Dr.CleaF · 2015. 2. 10. ·...

2Dr. Clea F. Rees

Ffydd, Gobaith & ChariadArweiniad i’r CythreuligFaith, Hope & CharityA Guide for the WickedY Gwanwyn/Spring 2015

Canolfan Addysg Gydol Oes Centre for Lifelong LearningPrifysgol Caerdydd Cardiff University

Compilation, supplementary material and cover imageCopyright ©2015 Clea F. Rees.

Cover image created in TikZ.Typeset using pdfLATEX, BibLATEX and Biber in Latin Modern and URW ChanceryL..

Contents

Syllabus 7

Adnoddau/Resources 13Writing with Philosophical Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Rule One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Paper Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Guidelines for Paper Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Philosophical Target Practise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21The Practice of Writing with Philosophical Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Glossary of General Philosophical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Asesiad/Assessment 27Papur/Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

§1 The Character of Virtue Ethics 33Hursthouse, excerpt from On Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

§2 Ancient & Medieval Virtue Ethics 47The Cardinal Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Aristotle, excerpt from Nicomachean Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51The Theological Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Aquinas, excerpts from Summa Theologica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

§3 Contemporary Virtue Ethics 101Contemporary Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Did Virtue Ethics Deserve to Fail? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Schneewind, ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Agent-Based Virtue Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Slote, ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Heyden, Iusticia, c1550

§3 Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Compilation and supplementary material copyright ©2015 Clea F. Rees.Cover image: Pieter van der Heyden (c1550c). Iusticia.

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Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics, as we discussed in our first class, takes character to be of central moral concern.It consists of a family of ethical theories which claim that character traits are properly the

direct objects of moral evaluation. In other words, some character traits are morally good to have(virtues*) and others are morally bad to have (vices*). Unlike blue eyes or a head for heights,considerateness is arguably to its possessor’s moral credit, while vindictiveness is plausibly considereda moral defect.

Recall the two ethical questions we introduced:

Question 1: What kind of character is it good to have?

Question 2: What kinds of actions is it good to do?

Both of these questions are ethical. They are both questions which an ethical theory might try toprovide an answer to. Their focus, however, is rather different.

Theories of right action take questions about the criteria for right action to be fundamental toethical theory. That is, they take the second question to be basic. This is not to say that the firstquestion is unimportant but the answer to the first question depends on the answer to the second.On these views, we need to begin by figuring out what makes actions morally right and wrong. Oncewe know this, we will be able to decide whether it matters morally what kind of characters we haveand, if so, what sorts of character traits are morally good to have.

As we mentioned in our first session, several theories of right action were developed by modernmoral philosophers (figure 2). For example, we noted that both Mill and Kant proposed theories ofthis kind (Kant 1999b; Mill 1979). On Mill’s view, honesty and a willingness to sacrifice oneself forothers are good character traits to have because people who have them tend to perform right actions.An action is right, on Mill’s view, just if it maximises the total happiness of all those concerned. Atrait is virtuous, therefore, just if it tends to maximise total happiness. Similarly, the core principlesof Kant’s account are designed to answer the question of what makes an action right. An action isright, on Kant’s view, just if it is done because it is right. In Kant’s terms, an action is right if it isdone ‘from’ duty*, rather than merely in accordance with it, and somebody who is appropriatelymotivated by moral reasons has a good will* (1999a).

The theories we are concerned with in this course, in contrast, are forms of virtue ethics*.These theories take the first question to be fundamental. Some of these theories take it to be thefundamental question: only once we have considered criteria for good character will we be able todecide whether actions are right or wrong4.

We have briefly explored two historical accounts of virtue: Aristotle’s teleological theory andthe theological framework offered by Aquinas (Aquinas 2013; Aristotle 2002). Since, Aristotle’stheory has played an especially significant role in shaping contemporary virtue ethics, it is worthsummarising some of its key points before proceeding.

4Other theories take both questions to be fundamental. On these views, the answer to the first question does notdetermine the answer to the second question, but neither does the answer to the second determine the answer to thefirst.

104Ffydd, Gobaith & Chariad: Arweiniad i’r Cythreulig — Faith, Hope & Charity: A Guide for the Wicked

Aristotle

Plato

Epictetus

Socrates

Augustine

Aquinas Kant

BenthamMill

Foot

Anscombe

Ancient Medieval ModernContemporary

Virtue Ethicscourage, justice. . .

Right Actionmoral, right, law. . . Virtue Ethics?

BCE CE500 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Figure 2: (Crude!) History of Moral Philosophy

Aristotelian RootsAs we’ve seen, for Aristotle, eudæmonia* (~flourishing, well-being, well-living, happiness) is

the chief good. It is an end in itself, a complete and self-sufficient good (2002, 100–102/1097a25–1098a20). What this means is that eudæmonia is not merely a means to some other good and it isnot good only if some other condition holds. It is good in and of itself. If you have eudæmonia, youdon’t need anything else. If you are familiar with the moral philosophy of Mill or Bentham, thismay sound rather familiar but the similarity is misleading because ‘happiness’ means something verydifferent for Aristotle. Unlike those theories, however, Aristotle’s is teleological*. The chief good —that is, eudæmonia — for human beings consists in fulfilling the function of a human being well.The function of humans involves the use of reason since humans are, Aristotle thinks, distinctivelyrational. That is, humans differ from other animals in their ability to use reason. The chief humangood — that is, eudæmonia for human beings — is a matter of distinctively human excellence. Sohuman eudæmonia turns out to consist in leading a rational life well.

For Aristotle, there are two kinds of human excellence: intellectual excellences and excellencesof character. The best — happiest — human life involves both kinds of excellence. Intellectualexcellences involve rational reflection. This might include, for example, doing mathematics, discussingphilosophy or translating Aristotle. Intellectual excellences are taught.

Excellences of character involve the rational guidance of non-rational aspects of human life such asemotions, physical sensations and desires and appetites. Excellences of character are habits resultingfrom training or habituation. They are typically means which avoid the extremes of both excess anddeficiency. For example, temperance or moderation involves the tendency to consume, and desire,food and drink in a reasonable way. Somebody who is moderate desires the right amount of the rightkinds of food and drink at the right times and in the right places (figure 3). She neither eschewsfood and drink altogether (deficiency) nor indulges gluttony (excess).

In this section, we turn to contemporary discussions of virtue ethics, beginning with Foot’sneo-Aristotelian theory (2002). Drawing inspiration from Aristotle and Aquinas, Foot brings thetools of contemporary analytic philosophy to bear on the question, What is a virtue? We then lookat the criticisms of virtue ethics made by Schneewind in ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’ (1990). Finally,we consider an alternative to the neo-Aristotelian approach in Slote’s ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’

Contemporary Virtue Ethics 105

Image credit:Martin(2005–2013)

Goldilocks might enjoy Aristotle. As she exploresthe house of the three bears, she repeatedly findsthat Father Bear’s things are uncomfortably closeto one extreme; Mother Bear’s things are too closeto the other extreme; but Baby Bear’s things arealways ‘just right’.For example, unlike the porridge of his parents,Baby Bear’s is at the perfect temperature —neither too hot nor too cold.

Figure 3: Goldilocks: A fairy tale analogy for the Aristotelian ‘doctrine of the mean’?

(1995).

Further Reading‘Virtues and Vices’ is the first in a collection of Foot’s essays on ethical theory. The collection

is available from the library in electronic (Foot 2003b) or paper (Foot 2002) form, and containsseveral essays relevant to the topics we are discussing. Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics is anotherneo-Aristotelian account and is also available in electronic (2001) or paper (1999) form.

Anscombe’s seminal paper, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ is not an easy read but is a challengeworth attempting for those already familiar with key concepts in moral theory (1958).

Virtue Ethics is a collection of key papers on virtue ethics (Crisp and Slote 1997). It includes bothAnscombe’s paper and some of the papers included in this course packet. The anthology representsthe views of both virtue ethicists and their critics. It includes Hursthouse’s ‘Virtue Theory andAbortion’, a reasonably accessible attempt to respond to the critics (1991). In particular, Hursthousetries to respond to an objection we will see Schneewind make, namely that virtue ethics cannotprovide practical guidance. The Handbook of Virtue Ethics is a more recent collection of paperswhich represents a cross-section of current work on virtue ethics (2013). Both collections should beavailable from the library.

If you are interested in Slote’s discussion of ‘morality as caring’, I recommend Held’s The Ethicsof Care: Personal, Political, and Global (2006). This is a credible and careful argument for acare-based ethic, which is generally clear, interesting and well-argued.

If this is your first experience of moral philosophy, I recommend starting with the Hooft andpicking out one or two papers which interest you. The collection is rather a hefty one and so offersa considerable amount of choice. As is often the case, the introduction offers an overview of thecontents and may help you to select items likely to be of particular interest.

ReferencesAnscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1958). ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. Philosophy 33.124

(Jan. 1958), 1–19. doi: 10.1017/S0031819100037943.Aquinas, Thomas (2013). Summa Theologica. Prod. by Chris Widdowson. Trans. by Fathers of the

English Dominican Province. 17th Jan. 2013. url: http://chris.widdowson.id.au/?p=992(visited on 23/01/2015).


Aristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans., with a historical introd., by Christopher Rowe.Philosophical introd. and comment. by Sarah Broadie. Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Crisp, Roger and Michael A. Slote, eds. (1997). Virtue Ethics. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxfordand New York: Oxford University Press.

Foot, Philippa (2002). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon, 1–18.

— (2003a). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford:Oxford University Press/Oxford Scholarship Online, Nov. 2003. doi: 10.1093/0199252866.003.0001.

— (2003b). Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress/Oxford Scholarship Online, Nov. 2003. doi: 10.1093/0199252866.001.0001.

Held, Virginia (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. Oxford and New York:Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0195180992.001.0001.

Hooft, Stan van, ed. (2013). The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. In collab. with Nafiska Athanassouliset al. Durham, U.K.: Acumen.

Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991). ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, 223–246. JSTOR: 2265432.

— (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.— (2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Oxford Scholarship Online, Nov. 2001.

doi: 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001.Kant, Immanuel (1999a). Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Ed. and

trans. from the German by Mary J. Gregor. With an intro. by Allen W. Wood. The CambridgeEdition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 37–108.

— (1999b). Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. from the German by Mary J. Gregor. With anintro. by Allen W. Wood. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, Phillip (2005). url: http://languagearts.phillipmartin.info/cl_goldilocks.htm (visitedon 27/01/2015).

Mill, John Stuart (1979). Utilitarianism. Ed. by George Sher. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett.Repr. of Utilitarianism. 7th ed. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1879. Repr.

Schneewind, J. B. (1990). ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’. Ethics 101.1, 42–63. JSTOR: 2381891.Slote, Michael A. (1995). ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20.1, 83–101.


Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Any moral theory in the virtue ethics tradition must explain what a virtue is. That is, it mustexplain what criteria something must satisfy if it is to count as a ‘virtue’. Moreover, if the

theory takes the question of what makes a character good to be a fundamental one, then thesecriteria must be independent of any criterion of right action.

In ‘Virtues and Vices’, Foot offers an account of ‘virtue’ (2002). That is, Foot is offering us astory about what it is for something to count as a ‘virtue’.

The key reading for this week is Foot’s ‘Virtues and Vices’ (2003) and is included in this coursepacket. In preparing for class, focus on questions 1, 2 and 3.

1 Philippa FootIf Foot’s account is right, then anything satisfying her proposed criteria will be a virtue and

anything which fails to satisfy them will not be a virtue. In more technical terms, her accountproposes a set of necessary condition* and sufficient condition* conditions for ‘virtue’: itproposes a definition* of‘virtue’ (figure 4).

Foot’s account of virtue is based on that of Aristotle and Aquinas. Essentially, Foot presents anaccount which owes much to the earlier theories of Aristotle and Aquinas but which situates thataccount within the contemporary debate.

Philosophers are concerned with the arguments which authors give for their theses. In order toevaluate a piece of philosophical writing, we need to clarify both the claims the author is makingand the reasons she gives in support of those claims.

Thesis

1. What is Foot’s main thesis or conclusion in ‘Virtues and Vices’ (2003)?

Terminology

Understanding a philosophical text often involves identifying specialist terminology and ensuringthat you understand how the author is using that terminology.

2. Identify and explain in your own words the terms which are important for understanding‘Virtues and Vices’. Your explanations should reflect Foot’s use of the terms.

Virtues and vices

In order to develop an adequate conception of the virtues, Foot needs some examples to workwith. These should be instances which clearly count as virtues if anything does so that any adequateconception must count these examples as instances of virtues.

It will also helpful to have some sense of the sorts of things which should not count as virtuesso that any proposed conception which includes them can be rejected. As we discussed during ourfirst meeting, these will include both vices, on the one hand, and character traits which are neithervirtues nor vices, on the other.


A satisfactory definition of a term ‘X’ sets out both necessary and sufficient conditionsfor something being an X.

We can think of a definition like a search light, picking thingsout which fall within the beam of light and excluding thingswhich remain in darkness. A good definition of ‘X’ is onewhich gets things just right — anything which is an X getsilluminated and anything which is not an X is left in darkness.

A necessary condition is one which must obtain. For ex-ample, having four sides in a necessary condition for being asquare.A sufficient condition is one which is enough by itself. Forexample, being a square is a sufficient condition for being afour-sided shape.

This means a definition can fail in two different ways:

Problem 1: conditions are jointly insufficientProposed definition of ‘square’: A square is a rectangle. Thatis, being a rectangle is a necessary and sufficient condition forbeing a square.Is the condition necessary? Yes. All squares are included.Is the condition sufficient? No. The definition includes eventhose rectangles which do not have four equal sides and so arenot squares.So, the definition proposed is unsatisfactory because itincludes too much.In this case, the definition is too broad.

Problem 2: one or more unnecessary conditionsProposed definition of ‘rectangle’: A rectangle is a square.That is, being a square is a necessary and sufficient conditionfor being a rectangle.Is the condition sufficient? Yes. No non-rectangles areincluded.Is the condition necessary? No. The definition excludesrectangles which do not happen to have four equal sides.So, the definition proposed is unsatisfactory because itincludes too little.In this case, the definition is too narrow.

Spotlight Image Credit: AVE Services

Figure 4: Definitions


‘Cardinal’ virtues1. courage

2. temperance

3. wisdom (phronesis*)

(a) knowing means to ends• given good ends. . .• accessibility

(b) knowing value of ends• true values, correct judgements• more. . .

4. justice

‘Theological’ virtues

1. faith

2. hope

3. charity

Vices

• pride

• vanity

• worldliness

• avarice

• (excessive) self-love

• intemperance

• cowardice

Neither virtues nor vices

• health

• physical strength

• memory

• concentration

• specialised knowledge

• cleverness

• ability to spell

• (moderate) self-love

Foot’s proposals

Foot thinks of character traits as dispositions*. Roughly speaking, this means that to have aparticular character trait, such as compassion, is to be disposed to act compassionately when thesituation demands it. So a compassionate person will tend to react sympathetically and helpfullywhen she encounters situations in which she finds others in distress. If such a person sees an elderlywoman drop her shopping and struggle to pick it up, she will tend to stop and help by picking upthe stray items, replacing them in the bag and ensuring that the woman is able to continue on herway. Of course, if she sees nobody in need of assistance, the compassionate person will just do herown shopping and go home. The idea is that she is compassionate even when compassion isn’t calledfor. She is disposed to help even when no help is needed. The disposition only manifests itself inaction when the situation calls for it.

Foot’s paper consists of some general discussion and background followed by a series of proposeddefinitions* of ‘virtue’. Each proposal is a refinement of the previous one which Foot supports byarguing that the refinement succeeds in avoiding a problem identified with the previous proposal.Each problem she identifies takes the form of a counterexample which demonstrates the previousproposal to be unsatisfactory (figure 5).

I’ve divided up Foot’s discussion into a series of 10 proposed definitions of ‘virtue’. The linebetween one proposal and the next is sometimes drawn somewhat arbitrarily. Where I present two

110 Ffydd, Gobaith & Chariad: Arweiniad i’r Cythreulig — Faith, Hope & Charity: A Guide for the Wicked

Philosophers often use counterexamples. Counterexamples can support arguments in variousways.The type of counterexample of interest to us here is one which shows that a definition isunsatisfactory because it does not include both necessary and sufficient conditions. Theseterms are explained in figure 4.Foot is concerned with definitions of the term ‘virtue’ — that is, analyses of our concept of‘virtue’ which claim to lay out necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s counting asvirtue. This means that:

1. nothing which counts as ‘virtue’ could fail to satisfy those conditions (i.e. the conditionsare all necessary);

2. anything which satisfies those conditions must count as a ‘virtue’ (i.e. the conditions arejointly sufficient).

Thinking about the two ways in which a definition can fail to be satisfactory (figure 4), wecan see that two different types of counterexample might show that a proposed definition isunsatisfactory. A counterexample might show that:

1. the proposed conditions are jointly insufficient (i.e. the proposed definition is too broad);

• A rectangle without four equal sides would be a counterexample to the proposeddefinition of ‘square’ in figure 4.

2. one or more of the proposed conditions are unnecessary (i.e. the proposed definition is toonarrow).

• A rectangle without four equal sides would be a counterexample to the proposeddefinition of ‘rectangle’ in figure 4.

Figure 5: Counterexamples


distinct proposals, one might sometimes equally well think of Foot as discussing a single proposaland vice versa. The series should, however, help to clarify the general line of thought Foot presentsin her paper.

Proposal 1: A virtue is a disposition of persons which generally benefits both persons who havethe disposition and other people (Foot 2002, 3).

Problem: includes too much. Health, physical strength, memory and concentration fit the criteriabut are not virtues.

Proposal 2: A virtue is a disposition of persons which:

• generally benefits both persons who have the disposition and other people;• ‘belongs to the will’ i.e. involves intentions/motives (Foot 2002, 4).

Problem: possibly includes too much. Some of these cases turn out to involve blameworthyignorance. For example, if I negligently fail to ensure that I am giving the patientmedicine and not poison even though you told me how important this was, the fact thatI mean well in giving the patient what I believe to be medicine will not excuse me if Iam in fact giving her poison. But here we can say that it is the earlier negligence whichis culpable.

Problem: includes too much. Cases of people who mean well but whose ‘hearts lie in a differentplace’ satisfy the criteria but seem to lack virtue.

Problem: includes too little. It fails to deal adequately with cases of immediate action such as thetracker saving the boy.


• generally benefits both persons who have the disposition and other people;• belongs to the will i.e. involves intentions/motives, desires (Foot 2002, 5).

Problem: includes too little. Wisdom is a virtue but doesn’t seem to satisfy the criteria.


• generally benefits both persons who have the disposition and other people;• belongs to the will i.e. involves intentions/motives, desires, values etc. (Foot

2002, 6–7).

Problem: includes too much. The ability to spell, cook, make rocking chairs, do logic, write poetryor paint pictures seem to meet the criteria but aren’t virtues.


• generally benefits both persons who have the disposition and other people;• engages the will:

◦ involves intentions/motives, desires, values etc.;◦ involuntary error in performance is preferable to voluntary error (Foot

2002, 7–8).


Problem: includes too much. Moderate self-love satisfies the criteria but isn’t a virtue.



◦ involves intentions/motives, desires, values etc.;◦ involuntary error in performance is preferable to voluntary error;

• acts as a corrective to a natural tendency (Foot 2002, 8–10).

Problem: includes too little. The criteria exclude people who are naturally courageous or who takejoy in generosity.




• acts as a corrective to a natural human tendency, even if some persons with thedisposition don’t share the general human tendency the virtue corrects (Foot2002, 10–11).

Problem: includes too little. Sometimes, moral praise is due to those who must make special effortsdue to especially unfortunate circumstances.




• acts as a corrective to a natural human tendency, even if some persons withthe disposition don’t share the general human tendency the virtue corrects,or to temptations persons with the disposition face as a result of unfortunatecircumstances rather than defects of character (Foot 2002, 11–14).

Problem: includes too much. Are there virtuous villains? The criteria suggest so, but one mightdoubt this. . .

Proposal 9: Might say that a particular virtue does not operate as a virtue in the villain (Foot2002, 16).

Problem: includes too little. The same character trait may be involved in the pursuit of both goodand nefarious goals.

Proposal 10: A virtue is a disposition which meets the above criteria and can be thought of as apower which:


• ‘operates as a virtue’ on a particular occasion if it is connected with goodmotives, intentions etc.;

• ‘is a virtue in a particular person’ if it generally operates as a virtue in that personi.e. is not typically connected with ‘defective action’ in her (Foot 2002, 16–17).

Argumentation

3. What reasons does Foot give for the main conclusion you identified in question 1?

2 Virtuous and vicious character traitsAs Foot points out, even once a conception of ‘virtue’ is agreed, there is a further question

concerning which specific traits actually are virtues and vices (2002, 10). If an Aristotelian accountsuch as that offered by Foot is accepted, for example, which traits are virtues, which are vicesand which are neither will depend on human nature. If the traditional picture of human beings ismistaken — if humans are typically subject to different temptations — then the traditional list ofvirtues and vices will be mistaken because it will not constitute an accurate list of correctives. Thereare various ways in which the list might be mistaken: first, the list of traditional vices might includetraits which are either morally neutral or, even, virtues; second, the list of traditional virtues mightinclude morally neutral or vicious traits; third, there might be virtuous and/or vicious traits whichdo not appear on either list and have therefore been considered morally neutral by default.

In thinking about these issues, it can be particularly helpful to consider a wide range of examples.By thinking carefully about the traits these persons have and the way in which those traits affecttheir lives and communities, we can build up a richer picture of what matters in our moral world.

Because the picture we are looking at makes explicit reference to human nature, the list of virtuesand vices is a list of human virtues and human vices. If Martians are never afraid to take reasonablerisks or tempted to flee in the face of danger, courage will not be a virtue in them although it is inus. If Alpha Centaurians are naturally inclined to share good things with all around them, charitywill not be a virtue in them although it is in us. Likewise, if Alpha Centaurians tend to be deficientin self-love and to ignore their own needs in their eagerness to assist others, (moderate) self-lovemight be a virtue in them although it is not in us. This means it is not possible to determine whatit is to live well as a human being without empirical investigation. Ethical theory will depend, then,on knowledge of the world and we cannot hope to learn about morality by using reason alone. Wemust, rather, poke around in the world to discover what humans are actually like. Ethical knowledgemust be a posteriori* rather than a priori*; and moral truths must be contingent* rather thannecessary*.

Examples

The full range of human lives, both factual and (realistically) fictional, is available as a sourceof case studies. It may be especially important to think about exploring a wide range of types ofgood and bad human lives, drawing on examples from different times, various cultures and diversegroupings within societies.

Evaluation

4. Is Foot’s account of what it is for something to be a ‘virtue’ a good one? That is, is herdefinition* a good one? (See figure 4.) Why or why not? At the end of our first class, we‘brain-stormed’ a list of character traits, dividing them into virtues, vices, morally-neutral traitsand those we weren’t sure about. How well does Foot’s proposed definition of a ‘virtue’ fit thetraits on that list? (See figure 5.)


Traditional virtues and vices

Which of the following traditional virtues and vices need to be re-evaluated? Which charactertraits should be added to the lists?

Traditional virtues

1. courage

2. justice

3. temperance

4. wisdom

5. charity

6. faith

7. hope

Traditional vices: 7 ‘deadly sins’

1. anger

2. covetousness

3. envy

4. gluttony

5. lust

6. pride

7. sloth

References(2015). AVE Services. url: http://audiovisualexcellence.co.uk/locations/av- audio-visual-

equipment-hire-conference-newbury/stage-disco- lighting-hire/01- spotlight/ (visited on29/01/2015).

Aquinas, Thomas (2013). Summa Theologica. Prod. by Chris Widdowson. Trans. by Fathers of theEnglish Dominican Province. 17th Jan. 2013. url: http://chris.widdowson.id.au/?p=992(visited on 23/01/2015).

Aristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans., with a historical introd., by Christopher Rowe.Philosophical introd. and comment. by Sarah Broadie. Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress.


— (2003). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford:Oxford University Press/Oxford Scholarship Online, Nov. 2003. doi: 10.1093/0199252866.003.0001.

115

Hard copy includes Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’(Foot 2003)


Hard copy includes Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’ (2003)

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Did Virtue Ethics Deserve to Fail?

No substantive philosophical theory is without its critics and virtue ethics* is certainly noexception. In the next section of the course, we will look at objections based on the findings

of social psychologists. For now, however, we will confine ourselves to criticism which takes a moretraditionally philosophical form.

Ethical theory is essentially practical: it is intended to guide. One key objection to virtue ethicsis that it just doesn’t help. Suppose you are a member of the resistance in Nazi occupied Europe andyou are trying to decide whether or not to bomb a nightclub popular with members of the SS. Yourquestion is, should I do it? If you had some moral rules, you might be able to apply them. But, theobjection says, virtue ethics cannot give you moral rules: all virtue ethics can do is tell you to actvirtuously, or to do what a virtuous person would do. But that is of no help at all. If you were fullyvirtuous, of course, you’d presumably know what the virtuous person would do. But, if you werefully virtuous, you wouldn’t need to turn to a moral theory for guidance. And if you are not fullyvirtuous, virtue ethics offers little help. Not only does virtue ethics not give you any help in figuringout how to act virtuously. It doesn’t even give you any help in figuring out who the virtuous peopleare so that you can ask one of them what to do. That is, either you don’t need virtue ethics (becauseyou are already virtuous) or it can’t help you (because you aren’t).

In ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’, Schneewind offers an analysis of virtue’s historical ‘misfortunes’and an argument that those misfortunes were largely justified by virtue ethics’ inherent weaknesses(1990). One question we will, therefore, want to think about is how fair such criticisms are andwhether the most plausible forms of virtue ethics can avoid them.

Schneewind provides a whirlwind tour of modern moral philosophy, sketching a large number ofethical theories in the space of a few pages. Do not expect to follow every detail of this discussionunless you are already familiar with the details of these various theories. Note, in particular, thatthe discussion of Kant is likely to seem unfamiliar even if you have studied Kant’s moral philosophybefore. This is because Schneewind is drawing on Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, whereas you arelikely to have studied only the Groundwork.

The key reading for this week is Schneewind’s ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’ (1990) and is includedin this course packet. In preparing for class, focus on questions 1, 2 and 4.

Recall that we are concerned with the arguments which authors give for their theses and that inorder to evaluate a piece of philosophical writing, we need to clarify both the claims the author ismaking and the reasons she gives in support of those claims.

Thesis

1. What is Schneewind’s main thesis or conclusion in ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’ (1990)?

Terminology


2. Identify and explain in your own words the terms which are important for understanding ‘TheMisfortunes of Virtue’. Your explanations should reflect Schneewind’s use of the terms.


We have seen that philosophy is concerned with arguments and with evaluating them i.e.with deciding whether they are any good. By now, you probably have an intuitive sense of whatarguments are and the sorts of considerations relevant to evaluating them. We now introducesome terminology to capture our intuitive sense of what arguments are and what makes themgood or bad.

An argument is a set (or group) of sentences. One of the sentences is the conclusion ofthe argument and the other sentences are premises5. The premises are supposed to supportthe conclusion. The conclusion is the claim the argument is trying to convince you of.

Figure 6: Arguments, premises & conclusions

3. Explain the following distinctions in your own words:(a) ‘virtue-centered’ ethical theories vs ‘act-centered’ or ‘rule-centered’ accounts (section I);(b) ‘perfect’ vs ‘imperfect’ duties (section III).

Argumentation

4. What argument does Schneewind give for the main conclusion you identified in question 1?(See figure 6.)(a) What are the premises?(b) How are the premises supposed to support the conclusion?Try to identify Schneewind’s key claims and the contributions they make to the overall structureof Schneewind’s argument. To identify these claims, it may help to write down a single sentencesummarising the main point Schneewind is trying to make in each section of the paper. Aresome sections more significant than others? Do the details of some sections play especiallyimportant roles in the case Schneewind makes for his conclusion?

Evaluation

5. Is the argument you explained in question 4(a) valid?(b) sound?(See figure 7.) Why or why not?

6. Is Schneewind’s characterisation of virtue ethics in section I of his paper a fair one?7. Did ‘virtue’s own weakness. . . [bring] its misfortunes down upon its own head’ (63)?8. If I’m not very good at figuring morality out for myself, how can I distinguish between a genuine

moral law and somebody else’s moral mistake?

ReferencesKant, Immanuel (1999a). Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Ed. and

trans. from the German by Mary J. Gregor. With an intro. by Allen W. Wood. The CambridgeEdition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 37–108.

2Technically, an argument can have zero or more premises but we will not be concerned about arguments with zeropremises for now.


Intuitively, a good argument needs two things:

(i) good logic/reasoning i.e. the premises should support the conclusion;(ii) good premises i.e. the premises should be true.

Philosophers use the terms valid and invalid to describe the quality of an argument’s logic.An argument is valid if, and only if, the conclusion follows from the premises. Thatis, it is not possible for the premises to all be true and the conclusion false. In other words, ifthe premises are all true then the conclusion must be true as well. An argument isinvalid if, and only if, it is not valid.

Here are two examples:

1. Purple mice discussDescartes daily.

2. If purple mice discuss anyphilosopher daily, theymust be super-intelligentaliens.

3. Descartes is a philosopher.

4. Purple mice must besuper-intelligent aliens.

Exhibit A: A valid argument.

1. A child starving on your doorstep is relevantlysimilar to a child starving thousands of miles away.

2. In the case of a child starving on your doorstep,you should give the child something to eat.

3. Contributing to famine relief (in the distance case)is relevantly similar to giving the child something toeat (in the doorstep case).

4. In the case of a child starving thousands of milesaway, you should contribute to famine relief.

Exhibit B: Another valid argument.

Clearly, validity is not enough. Exhibit A is valid but obviously rubbish!

Philosophers use the terms sound and unsound to describe the overall quality of anargument. An argument is sound if, and only if, it is valid and all its premises aretrue. An argument is unsound if, and only if, it is not sound.

So an argument can go wrong in two different ways:

(i) An argument may be unsound because it is invalid.i.e. The logic is bad — the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises.

(ii) An argument may be unsound because one (or more) of the premises is false.

On the one hand, if you can show either that an argument is invalid or that one of itspremises is false, you’ve shown it is unsound. An unsound argument gives you no reason,by itself, to accept its conclusion.

On the other hand, the conclusion of a sound argument is true. If the conclusion isfalse, there must be something wrong with the argument.

So if you think an argument’s conclusion is false but the argument seems sound, you needto rethink!

Figure 7: Validity & soundness


Kant, Immanuel (1999b). The Metaphysics of Morals. In Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. fromthe German by Mary J. Gregor. With an intro. by Allen W. Wood. The Cambridge Edition ofthe Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 353–603.

Schneewind, J. B. (1990). ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’. Ethics 101.1, 42–63. JSTOR: 2381891.

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Hard copy includes Schneewind, ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’(Schneewind 1990)


Hard copy includes Schneewind, ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’ (1990)

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Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

Ethical evaluation, as we have seen, may have a variety of targets. It may be focused primarilyon agents’ actions. Or it may be focused primarily on agents’ characters. We saw Schneewind

argue that any theory worth calling a form of ‘virtue ethics’ must understand the virtues as having‘a life of their own’ in the sense that their value must not depend on moral rules or laws (1990, 44).What, however, is the relation between the value of character traits and the value of actions?Schneewind’s criterion leaves this question open: the criterion is consistent with the claim thatwhat makes something a virtue — what gives a character trait its ethical value — depends on itsconnection with action. Although the criterion says that a trait’s value cannot depend on moralrules, it might still depend on the value of actions. Indeed, we saw Foot start from the idea of avirtue as a trait which is generally good for both its possessor and others (2002), and this seems tobe at least partly because of its connection with action. Compassion is a virtue, on this view, atleast partly because the compassionate person is disposed to relieve others’ suffering; courage is avirtue, at least in part, because the courageous person tends to respond to danger in ways whichbenefit everyone. That is, the value of character traits still seems to depend on the value of actions.

In ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’, Slote offers a more ‘radical’ form of virtue ethics inspired by analternative to the Aristotelian tradition (1995). In particular, he argues for two promising ways todevelop ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics*, contrasting this with ‘agent-focused’ virtue ethics*.

The key reading for this week is Slote’s

Particular Triangles

Formof

Triangle

Figure 8: No particular triangle is perfect: only the‘form’ is perfectly triangular.

‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ (1995) and isincluded in this course packet.

If you are not familiar with the ideas dis-cussed in section 4, ignore the details hereand focus on the other sections of Slote’spaper.

You may also be unfamiliar with someof the ideas presupposed in section 3, butdon’t let mention of Platonic Forms intimid-ate you (figure 8): the basic idea developedin this section does not depend on Plato’smetaphysics.

Recall that we are concerned with thearguments which authors give for their thesesand that in order to evaluate a piece ofphilosophical writing, we need to clarifyboth the claims the author is making andthe reasons she gives in support of thoseclaims.

In preparing for class, focus on questions 1–4, 7 and 8.

Thesis

1. What is Slote’s main thesis or conclusion in ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ (1995)?


Terminology


2. Identify and explain in your own words the terms which are important for understanding‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’. Your explanations should reflect Slote’s use of the terms.

3. Explain the following distinctions in your own words:(a) ‘agent-based’ ethical theories vs ‘agent-focused’ virtue ethics (section 1);

• How does this distinction compare with Schneewind’s distinction between ‘virtue-centered’and ‘act-centered’ or ‘rule-centered’ theories (1990)?

(b) ‘cool’ vs ‘warm’ agent-based theories (section 3).

Argumentation

4. Explain each of the objections Slote considers in section 2. How does he reply to each of theseobjections?

5. What does Slote mean by ‘morality as inner strength’ (section 3)? Why does he reject this as abasis for developing an agent-based theory?

6. What does Slote mean by ‘morality as universal benevolence’ (section 4)? Why does he considerthis a promising approach?

• Skip this question if you are not familiar with consequentialist and utilitarian ethics.7. What does Slote mean by ‘morality as caring’ (section 5)? Why does Slote think that morality

as caring provides a promising way to develop an agent-based theory? Why does Slote thinkthat agent-basing provides a promising way to develop the idea of morality as caring?

• Don’t worry if you are unfamiliar with Noddings’ view — so are most philosophers. Moreover,Slote is himself unsure what her view is and, insofar as he is able to ascertain what it is,seems dubious about its value. Although I try to remain neutral on such questions, for therecord, I think that Slote is being charitable not to a fault, but so far beyond it that the faulthas long been left behind in the vast reaches of interstellar space.

8. Explain the objection Slote considers in section 6. How does Slote respond to this objection?

Reflection

9. Schneewind draws the following inference at the end of section I of his paperAn act-centered morality will naturally welcome the virtues, construed in its own way, as

subordinate to the explicit rules or laws that require specific actions. So if a virtue-centeredethic is to be significantly different from an act-centered ethic, it needs to show that the virtueswhich are most important to morality have a life of their own, which is independent of rules orlaws. (Schneewind 1990, 44)

Should neo-Aristotelians accept this criterion in light of the distinctions drawn by Slote? Shouldvirtue ethicists?

ReferencesFoot, Philippa (2002). ‘Virtues and Vices’. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy.

Oxford: Oxford University Press/Clarendon, 1–18.


Noddings, Nel (2002). Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. NewYork: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.

Schneewind, J. B. (1990). ‘The Misfortunes of Virtue’. Ethics 101.1, 42–63. JSTOR: 2381891.Slote, Michael A. (1995). ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20.1, 83–101.


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Glossary

a posterioriK is knowable only a posteriori iff K cannot be known a priori. See a priori*.

a prioriK is knowable a priori iff K can be known independently of experience. See a posteriori*.

actSomething one does deliberately and voluntarily; an action.

‘agent-based’ virtue ethicsAny virtue ethics which takes the motives, character traits and mind of a moral agent — asopposed to actions — as the sole ultimate ground for ethically evaluating her (Slote 1995).Compare ‘agent-focused’ virtue ethics*. See morality as inner strength*, moralityas universal benevolence*, morality as caring*.

‘agent-focused’ virtue ethicsAny virtue ethics which takes the motives, character traits and mind of a moral agent — asopposed to actions — as the primary focus of any satisfactory evaluation (Slote 1995).Compare ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics*.

arete1) (ἀρετή, Greek) Excellence of a thing or a person. Christopher Rowe translates Aristotle’suse of the term as ‘excellence’ (2002). Philippa Foot points out that the term is used by theAncient Greeks to include many non-moral excellences that contemporary usage would notconsider to be instances of ‘virtue’ (2002). For Aristotle, excellence is relative to functionor purpose. For example, an excellent house serves the functions of a house — providingshelter from the elements, space and facilities for the residents etc. — well. Given Aristotle’steleological* conception of the world, this is so not only for artefacts, but also for naturalobjects and human and non-human animals.2) The moral goodness, moral worth or virtue of an agent.

contingentT is contingently true iff T is true in this (the actual) world, but not in all possible worlds.See necessary*.

definitionA definition provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a term — i.e.a definition of ‘x’ gives necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being an ‘x’. Seenecessary condition*, sufficient condition*.

dispositionA property of an object or organism which manifests itself if and when some condition issatisfied. For example, glass is brittle. Brittleness is a dispositional property. This means thatglass is disposed to break under certain conditions e.g. if it is dropped from a height onto a


hard floor. So the glasses in my kitchen cupboard have this property even though I have notyet broken them. Even though they have not yet broken, they are brittle because they have atendency to break if the conditions are right.

eudæmonia(εὐδαιμονία, Greek) This term has no exact equivalent in modern English and is variouslytranslated as ‘well-being’, ‘flourishing’, ‘happiness’ etc. or, sometimes, merely transliterated inorder to ensure no loss of original nuance.

morality as caringA form of ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics* discussed by Michael Slote (1995), which takes‘caring’ as the fundamental virtue, and, hence, as the fundamental moral value. Althoughinspired by Nel Noddings sense of ‘one-caring’ (1984), Slote rejects the details of her accountand proposes a virtuous balance between (i) concern for self; (ii) concern for strangers;(iii) particularistic caring; (iv) caring for as more admirable than being cared for.

morality as inner strengthA form of ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics* discussed by Michael Slote (1995), which takes ‘innerstrength’ in four forms as the fundamental virtue, and, hence, as the fundamental moral value.These are (1) self-sufficiency as self-reliance; (2) self-sufficiency as moderation & generosity;(3) courage in dealing honestly with both the truth and danger; (4) carrying through one’sprojects, persistence, determination, commitment to one’s purposes in the face of set-backs etc.

morality as universal benevolenceA form of ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics* discussed by Michael Slote (1995), which takes‘universal benevolence’ as the fundamental virtue, and, hence, as the fundamental moral value.Universal benevolence is understood as a ‘regulative motive’ — i.e. as the motive to appeal toin cases of conflict between other virtues.

necessaryT is necessarily true iff T is true in all possible worlds. See contingent*.

necessary conditionA condition for something is necessary iff the condition must be satisfied if that something isto be the case. In the case of a term ‘x’, a necessary condition for the application of ‘x’ is onewhich something must satisfy if it is an ‘x’.e.g. something’s ‘having 4 sides’ is a necessary condition for it’s being a ‘square’ because allsquares must have 4 sides.See sufficient condition*.

phronesis(φρόνησις, Greek) Wisdom.

sufficient conditionA condition for something is sufficient iff the condition guarantees that that something is thecase. In the case of a term ‘x’, a sufficient condition for the application of ‘x’ is one which issuch that anything which satisfies the condition must be an ‘x’.e.g. a sufficient condition for something’s being a ‘square’ is that it ‘is a 4cm x 4cm rectangle’

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because anything which is a 4cm x 4cm rectangle must be a square.See necessary condition*.

teleologicalConcerned with ends, functions or purposes of things. A teleological approach to human-madeobjects is typically unproblematic — such an object’s function or purpose depends only onwhat it was designed to do or what purpose it was intended to serve. A teleological approachto natural objects, including human beings, deserts, small furry creatures from Alpha Centaurietc., has been, and continues to be, controversial.

viceA negative character trait, especially one with ethical disvalue. See virtue*.

virtueA positive character trait, especially an ethically valuable one. See vice*.

virtue ethicsCovers a number of theories which claim that the kind of person one is has moral value: oneshould be virtuous. Virtues* are character traits of a certain sort, and vices* are charactertraits of another sort. (Clearly, however, some character traits might be neither virtuous norvicious.)

ReferencesAristotle (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. Trans., with a historical introd., by Christopher Rowe.

Philosophical introd. and comment. by Sarah Broadie. Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress.


Noddings, Nel (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. Berkeley andLos Angeles, California: University of California Press.

Slote, Michael A. (1995). ‘Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20.1, 83–101.

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