Government Availability, Political Access,

12 12 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 12 5 4 3 12

4.25 5.67 4 = 4.3-5.7

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 10 - 2 6 4 5 - - 3 4 10 - - 3 4 5 4.6 (3)

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 100.0 = 4.04. How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family's property rights?

VAR4 a: Property Rights 12 10 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 10 5 3 2 10

4.5 7 4.5 = 4.5-7.0

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 8 - 2 3 8 5 - - - 4 10 - - - 4 5 5.1 (3)

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 = 4.55. How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family's civil rights?

VAR5 a: Civil Rights 12 10 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 10 4 3 3 10

9.5 7 6.5 = 6.5-9.5

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 6 - - - 4 15 - - - 4 10 - - - 8 5 7.7 (3)

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 100.0 = 4.76. How have the CPC’s political policies influenced your/family's enjoyment or living standards?

VAR6 a: Enjoyment, Living Standards

12 10 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 10 4 3 3 10

9.5 6.5 7 = 6.5-9.5

* Weighted Segment Sampling Frequency Distr = ʄ = 6 - - - 4 15 - - - 8 5 - - - 4 10 7.7 (3) = 4.7

** Scale Value: Percent Voting 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 100.0

Cumulative totals 48 73 0 23.7 62.7 42 56.5 0 0 24.7 54.3 141 0 11.3 37 62.8 19.3 26 23 17 660.394 0.348 0.258

Age Segment 20-35Group Distribution



LessSomewhatLess

Neutral -

Don'tKnow

Somewhatmore

More LessSomewhatLess

Neutral -

Don'tKnow

Somewhatmore

More LessSomewhatLess

Neutral -

Don'tKnow

Somewhatmore

More

1. Empowerment - - 3 4 5 - - 3 8 15 - 2 3 4 -2. Stability - 2 6 4 5 - - - 4 15 - - 3 8 -3. Availability,Access - 2 6 4 5 - - 3 4 10 - - 3 4 54. Rights - 2 3 8 5 - - - 4 10 - - - 4 55. Ownership - - - 4 15 - - - 4 10 - - - 8 56. Enjoyment - - - 4 15 - - - 8 5 - - - 4 10

- 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0

10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0

Work Stratifications:Primary, Secondary, Tertiary

Group Frequency DataMean Distribution = ʄ / n-1

Group Frequency DataMean Distribution = ʄ / n -1


�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛

�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛

�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛

�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛

�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛

�̅�𝑅 = �( 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓 )

𝑛




IDDIn

IDDIn

IDDIn

IDDIn

IDDIn

IDDIn

TRO

D n , a

ndID

DIn

2

1

3

WPS/HISSDIFF = -13.9 %

WPS/HISSDIFF = -11.9 %

WPS/HISS DIFF = + 25.8 %

VAR1a:WPS/HISSMean DIFF = 17 %

= TROD1

= IDDI1

= TROD2

= IDDI2

= TROD3

= IDDI3

= TROD4

= IDDI4

= TROD5

= IDDI5

= TROD6

= IDDI6

240


Source: HISS data, P.D. Huff, 2015; P.D. Huff, 2012, as extracted from this study’s RTD; digital file Chap 2-3 IS Tables 150417-01, MsExl/Pol Survey-B (ebk) Analysis2, Also see PER-A, or Policy Evaluation Rubric - A, Figure 11, pertaining to Political inquiries.

Table 21: Consensus Quartile Profiles (CQP)

∴ {VAR4a, VAR5a and VAR6a} ≤ 1.0 and considered significant.

Test: Using MS Excel Quartile.Inc formula for data sample analysis. Source: HISS data, P.D. Huff, 2012, as extracted from this study’s RTD; digital file Chap 2-3 IS Tables 150417-01, MsExl/Political Survey-B.

n Values = 12 VAR1a Response: Weighted Sample Space Returns an RNG = {3,4,5,3,4,4,5,5,5,2,3,4}VAR1a Response: Weighted Ordered Sample Space Returns an RNG = {2,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5}

1 3 2 3.0 Q1 Lower

2 4 3 4.0 Q2 Median

3 5 3 5.0 Q3 Upper

4 3 3 2.0 IQR Inter-quartile range (Q3-Q1)

5 4 4 Test using MsExcel Quartile.Inc formula for sampling data

6 4 4

7 5 4

8 5 4

9 5 5

10 2 5

11 3 5

12 4 5

Lower Quartile Q1 =pos n = (6+1)/2 = 3 1/2 th Value in from the lowest

(3 1/2rd) Value or Position =Lower Quartile Q1 = (3+ 3) /2

Q1 =Lower Quartile Q2

pos n = (12+1)/2 = 6.5= Looking for the 6 1/2 value in

(6 1/2th) Value or Position =Median Q2 =

Lower Quartile Q3pos n = (6+1)/2 = 3 1/2 th Value in from the highest

(3rd) Value or Position In =Lower Quartile Q3 = 5

Q3 =IQR = Q3 - Q1

Inter Quartile Range =IQR =

Mean =

Mode(s) = 4

n AD1 2 4 22 3 4 13 3 4 14 3 4 15 4 4 06 4 4 07 4 4 08 4 4 09 5 4 1

10 5 4 111 5 4 112 5 4 112 47

= 47/12 4 = 4 = 47/12

= 3.92 = AD or average deviation

3.50

3.92

0.75

6.504.004.00

3.50

3.00

5.00

(5 - 3) 2.00

3.92

To

Lower Quartile 3 1/2 Values in from the median

Upper Quartile 3 1/2 Values in from the median

Lowest Observation

HighestObservation

Q1 Q2 Q3

LowerQuartile

UpperQuartile

Median

Observation Range: (Sample Space)= { 2,5 }

Distribution Characteristic = Symmetrical

Bar and Whisker Plot (Conceptualized Interpretative)

Q1 Posn

Q2 Posn (Median)

Q3 Posn

Outliers = Q1 - 1.5 ( Q3 - Q 1 )= Q1 - 1.5 ( 5.0-3.0 )= 3.0 - 1.5 ( 2.0 )= 3.0 - ( 3.0 )= 0.0 ∴ 0 (or the next lowest in sample space)

and where;

= Q3 + 1.5 ( Q3 - Q1 )= 5.0 + 1.5 ( 5.0-3.0 )= +8 ∴ 8 (or the next highest in sample space)

× ×

Outliers Outliers

�̅�𝑅 = �(𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑓)

𝑛 =

2 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 512

6 Positions

6 Positions

3.5 Positions

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sampling Space: {0,1,2,3,4,5}

Variable: AR1 Weighted Sample Bar Intrepretative

Distribution Characteristic = Symmetrical

Where, 𝑛 = ∑ ʄ

Median = X

3.5 Positions

X

= AD

0 1 2 3 4 5

Test for NegativeSkew If: = Q2- Q1 = (4.0-3.0) = 1.0And, isgreater than = Q3 - Q2= (5.0-4.0)= 1.0Therefore, No

LowestObservation

PossibleX = 0.0

Highest ObservationPossibleX = 5.0

Q2 = 4.0 MedianQ1 = 3.0 Q3 = 5.0

If Positive Skew = Q3 - Q2> Q2 - Q1= (5.0-4.0) >(4.0-3.0)= (1.0) > (1.0), then= No

If Negative Skew = Q2 - Q1 > Q3 - Q2= (4.0-3.0) > (5.0-4.0)= (1.0) > (1.0), then= No

Highly significantAD = 0.75

3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Q1 Lower4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 Q2 Median5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 Q3 Upper

2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 IQR Inter-quartile range (Q3-Q1)

VAR1a VAR2a VAR3a VAR4a VAR5a VAR6a

241


Table 22: Traditional Range of Distribution Analysis (TROD)

RNG Test: Using MS Excel Quartile.Inc formula for data sample analysis. Source: HISS data, P.D. Huff, 2012, as extracted from this study’s RTD; digital file Chap 2-3 IS Tables 150417-01, MsExl/Political Survey-B.

Distribution of Responses

The RTD provides the response weights associated with each of the participant age

segments. These are calculated as follows: Number of Responses (NR) multiplied by Scaled

Value (SV) = Weighted Response Value (WRV) or (NR x SV = WRV). In addition, the scale

VAR1a

Ord

inal

RN

G

VAR2a

Ord

inal

RN

G

VAR3a

Ord

inal

RN

G

VAR4a

Ord

inal

RN

G

VAR5a

Ord

inal

RN

G

VAR6a

Ord

inal

RN

G

Sam

ple

Spac

e

- - - - - - 18

- - - - - - 17

- - - - - - 16

- - - - - - 15

- - - - - - 14

- - - - - - 13

4 5 4 5 5 5 - - - - - - 12

5 5 5 - - -

3 5 4 5 4 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 11

2 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10

5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 9

4 4 4 5 5 5

5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 8

5 4 5 4 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 7

4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 6

3 3 3 4 4 4

4 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 4 4 4 4 5

3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 5 4 5 4 4

5 3 3 4 5 5 3

4 3 3 3 5 5 2

3 2 2 2 4 4 1

3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 Q1 Lower4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 Q2 Median5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 Q3 Upper

2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 IQR Inter-quartile range (Q3-Q1)

VAR1a Segment (20-35) Sampling Distribution

VAR1aSegment (36-55) Sampling Distribution




VAR2a Segment (56-75) Sampling Distribution

VAR1a VAR2a VAR3a VAR4a VAR5a VAR6a

242


values and voting percentages associated with each of the variables are indicated for the related

age segment response.

Age Segment Consensus Trending: The initial data indicates the responding participant

age segment ranging from 20 to 35 years of age; and, those in the segment ranging from 36 to 55

years of age demonstrated a relative consensus when trended. Consensus appeared within the two

segments as having benefited “somewhat more” to “more” from the CPC’s recent political

reforms. Consensus in the other segments where less pronounced.

As Turoff points out to researchers working in the area of policy development the

approach, methods, and tools applied are not perfect when attempting to investigate and

determine predictive outcomes associated with complex environmental factors and the discovery

of possible directions for future priorities and policy (Turoff M. , 2002). Researchers should

expect to obtain results that fail to provide clear inferences, in this case a unifying consensus. In

instances where this occurs, it does not mean the research inquiry was necessarily wrong,

however, it may imply that a time-space bias has shifted pertaining to the original inquiry that has

directly affected the possibility of a consensus occurring (Turoff M. , 2002). In such instances,

researchers may wish to modify or adjust their research inquiries in their subsequent

investigations.

Analysis

As viewed by many Western scholars examined in this study’s SLRs and narratives,

implementing the recommended future policies (RFPs) with positive potential outcomes as

indicated in this section’s series of analysis would demonstrate China is a mature global leader

with clear intensions of continuing to cooperate and support the Western Bloc and its European

partners. The adoption of the positive RFPs would serve as a way of cooling off tensions between

243


the East and the West. These analysts argue such actions would influence reduced each sides

interests to increase global defensive posturing. The positive RFPs would allow China to focus

on politically softening the landings or relations between the U.S. and European governments due

to the tensions and stresses that are related to the present global financial crisis and/or the pursuit

of those strategies and policies that have been identified in this study’s analysis as having

potentially negative outcomes that indicate dominant and highly resistive characteristics when

compared to the Western worldview and related interests.

Implementing this strategy could include identifying environmental sub-factors

(components) within the political environment that are influencing and driving China’s shift away

from Maoist traditions so as to more gradually adapt and transform the country to a strategy-set

and policies that are more in alignment with Western and Eastern European ideologies while

remaining uniquely Chinese. This slowed pace in implementing such policies would reduce the

risks to internal stability associated with rapid and disruptive innovation, change, and expansion.

Researchers Observations

• Martin Jacques argues the CPC’s policy, although yielding a positive effect today, may be

headed for challenging if not troubled times ahead. However, he believes the future

prospects pertaining to this problem can be solved if the Chinese government addresses its

issues early with effective reforms. (Manyika, Chui, Brown, Bughin, 2011; Jacques, 2006)

• Jianming argues there are indeed differences between age groups in China pertaining to

traditional and more modern values. These differences are becoming galvanized as the

CPC’s political policies transform the country from one of a planned-economy to one that

is market-oriented. This shift of ideologies and social values is causing a decline in the

traditional “ideal of communism”. This phenomenon is gradually affecting a reshaping of

244


China’s traditional communist ideologies to ones that are more liberalized, and uniquely

Chinese. This transformation of ideology is particularly stressful to the lower class rural

population segment as supported by this author’s in-country surveys. (Jianming & Xun,

2010, p. 65)

• West argues an opposing position to that of Chinascope. His position is supported by

applying the theory of macro-economic entropy. This theory suggests the larger national

economies become, the more they tend to increase in efficiency and profitability.

However, after achieving this apogee, they begin to face a downward trend. West

continues, arguing national economies can and do grow to a point of complexity that lead

to their collapse. This is due to a growth in scale that begins to impose environmental and

social adversity.

• Cross-cultural ideologies and social psychological dispositions play a significant role in

attempting to analyze and assess the mainland Chinese people. Princeton psychologists

have contrasted East Asia with the West in a series of studies from 1999 to 2014. Their

studies indicate there are significant psychological differences that exist within China.

These differences are almost as large as those that exist between the East and West.

Princeton’s scholars have proposed a “China Rice Theory” that is based on a

history of the Chinese farming rice that has influenced this occupational segment to being

more interdependent on one another. The theory asserts that while farming makes cultures

more independent, these agricultural legacies appear to extend to influence the degree of

popular independence in the modern world. Princeton research cohorts tested 1,162 Han

Chinese participants in 6 sites and found that rice-growing in southern China is more

interdependent and inspires increased holistic-thinking in this region than it does with

wheat-growing farmers in the northern regions. This discovery found that the variances

245


between the northern and southern climates appeared to be consistent for a number of

neighboring counties along what the researchers called “the rice-wheat border”. The

relevance of these studies is considered here as a matter of gaining an appreciation of the

level of difficulty the CPC and central government is facing when attempting to strategize,

plan, and develop internal policy for the country. The Princeton studies show that

modernization and complexity theories are directly affected by biological, climate, and

celestial influences on social and political behavioral data (Princeton Education, 2015).

• The author would argue the numerous structured literature reviews and results of his in-

country survey findings on these issues are supportive of his initial policy

recommendations. (See the Literature Review Section of this document.)

Summary

To summarize, this author returns to the central research question; How are the Chinese

people accepting the CPC’s policy changes that are moving the country to the right of its

traditional Maoist writs and doctrine?

This study’s initial research findings discovered that the CPC and central government’s

political ideologies have embraced strategies and policies that support moving the country to the

right of Mao’s original writs and doctrine. This move is continuing to limit the personal

privileges, rights or civil liberties that are being extended to all classes of the population in terms

of right of enjoyment, social, political, economic, technology and infrastructure benefits. These

modifications to Mao’s writs and ideologies are experimental and subject to reversal by the CPC

and the central government at any time either organization views a significant adverse or negative

shift in public opinion would threaten their position of power, authority, and control over the

people.

246


That said, China’s political strategies will continue to rapidly evolve as the CPC and

central government maintains close monitoring of its internal affairs and external interests.

Overall the country’s pure strategies are focused on maintaining its internal political

stability while at the same time increasing its global influence. In accomplishing this strategy,

China is likely to raise its priorities pertaining to external political policies in both the short and

long-terms. This is largely due to the fact that China’s internal stability and growth strategies are

coupled to and dependent on its external political objectives.

247

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