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DiannaTaylor2014ISSN:18325203

FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133,April2014ARTICLEUncertainOntologiesDiannaTaylor,JohnCarrollUniversityABSTRACT: This following essay explores themeaning and implications of philosophicalcritiqueandcreativitywithintheworkofGillesDeleuzeandMichelFoucault.Thetwophilosophers appeals toontology, as an important siteuponwhich their ethicopolitical commitmentstocritiqueandcreativitysimultaneouslyconvergeanddiverge,framethisexploration. The firstpartof the essay showshowDeleuzesandFoucaults respectiveontologiesfurthercritiqueandcreativity.Thesecondpartoftheessayfocusesonapointofdivergencein the two thinkers appeals to ontology: the relationship betweenphilosophy andhistory.FromaFoucauldianperspective,theahistoricalcharacterofDeleuzesontologyofdifferencethreatens toundermine its transformativepotential,whereas from aDeleuzianperspective,the historical character of Foucaults ontology of the present,while itmay not underminetransformation,certainlydoesnotfacilitateit. Inconclusion,Iarguethatitispreciselyfromwithinthesetensionsthatimportant,productive,andtransformativeaspectsofDeleuzesandFoucaultsworkemerge.Keywords:MichelFoucault,GillesDeleuze,Ontology,Ethics,PoliticsThehistoryofphilosophy,ratherthanrepeatingwhataphilosophersays,hastosaywhathemusthavetakenforgranted,whathedidntsaybutisnonethelesspresentinwhathedidsay.1~GillesDeleuzeThereisalwayssomethingludicrousinphilosophicaldiscoursewhenittries,fromtheoutside,todictatetoothers,totellthemwheretheirtruthisandhowtofinditbut[philosophy]isentitledtoexplorewhatmightbechanged,initsownthought,throughapracticethatisforeigntoit.2~MichelFoucault

IamgratefultoMichaelEngforprovidinghelpfulcommentsonanearlierversionofthisessay.1GillesDeleuze,OnPhilosophy,inNegotiations:19721990,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),135155.2MichelFoucault,IntroductiontoTheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeII:TheUseofPleasure,trans.RobertHurley,(NewYork:VintageBooks,1990),9.

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IntroductionBeginning in the 1960s, according toGaryGutting,Frenchphilosophy acquired anew anddistinctivecharacter.Youngphilosophersfoundhumanisticnarrativespositingtheinevitabilityofhumanprogresstobefundamentallyinconsistentwiththe[postWar]worldtheysawas irredeemable.3These philosophers therefore began challenging such narratives and thenormativevaluestowhichtheyhadgivenrise,aswellasendeavoringtoarticulateifnotalternativesthemselves,thenatleastconditionsfortheirpossibility.4Thisphilosophicalproject,whichGuttingreferstoasthinkingtheimpossible,isnotamerethoughtexperimentaimedatrejectinghumanism.Frenchphilosophyhasexpressedabroadethicopoliticalcommitmenttoarticulatingandfurtheringsomesortofguidingvisionspecifically,alivablevisionthatneither eliminates thedistinctively human normakes human beings the center of theuniverse.5From theperspectiveof thinking the impossible,Guttingwrites,theultimatepointandtestofphilosophicalthoughtisseeninitsrelevancetopoliticalgoals.6

Guttingshows thatphilosophershavedevelopedmultipleandsometimesconflictingapproachestothinkingtheimpossible. TwosuchapproachesaretobefoundintheworkofGillesDeleuze andMichelFoucault, both ofwho figureprominently inGuttings analysis.Consistentwith theaimof thinking the impossible,asGutting conceivesof it,DeleuzeandFoucault critiqueprevailingnorms, institutions,andpractices, including theWesternphilosophicaltradition. Throughtheirrespectivecritiques,boththinkersalsoaimtopromotethecreation andproliferation of (possibilities for) alternativewaysof living in theworld forwaysofliving,thatis,whichdonotreproduceandinfactcounterthosewaysofliving,whichgaverisetothedevastatingcrisesofthetwentiethcentury.

The followingessayseeks toexploremoreprecisely themeaningand implicationsofphilosophicalcritiqueandcreativitywithinthecontextofDeleuzesandFoucaultswork.Thetwophilosophersappealstoontologyframethisexploration,insofarasIseetheseappealsasasiteuponwhichtheirethicopoliticalcommitmentstothinkingtheimpossiblesimultaneouslyconvergeanddiverge. Inthefirstpartoftheessay,IshowhowDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveontologiescanbeseenasfurtheringtheireffortstothinktheimpossible.Thecritical and creative aspectsofDeleuzesontologyofdifference andFoucaultsontologyof thepresent are apparent in large part through each thinkers utilization of the work of Nietzscheathinkerwhoemployedcritiquespecificallyinordertopavethewayforthecreationofsomethingnew.ThesecondpartoftheessayidentifiesoneimportantpointofdivergenceinDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveappealstoontologyandthenfocusesonasecondthatin someways emerges from the first: the relationship between philosophy and history or,morespecifically,whetherand towhatextentappealingtohistoryfacilitatesefforts to thinkthe impossible. I show that from a Foucauldian perspective, the ahistorical character of 3GaryGutting,Thinking the Impossible:FrenchPhilosophySince1960, (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),22.4ItismyviewthatDeleuzeandFoucaultseektoidentifyandfosterconditionsunderwhichalternativestoprevailingmodesofthoughtandexistencemaybecreatedandexperimentedwith,andthattheythemselvesactuallycreatealternatives.ThroughouttheessayIthereforerefertothemasdoingboth.5Gutting,ThinkingtheImpossible,22.6Ibid,19.

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Deleuzesontologyofdifferencethreatenstoundermineitstransformativepotential.FromaDeleuzianperspective,bycontrast,thehistoricalcharacterofFoucaultsontologyofthepresent,while itmaynotundermine transformation,certainlydoesnot facilitate it. Bywayofconclusion,IarguethatthetensionproducedbythesedivergencesdoesnotinhibitDeleuzesandFoucaultseffortstothinkthe impossible. Rather, it ispreciselywithinthistensionthatthemostimportant,productive,andtransformativeaspectsofthinkingtheimpossibleemerge.

IDeleuzesethicopoliticalcommitment tocreatingandcultivatingpossibilities foralternativemodesof thoughtandexistenceforthe remarkable, thenew,and the important7is reflected inhisengagementwiththequestionof,asToddMayputs it,howonemight live.8WhileDeleuzeengagesthisquestionperhapsmostovertlyinhiscollaborativeworkwithFelixGuattari(especiallyinAntiOedipusandAThousandPlateaus),italsocanbeseenasframinghisanalysesofthinkerssuchasSpinoza,Nietzsche,Bergson,andevenKant,allofwhomhebelievedtobethinkingdifferently,orwhoseworkhesawopeningontothepossibilityofdoingso.ThequestionofhowonemightlivealsomotivatesDeleuzesworkinDifferenceandRepetition.Therehedevelopsanontologythatisbothcharacterizedbyandpromotestheproliferationofdifferenceandwhich,throughdoingso,generatesconditionsforthepossibilityofandthusfacilitatesnotmerelythinking,butalsoliving,differently.

According to Constantin Boundas, [f]or Deleuze, philosophy is ontology.9 WhileBoundas identifiesDeleuzeasoneof theonlyphilosophersofhisgenerationwhodoesnoteschewontology,healsomakesnoteof thenontraditionalnatureofDeleuzesontologyofdifference.AsBoundasdescribesit,Deleuzesontologyisarigorousattempttothinkofprocessandmetamorphosisbecomingnotasatransitionortransformationfromonepointtoanother,butratherasanattempttothinkoftherealasaprocess.10UnderstandingDeleuzesontologyofdifferenceinthiswayhelpsmakesenseoftheprominentroleNietzschesdoctrineofeternalrecurrenceplaysinitsarticulation.Deleuzerejectstheviewthateternalrecurrenceentailsperpetually reexperiencing the events of ones life exactly as onehas already livedthem. Hearguesthatreadingswhichposit theeternalreturnofthesame,on theonehand,andparticularevents,on theother,areerroneousat least inpartbecause theyrelyuponaconventionalunderstandingof thepassageof time. InNietzscheandPhilosophy,Deleuzearguesthateternalrecurrencecallsintoquestionandrecaststhetraditionalrelationshipbetweenpast,present,andfuture.Thiscritiqueandrecastinginturnunderminesthetraditionalrelationshipbetweenbeingandbecoming. According toDeleuze,Nietzscheshows that for the

7GillesDeleuzeandFelixGuattari,WhatisPhilosophy?,trans.HughTomlinsonandGrahamBurchell,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),82.CitedinToddMay,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),22.8May,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,1.9ConstantinV.Boundas,Ontology,inTheDeleuzeDictionary,ed.AdrianParr,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2005),191192.10Ibid.

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passageof time to takeplaceatall,andhence forthepast tobeconstituted in time,11 thepresentcannotbeastaticstateofbeing.12Thepassingmoment,Deleuzewrites,couldneverpassitifwerenotalreadypastandyettocomeatthesametimeasbeingpresent.Ifthepresentdidnotpassofitsownaccord,ifithadtowaitforanewpresentinordertobecomethepast, thepast ingeneralwouldneverbeconstituted in time,and thisparticularpresentwouldnotpass[t]hepresentbemustcoexistwithitselfaspastandyettocome.13

Byrevealingthepresentasmovement,asinpassing,eternalrecurrencereconfigurespast,present,andfutureascoexistingcycles.14Deleuzearguesthat,forNietzsche,itthereforecannotbethecasethatbeingconstruedassomeonethingiswhatreturns,forbeingisnotastaticstateorfixedidentitybutitselfadynamicpassing.15Ifthereisnootherbeingthanthispassing,whatreturnsisnothingmorethanwhatDeleuzereferstoasthebeingofbecoming,orrecurrence itself. Moreover,given thedynamicnatureof thisbeingofbecoming,whatreturnscanbesaidtobethesameonlyintermsofitsdifferencethedifferencebetweenaswellaswithin cycles.16Through illustrating thatbecoming isall that thereis,Deleuze thus sees eternal recurrence providing the ultimate affirmation ofdifference.Eternalrecurrence,heargues,mustbethoughtofasasynthesisoftimeanditsdimensionsofdiversityanditsreproductionofbecomingandthebeingwhichisaffirmedinbecomingasynthesisofdoubleaffirmation.17Inturn,thisaffirmationillustratesthateternalrecurrenceitselfmustbethoughtofastheexpressionofaprinciplewhichservesasanexplanationofdiversityanditsreproduction,ofdifferenceanditsrepetition.18

Theprincipleinquestioniswilltopower,aprinciplewhosearticulation,Deleuzecontends,Nietzschesawaseffectivelyunderminingprevailingmodesof thoughtandexistence:willtopower,accordingtoNietzsche,cannotbethoughtoutofthemechanisticorderwithoutthinkingawaythisorderitself.19TotheextentthatDeleuzesownontologyofdifferenceincorporateskeyaspectsofeternalrecurrence,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatitsarticulationproducessimilareffects. That is,Deleuzesontologyrevealsascontingentand therebycallsinto question amodernWesternmeaningmaking system thathas endowed itselfwith theauthoritytoprovideadefinitiveaccountofthenatureofreality.20AsDeleuzedescribesit,this 11GillesDeleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy, trans.HighTomlinson, (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1983),48.12SeeDeleuzesanalysisinChapterTwo,RepetitionforItself,ofDifferenceandRepetition,trans.PaulPatton,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),70128.13Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,48.14Ibid,49.15Ibid.16Ibid.17Ibid,48.18Ibid.19Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,49.20InAThousandPlateaus,DeleuzeandGuattariimplicatetheWesternphilosophicaltraditioninasystemofthoughtthatreducesdifferencetosameness.Theyalsoanalyzethespecificallypoliticaleffectsofthisimplication.SeeGillesDeleuzeandFelixGuattari,ChapterTwelve,1227:TreatiseonNomadologyTheWarMachine,inAThousandPlateaus,trans.BrianMassumi(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1987),351422.

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systemthatofrepresentationreliesuponandinturninvokessameness,specificallyintheformofidentity.Anobjectcanberepresentedandthereforeknownonlyifitpossessesapreexisting,recognizable,andunchangingidentity.Withrespecttobothindividualobjects(finiterepresentation)andbeingitself(infiniterepresentation),thesystemisonlycapableofmakingsenseofwhatitcanrenderknowablebywayofrepresentationalconcepts;anythingelse,anything that cannot be subsumed under the existingmeaningmaking systemdifference, inotherwordsisdenied and negated. Onwhat condition,Deleuzewrites, isdifferencetracedorprojectedontoaflatspace?Preciselywhenithasbeenforcedintoapreviouslyestablishedidentity,whenithasbeenplacedontheslopeoftheidenticalwhichmakesitreflectordesireidentity,andnecessarilytakesitwhereidentitywantstogonamelyintothenegative.21

Thus,whileasystemofrepresentationisabletomediatewhatalreadyexists,itisincapableofcreatinganythingnew.22To theextent that this is thecase,suchasystemcannotbegineventoentertainthequestionofhowonemightlive;allitcandoisgiveanaccountofprevailingwaysoflivingandrearticulateexistingconditionsforthepossibilityofmoreofthesame.AsIhaveshown,however,likeNietzschebeforehimDeleuzeseekstoconceiveofrealityinwaysthatcannotbearticulatedbymeansoftraditionalconcepts,categories,andprinciples,andwhich thereforeunsettle thesesamemeaningmaking tools. Deleuzemakes it impossibletouncriticallyacceptformulationsofbeingandbecoming,samenessanddifference,that are generated by way of a traditional system of representation that relies upon predetermined concepts in order to make sense of the world. Every object, every thing,Deleuzeargues,mustsee itsown identityswallowedup indifference,eachbeingnomorethanadifferencebetweendifferences.23 JustasNietzschesnotionofeternal recurrence recaststhepresentasapassingasopposedtoastateofbeing,soforDeleuzewhatisispreciselyaprocessofdifferenciation,wheredifference isshowndiffering.24 Justas forNietzscheall thatreturns isdifference,so is it thatwithinDeleuzesontology,being isunivocalonlyintermsofwhatisequivocal.25Whatunifiesbeingisdifference,whichsimultaneouslyundoesanysenseofbeingasstaticandhencedeniesanywayofmakingsensebywayofrepresentation.Inotherwords,allthatcanberelieduponwithinaDeleuzianontologyofdifference isthatwhichcontinuallydestabilizesandunsettles. Opening isanessentialfeatureofunivocity,Deleuzewrites. Only there does the cry resound, Everything is equal! andEverythingreturns!Suchassertionscanbemadeonlyonconditionthateachbeinghasreachedastateofexcessinwhichwhatisassertedissimultaneouslycalledintoquestion:thedifferencethatcausesassertionsabouttheworldtoreturnsimultaneouslydisplacesanddisguisesthem.26

ThequestionthatguidesFoucaultsethicopoliticalcommitmenttothinkingtheimpossible is that ofhow and towhat extent itmight bepossible to thinkdifferently than one 21Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,51.22Ibid,56.23Ibid.24Ibid.25Ibid,304.26Ibid.

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thinks,andperceivedifferently thanone sees.27Foucaultdoesnot simplywant to seeandthinkdifferentlyhimself.Throughhisphilosophyhealsoendeavorstofosterwidespreadcreationofandexperimentationwithnewmodesofthoughtandexistence.Inordertodothis,hefirstillustratestheneedforsucharticulationandexperimentationbyconductinggenealogicalanalyses. Through inquiring intohowprevailingnorms, institutions,andpracticeshavedevelopedhistoricallyand takenhold,genealogiesshow thatcurrentconditionsarenotnecessaryconditionsand,therefore,thattheyareopentocriticalanalysis.Engagingcriticallywiththepresentinturnfacilitatesidentificationandcounteringofnorms,institutions,andpracticesthatgeneratenormalizingeffects.Simplyput,normalizationasFoucaultconceivesofitrefersto themodernWesternphenomenonwherebyhumanbeingscriticalandcreativecapacitiesaremerelychanneledback into the rearticulationofprevailingmodesof thoughtandexistence.Thiscurtailmentofcritiqueandcreativityinturnreinforcesexistingpowerrelationsandisthereforecountertofreedom.ForFoucault,freedomentailsnavigatingexistingpowerrelationsinwaysthatdonotreinforcethemintheircurrentformbutratherkeepthemopenandfluid.28Powerrelationsarekeptopenandfluidwhencapacitiesaredirectedtowardinnovation, theoutcomeofwhichcannotbeanticipated inadvance,such thatalternative,multiple,andpotentiallyconflictingwaysoflivingproliferate.

ItisnotdifficulttoseehowthepressuretowardobedienceinthefaceofandconformitywithprevailingmodesofthoughtandexistencethatcharacterizesmodernWesternsocietiesposesamajorobstacletothekindofethicopoliticalengagementFoucaultaimstopracticeandencourage. Normalizingsocietieshonepersonsability toeffectively,efficiently,andobedientlyreproducewhatalreadyexists.Indoingso,theysimultaneously(andjustaseffectively)inhibit thinkingandperceivingdifferently;cultivationofcriticalandcreativecapacities;andidentificationandcounteringof,anddevelopmentofalternativesto,normalizingnorms,institutions,andpractices.Totheextentthattheyproduceconformityandobedience,suchsocietiesriskdeterioratingintostatesofdominationstaticconditionsofinequalitywherethesubstanceofpersonslives(especiallythosewhodonotforwhateverreasontoadheretoprevailingnorms)issimplydictatedtothem.

As Ihavedescribed ithere,Foucauldiangenealogy clearly reflectsNietzsches influence.Eveninhisearlywork,Nietzscheendeavorstoelucidatethehistoricalnatureandharmfuleffects(inthesenseofpromotingressentimentordecadence)ofconcepts,categories,principles, and practices that are considered to be not only fundamental but also valuable andemancipatory(inthesenseofpromotingmoralandintellectualprogress)aspectsofthemodernWest.InhisessayOnTruthandLiesinaNonmoralSense,forexample,Nietzscheillustratesthatapreoccupationwiththetruthaswellas,andmorefundamentally,theconceptoftruth itself,emergesataparticularpoint inhistoryspecifically,at thepointwherehumanbeingsundertaketolivetogetherincommunities.[F]romboredomandnecessity,Nietzsche 27Foucault,IntroductiontoTheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeII:TheUseofPleasure,8.28Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.Iamreferringheretotheversionofthisinterview,Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual. An Interview with Michel Foucault by Michael Bess,November3,1980, that ishoused in the IMECArchive (foldernumberFCL2.A0206). The interview is also available in History of the Present 4 (Spring 1988) and online athttp://www.vanderbilt.edu/historydept/michaelbess/Foucault%20Interview.

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writes,manwishestoexistsociallyandwiththeherd.29Thismovetowardorganizedsocialitymarksthefirststeptowardacquiringthatpuzzlingtruthdrivewhatcountsastruthfromnowonisestablished.30Moreover,justashedoesinOntheGenealogyofMoralswiththeconceptofmorality,Nietzscheshowsthattheconceptoftruth,largelyacceptedasnecessaryforthepurposesofbothmakingsenseofand improvingtheworld, isnotonlygrounded inbutalsoproducesdetrimentaleffects.Truthandthedesireforitstemfromthenegativeemotionoffear(specificallyfearofuncertainty),andinturnreduceacomplex,uncertain,unpredictablereality towhatwealreadyknow,even if thatknownreality is itselfnegative in thesensethatitlacksvalueandmeaning.Putdifferently,Nietzschesworkrevealsthatwhatpersons in fact know and engage isnot theworld inwhichwe live, but rather themeaningmakingsystemsthatwehave imposedupon theworld.31Obviously,fearofuncertaintyandattachmenttowhatbelievewealreadyknowgreatlyhinderspersonsabilitytocriticallyanalyzeexistingmeaningmakingsystemsand,therefore,toidentify,analyze,andcounterharmfulpractices.

Havingemployedgenealogyinordertocritiqueprevailingmodesofthoughtandexistence,andthusalsotoillustratetheneedfordevelopmentofandexperimentationwithnewsuchmodes,Foucaultengages inpreciselythiskindofdevelopmentandexperimentation inhislaterwork:heformulatesaphilosophicalmodeofexistenceawayoflivingorconductingourselvesintheworld.Inamovethatappearsatfirstparadoxical,FoucaultinitiateshisformulationnotthroughanalysisofNietzscheswork,butofKants.Thisapparentparadoxresolves itself,however,whenFoucault identifies twophilosophical traditionsstemming fromKantswork. The firstandmore readily recognizable,which isconcernedwitharticulatingthe conditionsunderwhich trueknowledge ispossible,Foucault refers toas theKantiancritical tradition.32 It iswithin the secondKantian tradition thatFoucault situatesbothNietzscheandhimself. This traditionstems fromKantsconceptualizationofenlightenment, isconcernedwiththequestionofthepresentthequestionofouractualityandthepresentfieldofpossibleexperiences,33andopensonto(andtosomeextentengages)34questionsthatbothNietzscheandFoucaulttakeupanddevelop.Thesequestionsinclude,Howhaveprevailingmodesofthoughtandexistencecometobeestablished?,Towhatextentareprevailingmodes(norms)acceptedasnecessary?,Whataretheeffectsofbothpowerofprevailingnormsandtheiruncriticalacceptance?

29FriedrichNietzsche,OnTruthandLiesinaNonmoralSense,inPhilosophyandTruth:SelectionsfromNietzschesNotebooksoftheEarly1870s,ed.andtrans.DanielBreazeale,(Amherst,NY:HumanityBooks,1979),81.30Ibid.31Nietzschewrites,Ifweareforcedtocomprehendallthingsonlyundertheseforms,thenitceasestobeamazingthat inallthingsweactuallycomprehendnothingbuttheseforms.SeeOnTruthandLiesinaNonmoralSense,87.32Foucault,WhatisRevolution?,inThePoliticsofTruth,eds.SylvreLotringerandLysaHochroth,(NewYork:Semiotexte,1997),99.33Ibid,100.34FoucaultandDeleuzebothseemtoseeKantsworkopeningontoimportantphilosophicalquestionsandpossibilitiesthatKantdoesnotnecessarilyexplorehimself.

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Foucaultreferstoamodeofexistencecharacterizedbysuchcriticalquestioningalternativelyasanethos,anattitude,anontologyofourselves,andanontologyofthepresent.ThattheontologyofwhichFoucaultconceivesextendsbeyondamethodofphilosophicalinquiryisapparentinhisdescriptionofanattitudeasamodeofrelatingtocontemporaryrealityawayofthinkingandfeelingofactingandbehaving.35Foucaultalsomakesclearthat thisattitudeentailsnotsimplyengaging,butmorespecificallyengagingcritically,withthepresent. Insofarasanontologyof thepresententailsadoptingacriticalattitude towardcontemporaryreality,itisimplicatedinthepracticeoffreedom.ThisimplicationisapparentinFoucaultscharacterizationofanontologyofthepresentintermsofacritiqueofwhatweare[that]isatoneandthesametimethehistoricalanalysisofthelimitsthatareimposedonus,andanexperimentwiththepossibilityofgoingbeyondthem.36Anontologyofthepresent is amode of conduct concernedwith identifying, analyzing, and challenging the constraintspersonsfacewithinnormalizingsocietiesrelativetoboththeirselfrelationandtheirbroaderrelationswithintheworld.Itentailsquestioningprevailingnormsandpractices,criticallyengagingthepresentinwaysthatyieldinsightintotheworkingsofexistingpowerrelations,andendeavoringtonavigatethoserelationssothatnewwaysof livingcanbecreatedand explored. It is thusawayof living in theworld that resistsand in turn facilitates resistanceagainstpressuretowardnormalization,whilealsofacilitatingalternativestonormalizingmodesofexistence.

IISeveralpointsof intersectionmaybe identifiedbetweenDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveappealstoontologyastheseappealsexpressanethicopoliticalcommitmenttocritiquingprevailingmodesof thought and existence and creating (possibilities for) alternatives to thosemodes. First,Deleuze and Foucault both see pressure toward conformitywith prevailingwaysof thinkingandacting inhibiting thekindofcriticalandcreativecapacities that fosterinnovationand,therefore,possibilitiesforthinkingandlivingotherwise.ThisviewisapparentinDeleuzescritiqueofsystemsofrepresentationandFoucaultsconcernwithnormalization. Second,evenastheycritiquethetraditionofWesternphilosophy,boththinkersnonetheless identify philosophical resources for countering this pressure toward conformity.Deleuzepositsanontologyofdifference thatundermines the selfascribedauthorityof systemsofrepresentationtosettlequestionsaboutthenatureofrealityandtherebyprovidecertaintyabouttheworldinwhichwelive.Foucaultconceivesofanontologyofthepresentthatfacilitatesidentificationandcriticalanalysisof,aswellascreationofalternativesto,normalizingmodesofthoughtandexistence.Finally,DeleuzesontologyofdifferenceandFoucaultsontologyof thepresentare informedby theworkofNietzsche.37DeleuzedrawsuponNie 35 Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in The FoucaultReader, ed. PaulRabinow, (NewYork: Pantheon,1984),39.36Ibid,50.37 Iamnotsuggesting that indeveloping their respectiveontologiesDeleuzeandFoucaultare influencedmerelybyNietzscheonlythatheisanimportantinfluence.AstheIndextoDifferenceandRepetitionmakesclear,Deleuzedrawsupon theworkofavarietyof thinkers, includingKant,whosework in fact figuresprominentlyinFoucaultsarticulationofanontologyofthepresent.

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tzschesdoctrineoftheeternalrecurrence,whereasFoucaultisinfluencedbyNietzscheangenealogy.

Despitethesesimilarities,substantivepointsofdepartureexistbetweenDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveeffortstothinktheimpossiblewhichinturnaffecthowtheirrespectiveappealstoontologyfunctionrelativetosuchaphilosophicalproject.Divergentviewsareapparent,first,inhoweachphilosopherengagestheguidingquestionIhaveidentified.AsMaypoints out,Deleuze conceives of the question of how onemight live in very broad terms,whereevennotionsofwhatitmeanstoliveandtheonedoingthislivingareintentionallyleftopen.38Aspresentedinthefirstsectionofthisessay,Deleuzesworkfocusesmoreongivinganaccountoftheconditionsfromwhichlivingandtheonesdoingitmightemergethanonenumeratinghowlivingmightactuallyoccurorwhatitmightlooklikewithinanyparticularcontext. Deleuzepresentsarealitythat is less influxthansimplyflux itself:allthatexistsistherepetitionofdifference,whichinturngeneratesaproliferationofdynamicdifferencesthatstemfrombutdonotreplicatetherealityfromwhichtheyspring.Multiplemanifestationsoflivingandwhoorwhatisdoingitperpetuallyfoldandunfold.Hence,therefore,MaysobservationthatinDeleuzeshandsontologyisnotaboutdiscoveringwhatisalreadyouttherewaitingtobefound,itisaboutcreatingsomethingnew.39

Foucaultsengagementwiththequestionofthinkingandseeingdifferently,andhisarticulationofanontologyofthepresentthisengagementfacilitates,makeclearthatheisconcernedwithhowhuman freedomcanbemaximizedwithin thecontextofhumanexistence.Heperceiveshumanbeingsastheoneswhoareactivelychallengingwhatispresentedtousasnaturalandnecessaryandstrivingtocreatealternatives.[O]neofthemeaningsofhumanexistencethe sourceofhuman freedom,Foucaultasserts,isnever toacceptanythingasdefinitive,untouchable,obvious,or immobile. Noaspectofrealityshouldbeallowedtobecome adefinitive and inhuman law forus.40 It is also clear, insofar asnormalization and,therefore,effortstocounterit,arespecificallymodernphenomena,thatFoucaultsontologyofthepresentisconcernedwithmaximizinghumanfreedomwithinaparticularsociohistoricalcontext.

DeleuzesandFoucaultsdifferentwaysofengagingtheseguidingquestionspointtodivergentattitudesconcerningwhetherandtowhatextenthistorymightfigurewithinaphilosophicalprojectofthinkingtheimpossible.NeitherthecriticalaspectsofDeleuzesworknortheontologyofdifferencehedevelopsarehistoricallyspecific.Incontrast,Foucaultcritiquesmodernnorms,practices,andinstitutionsthatgaverisetoandinturnreproducethespecificallymodern formsofpowerwithinwhichwecurrently findourselvesembedded, thenormalizing effectsofwhichFoucault aims to counter. Moreover, forDeleuze,history simply 38SeeMay,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction.39Ibid,17.40Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.WhileitillustratesthatFoucaultisspecificallyconcernedwithcounteringnormalizationandpromotingfreedomwithinthecontextofhumanexistence,thisstatementalsoshowsthathedoesnotsituateideasaboutwhatitmeanstobehumanoutsideoftherealmofcriticalinterrogation.Indeed,FoucaultscritiqueofthehumansciencesaswellashisgenealogyofthemodernWesternsubjectindicatethedegreetowhichheseestraditionalnotionsofhumannessbeingimplicatedintheproliferationofnormalizingpowerrelations.

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provides a context formaking sense of, but itself neither facilitates nor delimits, transformation.Foucault,however,associatesahistoricalclaimswithnormalization;forhim,historicalanalysisfacilitatesidentificationofpossibilitiesfortransformation.Inwhatfollows,Ishallexaminethissecondpointofdivergenceconcerningthequestionofwhetherappealstohistoryinhibitorenhanceeffortstothinktheimpossibleinmoredetail. IndoingsoIhopetoshowthatalthoughDeleuzeandFoucaultpartcompanyonthisissue,thetensionbetweentheirtwoviewpointsisaproductiveonethatultimatelyfacilitatesthecriticalandcreativephilosophicalpracticethatcharacterizesthinkingtheimpossible.

IIIFromaFoucauldianperspective,theextenttowhichtheahistoricalnatureofDeleuzesontologyofdifferenceinhibitsthinkingtheimpossiblehingesinpartonwhetherDeleuzedeploysorinvokesontologywhether,thatis,heusestheconceptstrategicallyinorderto[openup]newavenuesforlivingoractuallyaimstoofferanaccountofwhatis.41AsIreadDifferenceandRepetition, it isnot completely clearwhetherDeleuze simplydeploysor in fact invokesontology.Asnotedearlier,partofwhatDeleuzefindsobjectionableaboutthephilosophyofrepresentationisitsunbridledconfidenceinitsownabilitytoprovideadefinitiveaccountofthenatureofreality,aswellasintheaccountitprovides.Positingandpromotingadherencetoasinglewayofmakingsenseoftheworldandthe insight itaffordsclearlysettlesfundamentalphilosophicalquestions.Indoingso,suchaphilosophicalapproachprovidesasenseof certainty about theworld that inhibits creation and cultivation of new and unexpectedmodesofliving.Givenhiscritique,itispossibletoseeDeleuzeappealingtoontologysolelyfor thepurposeofunsettlingwaysofperceivingandhencenavigating theworld thathavebeenuncriticallyacceptedandtherebyfacilitatingtheproliferationofdifference.Onthisreading,Deleuzeisnotconcernedwithgivinganaccountofwhatis,asanysuchaccountwouldbecalled intoquestionalongwitheverythingelsebywayof thecontinual repetitionofdifference.Hisappealtoontologywouldthenfunctionsimplyasonemorelineofflight.

Atthesametime,Deleuzedoesappeartogiveanaccountofthenatureofreality.Thisaccount isahistorical:Deleuzedoesnotassert thatdifference isbehindeverything,butbehinddifferencethereisnothingspecificallywithinthecontextof,forexample,modernWesternsocieties.42Hesimplydescribesthenatureofrealityinthisway.Evenifitisimpossibletoknowwhetherdifferencewill in factbe cultivated,what that cultivationwill look like,andwhatitseffectswillbe,Deleuzesappealtoontologypresentstheconditionsunderwhichdifferencemaybe cultivatedasanaspectofwhat is.43 Inotherwords,and this is the crucialpoint,whetherdifferenceisinfactcultivatedornotwithinanyparticularsociohistoricalcontext,itisalwaysthecasethatitcouldhavebeen,canbe,orwillbeabletobe.Inarticulating 41May,personalcommunication,July2012.42Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,57.43Inpresentingdifferenceasanahistoricalgroundandtherebysecuringtheconditionsforthepossibilityofdifferences,Deleuzemightappeartobeinvokingdifferenceassomekindoftranscendentalrealm.PaulPattonargues,however,thatthisisnotthecase.Deleuze,hecontends,positsatranscendentalempiricismwhereindifferentialconditions . . .mustbeunderstoodas transcendentalbutentirely immanent torealexperience.SeePaulPatton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,(NewYork:Routledge,2000),40

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hisontologyofdifference,Deleuze thusappears tounderstand therelationshipbetween theempiricaland the transcendental,differencesanddifference,asbeinganalogous to the relationshiphepositsbetween theactualand thevirtual.44 Insofaras theactualizationofdifferenceasdifferences isnever fullycapturedorrealized in thosedifferences,differencecanbeseentofunction,asPattonputsit,asapurereservethatprovidestheguaranteeofanopenfuture.45Onthisreading,totheextentthatDeleuzesontologyofdifferencesettlesquestionsregardingpossibilities for theproliferationofdifferencesto theextent that,asMayputs it,ontologyisforDeleuzetheveryrouteonemusttakeinordertoadequatelyposethequestionofhowonemightliveitisanontologythatprovidesalevelofcertaintyaboutthenatureofrealitywhichinhibitstoatleastsomedegreepreciselythatproliferationitself.46

From a Foucauldian perspective, ahistorical assurances of an open futureassurances, that is, not of transformation itself but of the conditions for its actualizationunderminetheveryethicopoliticalcommitmenttocritiqueandcreativitytheyaimtosecure.(Thesamecanbesaidabout thedesire forsuchassurances). For this reason,Foucaultprovidesnoguarantees,andhis sustainedphilosophicalperspective is criticalof thedesire forthem. Whilesomeofhisreadershavesuggestedthathecannotprovideguaranteesbecausehisworklacksthenecessarynormativefoundations,onmyviewFoucaultintentionallyrefusestoarticulatewhathereferstoasblueprintsforchange.Fromhisperspective,anyenterprisethatpresumestotellotherswhattodo,andwhichindoingsoexacerbatestheexistingdesireinthemodernWesttobedirectedinonesactionswhich,inotherwords,exacerbatesexisting tendencies toward conformityandobediencereinforcesnormalizationand is thuscountertothepracticeoffreedom. Theresaterriblegamehere,Foucaultasserts, agamewhich conceals a trap, inwhich the intellectuals tend to saywhat isgood, andpeople asknothingbetter than tobe toldwhat isgoodand itwouldbebetter if they startedyelling,Howbaditis!47Foucaultdoesnotperceivemererejectioninsuchvehementcriticism.Rather, it constitutes refusalspecifically, refusal to uncritically accept prevailing modes ofthoughtandexistencethefirstofthreepracticesthattogetherIseecharacterizingtheworkof freedom asFoucault conceivesof it. Alongwith curiosity (theneed to analyze and toknow) and innovation (seek[ing] out in our reflection those things thathave never beenthoughtorimagined,)refusal(re)createsconditionsforthepossibilityofopenness,whicharealwayssociohistoricallyspecificandthereforecanneverbedefinitivelydefinedorsecured.48Foucaultsgenealogies,theinsighthedrawsfromthem,andrealityasheperceivesit,areradicallyhistorical;analyzingthepastelucidateshowwehavecometobewherewepresentlyareand,therefore,thefactthatthingscanbedifferentwithinthecontextofadynamicpresentthatopensontoanuncertainfuture.Claimstohaveidentified(ortobeabletoidentify)aswellasthedesireforahistoricalguaranteesofsettlednessandcertaintywithinsuchaframeworkare 44SeeforexampleDeleuzesaccountoftherelationshipbetweenthevirtualandtheactualinPartIVofDifferenceandRepetition.45Patton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,27;myemphasis.Pattonisreferringherenottodifferenceanddifferences,butrathertotherelationshipbetweentheempiricalandthetranscendental.46May,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,15;myemphasis.47Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.48Ibid.

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thereforeemptyatbest.Atworsttheyarenormalizing,insofarastheymasktheneedforandtherebyinhibitcultivationofcriticalandcreativecapacitiesthatbothfacilitateandcharacterizetheworkoffreedom.

Giventhatitsahistoricalcharacterinhibitscritiqueandcreativity,invokingaDeleuzianontologyofdifference is,fromaFoucauldianperspective, incompatiblewithaphilosophicalprojectofthinkingtheimpossible.Likewise,Foucaultseemstosuggest,oratleastheworries,that simply deploying ontology does not get around the problems created by ahistoricity.Foucaultexpressesthisconcern,interestinglyenough,inacommentaboutDeleuzeandGuattaris reconceptualizationof thenotionofdesire. Deleuze andGuattariobviouslyuse thenotion[ofdesire]inacompletelydifferentway,Foucaultobserves.ButtheproblemIhaveisthatImnotsureif,throughthisveryword,despiteitsdifferentmeaning,wedontruntherisk,despiteDeleuzeandGuattaris intention,ofallowingsomeofthemedicopsychologicalpresuppositions thatwerebuilt intodesire, in its traditionalsense, tobe reintroduced.49FoucaultseemstoseeDeleuzeandGuattariattemptingtodeploybutnotinvoketheconceptofdesire,aswellastosuggestthatthisdeploymentrunstheriskofinadvertentlyrearticulatingtheverynormalizingaspectsoftheconceptitisintendedtocounter.AsIseeit,hisconcernrelativetodeployinganontologyofdifferenceisthesame:thatdoingsoretainsandthusrearticulates the normalizing ahistoricity, built into ontology in its traditional sense, thatunderminesthetransformationthatdeploymentisintendedtopromote.Insum,fromaFoucauldianperspective,totheextentthatineitherinvokingordeployinghisontology,Deleuzepreservesdifferenceastheahistoricalconditionofexistencethatcanguaranteetheproliferationofdifferences and therefore transformation,both approaches rearticulate awill to andpromiseofcertaintythatunderminessuchproliferation.AsMayobserves,forFoucault,any[ahistorical] approach to thequestionofbeing thatgoesbymeansof an accountof anunchanging,purenatureoressence isnotmerelymisguidedbutalsoharmful,preciselybecausesuchanaccountconstrain[s]humanbehaviortoanarrowconformity.50

Inlightofhisconcernsaboutthepotentiallynormalizingeffectsofevenanontologyofdifference,onemightaskwhyFoucaultcharacterizeshisownworkintermsofontologyatall.Myviewisthatheusestheterminorderto,assuggestedearlier,markadistinctionbetweengenealogyasapurelyphilosophicalmethodofengagingthepresentcriticallyandcreatively,andabroadermodeoflivingthatreflectssuchengagement.Througharticulatinganontologyofthepresent,heaimstoexplorehowthecriticalandcreativeaspectsofgenealogymightbeactualizedasanethosorphilosophicalwayof lifecharacterizedby theproliferationofnewways of thinking and seeing. Foucault is interested in possibilities for cultivating antinormalizingmodesofexistencewithinthecontextofcontemporaryreality;heisnotinterested,inotherwords,indescribingthenatureofrealityormakingclaimsaboutwhatis.Thelimited scope of the ontology of the present Foucault articulates is apparent in his essay,What isEnlightenment?,wherehedescribes itaspartialand local,criticalandcreative,andpertainingspecificallytohumanexistence: 49MichelFoucault,TheGayScience,CriticalInquiry37(Spring2011),385403.50May,15.

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Thecriticalontologyofourselveshastobeconsiderednot,certainly,asatheory,adoctrine,norevenasapermanentbodyofknowledgethat isaccumulating;ithastobeconceivedasaattitude,anethos,aphilosophicallifeinwhichthecritiqueofwhatweareisatoneandthesametimethehistoricalanalysisofthelimitsthatareimposedonusandanexperimentwiththepossibilityofgoingbeyondthem.51

IV

Insofar as he sees the critique and creativity which characterize thinking the impossible(whether intermsofgenealogyoramodeof living)ashistorical, it isclearthatFoucault locatespossibilities for social transformationwithinhistory aswell. Thisview, taken at facevalue,directlyopposesDeleuzes. JustasFoucault seesDeleuzesahistoricityundermininghisefforttothinkthe impossible,forDeleuze it ishistory itselfthatproducessuchaneffect.Deleuzeisquiteadamantinhisviewthathistoryisnotasourceoftransformation.AccordingtoPatton, Deleuze subscribes to aviolent antihistoricism, an attitude thatbecomes clearwhenoneconsidersthedistinctionDeleuzedrawsbetweenhistoryandbecoming.52

Deleuzelocatesthepotentialforchange,andthusfortransformation,notwithinhistory butwithin becoming, and he argues that becoming transcends historical limits: historysimplyaccountsforthecontextofbecomingspossibility.Whathistorygraspsinanevent,Deleuzeasserts,isthewayitsactualizedinparticularcircumstances;theeventsbecomingisbeyondthescopeofhistory.Historyisntexperimental,itsjustthesetofmoreorlessnegativepreconditionsthatmake itpossibletoexperimentwithsomethingbeyondhistory.53AsDanielW.Smithexplains,eventsasDeleuzeconceivesofthemarenotreducibletothehistoricalcontexts fromwhich they spring; rather, theyareunpredictableeruption[s]ofpurebecomingthatoccurnotduetoandperhapspreciselyinspiteofconcretehistoricalconditions.54DeleuzereferstothestudentproteststhattookplaceinMayof1968asjustsuchanhistoricallytranscendentevent. Theemergenceandunfoldingoftheprotests,Deleuzewrites,cannotbeviewedaspartofacausalchain,theoriginsandtrajectoryofwhichcanbetraced linearlythroughtime.Rather,May68wasabifurcation,adeviationwithrespecttolaws,anunstableconditionwhichopen[ed]ontoanewfieldofthepossible.55

Insofar asDeleuze conceivesofaphilosophicalprojectof thinking the impossible intermsofontologyandinoppositiontohistory,howdoesheviewtheworkofFoucault?DoesDeleuzebelieve,asGuttingdoes,thatFoucaultsimplyanddeliberatelyeschewsphilosophy

51Foucault,WhatisEnlightenment?,50.52PaulPatton,DeleuzesPoliticalPhilosophy, inTheCambridgeCompanion toDeleuze (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),199.53Deleuze,ControlandBecoming,inNegotiations:19721990,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),170.54DanielW.Smith,DeleuzeandtheHistoryofPhilosophy, inTheCambridgeCompaniontoDeleuze(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),26.55GillesDeleuze,May 68didnottakeplace,in TwoRegimesofMadness:TextsandInterviews,19751995,ed.DavidLapoujade,trans.AmesHodgesandMikeTaormina,(NewYork:Semiotexte,2007),233.

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forhistory?56DoesDeleuzebelievethatFoucaultundermineshisowneffortstothinktheimpossiblebydrawinga connectionbetweenhistory and transformation? In addressing thesequestions it is important to firstacknowledge thatdespitehisradicalhistoricism,somethingakintoaDeleuzianeventseemstohaveheldsomeappealforFoucault,andthatitdidsopreciselyasasourceoftransformation.OneexampleofthisappealmaybefoundinFoucaultstreatmentoftheIranianRevolution.57InhiswritingsonIran,FoucaultmarksadistinctionsimilartothatwhichheseesKantmarkinginhisanalysisoftheFrenchRevolution:betweentherevolution itself,on theonehand,and itseffects,on theother. OnFoucaultsreading,Kantlocatesthetransformativepotentialoftherevolutionnotinitsownsuccessorfailure,butinsteadintherevolutionaryspirit(awishfulparticipationthatbordersonenthusiasm)therevolutioninspiresinthosewhowitnessit.58Thisrevolutionaryspiritisaproductof,butnotreducibleto,concretehistoricalconditions:itcanhavenoothercause,Kantwrites,thanamoralpredispositioninthehumanrace.59Becausetheconditionsforitsactualizationarelocatedwithinhumanityandnotinfleetingmomentswithinhistory,Kantseesthisrevolutionaryspiritsignifyingandtherebyofferinghopeforhumanadvancementfor,inotherwords,intellectualandmoralprogressand,therefore,positivesocialtransformation.60

Despitereadilyapparentdifferences,61Foucaults (initial) interpretationof the IranianRevolutionreflectsakeyaspectofKants interpretationof itsFrenchcounterpart.62FoucaultseestheIranianRevolutionexpressingacollectivewillthat,likeKantsrevolutionaryspirit,isactualizedbybutnotreducibletoconcretehistoricaloccurrences.63FoucaultarguesthattheideaofacollectivewillhasbeentheorizedbutneveractuallyobservedintheWest.HesaysthathehimselfalwaysconsideredthecollectivewilltobelikeGod,likethesoul,somethingonewouldneverencounter.64Andyet,hecontends,theIranianRevolutioninfactbroughtoutanabsolutelycollectivewillthiscollectivewill,accordingtoFoucault,haserupt 56Gutting,202.57IamgratefultoChloTaylorforencouragingmetothinkabout instances inwhichFoucaultappearstoidentifysourcesoftransformationandthereforefreedomessentiallyorpartiallyoutsideofpowerrelations(andthereforeofhistory).ShepointstohisanalysesofHerculineBarbinandPierreRivereastwoadditionalexamplesofsuchidentification.58ImmanuelKant,ThePhilosophyFacultyversustheFacultyofLaw,inTheConflictoftheFaculties,trans.MaryGregor(Lincoln,NE:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1992),153.59Ibid.60Ibid.61SuchdifferencesincludethefactthatFoucaultsituatestheIranianRevolutionwithinitsparticularsociohistorical context, contrasting it toother revolutions (including theFrench),andmarkingdistinctionsbetweenWesternandIslamicreligion,culture,andpolitics.Also,FoucaultseesthecollectivewillasamanifestationoftheIranianpeopleandRevolutioningeneral,notmerelyoftheRevolutionsspectators.62Foucaultsinitial,optimisticinterpretationofeventsinIranwasobviouslyinerrorandhelaterrevisedhisviews.ForaninformativeandconciseanalysisofFoucaultswritingsonIranseeRichardLynch,ReviewofJanetAfaryandKevinB.Anderson,Foucaultand the IranianRevolution:Genderand theSeducationsof Islamism,FoucaultStudies4(February2007):169176.63MichelFoucault,Iran:TheSpiritofaWorldwithoutSpirit, inAppendix to JanetAfaryandKevinB.Anderson,FoucaultandtheIranianRevolution:GenderandtheSeducationsofIslamism,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2005),252.64Ibid,253.

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ed intohistory.65It isnotclear,at leastnottome,fromwhenceFoucaultseesthecollectivewillerupting.Sinceithasappearedinhistory,thecollectivewillclearlydiffersfromGodandthesoul.Moreover,thedistinctionFoucaultdrawsbetweenKantscriticalandenlightenmentprojects,his identificationofhisownworkwith the latter,aswellashiscritiqueofmodernWesternsubjectivity,makeclearthatFoucaultwouldnotlocatethecollectivewillinsomeinherenthumanpredisposition. The fact that the collectivewill erupts intohistory,however,suggeststhat,likeaDeleuzianevent,itisaphenomenonforwhichhistorycannot(atleastnotfully)account. Moreover, likeMay 68 forDeleuzeand theFrenchRevolution forKant, theIranianRevolution forFoucault isahopeful signofpositive social transformation. Specificmanifestationsof this transformation include theShahsoverthrowand thepotential foranIslamicgovernment;amoregeneralmanifestationtakestheformofamovementthatwouldallow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political lifea movement, in otherwords, that facilitates the emergence ofwhat Foucault refers to as political spirituality.66FoucaultsviewoftheIranianRevolutionthusparallelsinimportantwaysDeleuzesviewofMay68asaneruptionofpurebecomingthatisnotreducibletohistoricalconditions.

A second sourceof insight intowhetherDeleuzebelieves that the relationshipFoucaultpositsbetweentransformationandhistoryundermineshiseffortstothinktheimpossibleareDeleuzesowncommentsonFoucaultsrelationshiptohistory.DeleuzeovertlystatesthatFoucaultsappealtohistoryisnotatoddswiththeaimsandobjectivesnotonlyofphilosophy,butofaphilosophyconcernedwiththinkingtheimpossible.Whileheacknowledgesthathistorywascertainlypartof[Foucaults]method,DeleuzenonethelessbelievesthatFoucaultneverbecameahistorian:

Foucaultsaphilosopherwhoinventsacompletelydifferentrelationtohistorythanwhatyoufindinphilosophersofhistory.History,accordingtoFoucault,circumscribesus and sets limits, itdoesntdeterminewhatwe are, butwhatwereintheprocessofdifferingfrom;itdoesntfixouridentity,butdispersesitintoouressentialothernessHistory,inshort,iswhatseparatesusfromourselvesandwhatwehavetogothroughandbeyondinordertothinkwhatweare.67

DeleuzedescribeshistoryforFoucaultfunctioninginamannerthatisverysimilartothewayinwhichtheeventfunctionswithinthecontextofhisownwork.HeseesFoucaultreconceptualizinghistory insuchaway that itdoesnot,asDeleuzebelieves traditionalhistorydoes,merelyprovidea contextoutofordespitewhich transformationmayoccur. ForFoucault,Deleuzecontends,historyitselfperformsthistransformativefunction;itdoessobyprovidingthegrounds for itsown transgression,where transgression isunderstood in the specifically 65Ibid.66MichelFoucault,WhataretheIraniansDreamingAbout?,inAppendixtoFoucaultandtheIranianRevolution,207.67GillesDeleuze,LifeasaWorkofArt,inNegotiations:19721990,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),9495.

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Foucauldiansenseofclarifying limits,butdoingsopreciselysoasnot tobedeterminedbythem.ConclusionInthisessayIhaveshownthatbothDeleuzeandFoucaultappealtothenotionofontologyintheirrespectiveeffortstothinktheimpossible.IhavealsoshownthatDeleuzesontologyofdifference and Foucaults ontology of the present differ in significantways. Indeed, eachthinkerviewsakeyaspectoftheothersontology(ahistoricityinFoucaultscase,historicityinDeleuzes)asunderminingoratleastfailingtofacilitateitsowncriticalandcreativepotentialand, therefore, as countering rather than facilitating efforts to think the impossible. At thesametime,however,wehavealsoseenthatFoucaultsandDeleuzespositionsinthisregardarenotabsolute. Foucaultappears to locate transformativepotentialwithin thenotionofacollectivewillwhich,whileitmaynotbetotallyahistorical,isatleastnotreducibletoconcretehistorical events;Deleuze believes that Foucault reconceptualizes history in transformativeways.

PointingtotensionswithinandbetweenDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveeffortstothink the impossible isneither toportray theirworkasmerelycontradictorynor tosuggestthateitherofthemfailsinhisefforts.Rather,asnotedattheoutsetofthisessay,itispreciselythesetensionsthatillustratetheextenttowhichbothDeleuzeandFoucaultsucceednotonlyinengagingincriticalandcreativethinking,butalso,therefore,incultivatingconditionswithinwhichcriticalandcreativemodesoflivingintheworldmightbefostered.GuttingsuggeststhatDeleuzeandFoucaultappealtoontologybecause,despitetheirrespectivecritiquesoftheWesternphilosophicaltradition,boththinkersaimtocontinuedoingphilosophy.Iconcuronthispoint,withoneimportantcaveat:weneedtoseeDeleuzeandFoucaultnotasuncriticallyreproducingthetraditionofWesternphilosophybut,rather,asrethinkingit.

DeleuzeandFoucaultarecommittedtopreciselythekindofcriticalandcreativeworkthatdoesnothesitatetoturnitsowncritiquebackontoitself.So,asIseeit,thesetwothinkersaredoingphilosophy,but they are also, andperhapsmore importantlyfor themselves aswellasforustodaydoingsomethingwithphilosophy.Thisdoingwithasopposedtosimplydoingisreflectedinthetwoepigraphsthatbeginthisessay. Inthosepassagesfromtheirwork,DeleuzeandFoucaultexpress theview thatapproaching the traditionandhistoryofphilosophy differently opens onto the possibility of philosophy itself becoming differentbecomingothertoitself.AsIhaveshowninthisessay,theybelievethatdoingsomethingdifferentwithphilosophy inturnopensontopossibilitiesforbroadersocialtransformation,thenatureofwhichwecannotpredict,butwhichwecantrytoshapeintosomethinglivable.

Thiscommitmenttoputtingphilosophytothetestofcontemporaryreality68 isperhapswhatDeleuze and Foucault holdmost in commonwithNietzsche,whowanted notmerelytoreconfigurebuttoundermineandthereforenolongerbeboundbyprevailingwaysofmakingsenseofandlivingintheworld.InHowtheRealWorldatLastBecameaMyth,Nietzschedoesnotmerelyarguethatallofwhatphilosophershavecalledrealityisinfactappearance. Rather, inrevealing theemptinessof theconceptofreality,Nietzscheshows that 68Ibid,46.

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theconceptofappearance lacksmeaningaswell. Heshows that thereal/apparentdualismdoesnothelpusmakesenseoftheworldbutratherdistancesusfromtheonlyworldwehave(theactualworld),andthatwethereforeneedtodevoteourcriticalandcreativecapacitiestodevelopingnewwaysofmakingsense.ThatDeleuzeandFoucaultshareNietzschescommitment and takeuphis challenge frames the tensionswithin andbetween their efforts tothinktheimpossiblepreciselyasevidencethatboththinkersstillhavesomethingimportanttosaytous,providedthatwe,too,arewillingtoriskthinking,living,andseeinginnewways.

DiannaTaylorJohnCarrollUniversity

1JohnCarrollBlvd.UniversityHeights,OH

USAdtaylor@jcu.edu