Boko Haram Terror

8/20/2019 Boko Haram Terror

1/25

Boko Haram

The maximum extent of Boko Haram, in January 2015, shown

in dark grey

Boko Haram, which calls itself Wilāyat Gharb

Ifrīqīyyah (Arabic: يقا غب فر سإ ي

, (IslamicState’s) West Africa Province, ISWAP ),[12] and Jamā'atAhl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād' (Arabic:

ا

د ا ج و ة ع ن ل ه , “Group of the People of Sun-nah for Preaching and Jihad”),[13] is an Islamic extremistgroup based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad,Niger and northern Cameroon.[7] The group’s leader isAbubakar Shekau. The group had alleged links to al-Qaeda, but in March 2015, it announced its allegianceto the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[14][15]

Since the current insurgency started in 2009, it has killed20,000 and displaced 2.3 million from their homes.[16]

After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram’s increasing rad-icalization led to a violent uprising in July 2009 in whichits leader was summarily executed. Its unexpected resur-gence, following a mass prison break in September 2010,was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks,initially against soft targets, and progressing in 2011 to in-clude suicide bombings ofpolice buildings andtheUnitedNations office in Abuja. The government’s establishmentof a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, ex-tended in the following year to cover the entire northeastofNigeria, ledto an increase in both security force abusesand militant attacks.[17][18][19][20]

Of the 2.3 million people displaced by the conflict sinceMay 2013, at least 250,000 have left Nigeria and fledinto Cameroon, Chad or Niger.[21] Boko Haram killed

over 6,600 in 2014.[22][23] The group have carried outmass abductions including the kidnapping of 276 school-girls from Chibok in April 2014. Corruption in the secu-rity services and human rights abuses committed by themhave hampered efforts to counter the unrest.[24][25]

In mid-2014, the militants gained control of swathesof territory in and around their home state of Borno,estimated at 50,000 square kilometres (20,000 sq mi)in January 2015, but did not capture the state capital,Maiduguri, where the group was originally based.[26] In

September 2015, the Director of Information at the De-fence Headquarters of Nigeria announced that all BokoHaram camps had been destroyed.[27]

1 Name

The group’s official name is Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya, todesignate it as a branch or “province” of the Islamic Stateof Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[12][28] Prior to AbubakarShekau’s pledge of allegiance to ISIL, the group’s offi-cial name was Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'watiwal-Jihād

و جاد عة ن له ا

, meaning “PeopleCommitted to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagationand Jihad”.[29]

The name “Boko Haram” is usually translated as “West-ern education is forbidden”. Haram is from the Ara-bic م َح ḥarām, “forbidden"; and the Hausa word boko

[the first vowel is long, the second pronounced in alow tone], meaning “fake”,[30][31] which is used to re-fer to secular Western education.[32] Boko Haram hasalso been translated as “Western influence is a sin”[33]

and “Westernization is sacrilege”.[18] Until the death of

its founder Mohammed Yusuf, the group was also re-portedly known as Yusifiyya.[34] Northern Nigerians havecommonly dismissed Western education as ilimin boko(“fake education”) and secular schools as makarantaboko.[31][32][35][36]

2 Ideology

Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamen-talist sect, influenced by the Wahhabi movement, advo-cating a strict form of Sharia law. It developed into a

Salafist-jihadi group in 2009. The movement is diffuse,and fighters associated with it do not necessarily followSalafi doctrine.[37][38][39][40][41] The group has denounced

1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_jihadismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia_lawhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunnihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Yusuf_(Boko_Haram)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hausa_languagehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E1%B8%A4ar%C4%81mhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haramhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maidugurihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borno_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibokhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok_schoolgirl_kidnappinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok_schoolgirl_kidnappinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_emergencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abujahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nationshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nationshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suicide_bombinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soft_targethttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summary_executionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levanthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaedahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaedahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abubakar_Shekauhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chadhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_languagehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabic_language


2/25

2 3 HISTORY

Nigerian states with sharia law shown in green

the members of the Sufi, the Shiite, and the Izala sectsas infidels.[42] Boko Haram seeks the establishment of anIslamic state in Nigeria. It opposes the Westernizationof Nigerian society and the concentration of the wealthof the country among members of a small political elite,mainly in the Christian south of the country.[43][44] Nige-ria is Africa’s biggest economy, but 60% of its populationof 173 million (2013) live on less than $1 a day.[45][46][47]

The sharia law imposed by local authorities, beginningwith Zamfara in January 2000 and covering 12 northernstates by late 2002, may have promoted links between

Boko Haram and political leaders, but was considered bythe group to have been corrupted.[48]:101[49][50][51]

According to Borno Sufi Imam Sheik Fatahi, Yusufwas trained by Kano Salafi Izala Sheik Ja'afar MahmudAdamu, who called him the “leader of young people";the two split some time in 2002–4. They both preachedin Maiduguri's Indimi Mosque, which was attended bythe deputy governor of Borno.[34][52] Many of the groupwere reportedly inspired by Mohammed Marwa, knownas Maitatsine (“Hewhocurses others”), a self-proclaimedprophet (annabi , a Hausa word usually used only to de-scribe the founder of Islam) born in Northern Cameroon

who condemned the reading of books other than theQuran.[31][53][54][55] In a 2009 BBC interview, Yusuf, de-scribed by analysts as being well-educated, reaffirmed hisopposition to Western education. He rejected the theoryof evolution, said that rain is not “an evaporation causedby the sun”, and that the Earth is not a sphere.[56]

3 History

3.1 Background

Further information: Fourth Nigerian Republic

Kano, biggest city in northern Nigeria

Before colonization and subsequent annexation into theBritish Empire in 1900 as Colonial Nigeria, the BornuEmpire ruled the territory where BokoHaram is currentlyactive. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to theprinciples of the Constitution of Medina, with a major-ity Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903, both the BornoEmirate and Sokoto Caliphate came under the controlof the British, who used educational institutions to helpspread Christianity in the region.[57] British occupationended with Nigerian independence in 1960.[58][59][60]

Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979and 1983, Nigeria was governed by a series of militarydictatorships from 1966 until the advent of democracy in1999. Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one ofthe causes of the 1967–70 civil war; religious violencereached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city inthe north of the country, where the Muslim fundamental-ist sect Yan Tatsine (“followers of Maitatsine”) instigatedriots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths. In theensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was killed, fu-elling a backlash of increased violence that spread acrossother northern cities over the next twenty years.[61] Socialinequality, poverty and the increasingly radical nature ofIslam, locally and internationally, contributed both to theMaitatsine and Boko Haram uprisings.[48]:97–98

In the decades since the end of British occupation, politi-cians and academics from the mainly Islamic North haveexpressed their fundamental opposition to Western ed-ucation. Political ethno-religious interest groups, whosemembership includes influential political, military and re-ligious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they werelargely suppressed under military rule. Their paramilitarywings, formed since the country’s return to civilian rule,have been implicated in much of the sectarian violencein the years following. The Arewa People’s Congress,the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum, themain political group representing the interests of northern

Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelli-gence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging inmilitary action, including covert bombing.[62]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arewa_Consultative_Forumhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arewa_People%2527s_Congresshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitaryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yan_Tatsinehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_violence_in_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_violencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sokoto_Caliphatehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borno_Emiratehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borno_Emiratehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanuri_peoplehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Medinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sultanatehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bornu_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bornu_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Empirehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonizationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Nigerian_Republichttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_Earthhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBChttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Cameroonshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hausa_languagehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maitatsinehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maidugurihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ja%2527afar_Mahmud_Adamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ja%2527afar_Mahmud_Adamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_movementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikhhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sufismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zamfarahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izala_Societyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shiitehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sufi


3/25

4.2 2010 3

3.2 Founding

Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became knownas Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of thenorth-eastern state of Borno. He established a religiouscomplex and school that attracted poor Muslim families

from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Thecenter had the political goal of creating an Islamic state,and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denounc-ing the police and state corruption, Yusuf attracted fol-lowers from unemployed youths.[38][58][63][64] It has beenspeculated that the reason Yusuf founded Boko Haramappears to be that he saw an opportunity to exploit publicoutrage at government corruption by linking it to West-ern influence in governance.[65] He is reported to haveused the existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala So-ciety (Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a pop-ular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, be-

fore breaking away to form his own faction. The Izalawere originally welcomed into government, along withpeople sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted itsoperations more or less peacefully during the first sevenyears of its existence, withdrawing from society into re-mote north-eastern areas. The government repeatedly ig-nored warnings about the increasingly militant characterof the organization.[39][66] The Council of Ulama advisedthe government and the Nigerian Television Authoritynot to broadcast Yusuf’s preaching, but their warningswere ignored. Yusuf’s arrest elevated him to hero sta-tus. Borno’s Deputy Governor Alhaji Dibal has report-edly claimed that al-Qaeda had ties with Boko Haram,

but broke them when they decided that Yusuf was an un-reliable person.[34]

4 Campaign of violence

4.1 2009

Further information: 2009 Boko Haram Uprising

In 2009, police began an investigation into the groupcode-named 'Operation Flush'. On July 26, securityforces arrested nine Boko Haram members and confis-cated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Eitherthis or a clash with police during a funeral processionled to revenge attacks on police and widespread riot-ing. A joint military task force operation was launchedin response, and by 30 July more than 700 people hadbeen killed, mostly Boko Haram members, and po-lice stations, prisons, government offices, schools andchurches had been destroyed.[18][48]:98–102[67][68] Yusufwas arrested, and died in custody “while trying to es-cape”. As had been the case decades earlier in the wake

of the 1980 Kano riots, the killing of the leader of anextremist group would have unintended consequences.He was succeeded by Abubakar Shekau, formerly his

Map of Nigeria from the CIA World Factbook

second-in-command.[69][70] A classified cable sent fromthe U.S. Embassy in Abuja in November 2009, availableon WikiLeaks, is illuminating:[34]

[Borno political and religious leaders] ...asserted that the state and federal governmentresponded appropriately and, apart from theopposition party, overwhelmingly supportedYusuf’s death without misgivings over the ex-trajudicial killing. Security remained a con-cern in Borno, with residents expressing con-cern about importation of arms and exchangesof religious messages across porous interna-tional borders.

According to the leaked document, there were reportsthat Yusuf’s deputy had survived, and audio tapes werebelieved to be in circulation in which BokoHaram threat-ened future attacks. Nevertheless, many observers didnot anticipate imminent bloodshed. Security in Bornowas downgraded. Borno government official Alhaji

Boguma believed that the state deserved praise from theinternational community for ending the conflict in sucha short time, and that the “wave of fundamentalism” hadbeen “crushed”.[34]

4.2 2010

Main article: Bauchi prison break

In September 2010, having regrouped under their newleader, Boko Haram broke 105 of its members out of

prison in Bauchi along with over 600 other prisoners andwent on to launch attacks in several areas of northernNigeria.[61][71][72]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bauchihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bauchi_prison_breakhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeakshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abujahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_cablehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Factbookhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abubakar_Shekauhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Boko_Haram_Uprisinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaedahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Television_Authorityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izala_Societyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izala_Societyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihadismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Yusuf_(Boko_Haram)


4/25


5/25

4.5 2013 5

ans living in the north, giving them three days to leave.Three days later they began a series of mostly small-scaleattacks on Christians and members of the Igbo ethnicgroup, causing hundreds to flee. In Kano, on 20 January,they carried out by far their most deadly action yet, an as-sault on police buildings, killing 190. One of the victims

was a TV reporter. The attacks included a combined useof car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs, supported byuniformed gunmen.[37][101][102][103][104][105][106]

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch pub-lished reports in 2012 that were widely quoted by gov-ernment agencies and the media, based on research con-ductedover the course of the conflict in the worstaffectedareas of the country. The NGOs were critical of bothsecurity forces and Boko Haram. HRW stated “BokoHaram should immediately cease all attacks, and threatsof attacks, that cause loss of life, injury, and destructionof property. The Nigerian government should take urgent

measures to address the human rights abuses that havehelped fuel the violent militancy.” According to the 2012US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices ,[25]

"... serious human rights problems in-cluded extrajudicial killings by security forces,including summary executions; security forcetorture, rape, and other cruel, inhuman, or de-grading treatment of prisoners, detainees, andcriminal suspects; harsh and life-threateningprison and detention center conditions; arbi-

trary arrest and detention; prolonged pretrialdetention; denial of fair public trial; execu-tive influence on the judiciary; infringementson citizens’ privacy rights; restrictions on free-dom of speech, press, assembly, religion, andmovement ...”

“On October 9, witnesses in Maiduguriclaimed members of the JTF “Restore Order”,[a vigilante group]based in Maiduguri, went ona killing spree after a suspected Boko Harambomb killed an officer. Media reported theJTF killed 20 to 45 civilians and razed 50 to100 houses in the neighborhood. The JTFcommander in Maiduguri denied the allega-tions. On November 2, witnesses claimed theJTF shot and killed up to 40 people duringraids in Maiduguri. The army claimed it dis-missed some officers from the military as a re-sult of alleged abuses committed in Maiduguri,but there were no known formal prosecutionsin Maiduguri by year’s end.”

“Credible reports also indicated ... uni-formed military personnel and paramilitarymobile police carried out summary executions,assaults, torture, and other abuses throughout

Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, andYobe states ... The national police, army, andother security forces committed extrajudicial

killings and used lethal and excessive force toapprehend criminals and suspects, as well as todisperse protesters. Authorities generally didnot hold police accountable for the use of ex-cessive or deadly force or for the deaths of per-sons in custody. Security forces generally op-

erated with impunity in the illegal apprehen-sion, detention, and sometimes extrajudicialexecution of criminal suspects. The reports ofstate or federal panels of inquiry investigatingsuspicious deaths remained unpublished.”

“There were no new developments in thecase of five police officers accused of execut-ing Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 at a state po-lice headquarters. In July 2011 authorities ar-raigned five police officers in the federal highcourt in Abuja for the murder of Yusuf. Thecourt granted bail to four of the officers, while

one remained in custody.”“Police use of excessive force, including

use of live ammunition, to disperse demon-strators resulted in numerous killings duringthe year. For example, although the Jan-uary fuel subsidy demonstrations generally re-mained peaceful, security forces reportedlyfired on protesters in various states across thecountry during those demonstrations, resultingin 10 to 15 deaths and an unknown number ofwounded.”

“Despite some improvements resultingfrom the closure of police checkpoints in manyparts of the country, states with an increasedsecurity presence due to the activities of BokoHaram experienced a rise in violence and lethalforce at police and military roadblocks.”

“Continuing abductions of civilians bycriminal groups occurred in the Niger Deltaand Southeast ... Police and other securityforces were often implicated in the kidnappingschemes.”

“Although the constitution and lawprohibitsuch practices and provide for punishment ofsuch abuses, torture is notcriminalized, andse-

curity service personnel, including police, mil-itary, and State Security Service (SSS) officers,regularly tortured, beat, and abused demon-strators, criminal suspects, detainees, and con-victed prisoners. Police mistreated civilians toextort money. The law prohibits the introduc-tion into trials of evidence and confessions ob-tained through torture; however, police oftenused torture to extract confessions.”[107]

4.5 2013

See also: 2013 Baga massacreNigeria’s Borno State, where Boko Haram is based, ad-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Baga_massacrehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_confessionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistreatmenthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biafrahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roadblockhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murderhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspicious_deathhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrajudicial_punishmenthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_in_custodyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadly_forcehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Excessive_forcehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrajudicial_killinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrajudicial_killinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plateau_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaduna_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kano_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Mobile_Policehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramilitaryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Killing_spreehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigilantehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Task_Forcehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summary_executionshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States%2527_Country_Reports_on_Human_Rights_Practiceshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States%2527_Country_Reports_on_Human_Rights_Practiceshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Department_of_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NGOhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watchhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnesty_Internationalhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igbo_people


6/25

6 4 CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE

Lake Chad

joins Lake Chad as do Niger, Cameroon and the countryof Chad. The conflict and refugees spilled over the na-tional borders to involve all four countries.

In 2013 Boko Haram increased operations in Northern

Cameroon, and were involved in skirmishes along theborders of Chad and Niger. They were linked to a num-ber of kidnappings, often reportedly in association withthe splinter group Ansaru, drawing towards them a higherlevel of international attention.

The U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism provides the fol-lowing summary of Boko Haram’s 2013 foreign opera-tions:

In February 2013, Boko Haram was re-sponsible for kidnapping seven French touristsin the far north of Cameroon. In Novem-

ber 2013, Boko Haram members kidnappeda French priest in Cameroon. In Decem-ber 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly at-tacked civilians in several areas of northernCameroon. Security forces from Chad andNiger also reportedly partook in skirmishesagainst suspected Boko Haram members alongNigeria’s borders. In 2013, the group alsokidnapped eight French citizens in northernCameroon and obtained ransom payments fortheir release.[7]

Boko Haram has often managed to evade the Nige-rian army by retreating into the hills around the borderwith Cameroon, whose army is apparently unwilling toconfront them. Nigeria, Chad and Niger had formeda Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998. In Febru-ary 2012, Cameroon signed an agreement with Nige-ria to establish a Joint Trans-Border Security Commit-tee, which was inaugurated in November 2013, whenCameroon announced plans to conduct “coordinated butseparate” border patrols in 2014. It convened again inJuly 2014 to further improve cooperation between thetwo countries.[108][109][110][111][112]

In late 2013, Amnesty International received 'credible'information that over 950 inmates had died in custody,mostly in detention centres in Maiduguri and Damaturu,

within the first half of the year. Official state corrup-tion was also documented in December 2013 by the UKHome Office:[113][114]

The NPF [Nigeria Police Force], SSS, and

military report to civilian authorities; however,these security services periodically act outsideof civilian control. The government lack ef-fective mechanisms to investigate and punishabuse and corruption. The NPF remain sus-ceptible to corruption, commit human rightsabuses, and generally operate with impunity inthe apprehension, illegal detention, and some-times execution of criminal suspects. The SSSalso commit human rights abuses, particularlyin restricting freedom of speech and press. Insome cases private citizens or the governmentbrought charges against perpetrators of human

rights abuses in these units. However, mostcases lingered in court or went unresolved afteran initial investigation.

The state of emergency was extended in May 2013 tocover thewhole of the threenorth-easternstates ofBorno,Adamawa and Yobe, raising tensions in the region. Inthe 12 months following the announcement, 250,000 fledthe three states, followed by a further 180,000 betweenMay and August 2014. A further 210,000 fled from bor-dering states, bringing the total displaced by the con-flict to 650,000. Many thousands left the country. An

August 2014 AI Amnesty International video showedarmy and allied militia executing people, including byslitting their throats, and dumping their bodies in massgraves.[115][116][117]

Michelle Obama raising awareness of the Chibok kidnapping

4.6 2014

4.6.1 Chibok kidnapping

Main article: Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok_schoolgirls_kidnappinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnesty_Internationalhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yobe_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adamawa_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borno_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home_Officehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damaturuhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Counterterrorismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansaruhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chadhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chadhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Chad


7/25

4.6 2014 7

In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls fromChibok, Borno. More than 50 of them escaped, butthe remainder have not been released. Instead, Shekau,who has a reward of $7 million offered by the USDepartment of State since June 2013 for informationleading to his capture, announced his intention of sell-

ing them into slavery. The incident brought BokoHaram extended global media attention, much of it fo-cused on the pronouncements of the US First LadyMichelle Obama. Faced with outspoken condemnationfor his perceived incompetence, and detailed accusa-tions from Amnesty International of state collusion, Pres-ident Jonathan responded by hiring a Washington PRfirm.[118][119][120][121][122][123][124][125]

Parents of the missing schoolgirls and those who hadescaped were kept waiting until July to meet with thepresident, which caused them concern. In October, thegovernment announced the girls’ imminent release, but

the information proved unreliable. The announcementto the media of a peace agreement and the imminentrelease of all the missing girls was followed days laterby a video message in which Shekau stated that no suchmeeting had taken place and that the girls had been“married off”. The announcement to the media, unac-companied by any evidence of the reality of the agree-ment, was thought by analysts to have been a politicalploy by the president to raise his popularity before hisconfirmation of his candidacy in the 2015 general elec-tion. Earlier in the year, the girls’ plight had featuredon "#BringBackOurGirls” political campaign posters in

the streets of the capital, which the president deniedknowledge of and soon took down after news of criti-cism surfaced. These posters, which were interpreted,to the dismay of campaigners for the girls’ recapture, asbeing designed to benefit from the fame of the kidnap-ping, had also been part of Jonathan’s “pre-presidentialcampaign”. In September, "#BringBackGoodluck2015”campaign posters again drew criticism.[126] The officialannouncement of the president’s candidacy was made be-fore cheering crowds in Abuja on 11 November.[127]

4.6.2 Northern Cameroon

Northern Cameroon Mandara Mountains

In 2014, Boko Haram continued to increase its presencein northern Cameroon. On May 16, ten Chinese work-ers were abducted in a raid on a construction companycamp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles andexplosives were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroonsoldier was killed. Cameroon’s antiterrorist Rapid Inter-

vention Battalion attempted to intervene but were vastlyoutnumbered.[128] In July, the deputy prime minister’shome village was attacked by around 200 militants; hiswife was kidnapped, along with the Sultan of Kolofataand his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers andpolice, were killed in the raid. The deputy prime min-ister’s wife was subsequently released in October, alongwith 26 others including the ten Chinese constructionworkers who had been captured in May; authorities madeno comment about any ransom, which the Cameroon gov-ernment had previously claimed it never pays.[129] In aseparate attack, nine bus passengers and a soldier were

shot dead and the son of a local chief was kidnapped.Hundreds of local youths are suspected to have been re-cruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border town ofGwoza was overrun and held by the group. In responseto the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian presi-dent sacked two senior military officers and sent his armychief with 1000 reinforcements to the northern borderregion.[130][131][132]

Between May and July 2014, 8,000 Nigerian refugeesarrived in the country, up to 25 percent suffering fromacute malnutrition. Cameroon, which ranked 150 outof 186 on the 2012 UNDP HDI, hosted, as of August

2014, 107,000 refugees fleeing unrest in the CAR, anumber that was expected to increase to 180,000 by theend of the year.[133][134][135] A further 11,000 Nigerianrefugees crossedtheborder intoCameroon andChaddur-ing August.[136]

4.6.3 Expansion of occupied territory

Wounded people following a bomb attack by Boko Haram in

Nyanya , Nasarawa in April 2014

The attack on Gwoza signalled a change in strategy forBoko Haram, as the group continued to capture territory

in north-eastern and eastern areas of Borno, as well as inAdamawa and Yobe. Attacks across the border were re-pelled by the Cameroon military.[137] The territorial gains

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasarawahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyanyahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2014_Nyanya_bombinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republichttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Indexhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNDPhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwozahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolofatahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandara_Mountainshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_general_election,_2015https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_general_election,_2015https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_relationshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Lady_of_the_United_Stateshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contemporary_slaveryhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Department_of_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Department_of_Statehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok


8/25


9/25

9

On 3 January 2015 Boko Haram attacked Baga, seizingit and the multinational joint task force military base. Asthe militants advanced the army fled. Some residentsmanaged to escape to Chad.[156] Although the death tollof the massacre was earlier estimated bywestern media tobe upwards of 2000,[157] the Defence Ministry dismissed

these claims as “speculation and conjecture”, estimatingthe figure to be closer to 150.[158] On 25 January the mil-itants advanced to Monguno, capturing the town and anearby military base. Their advance on Maiduguri andKonduga, 40 km to the southeast, was repelled. Afterretaking Monguno, the army expelled the militants fromBaga on 21 February.[159]

The Baga massacre was one of the Nigerian army’sbiggest defeats in terms of loss of equipment and civil-ian casualties. Several officers were court-martialed. InOctober 2015 General Enitan Ransome-Kuti was dis-missed from the army and sentenced to six months im-

prisonment. It was determined that he had failed in hisduty to launch a counter-attack after retreating from thetown.[160]

4.7.2 Cameroon raids

On January 12, Boko Haram attacked a Cameroonmilitary base in Kolofata. Government forces reportkilling 143 militants, while one Cameroon soldier waskilled.[161] On 18 January Boko Haram raided twoTourou Cameroon area villages, torching houses, killingsome residents and kidnapping between 60 and 80 peo-ple including an estimated 50 young children between theages of 10 and 15.[162]

4.7.3 West African offensive

Main article: 2015 West African offensiveStarting in late January 2015, a coalition of military

Niger Armed Forces fighting Boko Haram in March 2015

forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began acampaign against Boko Haram. [163] On 4 February, theChad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants.[164]

Soon afterwards, Boko Haram launched an attack on theCameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers.[165]

On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram’s leader AbubakarShekau pledged allegiance to ISIL via an audio mes-sageposted on theorganisation’s Twitteraccount.[166][167]

Nigerian army spokesperson Sami Usman Kukashekasaid the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekauwas like a “drowning man”.[168] On 12 March 2015,

ISIL’s spokesmanAbuMohammad al-Adnani released anaudiotape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance,and described it as an expansion of the group’s caliphateto West Africa.[14]

On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria saidthat Boko Haram had taken more than 400 womenand children from the town as they fled from coalitionforces.[169] On March 27, the Nigerian army capturedGwoza, which was believed to be the location of BokoHaram headquarters.[170] On election day, 28 March2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, includ-ing a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting. [171]

In March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of the NorthernNigerian towns of Bama[172] and Gwoza[173] to the Nige-rian army. The Nigerian authorities said that they hadtaken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled byBoko Haram.[172] In April, four Boko Haram camps inthe Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian militarywho freed nearly 300 females.[174] Boko Haram forceswere believed to have retreated to the Mandara Moun-tains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.[175]

4.7.4 July mosques massacres

Boko Haram militants attacked multiple mosques be-tween July 1 and 2. Forty-eight men and boys were killedon the 1st at one mosque in Kukawa. Seventeen werewounded in the attack. Ninety-seven others, mostly men,were killed in numerous mosques on the 2nd with a num-ber of women and young girls killed in their homes. Anunknown number were wounded.[176]

4.7.5 Suicide bombings in Chad

On June 15, two suicide bombings of police sites inN'Djamena, the capital and largest city of Chad, killed38 people. Boko Haram later claimed responsibility forthese attacks.[177] On July 11, a male suicide bomberdisguised in a woman’s Burqa detonated his explosivesbelt in the main market of N'Djamena, next to the mainmosque, killing 15 people and injuring 80.[178] Severaldays after the bombing, Boko Haram claimed responsi-bility via Twitter, signing as “Islamic State, West Africaprovince.”[179]

5 Claim of defeat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N%2527Djamenahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kukawahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandara_Mountainshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandara_Mountainshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sambisa_Foresthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bama,_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damasakhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Mohammad_al-Adnanihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fotokolhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Chadhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Armed_Forceshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_West_African_offensivehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolofatahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court-martialhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kondugahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongunohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_mediahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baga,_Nigeria


10/25


11/25

5.8 Niger 11

5.5 Yobe

On 7 October in Damaturu, Yobe at least 15 peo-ple were killed by 3 suicide bombers.[197] In Goniri,Yobe 7 soldiers and over 100 militants were killed, anda large arms cache was found, according to an army

spokesman, who said that the recent apparent rise in sui-cide bombings was an indication of the success of mili-tary operations.[198][199]

5.6 Cameroon

On 11 October in the far north region of Cameroon twofemale suicide bombers killed nine people in the townof Mora. On 18 October 10 militants were killed whenthey attacked a Cameroon military anti-terrorist division

convoy close to the border, after a military vehicle be-came stuck in mud. One army commander later diedof his wounds.[200] On 12 October the first 90 of a pro-posed deployment of 300 US troops arrived in the re-gion to assist with training, reconnaissance and airborneintelligence using Predator drones.[201] On 16 Octobermore than six security vehicles were transferred to theCameroon military. An AFRICOM spokesman said thatincreased cooperation had led them “to study the viabilityof ISR flights from a temporary location in Cameroon.”The deployment is “totally separateand distinct” from op-erations in Chad and Niger, where 250 and 85 personnel,respectively, are conducting missions including ISR andtraining.[202]

On 23 October Boko Haram fighters were driven outof Kerawa, a village of 50,000 in Kolofata, a communein the far north region. They had briefly occupied thevillage until the arrival of security forces. Reports ofcivilian casualties ranged from eight to eleven. An armyspokesman claimed the militants suffered heavy casual-ties. The village’s military base had previously been tar-geted by suicide bombers on 3 September, when 30 werekilled.[203][204][205][206]

5.7 Chad

On 6 October the Chadian army reported an attack inthe border region of Lake Chad. 11 soldiers were killedand 14 wounded in the pre dawn cross-border infiltra-tion, and 17 militants were also killed, according to anarmy spokesman.[207] On 10 October 5 suicide bomberskilled 33 in the market in Baga Sola, a camp for Nige-rian refugees.[208] On 1 November two dawn attacks onarmy posts occured. Eleven militants and two soldierswere killed atKaika, andin an attempted suicide bombing

at Bougouma, “Two members of Boko Haram were neu-tralised and a third blew himself up, wounding 11 civil-ians”, according to a government statement.[209][210]

5.8 Niger

On 25 September at least 15 civilians were massacred andstores were looted in a cross-border raid on a Niger vil-lage, according to anonymous military sources.[211] On 2October two soldiers died and four were wounded in a

Boko Haram attack on a village near the Nigerian borderin Niger’sDiffa province. The militants alsolooted stores,according to Niger army officers. On 4 October, accord-ing to an aid worker, a policeman and five civilians werekilled by 4 suicide bombers near the Nigerian border. On6 October three suspected Boko Haram militants acci-dentally blew themselves up while transporting explosivesto Bosso town in Diffa. On 21 October near Diffa towntwo soldiers were killed by explosives while intercept-ing an attack. Diffa region hosts over 150,000 Nigerianrefugees. It is under a stateof emergency. On 14 Octobera curfewand movement restrictions were imposed.[212] At

least 57 attacks occurred there from February to October2015. More than 1,100 Boko Haram suspects have beenarrested in Niger during 2015.[213][214][215]

On 11 November twoNiger militaryofficials described anattack on a village in Bosso district in which five civiliansand 20 militants were killed. A senior government officiallater denied that the attack had occurred, according toReuters .[216][217]

6 Organization

6.1 Leaders, structure and members

Although Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchicalstructure with one overall leader, the group also operatesas a clandestinecell system using a network structure,[218]

with units having between 300 and 500 fighters each.[219]

Estimates of the total number of fighters range between500 and 9,000.[5][6][220]

Between 2002 and 2009, Boko Haram was led by theorganization founder, Mohammed Yusuf. In 2009, af-ter Yusuf was killed, leadership passed to AbubakarShekau, whowasYusuf’s second-in command. AbubakarShekau was born in Yobe, Nigeria between 1965 and1975.[221] He speaks Arabic, Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri.On 21 June 2012 the U.S. Department of State desig-nated Abubakar Shekau a Specially Designated GlobalTerrorist.[221]

6.2 Financing

6.2.1 Kidnappings, robbery and extortion

Boko Haram gets funding from bank robberies and kid-

napping ransoms.[102][222] As an example, in early 2013,gunmen from Boko Haram kidnapped a family of sevenFrench tourists on vacation in Cameroon. Two months

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine_cell_systemhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosso,_Nigerhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffa_Regionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communes_of_Cameroonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolofatahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence,_surveillance_and_reconnaissancehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Africa_Commandhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predator_droneshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damaturu


12/25

12 6 ORGANIZATION

later, the kidnappers released the hostages along with 16others in exchange for a ransom of $3.15 million.[223]

Any funding they may have received in the past fromal-Qaeda affiliates is insignificant compared to the esti-mated $1 million ransom for each wealthy Nigerian or

foreigner kidnapped. Cash is moved around by couri-ers, making it impossible to track, and communication isconducted face-to-face. Their mode of operation, whichis thought to include paying local youths to track armymovements, is such that little funding is required to carryout attacks.[224] Equipment captured fromfleeing soldierskeeps the group constantly well-supplied.[225] The groupalso extorts local governments. A spokesman of BokoHaram claimed that Kano state governor Ibrahim Sheka-rau and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid themmonthly.[226][227]

6.2.2 Donations from Islamist sympathizers

After Boko Haram was founded, it received most of itsfunds from local donors who supported its goal of impos-ing Islamic law while ridding Nigeria of Western influ-ences. In more recent times, Boko Haram has broadenedits funding by drawing on foreign donors, and other ven-tures such as fake charity organizations.[223] In February2012, recently arrested officials revealed that while theorganization initially relied on donations from members,its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb openedit up to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and theUK.[228][229]

Boko Haram cloaks its sources of finance through theuse of a highly decentralized distribution network. Thegroup employs an Islamic model of money transfer calledhawala, which is based on an honor system and a globalnetwork of agents that makes the financing difficult totrack.[223] In the past, Nigerian officials have been crit-icized for being unable to trace much of the funding thatBoko Haram has received.[230]

6.2.3 Drug trafficking

Boko Haram has occasionally been connected in me-dia reports with cocaine trafficking.[231][232] James Cock-ayne, formerly Co-Director of the Center on GlobalCounterterrorism Cooperation and Senior Fellow at theInternational Peace Institute, wrote in 2012,[233][234]

Given their appreciation of the contestednature of much African governance, it comesas something of a surprise that Carrier andKlantschnig [Review of Africa and the War onDrugs , 2012] fiercely downplay the impact thatcocaine trafficking is having on West African

governance. On the basis of just three casestudies (Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho and Nigeria)the authors conclude that 'state complicity' in

the African drug trade is 'rare', and the domi-nant paradigm is 'repression'. As a result, theyradically understate the close involvement ofpolitical and military actors in drug trafficking– particularly in West African cocaine traffick-ing – and overlook the growing power of drug

money in African electoral politics, local andtraditional governance, and security.

6.3 Ties to other militant groups

In 2011, letters from Boko Haram were reportedly foundin bin Laden’s compound.[235]

Three weeks after the July 2009 riots, AQIM expressed

sympathy for Boko Haram.[236]

Speaking by phone to reporters in in November 2012,group spokesman Abu Qaqa said: “We are together withal-Qaeda, they are promoting the cause of Islam, just aswe are doing. Therefore they help us in our struggle andwe help them, too.” The 2012 Reuters special report de-tails how fighters have trained with al-Qaeda affiliates insmall groups over at least 6 years.[237]

According to the UN Security Council listing of BokoHaram under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime in May2014,[238] the group “has maintained a relationship with

AQIM for training and material support purposes”, and“gained valuable knowledge on the construction of im-provised explosive devices from AQIM”. The UN foundthata “number of Boko Harammembers fought alongsideal Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 be-fore returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise”. AQIMis oneof al-Qaeda’s regional branches, whose leader, AbuMusab Abdel Wadoud, has sworn an oath of allegiance toal-Qaeda’s senior leadership.[239]

However, al-Qaeda Central has never officially acceptedBoko Haram as an affiliate, and after the Chibok school-girls kidnapping, al-Qaeda did not praise Boko Haram,

leading some analysts to conclude that the group was tooviolent for al-Qaeda.[236][240] The form and structure ofal-Qaeda and its affiliates remains a matter of debatewithin theUS Intelligence Community, and the exact cur-rent status of ties between Boko Haram and the al-Qaedaorganization remains unclear.[235]

In July 2014, Shekau released a 16-minute video wherehe voiced support for ISIL's head Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,al-Qaeda’s head Ayman al-Zawahiri and Afghan Talibanleader Mullah Omar.[241] In March 2015, Shekau for-mally pledged allegiance to ISIL, which was accepted bythe group’s spokesman several days later.[14]

In October 2015 US military officials noted that whileBokoHaram hadimproved their useofpropaganda, thereis no evidence of on-the-ground ISIL advisors.[188]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Omarhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayman_al-Zawahirihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levanthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok_schoolgirls_kidnappinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chibok_schoolgirls_kidnappinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Musab_Abdel_Wadoudhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Musab_Abdel_Wadoudhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda_in_the_Islamic_Maghrebhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Qaqahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Peace_Institutehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_on_Global_Counterterrorism_Cooperationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_on_Global_Counterterrorism_Cooperationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawalahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isa_Yugudahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Shekarauhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Shekarau


13/25

13

7 Response by Nigerian authorities

The Nigerian military is, in the words of a former Britishmilitary attaché speaking in 2014, “a shadow of what it’sreputed to have once been. It’s fallen apart.” They are

short of basic equipment, including radios and armouredvehicles. Morale is said to be low. Senior officers are al-leged to be skimming military procurement budget fundsthat are intended to pay for the standard issue equipmentof soldiers. The country’s defense budget accounts formore than a third of the security budget of $5.8 billion,but only 10 percent is allocated to capital spending.[242]

In a 2014 United States Department of Defense assess-ment, funds are being “skimmed off the top”, troopsare “showing signs of real fear”, and are “afraid to evenengage”.[37]:9

In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military shut down

mobile phone coverage in the three north-eastern statesto disrupt the group’s communication and ability to det-onate IEDs. Accounts from military insiders and data ofBoko Haram incidences before, during and after the mo-bile phone blackout suggest that the shut down was 'suc-cessful' from a military- tactical point of view. Howeverit angered citizens in the region (owing to negative so-cial and economic consequences of the mobile shutdown)and engendered negative opinions toward the state andnew emergency policies. While citizens and organiza-tions developed various coping and circumventing strate-gies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network modelof insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the

center of its operations to the Sambisa Forest. This fun-damentally changed the dynamics of the conflict.[243]

In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have had the high-est number of terrorist killings in the world over the pastyear, 3477, killed in 146 attacks.[244] The governor ofBorno, Kashim Shettima, of the opposition ANPP, saidin February 2014:[245]

Boko Haram are better armed and are bet-ter motivated than our own troops. Given the

present state of affairs, it is absolutely impos-sible for us to defeat Boko Haram.

In March2015, itwas reported that Nigeria hademployedhundreds of mercenaries from South Africa and the for-mer Soviet Union to assist in making gains against BokoHaram before the March 28 election.[246]

In October 2015, General David M. Rodriguez, head ofU.S. Africa Command, reported that Boko Haram haslost territory, directly contradicting statements made byBoko Haram. U.S. efforts to train and share intelligence

with regional military forces is credited with helping topush back against Boko Haram, but officials warn that thegroup remains a grave threat. [247]

8 International responses

8.1 Designation as a terrorist organization

8.2 United States responses

The U.S. State Department designated Boko Haram andAnsaru as terrorist organizations in November 2013, cit-ing various reasons including links with AQIM, “thou-sands of deaths in north-east and central Nigeria over thelast several years, including targeted killings of civilians”,and Ansaru’s 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven in-ternational construction workers. In the statement it wasnoted, however, “These designations are an importantand appropriate step, but only one tool in what must bea comprehensive approach by the Nigerian governmentto counter these groups through a combination of lawenforcement, political, and development efforts.”[256][257]

The State Department had resisted earlier calls to desig-nate the group as a terrorist organisation after the 2011UN bombing.[258] The U.S. government does not believeBoko Haram is currently (2014) affiliated with al QaedaCentral, despite regular periodic pledges of support andsolidarity from its leadership for al-Qaeda, but is partic-ularly concerned about ties between Boko Haram and AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), including “likelysharing funds, training, and explosive materials”,[37]

Efforts to cooperate in freeing the Chibok schoolgirls hadfaltered, largely due to mutual distrust; the infiltrationof the military by Boko Haram meant that U.S. officialswere wary of sharing raw intelligence data, and the Nige-rian military had failed to supply information that mighthave aided U.S. drone flights in locating the kidnappedgirls. The Nigerian government claims that Boko Haramis “the West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-Qaidamovement with connections with Al’shabb [sic] in So-malia and AQIM in Mali”. They deny having commit-ted human rights abuses in the conflict, and therefore op-pose U.S. restrictions on arms sales, which they seeas be-ing based on the U.S. mis-application of the Leahy Lawdue to concerns over human rights in Nigeria. The U.S.had supplied the Nigerian army with trucks and equip-

ment but had blocked the sale of Cobra helicopters. InNovember 2014 the U.S. State department again refusedto supply Cobras, citing concerns over the Nigerian mili-tary’s ability to maintain and use them without endanger-ing civilians.[259][260][261][262]

On 1 December 2014 the U.S. embassy in Abuja an-nounced that the U.S. had discontinued training a Nige-rian battalion at the request of the Nigerian government.A spokesman for the U.S. state department said, “We re-gret premature termination of this training, as it was tobe the first in a larger planned project that would havetrained additional units with the goal of helping the Nige-

rian Army build capacity to counter Boko Haram. TheU.S. government will continue other aspects of the exten-sive bilateral security relationship, as well as all other as-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_helicopterhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy_Lawhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansaruhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_M._Rodriguezhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Nigeria_Peoples_Partyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashim_Shettimahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Defensehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehiclehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_fighting_vehicle


14/25

14 10 REFERENCES

sistance programs, with Nigeria. The U.S. government iscommitted to the long tradition of partnership with Nige-ria and will continue to engage future requests for coop-eration and training.”[262][263]

On 24 September 2015 the White House announced a

military aid package including training of up to $45 mil-lion for Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.[264]

On 14 October the White House released a statement, inaccordance with the War Powers Resolution, announcingthe deployment of 300 troops to Cameroon to conductairborne ISR: “These forces are equipped with weaponsfor the purpose of providing their own force protectionandsecurity, and theywill remain in Cameroon until theirsupport is no longer needed.”[265]

8.3 African Coalition force

After a series of meetings over many months,[8][9][10]

Cameroon’s foreign minister announced on 30 Novem-ber 2014 that a coalition force to fight terrorism, in-cluding Boko Haram, would soon be operational. Theforce would include 3,500 soldiers from Benin, Chad,Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.[266][267] Discussions be-tween the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) about a broader based military force havebeen scheduled.[268]

8.4 French and British assistance

France and the UK, in coordination with the UnitedStates, have sent trainers, and material assistance to Nige-ria to assist in the fight against Boko Haram.[269] Franceplanned to use 3,000 troops in the region for counter-terrorism operations. Israel and Canada also pledgedsupport.[270]

8.5 Chinese assistance

In May 2014, China offered Nigeria assistance

that included satellite data, and possibly militaryequipment.[269]

9 See also

• Islamic extremism in Northern Nigeria

• Timeline of Boko Haram insurgency

• Human rights in Nigeria

• Nigerian Mobile Police

• Boko Haram insurgency

10 References

[1] Morgan Winsor (17 April 2015). “Boko Haram In Nige-

ria: President Goodluck Jonathan Rejects Help From

UN Forces To Fight Insurgency”. International Business

Times . Retrieved 18 April 2015.

[2] “With Help From ISIS, a More Deadly Boko Haram

Makes a Comeback”. The Daily Beast . Retrieved 11

September 2015.

[3] We have restricted Boko Haram to Sambisa Forest –

Buhari

[4] “How Big Is Boko Haram?". 2 February 2015. Retrieved

2 February 2015.

[5] “Are Boko Haram Worse Than ISIS?". Conflict News.

[6] “Global Terrorism Index 2014” (PDF). Institute for Eco-

nomics and Peace. p. 53. Retrieved 23 February 2015.

[7] Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terror-

ism 2013”. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 7 August

2014.

[8]

[9] “Jonathan tasks Defence, Foreign Ministers of Nigeria,

Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Benin on Boko Haram’s defeat”.

sunnewsonline.com.

[10] Martin Williams. “African leaders pledge 'total war' on

Boko Haram after Nigeria kidnap”. The Guardian.

[11] “Chadian Forces Deploy Against Boko Haram”. VOA. 16January 2015. Retrieved 16 January 2015.

[12] “Boko Haram Changes Name To ‘West African Province’

Of The Islamic State”. Daily Times of Nigeria. 23 April

2015. Retrieved 21 July 2015.

[13] “Is Islamic State shaping Boko Haram media?". bbc . 4

March 2015. Retrieved 24 September 2015.

[14] “IS welcomes Boko Haram allegiance: tape”. AFP. 12

March 2015. Retrieved 12 March 2015.

[15] “Nigeria’s Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic

State”. BBC news (BBC). 2015-03-07. Retrieved 2015-

03-07.

[16] "http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/11/17/world/

africa/ap-af-boko-haram.html?_r=0" . New York Times.

ASSOCIATED PRESS. 18 November 2015. Retrieved

18 November 2015.

[17] Jack Moore (April 23, 2015). “Nigerian Military Enter

'Final Stages’ of Boko Haram Offensive”. Newsweek . Re-

trieved May 2, 2015.

[18] “Boko Haram”. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved

September 2014.

[19] “Nigerian army frees hundreds more women and girlsfrom Boko Haram”. The Guardian. May 1, 2015. Re-

trieved May 2, 2015.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/02/nigerian-women-girls-boko-haram-rebelhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/02/nigerian-women-girls-boko-haram-rebelhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1581959/Boko-Haramhttp://europe.newsweek.com/nigerian-military-enter-final-stages-boko-haram-offensive-324384http://europe.newsweek.com/nigerian-military-enter-final-stages-boko-haram-offensive-324384http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/11/17/world/africa/ap-af-boko-haram.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/11/17/world/africa/ap-af-boko-haram.html?_r=0http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538http://news.yahoo.com/accepts-allegiance-nigeria-jihadists-boko-haram-201513146.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31522469http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2014/07/13/Boko-Haram-voices-support-for-ISIS-Baghdadi.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2014/07/13/Boko-Haram-voices-support-for-ISIS-Baghdadi.htmlhttp://www.voanews.com/content/chad-sending-troops-to-help-cameroon-fight-boko-haram/2600762.htmlhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/west-african-countries-must-unite-fight-boko-haram-nigeriahttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/west-african-countries-must-unite-fight-boko-haram-nigeriahttp://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=85939http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=85939http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htmhttp://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%2520Terrorism%2520Index%2520Report%25202014.pdfhttp://www.conflict-news.com/boko-haram-worse-isis/https://medium.com/war-is-boring/how-big-is-boko-haram-fac21c25807http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/we-have-restricted-boko-haram-to-sambisa-forest-buhari/http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/we-have-restricted-boko-haram-to-sambisa-forest-buhari/http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/26/with-help-from-isis-a-more-deadly-boko-haram-makes-a-comeback.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/26/with-help-from-isis-a-more-deadly-boko-haram-makes-a-comeback.htmlhttp://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-nigeria-president-goodluck-jonathan-rejects-help-un-forces-fight-1885770?rel=latest3http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-nigeria-president-goodluck-jonathan-rejects-help-un-forces-fight-1885770?rel=latest3http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-nigeria-president-goodluck-jonathan-rejects-help-un-forces-fight-1885770?rel=latest3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram_insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Mobile_Policehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Boko_Haram_insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_extremism_in_Northern_Nigeriahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Community_of_West_African_Stateshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beninhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Powers_Resolution


15/25

15

[20] “Boko Haram crisis: Nigerian military chiefs given dead-

line”. BBC News . 13 August 2015. Retrieved 14 August

2015.

[21] MICHELLENICHOLS (25 September 2015). “U.N. ap-

peals for help for Boko Haram displaced; Nigeria a no-

show”. Reuters . Retrieved 28 September 2015.

[22] “Nigerian troops were denied guns to fight Boko Haram

– Buhari”. Vanguard . 18 November 2015. Retrieved 18

November 2015.

[23] Rose Troup Buchanan (18 November 2015). “Isis over-

taken by Boko Haram as world’s deadliest terror organi-

sation”. The Independent . Retrieved 18 November 2015.

[24] Glenn Kessler (19 May 2014). “Boko Haram: Inside the

State Department debate over the 'terrorist' label”. The

Washington Post . Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[25] “Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Likely Crimes Against

Humanity”. Human Rights Watch. 11 October 2012. Re-trieved 6 August 2014.

[26] “Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own

territory”. The Telegraph. 10 January 2015.

[27] Nnenna Ibeh (9 September 2015). “Boko Haram camps

“wiped out” – Nigerian military”. Premium Times . Re-

trieved 10 September 2015.

[28] “ISIS Global Intelligence Summary March 1 – May 7,

2015” (PDF). Institute for the Study of War. 10 May

2015. Retrieved 12 May 2015.

[29] Department of Public Information • News and Media Di-vision (22 May 2014). “Security Council Al-qaida Sanc-

tions Committee Adds Boko Haram to its Sanctions List”.

NewYork: UN Security Council. Retrieved 30 July2014.

[30] http://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde99.htm

[31] George Percy Bargery (1934). “Hausa-English dictio-

nary”. Lexilogos. Retrieved 25 July 2014.

[32] Paul Newman (2013). “The Etymology of Hausa boko”

(PDF). Mega-Chad Research Network. Retrieved August

2014.

[33] “Nigeria committing 'war crimes’ to defeat Boko Haram”.

The Independent . 17 August 2014. Retrieved August

2014.

[34] U.S. Embassy, Abuja (4 November 2009). “Nigeria:

Borno State Residents Not Yet Recovered From Boko

Haram Violence”. Wikileaks. Retrieved August 2014.

[35] William F. S. Miles (9 May 2014). “Breaking Down

'Boko Haram'". cognoscenti.

[36] Dr. Aliyu U. Tilde. “An in-house Survey into the Cultural

Origins of Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria”. Retrieved

24 July 2014.

[37] Lauren Ploch Blanchard (10 June 2014). “Nigeria’s BokoHaram: Frequently Asked Questions” (PDF). Congres-

sional Research Service. Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[38] Johnson, Toni (2011-12-27). “Backgrounder — Boko

Haram”. www.cfr.org. Council of ForeignRelations. Re-

trieved 12 March 2012.

[39] Cook, David (26 September 2011). “The Rise of Boko

Haram in Nigeria”. Combating Terrorism Centre. Re-

trieved 2012-01-12.

[40] “The Diffusion of Intra-islamic Violence and Terrorism:

the Impact of the Proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideolo-

gies”. Retrieved 10 November 2014.

[41] Onuoha, Freedom (2014). “Boko Haramand the evolving

Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria”. In Pérouse de Montclos,

Marc-Antoine. Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security

and the state in Nigeria (PDF). Leiden: African Studies

Centre. pp. 158–191. ISBN 978-90-5448-135-5. Re-

trieved 14 May 2014.

[42] New York Times: “Nigeria’s Internal Struggles” By

TOLU OGUNLESI March 23, 2015

[43] “African Arguments Editorial – Boko Haram in Nigeria

: another consequence of unequal development”. African

Arguments. 9 November 2011. Retrieved 31 July 2014.

[44] Bartolotta, Christopher (23 September 2011). “Terrorism

in Nigeria: the Rise of Boko Haram”. The Whitehead

Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations . Re-

trieved 2012-01-12.

[45] Zainab Usman (1 May 2014). “Nigeria’s Economic Tran-

sition Reveals Deep Structural Distortions”. African Ar-

guments. Retrieved August 2014.

[46] “Data”. The World Bank. Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[47] “Nigerians living in poverty rise to nearly 61%". BBC. 13

February 2012. Retrieved August 2014.

[48] Adesoji, Abimbola (2010). “The Boko Haram Uprising

and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria”. Africa Spectrum.

Retrieved August 2014.

[49] “USCIRF Annual Report 2013 – Thematic Issues: Severe

religious freedom violations by non-state actors”. UN-

HCR. 30 April 2013. Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[50] Barnaby Phillips (20 January 2000). “Islamic law raises

tension in Nigeria”. BBC. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[51] “Article 7: Right to equal protection by the law”. BBC

World Service. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[52] Gérard L. F. Chouin, Religion and bodycount in the Boko

Haram crisis: evidence from the Nigeria Watch database,

p. 214. ISBN 978-90-5448-135-5

[53] Adebayo, Akanmu G, ed. (2012). Managing Conflicts

in Africa’s Democratic Transitions . Lexington Books. p.

176. ISBN 978-0739172636.

[54] West African Studies Conflict over Resources and Terror-

ism. OECD. 2013.

[55] J. Peter Pham (19 October 2006). “In Nigeria FalseProphets Are Real Problems”. World Defense Review.


http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtmlhttp://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0739172636https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9789054481355http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art07.shtmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/612144.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/612144.stmhttp://www.refworld.org/docid/51826edc27.htmlhttp://www.refworld.org/docid/51826edc27.htmlhttp://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/330/330http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/330/330http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTLhttp://africanarguments.org/2014/05/01/nigerias-economic-transition-reveals-deep-structural-distortions-by-zainab-usman/http://africanarguments.org/2014/05/01/nigerias-economic-transition-reveals-deep-structural-distortions-by-zainab-usman/http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/09/terrorism-in-nigeria-the-rise-of-boko-haram/http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/09/terrorism-in-nigeria-the-rise-of-boko-haram/http://africanarguments.org/2011/11/09/african-arguments-editorial-boko-haram-is-another-consequence-of-unequal-development-in-nigeria/http://africanarguments.org/2011/11/09/african-arguments-editorial-boko-haram-is-another-consequence-of-unequal-development-in-nigeria/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/opinion/nigerias-internal-struggles.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/opinion/nigerias-internal-struggles.html?_r=0https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-90-5448-135-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/23853/ASC-075287668-3441-01.pdfhttps://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/23853/ASC-075287668-3441-01.pdfhttp://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/the-diffusion-of-intra-islamic-violence-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-proliferation-of-salafiwahhabi-ideologies/http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/the-diffusion-of-intra-islamic-violence-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-proliferation-of-salafiwahhabi-ideologies/http://www.gloria-center.org/2014/07/the-diffusion-of-intra-islamic-violence-and-terrorism-the-impact-of-the-proliferation-of-salafiwahhabi-ideologies/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttp://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdfhttps://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdfhttp://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde99.htmhttp://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde99.htmhttp://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2014/05/09/nigeria-schoolgirls-kidnapping-william-f-s-mileshttp://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2014/05/09/nigeria-schoolgirls-kidnapping-william-f-s-mileshttps://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA2014_a.htmlhttps://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA2014_a.htmlhttps://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA2014_a.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigeria-committing-war-crimes-to-defeat-boko-haram-9674775.htmlhttp://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman-2013-Etymology-of-Hausa-boko.pdfhttp://bargeryhausa.gotdns.com/http://bargeryhausa.gotdns.com/http://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde99.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11410.doc.htmhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11410.doc.htmhttp://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%2520INTSUM_Final.pdfhttp://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%2520INTSUM_Final.pdfhttp://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/189748-boko-haram-camps-wiped-out-nigerian-military.htmlhttp://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/189748-boko-haram-camps-wiped-out-nigerian-military.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.htmlhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/11/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-likely-crimes-against-humanityhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/11/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-likely-crimes-against-humanityhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-haram-inside-the-state-department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-haram-inside-the-state-department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.htmlhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-overtakes-isis-as-worlds-deadliest-terror-organisation-a6737761.htmlhttp://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/nigerian-troops-were-denied-guns-to-fight-boko-haram-buhari/http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/nigerian-troops-were-denied-guns-to-fight-boko-haram-buhari/http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/25/us-un-assembly-boko-haram-aid-idUSKCN0RP2IF20150925http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/25/us-un-assembly-boko-haram-aid-idUSKCN0RP2IF20150925http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/25/us-un-assembly-boko-haram-aid-idUSKCN0RP2IF20150925http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33913305http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33913305


16/25

16 10 REFERENCES

[56] “Nigeria’s 'Taliban' enigma”. BBC News. 28 July 2009.

Retrieved 2009-07-28.

[57] Helen Chapin Metz, ed. “Influence of Christian Mis-

sions”, Nigeria: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for

the Library of Congress, 1991, accessed 18 April 2012

[58] Chothia, Farouk (11 January 2012). “Who are Nigeria’sBoko Haram Islamists?". BBC News. Retrieved 2012-

01-25.

[59] Ijeaku, N.J.O. (2009). The Igbo and Their Niger Delta

Neighbors: We Are No Second Fools . Xlibris Corporation.

pp. 82–83. ISBN 9781462808618.

[60] Martin Meredith (2011). “5. Winds of Change”. The

State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Indepen-

dence (illustrated ed.). Simon and Schuster. p. 77. ISBN

9780857203892.

[61] Martin Ewi (24 June 2013). “Why Nigeria needs a crim-

inal tribunal and not amnesty for Boko Haram”. Institutefor Security Studies. Retrieved 30 July 2014.

[62] Kirk Ross (19 May 2014). “Revolt in the North: Inter-

preting Boko Haram’s war on western education”. African

Arguments. Retrieved August 2014.

[63] “Analysis: Understanding Nigeria’s Boko Haram radi-

cals”. www.irinnews.org. 18 July 2011. Retrieved 12

March 2012.

[64] “Whose faith, whose girls?". The Economist .

[65] Owolade, Femi (March 27, 2014). “Boko Haram: How a

Militant Islamist Group Emerged in Nigeria”. GatestoneInstitute. Retrieved 2015-07-15.

[66] “Nigeria accused of ignoringsect warningsbefore wave of

killings”. The Guardian (London). 2 August 2009. Re-

trieved 2009-08-06.

[67] Joe Bavier (15 January 2012). “Nigeria: Boko Haram

101”. Pulitzercenter.org.

[68] Nossiter, Adam (27 July 2009). “Scores Die as Fighters

Battle Nigerian Police”. The New York Times . Retrieved

22 January 2012.

[69] “Nigeria sect head dies in custody”. BBC. 31 July 2009.Retrieved 31 July 2014.

[70] “Nigeria killings caught on video – Africa”. Al Jazeera

English. 10 February 2010.

[71] “Boko Haram attacks – timeline”. The Guardian. 25

September 2012. Retrieved 30 July 2014.

[72] “Peace and Security Council Report” (PDF). ISS. Febru-

ary 2012. Retrieved 30 July 2014.

[73] Ndahi Marama (30 July 2014). “UN House bombing:

Why we struck-Boko Haram”. Vanguard. Retrieved 30

July 2014.

[74] “Counterterrorism 2014 Calendar”. The National Coun-

terterrorism Center. 2014. Retrieved 30 July 2014.

[75] Ibrahim Mshelizza (29 August 2011). “Islamist sect Boko

Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing”. Reuters. Re-

trieved 30 July 2014.

[76] Joe Brock (31 January 2012). “Special Report: Boko

Haram — between rebellion and jihad”. Reuters. Re-

trieved 3 August 2014.

[77] “Special Report: Boko Haram – between rebellion and

jihad”. Reuters.

[78] Richard Dowden (9 March 2012). “Boko Haram – More

Complicated Than You Think”. Africa Arguments. Re-


[79] David Cook (26 September 2011). “The Rise of Boko

Haram in Nigeria”. Combating Terrorism Center. Re-


[80] “Boko Haram attacks an air base in Nigeria”. Aljazeera.

3 December 2013. Retrieved 30 July 2014.

[81] “Boko Haram claims responsibility for bomb blasts in

Bauchi, Maiduguri”. Vanguard News. 1 June 2011. Re-


[82] Olalekan Adetayo (9 January 2012). “Boko Haram has in-

filtrated my govt –Jonathan”. Punch. Retrieved 6 August

2014.

[83] David Cook (26 September 2011). “The Rise of Boko

Haram in Nigeria”. Combating Terrorism Center. Re-


[84] Jean Herskovits (2 January 2012). “In Nigeria, Boko

Haram Is Not the Problem”. The New York Times . Re-trieved 3 August 2014.

[85] Olly Owen (19 January 2012). “Boko Haram: Answering

Terror With More Meaningful Human Security”. African

Arguments. Retrieved 1 August 2014.

[86] Olly Owen (19 January 2012). “Boko Haram: Answering

Terror With More Meaningful Human Security”. African

Arguments. Retrieved 31 July 2014.

[87] Gernot Klantschnig (February2012). “Review of theJan-

uary 2012 UK Border Information Service Nigeria Coun-

try of Origin Information Report” (PDF). Independent

Advisory Group on Country Information. Retrieved 31

July 2014.

[88] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012”.

U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 4 August 2014.

[89] “Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Likely Crimes Against

Humanity”. Human Rights Watch. 11 October 2012. Re-


[90] Ibanga Isine (27June2014). “High-level corruption rocks

$470million CCTV project thatcould secure Abuja”. Pre-

mium Times. Retrieved August 2014.

[91] Duncan Gardham; Laura Heaton (25 December 2011).“Coordinatedbomb attacks acrossNigeriakill at least 40”.

The Telegraph. Retrieved August 2014.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/8977585/Coordinated-bomb-attacks-across-Nigeria-kill-at-least-40.htmlhttps://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/163975-high-level-corruption-rocks-470million-cctv-project-secure-abuja.html#sthash.rEA1DWAX.dpbshttps://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/163975-high-level-corruption-rocks-470million-cctv-project-secure-abuja.html#sthash.rEA1DWAX.dpbshttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/11/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-likely-crimes-against-humanityhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/11/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-likely-crimes-against-humanityhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204153#wrapperhttp://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Nigeria-March-20121.pdfhttp://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Nigeria-March-20121.pdfhttp://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Nigeria-March-20121.pdfhttp://africanarguments.org/2012/01/19/boko-haram-the-answer-to-terror-lies-in-providing-more-meaningful-human-security-by-olly-owen/http://africanarguments.org/2012/01/19/boko-haram-the-answer-to-terror-lies-in-providing-more-meaningful-human-security-by-olly-owen/http://africanarguments.org/2012/01/19/boko-haram-the-answer-to-terror-lies-in-providing-more-meaningful-human-security-by-olly-owen/http://africanarguments.org/2012/01/19/boko-haram-the-answer-to-terror-lies-in-providing-more-meaningful-human-security-by-olly-owen/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-the-problem.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-the-problem.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttp://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-has-infiltrated-my-govt-jonathan/http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-has-infiltrated-my-govt-jonathan/http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/boko-haram-claims-responsibility-for-bomb-blasts-in-bauchi-maiduguri/http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/boko-haram-claims-responsibility-for-bomb-blasts-in-bauchi-maiduguri/http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2013/12/boko-haram-attacks-an-air-base-nigeria-2013123164011457106.htmlhttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttps://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeriahttp://africanarguments.org/2012/03/09/boko-haram-%25E2%2580%2593-more-complicated-than-you-think-%25E2%2580%2593-by-richard-dowden/http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/09/boko-haram-%25E2%2580%2593-more-complicated-than-you-think-%25E2%2580%2593-by-richard-dowden/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSTRE80U0LR20120131http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSTRE80U0LR20120131http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSTRE80U0LR20120131http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSTRE80U0LR20120131http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/boko_haram.htmlhttp://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/un-house-bombing-why-we-struck-boko-haram/http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/un-house-bombing-why-we-struck-boko-haram/http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No31Feb2012.pdfhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeriahttp://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/02/20102102505798741.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8177451.stmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/africa/28nigeria.html?scp=6&sq=nigeria&st=csehttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/africa/28nigeria.html?scp=6&sq=nigeria&st=csehttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nigeria-boko-haram-terrorist-group-islam-christian-church-targets-youth-militaryhttp://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nigeria-boko-haram-terrorist-group-islam-christian-church-targets-youth-militaryhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-secthttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-secthttp://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeriahttp://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeriahttp://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2014/05/islam-west-and-nigeriahttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/93250/Analysis-Understanding-Nigeria-s-Boko-Haram-radicalshttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/93250/Analysis-Understanding-Nigeria-s-Boko-Haram-radicalshttp://africanarguments.org/2014/05/19/revolt-in-the-north-interpreting-boko-harams-war-on-western-education-by-kirk-ross/http://africanarguments.org/2014/05/19/revolt-in-the-north-interpreting-boko-harams-war-on-western-education-by-kirk-ross/http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-nigeria-needs-a-criminal-tribunal-and-not-amnesty-for-boko-haramhttp://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-nigeria-needs-a-criminal-tribunal-and-not-amnesty-for-boko-haramhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780857203892https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Meredithhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9781462808618https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/africa/8172270.stm


17/25

17

[92] “Five bombs explode across Nigeria killing dozens”.

Buenos Aires Herald . 25 December 2011. Retrieved Au-

gust 2014.

[93] Adam Nossiter (25 December 2011). “Nigerian Group

Escalates Violence With Church Attacks”. The New York

Times . Retrieved August 2014.

[94] Tina Moore (25December2011). “ChristmasDaybomb-

ings in Nigeria kill at least 39, radical Muslim sect claims

responsibility”. New York Daily News . Retrieved August

2014.

[95] “Nigeria churches hit by blasts”. Aljazeera. 26 December

2011. Retrieved August 2014.

[96] “Christmas bombings kill many near Jos, Nigeria”. BBC.

25 December 2010. Retrieved August 2014.

[97] Felix Onuah; Tim Cocks (December 31, 2011).

“Nigeria’s Jonathan declares state of emergency”.Reuters. Retrieved 1 August 2014.

[98] “Nigerian fuel subsidy: Strike suspended”. BBC. 16 Jan-

uary 2012. Retrieved 1 August 2014.

[99] “Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800”. Human

Rights Watch. 17 May 2011. Retrieved November 2014.

[100] Toyin Falola; Matthew M. Heaton (24 April 2008). A

History of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press. p. 277.

ISBN 978-1-139-47203-6.

[101] David Blair (5 February2012). “Al-Qaeda’s hand in Boko

Haram’s deadly Nigerian attacks”. Daily Telegraph. Re-


[102] Mike Oboh (22 January 2012). “Islamist insurgents killover 178 in Nigeria’s Kano”. Reuters. Retrieved 3 August

2014.

[103] “Nigerians offer prayers in Kano for suicide bombers’ vic-

tims”. The Guardian. Associated Press. 23 January 2012.

Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[104] “Nigeria’s Kano rocked by multiple explosions”. BBC. 21

January 2012. Retrieved 3 August 2014.

[105] Taye Obateru; Grateful Dakat (22 January 2012). “Boko

Haram: Fleeing Yobe Christians”. Vanguard. Retrieved

3 August 2014.

[106] “Nigeria: Boko Haram Widens Terror Campaign”. Hu-man Rights Watch. 24 January 2012. Retrieved 2 August

2014.

[107] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2012).

“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012”.

US Department of State. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[108] “With cross-border attacks, Boko Haram threat widens”.

IRIN. 21 November 2013. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[109] Tim Cocks (30 May 2014). “Cameroon weakest link in

fight against Boko Haram”. Reuters. Retrieved 7 August

2014.

[110] “Nigeria: FG Inaugurates Nigeria-Cameroon Trans-Border Security Committee”. allAfrica. 5 February 2013.


[111] “2nd session of Nigeria/Cameroon Trans-Border Security

Committee meets in Abuja”. Daily Independent . Re-

trieved August 2014.

[112] “Nigeria-Cameroon security committee meets”. News 24

Nigeria. 2014-07-07. Retrieved August 2014.

[113] “Nigeria: Deaths of hundreds of Boko Haram suspectsin custody requires investigation”. Amnesty International.

15 October 2013. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[114] “Operational Guidance Note” (PDF). Home Office. De-

cember 2013. Retrieved 6 August 2014.

[115] “650,000 Nigerians Displaced Following Boko HaramAt-

tacks – UN”. Information Nigeria. 5 August 2014. Re-


[116] Adrian Edwards (9 May 2014). “Refugees fleeing attacks

in north eastern Nigeria, UNHCR watching for new dis-

placement”. UNHCR. Retrieved 7 August 2014.

[117] Emele Onu (5 August 2014). “Amnesty Says 'Gruesome'

Nigerian Footage Shows War Crimes”. Bloomberg. Re-

trieved August 2014.

[118] “Rewards for Justice �

Boko Haram Terror

Documents

Transcript of Boko Haram Terror