Cakeshop Ruling

8/12/2019 Cakeshop Ruling

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STATE OF COLORADOOFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

1525 Sherman Street, 4t Floor, Denver, Colorado 80203

CHARLIE CRAIG and DAVID MULLINS,Complainants,

vs.

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, INC., and anysuccessor entity, and JACK C. PHILLIPS,Respondents


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as well as other administrative remedies.1

Hearing began on September 26, 2013 and was2013 to give the parties time to complete discovery ansummary judgment. Complainants and Counsel in Supthat because there is no dispute that Masterpiece Caaccommodation, or that Respondents refused to sell Comtheir same-sex wedding, that Respondents violated 24Respondents do not dispute that they refused to sell Csame-sex wedding, but contend that their refusal was ba

religious conviction that marriage is only between a mandue to bias against Complainants sexual orientation. Thedid not violate the public accommodation statute whichbecause of . . . sexual orientation. Furthermore, Responof the law to them under the circumstances of this case w


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discussion with Phillips.

8. The whole conversation between Phillips brief, with no discussion between the parties about what th

9. The next day, Ms. Munn called MasterpiePhillips. Phillips advised Ms. Munn that he does not cresex weddings because of his religious beliefs, and recognize same-sex marriages.

10. Colorado law does not recognize same-sex 31 (Only a union of one man and one woman shallmarriage in this state); 14-2-104(1), C.R.S. ([A] marriais only between one man and one woman.)

11. Phillips has been a Christian for approximaJ Ch i t hi L d d i A Ch i ti Ph


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as a matter of law, based on undisputed facts, one partyAm. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 546, 548 (Colo.

judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted onthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Brodeu169 P.3d 139, 146 (Colo. 2007). Even where it is extreissue of fact exists, summary judgment is not appropriatev. Feil, 854 P.2d 791, 795 (Colo. 1993).

The fact that the parties have filed cross-motioparty's burden of proof. When a trial court is presented w

judgment, it must consider each motion separately, reviwhether a genuine dispute as to any fact material to thgenuine disputes regarding facts material to both motiomotions. Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336,

H i f ll i d h i


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same-sex wedding. Respondents, however, argue that 24-34-601(2) because it was due to their objection to sam

of Complainants sexual orientation. Respondents dentoward homosexuals or gay couples, and would willinglygoods to Complainants or any other gay customer. On would refuse to provide a wedding cake to a heterosexualsex wedding. The ALJ rejects Respondents argumedifference.

The salient feature distinguishing same-sex weddi

the sexual orientation of its participants. Only same-sexweddings. Therefore, it makes little sense to argue that same-sex couple for use at their wedding is not because

Respondents reliance on Bray v.Alexandria Wom263 (1993) i i l d I B f b ti li


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2971, 2990 (2010). In rejecting the Chapters argumenstudents who engaged in "unrepentant homosexual c

universitys policy against discrimination due to sexual orOur decisions have declined to distinguish between statuId.

Nor is the ALJ persuaded by Respondents argucompelled to recognize same-sex marriages because

Although Respondents are correct that Colorado domarriage, that fact does not excuse discrimination baseoral argument, Respondents candidly acknowledged thprovide a cake to a same-sex couple for a commitmeneither of which is forbidden by Colorado law.4 Becausebeyond just the act of marriage, and extends to any unapparent that Respondents real objection is to the coup


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law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, anapplies that protection to the states. Article II, 10 of th

that, No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of high rank . . . in the constellation of freedoms guaranteConstitution and our state constitution. Bock v. Westmin(Colo. 1991). The guarantee of free speech applies not omediums of expression, such as art, music, and expres

American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, I

(the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words asymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicatin

Respondents argue that compelling them to prewedding is equivalent to forcing them to speak in fasomething they are unwilling to do. Indeed, the right togovernment may not compel an individual to commu


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Amendment protection.8

Furthermore, even if Respondents could make a

601(2) impacts their right to free speech, such impact is legitimate regulation of discriminatory conduct and thus iForum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. rejected the argument that withholding federal funding froto military recruiters violated the schools right to protest tpolicies. In the Courts opinion, any impact upon the schplainly incidental to the governments right to regulatecompelled speech to which the law schools point is pla

Amendments regulation of conduct, and it has never befreedom of speech or press to make a course of conduconduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out spoken written or printed Id at 62 (quoting Giboney


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supremacist message for a member of the Aryan Nation; arefuse to make a cake denigrating the Koran for th

However, neither of these fanciful hypothetical situations both cases, it is the explicit, unmistakable, offensive messto put on the cake that gives rise to the bakers free showever, is not the case here, where Respondents reComplainants regardless of what was written on it or whahave no free speech right to refuse because they were omake a speech.

Although Respondents cite Bock v. Westminsproposition that Colorados constitution provides greater

Amendment, Respondents cite no Colorado case, and thwould extend protection to the conduct at issue in this cas

F ll h h ALJ l d h


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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held

even when religiously based, are often subject to regexercise of their undoubted power to promote the healthWisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. To excuse all religstate control would permit every citizen to become a lawDivision v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Thus, for exlaw prohibiting religious-based polygamy, Reynolds v. (1879); upheld a law restricting religious-based child lab321 U.S. 158 (1944); upheld a Sunday closing law thbusinesses, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); upcollect Social Security taxes from an Amish employer dereligious principles, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252unemployment compensation to persons who were fired f


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(or proscribes). Employment Division v. Smith, 494 Ufollowed in the Tenth Circuit, Grace United Methodist Ch

F.3d 643, 649 (10th

Cir. 2006) (a law that is both neutral only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental intechallenge).

Only if a law is not neutral and of general applicabChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 50city ordinance outlawing rituals of animal sacrifice was performance of religious animal sacrifice, it was not neutand therefore had to be narrowly drawn to meet a compTown of Foxfield v. Archdiocese of Denver, 148 P.3d example of how this test has been applied in Colorado. Inappeals held that a parking ordinance was subject to striof general applicability in that it could only be enforced


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churches and other places used primarily for religioulegislatures respect for religious freedom.11 Conestog

Sebelius, 917 F.Supp.2d 394, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (the fafor religious employers shows that the government mreligious beliefs, which counsels in favor of the regulatio377 (3

rdCir. 2013).

The only other exception in 24-34-601 is a secpublic accommodations to one sex, where the restriction the good or service being provided; such as a womens601(3). The Tenth Circuit, however, has joined other cSmith as standing for the proposition that a narrow seexempts all religiously motivated activity. Grace United,with the majority of our sister circuits, however, we havSmith as standing for the proposition that a secular exem


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application of this law to Respondents does not violateunduly abridge their right to free exercise of religion. Acco

for summary judgment is GRANTED and Respondents mDENIED.

Initial Decision

Respondents violated 24-34-601(2), C.R.S. suFormal Complaint. In accordance with 24-34-306(9) aare ordered to:

(1) Cease and desist from discriminating against Csex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or anwould provide to heterosexual couples; and

(2) Take such other corrective action as is


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Cakeshop Ruling

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