The Effect of Multilateral Aid Allocations on Government Respect for Human Rights From 1992-2001

by

Taylor Bates

Major: Political Science

Secondary Major: International and Area Studies

Evaluated by: Dr. Michael Flynn

Kansas State University

July 25, 2016

Abstract: This study examines the understudied impact of multilateral aid allocations on human rights abuses. While most studies focus either on U.S. allocations of foreign aid or the effect of human rights abuses on the amount of foreign aid distributed, this study emphasizes the importance of multilateral aid, with the assumption that the motivation behind the allocations differs from its bilateral counterparts. The timeframe of the study serves to minimize the effect that conflict has on aid allocations, attempting to capture aid that is used to promote democracy, economic stability and social welfare. Using data collect from the OECD, World Bank, Polity IV Project, and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Set, a statistical analysis using scatter plots and multivariate regression output indicates that while regime type and level of economic development positively impact human rights, funding by the OECD allocated to promote those variables has a negative impact on both. Therefore, multilateral aid has a negative impact on human rights overall. It should be noted that due to data collection limitations, it is unlikely that the results from this study are generalizable.

Table of Contents

Introduction 2

Literature Review 3-7

Theory 7-14

Figure 1: Theoretical Causal Chain

Research Design 14-20

Table 1: Breakdown of Country Selection All countries, 1992-2001

Analysis 21-31

Figure 2: Total ODA Disbursements 1992-2001, World Map

Figure 3: Effect of ODA Allocations on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Figure 4: Effect of ODA Allocations on Empowerment Rights Scores 1992-2001

Figure 5: Effect of Regime Type on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Figure 6: Effect of Regime Type on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001

Figure 7: Effect of GDP Per Capita on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Figure 8: Effect of GDP per capita on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001

Figure 9: Effect of ODA Allocations on Regime Type 1992-2001

Figure 10: Effect of ODA allocations on GDP Per capita 1992-2001

Figure 11: Logged ODA Allocations and Logged GDP per capita 1992-2001

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Physical Integrity Rights

Table 3: Summary Statistics: Empowerment Rights

Conclusion 31-33

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Introduction

Capital abundant countries are often involved in international organizations such as the

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) whose mission “is to promote

policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the

world.” (OECD (c)). As a result, one of the areas that the OECD focuses on is human rights. The

organization’s commitment to improving human rights around the world is reaffirmed in several

reports published by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) including the Final Report

of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance (1997),

Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human Rights and Development (2007), and Imagining More

Effective Humanitarian Aid: A Donor Perspective (2014; hereafter IMEFHA). Aside from their

OECD/DAC commitments, DAC countries, who are also signatories of the Charter of the United

Nations, are required to uphold Article 55, as stipulated in Article 56 (Charter of the United

Nations 1945; hereby CUN), which state that the United Nations will promote “human rights and

fundamental freedoms for all” (CUN art. 55 1945) and “pledges” member states to individual

and joint cooperation to carry out Article 55 (CUN art. 56, 1945). Despite these ongoing

commitments, “OECD/DAC donors have been under growing pressure…to prove and improve

their performance…they must demonstrate value for money and tangible results if they are to

maintain their share of the aid budget” (IMEFHA, 2014, 3). The increased pressure does not

seem to be providing many tangible results. As noted in The Swedish Agency for Development

Evaluation’s (SADEV) 2006 report titled Improving Democracy and Human Rights Support:

Recommendations for the Use of Indicators Based on the Case of Mozambique, with regard to

democracy and human rights, “little is known about the actual effects of this

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support.” (Dawidson, Hulterström 2006, 8) The report goes on to list a variety of indicators that

could be used to measure the success of programs and aid, also notes that the definition and

measurement of both democracy and human rights differ throughout the international community

and indicators should have “substantial room for interpretation and formulation of

objectives” (Dawidso, Hulterström 2006, 9). Therefore, to test the effectiveness of OECD

allocations on human rights, this study examines two different relationships between OECD

allocations and human rights; a direct relationship between the two and an indirect relationship,

where OECD allocations impact regime type or economic development, which in turn affects

human rights. The results show that while democracy and economic development improve

government respect for human rights, ODA allocations have a negative impact on both.

Literature Review

Surprisingly, there is not much data on whether or not foreign aid leads to greater respect

for human rights. Most of the research on these two variables is concerned with whether or not

levels of respect for human rights affects how much development aid a country will receive.

While this is certainly a question worthy of analysis, it only represents one half of a broader

topic, which investigates the relationship between foreign aid and human rights abuses.

Additionally, these studies have only examined the effect that U.S. foreign aid has on human

rights abuses in other countries (Regan 1995, Gibler 2008, Dunning 2004) and they generally

assume that foreign aid is allocated based on a preexisting human rights score, where countries

who have higher human rights scores receive more aid as a reward for their respect and countries

with lower human rights scores are punished with lower levels of aid. Dunning’s study showed

that between “1975 to 1986, no statistically significant relationship emerges between ODA and

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democracy”(Dunning, 2004 410). However “from 1987 to 1997, the relationship between aid

and democracy is positive and statistically significant” (Dunning, 2004, 410). Though Dunning’s

study does not actively seek to answer the question posed in this study, his evidence of a

connection between aid and democracy provides valuable evidence that supports the possibility

of an indirect effect of aid on human rights, a theory this study intends to test.

Hyun Ju Lee’s study narrowed the focus to the impact of U.S. foreign aid on human

rights abuses in the post-Cold War world while also focusing his study on countries that have a

relation to the former Soviet Union (Lee, 2011). Lee attempts to answer the same basic question:

“Does the presence of foreign aid increase human rights scores?” For his study, Lee examines

only the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and physical integrity rights from the years

1992-2009. Lee uses similar reasoning to suggest that because foreign aid increases levels of

democracy, as demonstrated by Regan, and democracy leads to a government that is more

responsive to its citizens, which in turn, creates a greater appreciation for human rights, it is

probable that human rights scores will increase as a result of foreign aid. Though Lee ultimately

found that US foreign aid had a negative impact on human rights scores in former USSR

countries, this line of causal reasoning also suggests that there could be an indirect relationship

between foreign aid and human rights.

Lee’s study introduces a second element that may be useful for explaining varying human

rights scores in relation to foreign aid, which is level of economic development. It is known that

there is a relationship between level of economic development and human rights scores (Richard

et al 2001, Gibler, 2008). Like others, Gibler’s study focuses on disbursement of US foreign aid,

not multilateral aid. Gibler suggests that the relationship between US foreign aid and human

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rights scores is an indirect one, using opportunity cost logic; Gibler argues that because foreign

aid allocations are made public each year, countries with poor human rights “are quite aware of

the monies lost due to repressive human rights practices” (Gibler 2008, 513). This has interesting

implications for this hypothesis because it does show that it is possible that foreign aid has an

indirect effect on human rights. Like others, Gibler works with the assumption that monies are

allocated based on level of respect for human rights by the country. This once again bases levels

of aid on human rights scores instead of human rights scores being affected by levels of aid.

However, the results of his study indicate that “U.S. aid does positively affect human rights

policies abroad” (Gibler 2008, 514). Surprisingly, it is not the allocation of foreign aid that

changes human rights behavior, but the absence of foreign aid. In other words, repressive

governments that do not receive foreign aid modify their behavior after viewing the opportunity

cost of their disrespect for human rights. At the 1993 Vienna Conference, United Nations

members agreed that “there was substantial consensus [that]…democracy, development and

respect for human rights were all pronounced ‘interdependent and mutually

reinforcing’”(UNHCR 1993). This also lends support to the theory that as democracy and levels

of development increase, respect for human rights should also increase.

Richards, Gelling and Sacko’s 2001 study examined the relationship between

development assistance and human rights along with the the relationship between human rights

and other variables such as democracy and economic development and reached the following

conclusion:

“Both models fail to provide evidence that official development assistance influences

government support for human rights. The fact that we found aid to be consistently

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insignificant (over a longer time frame than most other studies) raises serious questions

about the practicality of shaping human rights policies in developing countries through

aid incentives” (Richard et. al 2001, 235).

Their study examined two schools of thought surrounding foreign aid allocations: the

dependency perspective and the neoclassical perspective, the latter of which is relevant to this

study. The neoclassical perspective suggests that “developing countries that make use of the

opportunities provided by foreign investment will quickly raise their economic

standing” (Richard et al, 2001, 221). Furthermore, the theory suggests that along with this

increase in economic standing comes liberalization, democracy, and increased government

respect for human rights. Richards et al. demonstrates the success of this theory with the

economic and political reforms experienced in Thailand beginning in the 1980’s (Richard et al.

2001, 221).

Lastly, it is important to consider the motivation behind aid allocations. There are two

competing frameworks that attempt to explain the motivation for countries to give foreign aid.

The donor-interest model, which is supported by the neoliberal school and the recipient-need

model, which is supported by idealists (Carey 2007, 452). In the donor-interest model, aid is

given on the condition that it promotes national security and strengthens alliances with other

nations. Previous research seems to confirm this theory possibly because most of the previous

research only examines aid allocations from the United States, not from a multinational

organization such as the OECD. In the recipient-need model, aid is given based on some “moral

obligation” (Carey 2007, 452) such as desire to reduce extreme poverty. It is the latter of these

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two theoretical frameworks that the OECD uses to determine aid allocations, focusing on three

motivations: humanitarian, enlightened self-interest, and solidarity (DAC 2006).

One of the reasons that the OECD may be more likely to follow the recipient-need model

is due to the diversity in foreign policy objectives of DAC members. Given the diversity, it

would be more difficult to align the national security and alliance objectives of all donor

countries in order to allocate aid. Additionally, DAC members give aid both bilaterally, outside

of the OECD, and multilaterally through the OECD. If countries were only interested in giving

aid for personal gain, they would have little incentive to reduce their control over the decision

making process by giving aid through international programs such as the OECD.

Theory

Given the previous literature, this study examines the relationship between OECD ODA

disbursements and human rights. One of the primary motivations behind studying this particular

relationship is the general lack of study on the effectiveness of multilateral aid distributions.

According to the OECD multilateral aid is defined as “core contributions from official

(government) sources to multilateral agencies where it is then used to fund the multilateral

agencies’ own programmes.” (OECD(a)). I’ve further divided the relationship between

multilateral aid and human rights into two distinct categories: a direct relationship, and an

indirect relationship. This theory assumes that ODA allocations are made based on the recipient-

need model (Carey, 2007) as well as the neoclassical model (Richard et al. 2001). Therefore,

ODA allocations are given with the needs of the recipients as the primary motivation, with goals

to reduce poverty and promote economic development. In addition to poverty reduction and

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economic development, ODA allocations are awarded with the goal of creating “effective,

democratic and accountable governance [and] the protection of human rights” (DAC 1996, 2).

ODA and human rights: A Direct Relationship

The Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration, Cyrus Vance testified before

the House Committee of Foreign Affairs stating that “foreign assistance programs are an

essential tool in promoting a broad category of internationally recognized human rights” (Regan,

1995, 615). Another way to view this relationship is using the common “carrot and stick”

analogy which states that when attempting to change the behavior of an individual or a country,

the one who seeks change has two options. They can dangle a carrot, an incentive in front of the

country that they wish to modify, or beat them with a stick, in other words punishing them with

the hopes of forcing them into cooperation. Following that logic, a target country should prefer a

reward over punishment and opt to change their human rights practices in return for a reward

over being punished. In practice this is called aid conditionality, which USAID defines as “an

exchange of policy reforms for external resources.” and is “based on the premise that financial

aid works best in a sound policy environment” (Spevacek 2010, 2). Though aid conditionality

was deemed a failure by the OECD in the mid to late 2000’s, it was a common form of economic

reform in the 80’s and 90’s (Mold, Zimmerman, 2008, 1). Given the premise regarding financial

aid, and the prevalence of aid conditionality during the time period being examined, the first

hypothesis examined will examine the direct relationship between ODA and human rights.

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Hypothesis 1: When comparing the direct relationship between ODA and human rights

scores, ODA has a positive effect on human rights scores from 1992-2001. The first hypothesis

tested will examine the direct relationship ODA and both physical integrity and empowerment

rights scores. A test of the direct relationship of the two is the most simplistic and relies on the

idea that aid functions as a positive incentive for countries to change their human rights

practices. Testing the direct relationship between aid and human rights in this study differs from

most previous studies because the aid that is dispersed in this study is multilateral while previous

studies have generally looked at the effect of US foreign aid on human rights abuses. The major

potential difference between these two types of dispersions lies in what I believe to be the true

intent of the aid. Recalling the donor-interest model cited by Carey, I believe it is more likely that

bilateral aid allocations fall under this model, whereas ODA falls under the recipient-need model.

Since ODA is dispersed by a committee rather than a single nation, individual policy objectives

can be minimized by the presence of multiple countries. In theory, the effect of this would keep

the focus on OECD objectives such as promoting human rights, rather than extraneous policy

agendas held by individual member nations and should lead to an increased respect for human

rights.

ODA and Human Rights: An Indirect Relationship

I suspect that one of the reasons that research is focused on an indirect relationship

between aid and human rights is because political scientists recognize that human interaction is

very complex and usually cannot be explained by a simple causal chain where A leads to B and B

leads to C etc. Working under the assumption that interaction is complex, political scientists have

rightfully studied the effect of aid on a multitude of factors, particularly economic development

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and regime type. Combined with studies that focus on the effect of them on human rights, it

becomes easier to see a connection that could link them all together, resulting in foreign aid

having an indirect effect on human rights. Literature shows that autocracies generally have less

respect for human rights (Gibler 2008). One reason for this is that the position of an autocratic

leader is generally secure because they maintain power by pleasing a select few in the country

that share their interests. In return for money and political favor, these select few maintain order

throughout the country. This can be observed in Soviet Russia, Communist China, and North

Korea. As a result, autocratic leaders are generally unresponsive to a majority of their citizens.

This results in lower scores for empowerment rights such as political participation, freedom of

association, speech, and movement. These countries are also more likely to violate physical

integrity rights such as government sponsored extrajudicial killings, kidnappings and torture as a

way to discipline those who oppose with the ruling party and signal to other dissidents that

certain behavior will not be tolerated. For example news reports indicate that it is common for

troops in North Korea to shoot anyone who attempts to leave on site. (Hiatt, 2012) Furthermore,

high levels of democracy are linked to high levels of respect for human rights.

A blog post on aiddata.org provides support for a link between aid and democracy. While

previous studies yielded “mixed results”, after correcting some design flaws, studies found “a

robust positive link between aid and democracy. In other words, over the course of several

decades, foreign aid has promoted democracy” (Kersting, Kilby, 2014 ). This study provides

evidence of a link between aid and democracy but what about a link between aid and economic

development?

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Findings surrounding the effect of aid on economic development are mixed. Therefore it

is unclear whether or not aid will produce positive economic effects. While the OECD suggests

that its “Aid For Trade” program is showing promising results, working papers published by the

International Monetary Fund conclude that “certain types of foreign aid do positively impact

[economic] development though they are unable to determine what types of aid have that

impact” (Minoiu, Sanjay 2009). While no causal mechanism has been identified, constant

reference to the mysterious relationship warrants further investigation.

As a result of the potential indirect relationships between ODA and human rights, four

more hypotheses emerge to be tested, followed by Figure 1, which visually links the hypotheses

with one another.

Hypothesis 2: When comparing the relationship between regime type and human rights

scores, democracy has a positive effect on human rights from 1992-2001. Research indicates that

as countries become more democratic, they have a greater respect for human rights (Howard,

Donnelly 1986). One of the reasons that this occurs can be explained by the selectorate theory

which is described in The Logic of Political Survival. The selectorate theory states that three

groups of people affect leaders: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate and the winning

coalition (Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow, 2003). The nominal selectorate is every

individual in a country that has a say in choosing a leader, the real selectorate are the individuals

who choose the leader, and the winning coalition is everyone who supports the winning leader.

The selectorate theory states that the primary goal of a leader is to remain in power, by retaining

the winning coalition. In order to retain the winning coalition, leaders must respond to their

needs and in democracies, the winning coalition is much larger and more diverse than it is in an

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autocracy. According to the theory, regimes with a larger winning coalition and even larger

selectorates pose the greatest risk to a leader’s position because they have to satisfy more

individuals to remain in power (Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow, 2003). As a result,

widespread abuses of power such as the violation of human rights reduce the size of the winning

coalition, leading to greater instability for the leaders.

Another important feature of democracies with regard to human rights is free press.

When the government has little to no control of the press, their ability to control public

perception is limited. In some ways, the free press can serve as a check on the government’s

power, due to its ability to report on government affairs and hold leaders accountable. Lastly, a

strong, separate legal system is imperative to increase government respect for human rights. Like

the press, legal institutions enforce the laws of the country and ensure that the government does

not overstep its boundaries. An example of this would be the Supreme Court in the United States.

The Court routinely hears cases regarding constitutional freedoms and has the authority to curb

the government when it oversteps. A court must have the ability to check other branches of

government or the court has no real power. Legal systems like this most often accompany

democracies (Reenok, Jeffery, Radean 2012).

Hypothesis 3: When comparing the relationship between level of economic development

and human rights scores, economic development has a positive effect on human rights from

1992-2001. Economic development has several positive effects including poverty reduction,

infrastructure improvement, improved healthcare and higher education levels. As previously

stated there is very little information regarding the exact relationship between economic

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development and human rights however there are several references to it throughout the

literature (Mold and Zimmerman 2008, OECD B, Robinson 2000)

Hypothesis 4: When comparing the relationship between ODA and regime type, ODA has

a positive effect on regime type from 1992-2001. Several studies suggest a link between aid and

democracy (Kersting, Kilby 2014, Gibler 2008,) and the development assistance committee has

listed one of its goals as the promotion of democracy (DAC 1996, 2). As a result of this expressly

stated goal, it becomes necessary to test whether or not aid has an effect on regime type. Given

the rhetoric from the DAC, previous studies, and democracy building efforts by global leaders

such as the United States in the Middle East in the 1990’s support a theory that as aid increases,

countries should be more democratic. This is because like economic development’s effect on

human rights scores, aid gives the recipient government more resources to invest in better

government institutions and reduce corruption.

Hypothesis 5: When comparing the relationship between ODA and level of economic

development, as ODA levels increase, so does the level of economic development in sample

countries from 1992-2001.

Miniou and Sanjay suggest that foreign aid does have an impact on human rights, though

further research has yet to determine what type of aid that is. Therefore it is important to test the

relationship between ODA and economic development. One possible explanation is that ODA

has the power to subsidize operating costs that recipient governments face such as costs to

upgrade and strengthen existing government infrastructure, like an independent legal system. In

Richards et al.’s Thailand example, the influx of capital for government programs freed up other

government revenue such as taxes collected for other projects that may not be possible without

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assistance from the OECD. The creation of more or better economic opportunity in a country

may also foster a desire for increased government respect for human rights. Additionally

increased economic development reduces unemployment, increases consumption, and increases

tax revenue for governments. With increased tax revenue comes better government institutions

that have the capability to hold leaders accountable for human rights violations.

Figure 1 further illustrates how hypotheses one through five are related, exemplifying

both the theoretical direct and indirect relationships between official development assistance and

human rights.

Figure 1: Theoretical Causal Mechanisms

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Research Design

In attempt to test for the presence of either a direct of indirect relationship between aid

and human rights, it is imperative to try to isolate the two variables by reducing the impact of

external circumstances that may influence levels of aid such as presence of conflict or

international foreign policy issues such as the Cold War or the global War on Terror. I felt that

the best way to do this was to examine a time period where the influence of those factors would

be minimized. To do this, I did my longitudinal study from the years 1992-2001. I selected 1992

because following the end of the Cold War, donor countries were less bound to the communist/

capitalist divide that guided politics following World War 2. The collapse of the Soviet Union

meant that focus of aid allocations was no longer on containing the opposing economic/political

view and the donors shifted their focus on regional stability and democracy development (Fleck

and Kilby, 2008, 6). I chose an end date of 2001 because evidence suggests that aid levels and

allocations were affected by the War on Terror (Fleck and Kilby 2008).

The next challenge was determining the best way to measure the variables. To measure

human rights abuses I elected to use the CIRI Human Rights Data set because it is used most

often when states are deciding how much foreign aid they want to give to a particular country.

CIRI breaks human rights down into smaller categories as well as additive indexes. I chose to

use the Physical Integrity Rights Index which is “constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial

Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 to

8” (Cingranelli, Richards, Clay 2014). I also used the Empowerment Rights Index which is 1

The CIRI Human Rights Data Set codes two different Empowerment Rights Indexes. They are 1

labeled Old Empowerment (retired in 2007) and New Empowerment. For this paper I chose to use the new Empowerment Index.

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“constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of speech, Freedom of

Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral-Self Determination and Freedom of

Religion indicators. It ranges from 0-14”(Cingranelli, Richards, Clay 2014).

To measure regime type I decided to use the Polity IV Project. The polity score captures

this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to

+10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in

a suggested three part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" and "democracies"

(+6 to +10)” (Polity IV). The use of a spectrum of regime type instead of just designating

whether a country is democratic or autocratic allows researchers to observe any changes in

regime type better than classifying them into two groups.

To measure economic development I decided to use each country’s Gross Domestic

Product Per Capita, or GDP per capita. GDP per capita uses Gross Domestic Product, which is

“the value of all final goods and services produced in a country in one year” (World Bank) and is

divided by the country’s midyear population. This information was provided by the World Bank 2

in current 2014 dollars. I then translated it into constant 2014 dollars so that the value amounts

would be consistent with the ODA amounts which are also in constant 2014 amounts.

It was my hope to use GDP per capita as a way to show economic development, and

more broadly, quality of life for citizens in each country. One of the problems with GDP however

The World Bank lists the following specific criteria on their website, which details the exact 2

methods used to calculate GDP per capita “GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.” (World Bank)

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is that it only measures production, and while increased production may signal a growing

economy, it’s hard to use this statistic to measure the wellbeing of a society. Additionally, as

markets become more complex, some services of great importance such as “education…which

by definition have no market price” (OECD Observer 2004) cannot be accurately captured in

GDP calculations. One of the major criticisms of GDP is that it does not only capture positive

economic growth. For example, following the widespread devastation of hurricane Katrina,

production to rebuild the region increased. GDP captures this production without subtracting the

goods and services that were lost due to the hurricane, causing a temporary spike in GDP for the

region. When looking at aggregate numbers without knowledge of the natural disaster, the

increase in GDP could be confused with an expanding market. Despite its issues, GDP per capita

remains one of the best measures available for this study.

Countries selected for review must first meet the following criteria: They must be an

established country from 1992-2001, they must have human rights, Polity IV, GDP per capita,

and ODA data available for all ten years, and they must also be a non-OECD member state.

Some countries, like Afghanistan for example, seem fitting for this type of study but data was not

present for all 10 years. There are a number of reasons that this data could be missing. For

example, regime type may effect whether or not the information required for CIRI is readily

available. Autocratic regimes like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may not report

some data such as the number of people who have disappeared in a given year. Without this data

CIRI is unable to create a physical integrity index.

Another possible cause for missing data is regional conflict or regime change. When

there is conflict in the region, the regime changes leaders or regime type, records required for

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analysis may go missing or be destroyed. It is likely that conflict is the reason that GDP per

capita is missing in countries such as Kuwait and Iraq; both countries involved in Gulf War and

its aftermath in the early 90’s. It is also possible that when agencies were collecting data during

a particular year, there was no installed government and therefore no data could be collected.

Regardless of the reasoning, countries with missing data cannot be included because without the

data it is difficult to determine whether or not the independent variables, development aid,

regime type or economic development have any effect on human rights scores. Lastly, countries

that were examined were non-OECD member states. Once a country failed to meet the

dependent variable requirements, it was removed from the study entirely and its ability to meet

the independent variable requirements was not assessed.

One of the most difficult aspects of this research was collecting information across the

different databases. Information regarding GDP, OECD allocations, regime type and human

rights scores came from four separate databases, The World Bank, OECD, the Polity IV Project,

and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, respectively. Each database or organization sets their own

criteria for what constitutes a state, which determines whether or not data will be collected. For

example, the Polity IV project does not collect data for countries with a population under

500,000 in the most recent year (Center for Systemic Peace). As a result, a number of countries

had to be excluded because they were not listed across all the databases. Due to this, it is possible

that the results of this study may be impacted by their exclusion.

The next challenge was determining how to measure the aid each country received. Aid

allocations are rarely marked as “humanitarian aid” and packaged with a nice neat bow. Since I

decided to focus my research on the OECD, I began researching different ways in which they

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allocated aid. I settled on Official Development Assistance which is dispersed by the

Development Assistance Committee, due to its multilateral nature. ODA must be “concessional

and convey a grant element of at least 25%”. The DAC was composed of 29 members during the

time of the study and members were (and continue to be) assessed using a variety of measures

ranging from “the existence of appropriate strategies” to “the existence of a system of monitoring

and evaluation” (OECD(c)). I used the OECD’s Query Wizard for International Development

Statistics (QWIDS) to pull the ODA disbursements from all donors from the years 1992-2001 for

the predetermined countries. An OECD country is defined as any member of the OECD that

obtained its membership status before 2001. A complete list of OECD countries and countries

included in this study can be found in Table 1.

After compiling a list of countries that satisfied dependent variable criteria requirements,

I pulled the ODA disbursements for those countries and examined them. In some cases, ODA

raw data indicated that the aid values for some countries in particular years was “..”(QWIDS).

Any cases where aid data was noted with this was assigned an aid value of ‘0’. Next I removed

any countries that had negative aid values. After removing all countries that did not meet the

selection criteria for either the dependent or independent data I was left with 80 countries.

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Table 1: Breakdown of Country Selection

All countries, 1992-2001

Countries for Analysis Countries Excluded OECD Member States

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burma/Myanmar, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan,Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Failed to Meet Dependent Variable Criteria:Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Burundi, Cape Verde, Columbia, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Georgia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kosovo, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Palau, Qatar, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu

Failed to meet Independent Variable Criteria:Belize, Bolivia Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia Costa Rica, Cote d’ivore, Croatia Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Iran, Iraq Jamaica, Kuwait Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates.

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

�20

Analysis

I have chosen to organize the analysis section by analyzing each hypothesis individually,

in the order that they were originally presented. Next, I’ll examine the multivariate regression

data.

To begin the analysis, I created a map detailing the total amount of ODA disbursed to

each country in the study over ten years. Figure 2 has been included to provide a visual

representation of all countries that are being assessed as well as their total aid values. Darker

shades of purple indicate that a country received more total aid during the study. One important

feature of this map is that it indicates that aid is clustered in two major areas: South Asia and

Africa. While there is some aid given to South America, it should be noted that important

�21

Figure 2: Total ODA Disbursements 1992-2001, World Map

developing countries such as Brazil are absent from aid allocations, and a majority of Eastern

Europe is missing, despite documented changes in aid allocations during the time of this study

(Lee 2011). The reason for this is that data for those countries that is required for this study is

either missing or incomplete. Therefore, it should be noted that the absence of those countries

may affect the outcome of this study.

I began the analysis by creating scatterplots regarding ODA and physical integrity rights,

as well as ODA and empowerment rights. I chose to use scatter plots for my analysis because

scatter plots provide a visual representation of the correlation between the two variables. In other

words, the scatter plot demonstrates the relationship between the two variables being examined.

Given my theory, I expect to find a positive relationship in all of the scatter plots meaning that as

the independent variable increases, the dependent value also increases.

�22

Figure 3: Effect of ODA Allocations on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Phys

ical I

nteg

rity

Righ

ts

-2

0

2

4

6

8

ODA allocations in millions of 2014 constant dollars0 1250 2500 3750 5000

y = -0.0012x + 4.6938R² = 0.0809 Physical Integrity Rights

Figures 3 and 4 both indicate a negative relationship between ODA allocations and physical

integrity rights and empowerment rights respectively. ODA allocations have larger negative

impact on physical integrity rights than they do on empowerment rights as indicated by the slope

of each of the linear trend lines. For every $1 increase in aid, physical integrity rights decrease

by 1.2 points whereas for empowerment rights, every $1 increase leads to a .8 decrease in

empowerment rights. Therefore, the data provided suggests that there is a negative relationship

between ODA allocations and human rights.

Figures 5 and 6 analyze the effect of regime type on both physical integrity rights and

empowerment rights.

Both figures indicate a positive relationship between regime type and human rights

meaning that as a country becomes more democratic, the more respect it has for human rights.

�23

Figure 4: Effect of ODA Allocations on Empowerment Rights Scores 1992-2001

Empo

werm

ent R

ight

s

0

3.5

7

10.5

14

ODA Allocations in Millions of 2014 Constant Dollars0 1250 2500 3750 5000

y = -0.0008x + 7.7762R² = 0.0121 Empowerment Rights

One of the reasons this may occur is that democracies are generally supported by strong judicial

institutions (Reenock, Staton, Radean, 2012). Strong legal institutions along with the free press

make it easier for countries to draw attention to, and punish public officials who commit human

rights violations. Furthermore, there is a strong connection between regime type and

empowerment rights specifically, where every one point increase on the Polity IV scale leads to a

�24

Figure 5: Effect of Regime Type on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Phys

ical I

nteg

rity

Righ

ts

0

2

4

6

8

Polity IV score-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10

y = 0.0795x + 4.248R² = 0.0631

Integrity

Figure 6: Effect of Regime Type on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001

Empo

werm

ent R

ight

s

0

3.5

7

10.5

14

Polity IV Score-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10

y = 0.466x + 7.2766R² = 0.622

Empowerment

.466 increase on the empowerment rights scale. This is to be expected since democracies place

such high value on the freedoms included in the empowerment rights index.

An analysis of the effect of economic development on human rights scores (Figures 7 and

8) also yielded results that were consistent with the hypothesis. The evidence suggests that

increase in GDP per capita leads to a marginal increase in physical integrity rights and a minimal

�25

Figure 7: Effect of GDP Per Capita on Physical Integrity Rights 1992-2001

Phys

ical I

nteg

rity

Righ

ts

0

2

4

6

8

GDP per capita in constant 2014 dollars0 10000 20000 30000 40000

y = 6.226E-5x + 4.0977R² = 0.0281

Integrity

Figure 8: Effect of GDP per capita on Empowerment Rights 1992-2001

Empo

werm

ent R

ight

s

0

3.5

7

10.5

14

GDP per capita in Constant 2014 dollars0 10000 20000 30000 40000

y = 1.899E-5x + 7.4224R² = 0.0008 Empowerment

positive impact on empowerment rights. However, given the size of the increases, 6.266E-5 and

1.899E-5, respectively, its difficult to ascertain whether or not the results are actually due to a

relationship between the two variables or if the results appeared by chance.

At first, the results of Figure 9 seems to be damaging to the hypothesis however, there is

at least one explanation that explains the trend seen in the scatter plot below. Changes in regime

type rarely, if ever occur over night. Even transitions under the best circumstances take time,

often years to fully implement. The data in this set only covers a period of 10 years. It is possible

that over a longer time period, ODA disbursements may actually foster democratization, but the

process occurs so slowly that it is not captured in such a short time period. Using this data set

and model, it appears that ODA has an extremely small, negative relationship with regime type,

however it is also possible that this result is due to the countries included in the sample. While

�26

Figure 9: Effect of ODA Allocations on Regime Type 1992-2001

Polity

IV s

core

-10-8-6-4-202468

10

ODA allocations Millions of constant 2014 US Dollars0 1250 2500 3750 5000

y = -0.0001x + 0.4694R² = 0.0001

Polity IV Scores

the purpose of this paper is to look at the aggregate results, it would also be beneficial to look at

countries that receive the most ODA individually over a longer period of time and monitor

changes in regime type over time for a clearer picture of the effects of ODA on regime type.

The results of figure 10 indicate that ODA does not increase the level of economic

development. In theory, the addition of ODA should for lack of a better phrase, make the

governments’ pie bigger. In other words, additional funds give recipient countries more money to

work with, allowing better allocation of resources, thus allowing for more economic production

in a country. While the “pie” may be getting bigger, it doesn’t appear that citizens of these

countries are seeing benefits from this increase in terms of economic development.

�27

Figure 10: Effect of ODA allocations on GDP Per capita 1992-2001

GDP

per

cap

ita c

onst

ant 2

014

dolla

rs

-10000

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

ODA Allocations 2014 constant US dollars0 1250 2500 3750 5000

y = -1.1986x + 3389.6R² = 0.0117

GDP Per Capita Constant 2014 dollars

It is entirely possible that since wealth isn’t equally distributed, that the addition of aid to

these countries minimally improves the lives of the poorest citizens however that improvement is

too small to be seen in aggregate data. Lastly it is also possible that this scatterplot is skewed due

to the presence of outliers. As a result, Figure 11 examines the logged data and arrives at the

same conclusion, that ODA has a negative effect on economic development. Taking the log of

both the ODA data and the GDP per capita data reduces the effect of outliers on the scatterplot.

In figure 10, higher values skew the data set in a positive direction, indicating that negative

relationship between the two variables is smaller than it is after the effect of outliers has been

reduced.

�28

Figure 11: Logged ODA Allocations and Logged GDP per capita 1992-2001

Logg

ed G

DP p

er c

apita

0

1.25

2.5

3.75

5

Logged ODA Allocations -1 0 1 2 3 4

y = -0.2745x + 3.683R² = 0.1881 GDP per capita

Summary statistics provide further support for the preliminary evidence in the scatter

plots. Using multivariate regression I was able to control each independent variable (ODA,

regime type, and GDP per capita) and examine their individual effect on both physical integrity

rights and empowerment rights separately. With the independent variables being controlled it

allows us to examine the impact of each one individually, to help determine which one of the

independent variables has the greatest effect on the dependent variable. Tables 2 and 3 provide

the multivariate regression outputs for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights,

respectively.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Integrity Rights

Multiple R 0.396

R Square 0.156

Adjusted R2 0.153

Standard Error 1.886

Observations 800

Integrity Rights

Coefficients Standard Error

t Stat P-Value Lower 95% Upper 95%

Intercept 4.511 0.091 49.335 2.62E-244 4.331 4.690

ODA -0.001 0.0001 -8.244 6.837E-16 -0.001 -0.0008

Polity IV 0.076 0.010 7.303 6.8453E-13 0.0552 0.096

GDP per capita

4.3536E-05 1.2203E-05 3.568 0.0004 1.9581E-05 6.7491E-05

�29

Upon review of the coefficients, I found that for both physical integrity rights and

empowerment rights, the Polity IV indicator, which measures regime type, had the greatest

effect. Like Figures 5 and 6, this coefficient indicates that as Polity IV scores increase, indicating

that a country is more democratic, respect for both sets of human rights also increases.

Additionally, an examination of the P-Values indicate that the observed results are significant at

the .99 confidence interval.

Contrary to my original hypothesis, ODA has a negative impact on physical integrity

rights. Furthermore, both GDP per capita and a direct relationship between ODA and human

rights have a negative, statistically significant effect on empowerment rights, indicating that

instead of improving empowerment rights scores, they actually have a very small, negative

impact on them. According to analysis the results for all three independent variables for both

Table 3: Summary Statistics

Empowerment Rights

Multiple R 0.797

R Square 0.636

Adjusted R2 0.634

Standard Error 2.314

Observations 800

Empowerment Coefficients Standard Error

t Stat P-Value Lower 95% Upper 95%

Intercept 7.685 0.112 68.513 0 7.465 7.906

ODA -0.0008 0.0002 5.11 4.0441E-07 -0.001 -0.0005

Polity IV 0.468 0.013 36.910 1.363E-174 0.443 0.493

GDP per capita -3.81E-05 1.4972E-05 -2.545 0.011 -6.749E-05 -8.712E-06

�30

physical integrity rights and empowerment rights are statistically significant at the 95%

confidence interval, indicating that the null hypotheses which state that there is no relationship

between the variables must be rejected. While the results observed are statistically significant,

the limitations for country selection make it difficult to suggest that these results are unbiased.

Conclusion This study examined two possible relationships between foreign aid and respect for

human rights during the interwar period. Research on the topic has yielded mixed results and

several developed nations question whether or not aid they are giving has the intended effects.

The first, a direct relationship between the two, hypothesizes that the OECD’s official

development aid positively effects human rights scores. Both the scatter plots (figures 3 and 4)

and the multivariate regression analysis (Tables 2 and 3) provide evidence that contradicts this

theory, indicating that the aid has a negative impact on both physical integrity and empowerment

rights. The second relationship, an indirect one, hypothesizes that official development aid may

have an indirect effect on respect for human rights by positively impacting either regime type or

GDP per capita. Once again, this study finds evidence to contradict this theory. Figures 9-11

suggest that aid has a negative effect on regime type and GDP per capita, even after the impact

of outliers has been reduced (Figure 11). This study found evidence that supports the theory that

GDP per capita and regime type positively effect human rights scores (Figures 5-9), though the

multivariate regression suggests that GDP per capita has a negative effect on empowerment

rights (Table 3).

The next question of interest is why does aid fail? One of the reasons that aid may fail in

this study is due to the countries selected. This study unintentionally focuses on Southeast Asia

�31

and Africa, neglecting large parts of Eastern Europe and South America due to the selection

criteria. Modifying the selection criteria by including all countries may change the results of the

study. Dr. Christopher Coyne, F.A. Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University

examines this question in his book Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Aid Fails.

Coyne asserts that several problems plague the humanitarian system including bureaucracy,

incentives, political institutions, what he coins as “‘planner’s problem’ which refers to the

inability of non market participants to access relevant knowledge on how to allocate resources in

a welfare maximizing way” (Coyne 2013 43). The planner problem feeds into another problem,

that those who carry out the humanitarian aid, such as Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO’s)

don’t have the knowledge required to meet the goals specified. Lastly, Coyne states that

“humanitarian action is often not compatible with the incentives of those in political

power” (Coyne 2013 15).

Coyne’s approach to humanitarian aid address both indirect relationships examined in

this study. If aid resources are not allocated in an efficient way, then economic growth is stifled.

One of the reasons that aid resources are not allocated in an efficient way is because the aid

giving process removes the supply and demand aspect that is prevalent in capitalist markets.

Since aid is given in such repeatedly large sums, there is a constant influx of capital into a

country regardless of how it is used. This is different from a capitalist market because in a

capitalist market, bad ideas, businesses, and products are flushed out of the system as they run

out of capital. The lack of capital scarcity prevents the efficient allocation of resources.

Furthermore, regarding regime type, if respecting human rights does not benefit the leader in

power, then they have no incentive to respect them. As previously discussed, authoritarian

�32

regimes do not benefit from gaining the support of average citizens, as the elite keep them in

power. Despite the aid given to foster democratization, an authoritarian leader is not likely to

follow through with reform because such reform would oust them from power forcing them to

either hide or be killed.

Overall, this study provides discouraging results for those who advocate for increased

foreign aid as a way to promote human rights. Future studies should focus on including more

countries to ensure a representative sample of all regions and increase the length of time studied

while still controlling for factors that may influence aid allocations such as conflict.

�33

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