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21 MARCH 1953 {WWUSC9W5 ‘5?—53 4234 ' ' ' COPY I!!!

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (U)

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The Defense Intelligence Summary is prcduced by the Directcrcf the Defense Intelligence Agency te serve the needs cf theDepartment ct Defense fer apprepriate current intelligence.It is furnished to nen—Deiense Department agencies fer infer—matien enly. lnterpretatiens et intelligence infermatien inthis publicatitni represent [nmrthninary views tavern are sub—ject te medificatien in the light cf further infermatien andmere cemplete analysis.

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WARNING

This tlecument centains classified ini'c1'*matien affecting the .natienal security cf the United States within the meaningcf the espienage laws,r US Cede Title 18, Sectiens T93, T94.a nd 7’98. |{b}{3]1DU.S.C.424 1 I(bjtfij 1D U.S.C. 424

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DIA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. Non Responsive

REPUBLIC OFVIETNAM:

. NORTHVIETNAM:

URUGUAY:

SUPPLEMENT:

VIETNAM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Situation report.

New NVA artillery regiments may havearrived.

Communist use of Cambodia to supplyViet Cong.

San Antonio formula rejected again.

Elements of 316th Division possiblyin northern Laos.

Communists plan rally for Viet Cong.

COMMUNIST CHINESE INVULVEMENT INNORTH VI ETNAM .

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. 21 Mar 63 i DIAIS 67-63

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VIETNAMAND

RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

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. Developments in South Vietnam

flThe enemy may be moving some forcesfrom Khe anh to Hue and may be preparing tointerdict Route 1 between there and Quang TriCity. US and ARVN infantry forces conductingan offensive sweep around Ban Me Thuot in DarlacProvince have made contact with an estimatedbattalion of the enemy. The numerous messagessent by Communist units in 3d Corps may presageincreased activity there, but any actions aimedat Saigon will probably be postponed until afterAllied offensive operations around the capitalend. In the Delta, large enemy units arereported near the towns of My Tho and Cai Layon Route 4 in Dinh Tuong Province.

Contact With Enemy Forces Continues in lst Corps

(C) While contacts with the enemy have subsidedsomewhat in the southern portion of the country, USforces in northern lst Corps continued to makecontact. Several engagements were reported on20 March ranging from just south of the DMZ to an

. area north of Sam Ky in Quang Tin Province. Thecombined actions left 120 of the enemy dead; 13sampans were also destroyed in the fighting. Alliedlosses were light.

Possible Enemy Movement From Khe Sanh to Hue

New developments support previous indica—tions that the 95C NVA Regiment and the 101D NVARegiment, 325C Division, might be moving from KheSanh to Hue.

magnum ‘ Lu“ “- [the 101D has joinedthe 950 in an area 18 miles west—southwest of KheSanh near Route 92, which runs to the A Shau Valley.Two AA units that have been located in the vicinityof these two regiments may be providing their airdefense. Moreover, a sharp increase in communica—tions between enemy units in the Hue and Khe Sanhareas and higher headquarters in North Vietnam mayreflect coordination for a movement toward Hue.

(Continued)

. 21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page A—S

'IFSIP g: 1f 1" 366- 3-3<b><Although the shift of the two regiments away fromKhe Sanh could be a temporary relocation to avoid3—52 strikes, the evidence favors their reassign—ment to the Hue area.

fil In the A Shau Valley, a rise in enemyactivity is suggested by indications of the arrivalof an NVA Artillery regiment, possibly the 45th,and several enemy tanks. (See page A-8.)

Activity Around Quang Tri City

.33mnn anattempt by the 812th NVA Regiment to cut Routebetween Quang Tri City and Hue. Such an opera—tion could precede an attack on Quang Tri Cityand would in any case help restrict shifts offriendly troops between Thua Thien and Quang TriProvinces.

Possible Infiltration Corridor for VC/NVA Forces inQuang Tri’Province

gghmsasm(n _ |Hsiasmm) Lleessamm) Ia possible infiltration corridor isbeing utilized for the movement of men and suppliesto and from the DMZ and Base Area 101. During thepast month, SEC-3-3(b)(1):SEC-3-3(b)(5) ltheseunidentifiec groups have been moving through a five—mile-wide corridor extending from an area northwestof Dong Ha south to the Thua Thien Province border.The route passes east of Cam Lo and west of Dong Hasouth past Ba Long. The possible ”staging/receiving”area in the DMZ area is located approximately sixmiles northwest of Dong Ha at a point where thisinfiltration corridor is believed to begin. Thedaily north—south movement of unidentified VC/NVAentities in this area may indicate the shifting ofmen or supplies to and from the DMZ and Base Area101.

Activity Around Ban Me Thuot

In Darlac Province about 10 milesnorth—northwest of Ban Me Thuot, US and ARVNinfantry units conducting a sweep gained contactwith an estimated battalion, probably from the32d NVA Regiment, on 20 March. The enemy force

(Continued)

Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page A-G

“-I-e-ii Il'l-FR'l-l' Sec- 3-309)

21

inc-P s-l-e-R-l-I- 3a. 3-3itried to withdraw to the north but was blocked byfriendly reinforcements. Pressure on the enemyis being maintained from three directions. Thisengagement, the arrival of three additional SouthVietnamese companies in Ban Me Thuot,|3fl;33m)m} |leeissm}m) Hq, 33d NVA Regiment, has movedaway from the town may indicate that the recentthreat to the city has diminished.

Message Volume Suggests Future Activity ingafigon Area

('H- | 132:. 3.3m {1: |eeiasmm) Ithe Communists plan to step up their

activity7__ltjseems likely that any projected actionin the Saigon area would await the end of AlliedOperation QUYET THANG and be directed at the mainlines of communication around the city. Harassmentand sapper attacks on the capital remain withinthe enemy's capability, of course, and would havean adverse effect on the already uneasy population.

Hau Nghia Engagement

A Communist unit, located approximately sixmiles northeast of Bao Trai in Han Nghia Province,yesterday failed to escape a sweep of Allied forcesin the area. US and ARVN troops engaged what wasestimated to be a battalion—sized force and killed142 of the enemy in a battle that raged for eighthours. It was a lopsided victory for the Allieswho lost only eight killed and 21 wounded.

Enemy Threat to Dinh Tuong Towns

- Large Viet Cong units are now deployednear two major population centers along Route 4 inDinh Tuong Province. The 514th Local Force Battalionis north of Cai Lay, and both battalions of the DT lRegiment have been contacted northeast of My Tho.ARVN forces, under recently appointed 4th CorpsCommander Gen Thang, have been making a determinedeffort to establish control of the rural areas andopen lines of communication by conducting opera—tions in the countryside. As a result of GenThang's leadership and his program of offensiveaction, the situation in the Delta is said to haveimproved somewhat in the past few weeks.(Incense-mm)

Mar 68 BIA Intelligence Summary Page A—7“es-Ii u-I-Ht-H- “sec-33m:

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Possible New NVA Artillery Regiments in South Vietnam

North Vietnam may be strengthening itsartillery capabilities in South Vietnam.

paiammm) ‘3E13$WU1 |a regular NorthVietnamese Army (NVA) artillery regiment, possiblythe 45th, may have entered the country and may nowbe near Route 547 in the A Shau Valley. 3a;amm{n |5&13RMU) Ia large amount of ammunition beingstored at Kilometer Marker 31 on Route 547. The 45thArtillery Regiment, a subordinate of the 3515tArtillery Command, has been carried at Son Tay inNorth Vietnam for several years.

Several prisoners claim that the 208th NVAArtillery Regiment is in southern Binh DuongProvince . m 35;, 3,303)

.21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 3-8

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Vietnamese Communist Use of Cambodian Territory

A recent rallier in South Vietnam has describedone method by which the Vietnamese Communistsallegedly obtained supplies in Cambodia during1967. Although he claims that the operations werecondoned by the Cambodian Government, it may‘bethat only local military commanders trying tosapplement their meager income were involved.

An ”86th NVA Regiment” in Cambodia had themission of procuring rice there and transportingit to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, according tothe rallier. The regiment's commander was saidto have bought the rice in Phnom Penh, where hearranged to have it trucked to a point near astorage site off Route 14. Troops of the regiment's2d battalion then took the grain to an area aboutthree kilometers from the South Vietnamese frontier,whence it was carried to a receiving unit at theborder; about 10 tons of milled rice was reportedlymoved monthly into South Vietnam in this way.

. The 86th Regiment had allegedly been guaranteedthe right to control the supply route and bivouacarea near the border and Cambodian forces wereordered to stay away. Cambodian patrols did enteroccasionally, however, and in May 196?, one engagedin a firefight with a Viet Cong security detachment;three Cambodians were reportedly killed and fourwounded. When it complained to the provincial chief,the regiment was supposedly informed that theCambodian troops would henceforth remain outsidethe Communist—controlled area.

Many reports of the transfer of supplies byCambodian military vehicles to Communist supplyareas along the border have been received, andCOMUSMACV carries an “86th Viet Cong rear servicesgroup” with an estimated 1,000 men near the borderin South Vietnam‘s Phuoc Long Province. Smugglingoperations reportedly became more difficult afterSihanouk ordered them stopped in late January. Thematter was also brought to the attention of the VietCong representative in Phnom Penh on 23 February.

. 21 Mar 68 01a Intelligence Summary Page A—Q

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Hanoi Again Rejects the San Antonio Formula

Hanoi has twice again categorically rejectedPresident Johnson's San Antonio formula for negotia—tions.

Foreign Minister Nguyen Duv Trinh recently setforth North'Vietnam‘s hard—line position to NorwegianAmbassador to Peiping Allgaard. When Allgaard point—ed out that the US proposal was designed to avoidanother Panmunjon, Trinh replied: ”We fight honestlyand we negotiate honestly.” The Ambassador was im—pressed with the "self-confidence and openness” ofNorth Nietnamese authorities and felt that his in-vitation was a part of Hanoi‘s campaign to influenceScandinavian officials.

Hanoi also denounced the San Antonio formulato a visiting high—level French Communist Partydelegation. a joint communique signed on 11 Marchstated that although Washington said it wanted toopen conversations with HanoiI it had refused to

. reply’ to North Vietnam's declarations of willingnessto talk once the bombings had been stopped. Accord—ing to the communique, this proved that Americanstatements were only ”lies” intended to mask anintensification of the war. The document furtherasserted that this was precisely why so many govern—ments and international public opinion approved theNorth Vietnamese position. m H WW)

21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page A—lU

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Elements of 316th NVA Division May Be in Northern Laos

Major elements of the 316th NVA Division mayhave deployed to northern Laos where they had opera—ted during the early 1960s.

Seiaamrn elements of the 316thDivision moved out of Worth Vietnam in late Januaryor early February. pniaamm) lplaced its 174thand 148th Infantry Regiments and separate 4th Battal—ion in northern Laos as of late January. The divi—sion's last confirmed location was in the Moo Chanarea of North Vietnam near the Lao border.

a sizable increase in North Vietnamese forcesin Laos since early 1967 has been indicated by theexpansion of the NVA operational network there from60 radio stations at that time to about 130. Mostterminals are in the northern region and subordinateto or associated with the Headquarters of North Viet—nam's neighboring Military Region (MR) Northwest.During the 1961—1962 period of NVA offensive opera—tions in-Laos, Hq, MR Northwest, acted as communica—tions control. m—

Communists Plan Pro—North Vietnam Rally in Uruguay

Communist groups planning a pro—North Vietnam

rally on 26 March will probably carry out ”lightning”

demonstrations before US business and governmentoffices in Montevideo.

The groups plan to show ”atrocity” films from

Vietnam and will solicit funds to purchase bicyclesand medicine for North Vietnam. Although not direc-tly associated, the Communist—dominated NationalLabor Confederation has reaffirmed its solidaritywith Hanoi as a part of its ”battle plan” againstthe government‘s belt—tightening economic policies.Uruguayan security forces have been alerted.Mam)

. 21 Mar 63 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 31-11

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SUPPLEMENT

CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN

NORTH VIETNAM

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. CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT INNORTH VIETNAM

Introduction

The 30,000-50,000 Chinese Communist militarypersonnel in North Vietnam represent the largestdirect manpower commitment of any Communist countrysupporting Hanoi. The Chinese have undoubtedlymade this commitment not only to support the wareffort but also to maintain their military andpolitical influence on North Vietnam's leaders inthe face of the greater material assistanceprovided by the USSR. Peiping probably also hopesto ”prove” that it, not Moscow, leads the worldin resisting ”US imperialism” and in advancing theCommunist cause.

Chinese Communist Doctrine

The Chinese Communists obviously feel that theVietnamese War is the ”proving ground“ for theirdoctrine that backing ”People's Wars of NationalLiberation“ is the principal means by which theycan extend their influence into developing nations,

. particularly those in Southeast Asia. Providingpolitical and material support to insurgent groupsin the ”victim” country without committing groundcombat troops offers a relatively cheap, low—risk,and flexible way to expand Chinese influence.

The conflict in South Vietnam began as a Com-munist—inspired insurgency -— a model ”people's war.”As the war progressed, the need for additionalassistance to North Vietnam grew, and China, in turn,was called upon to increase its support. This tookthe form of stepped—up shipments and the sending ofChinese military personnel. The latter representsomething of a diversion from the ”people’s war”doctrine, but the main thesis is retained becauseChina is providing primarily materiel, while thenatives fight the battles.

Sources of Information

Sexihmih basis forassessments of the nature and extent of Chineseinvolvement in North Vietnam. Aerial photographsand other collateral reports have substantiated the

21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 3-1

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Makeup of Chinese Forces in North Vietnam

The senior Chinese Communist communicationsauthority in North Vietnam is probably collllocatedwith the Chinese Embassy. The headquarters involvedcommunicates with four construction/military supportelements, four major antiaircraft artillery units,and the Kunming Military Region, This force alsoincludes technicians, advisers,and air surveillancecomponents.

Logistic/Construction—Related Advisory Elements

A major phase of Chinese Communist activity inNorth Vietnam is the logistic and constructionsupport effort in the northwest and northeast areasISec. 3.3“:‘1 {EISeo ass (1‘:

|Saflfimjflj |a fifth one, however, in the Cao Bangvicinity evidently underwent an extensive change inlate 1967 and may have returned to China or movedelsewhere in North vietnam. |meaamnm |lSec. 3.3m} {nSec 3.3m} {1}1

0f the construction—related elements, the 2d Railway


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Engineer Division near Kep is the most firmlyidentified. It may not be at full TfihE strength,slightly in excess of 11,000, since|smaamqm1 |

Emaasmm;one of its regiments remained behind, the divisionstrength in North Vietnam would approximate T,000men. Two of the other three construction-type unitsare in the Lao Cai area and one is near Hanoi. Ifthey are organised in a manner roughly comparableto an Independent Engineer Regiment -- some similarityof function seems apparent -- they probably eachhave some 2,000 personnel.

The possibility exists that all four of theseconstruction—type units may be employing only acadre force to supervise unskilled and semiskilledChinese or Vietnamese laborers. Employment ofVietnamese labor by Chinese units appears unlikelyconsidering historical Chinese—Vietnamese animosities,the language barrier, and suggestions in some reportsthat the Chinese are generally segregated. It seemsmore likely that civilian Chinese laborers may beattached to these units for support duties.

. A Chinese presence J3ec.3.3{bj{1j Ipaiasmm) |may be associatedwith construction there, but insufficient data pre—clude 'association of a troop strength with this unit.A recent series of reports,hmaasmu1 ||Saaasm{u | cites thepresence of exceedingly large numbers of laborers inNorth Vietnam; this information suggests that Chinamay have sent in a labor corps. Although undoubtedlyexaggerated, they could eventually become a basisfor enlarging the currently estimated 30,000—50,000strength.

Some 4,000-ll,000 technicians and advisers arealso believed present in addition to 26,000—39,000troops, making a total estimated Chinese militarypresence of 30,000—50,000.

AAA Units

Most recent Chinese Communist AAA deploymentsinvolved the introduction of the 104th and 111thCCAF AAA Divisions. The 111th was deployed from

. China in January to replace the 105th located at Lang


_— 350.13.3{b}

F_ Seo.3.3(b)

Son; the 104th apparently began a deployment fromNingming in early March and appears destined toreplace the 110th in the Hanoi area which hascompleted the usual six— to eight-month tour inNorth Vietnam. The size of the AAA units presentmay vary considerably since organizational flexibilityis characteristic of antiaircraft artillery elements.The four AAA Divisions are believed to have a totalof 12,000—20,000 troops.

Air Surveillance Sites

An air surveillance site is located at Dien BienPhu, Yen Bai, Lai Chan, and two are on the northeast

. coast. Three of them operate KNIFE REST B earlywarning radars; the equipment at Lai Chan and at onesite in the northeast has not been identified. TheChinese Communist air defense sector headquartersnear Mengtzu in the Kunming Air Defense District isknown to control the sites at Dien Bien Phu, YenBai, and Lai Chau; the two on the northeast coastare under the operational control of an unidentifiedfacility in the Lang Son—Ningming area.

Deployment of Chinese Forces

Except for the AAA element reported in Nam Dinhand units at Thai Nguyen and coastal points, theChinese forces are generally deployed along the twomain rail lines north of Hanoi. The bulk of thosein the northeast are along the rail line betweenHanoi and Lang Son; in the northwest, they are alongthe Hanoi—Lao Cai link. These alignments haveapparently been effected to facilitate the movementof weapons, equipment, and supplies into North Vietnam,at least as far south as Hanoi, and to help the Viet-namese maintain and operate lines of communication.

The main function of the Chinese AAA is theprotection from US air strikes of these lines ofcommunication and the supplies moving along them.The Chinese Communist AAA units in North Vietnamreceive administrative instructions and some opera—tional direction from the headquarters of the Cantonand Kunming Military Regions. In addition, closecommunication between the CCAF AAA units in NorthVietnam and Hq, 7th Air Army, in Nanning has beenobserved.

21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 8—4

— — Seo.3.3(b)

i . . .1 -L"# Sec. 3.311311:

Capabilities

Chinese Communist forces in North Vietnam arecapable of helping the Vietnamese repair andrehabilitate war—damaged roads and railroads, under—take new construction, and distribute materiel andsupplies received from China. The AHA units notonly protect Chinese activities, they also reinforceNorth Vietnam's air defense establishment. Therather extensive communications network and thelogistic structure that have been established providethe organisational framework for the introduction ofChinese ground combat units —fl if the Communistsdecide upon such a course of action. m you!!!

. 21 Mar 68 DIA Intelligence Summary Page 8—5

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