Alaphonso v. FSM

8/2/2019 Alaphonso v. FSM

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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

Cite as Alaphanso v. FSM,1 FSM Intrm. 209 (App. 1982)

APPELLATE DIVISION

[1 FSM Intrm. 209]

PAKO ALAPHONSO,

Appellant,

vs.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,

Appellee.

APPEAL CASE NO. T1-1981

OPINION

December 20, 1982

Before Edward C. King, Chief Justice, FSM Supreme Court; and FederatedStates of Micronesia Supreme Court designated justices Alfred Laureta (Judge,United States District Court, Northern Mariana Islands) and Herbert Soll (Judge,Commonwealth Court of the Northern Mariana Islands).

APPEARANCES:

For Pako Alaphonso: Wanis Simina

Public Defender State of Truk

Truk, Caroline Islands 96942

For the Federated Jeanne Rayphand States of Micronesia: Acting Attorney General

State of Truk

Truk, Caroline Islands 96942

[1 FSM Intrm. 210]

EDWARD C. KING, Chief Justice,

Defendant Pako Alaphonso appeals from his conviction on three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of 11 F.S.M.C. 919. 1 All countsinvolve the same October 4, 1981 incident but relate to separate victims of thealleged actions. Defendant Alaphonso was sentenced on each count to 18months' imprisonment, all three sentences to run concurrently.



Defendant's appeal is grounded on claims that there was insufficient evidenceto support findings of guilt for the three counts and that the trial court improperlyrejected the defendant's alibi defense.

We find that the trial court's substantive rulings appealed from were correctand we affirm the trial court's

[1 FSM Intrm. 211]

decision. Because this is the first appeal on the merits to this Court's appellatedivision and to assist in developing the jurisprudence of this new nation, we find itappropriate here to discuss at some length several fundamental aspects of thiscase.

Factual Background The Government presented three witnesses. All three were in a motorboat

on the afternoon of October 4, 1981 attempting to proceed from the Neotes

section of Moen Island in the State of Truk to the boat pool area, when a man inanother motorboat began shooting at them. Each witness saw their assailantstanding at the front of the other motorboat pointing a revolver toward them andshooting. Transcript at 3, 4, 6, 13, 14, 17 and 18. Two witnesses said he shottwice, id. at 6 and 13, and one testified that he shot only one time. Id. at 18. Allthree Government witnesses, one of whom had been a childhood playmate of Pako Alaphonso, identified Pako Alaphonso as the person shooting at them froma distance of approximately 200 feet. Id. at 6, 13, 14 and 18.

The defense countered with an attempt to establish an "alibi," that is, to showthat the defendant was on Wonei Island at the time when the crime occurred and

that he therefore could not have been the person shooting at the victims. Id. at24-36.

Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases

This is a case of first impression in the sense that it is the first appeal on themerits within the Federated

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States of Micronesia from a finding of criminal guilt of a citizen of the FederatedStates of Micronesia by a Court established under the Constitution of theFederated States of Micronesia.

Consequently, there is no direct precedent establishing the standard of proof to be met in criminal cases, either for a finding of guilt or to consider alibidefenses. Such a standard is obviously necessary for us to assess the actions of the trial court. We must therefore develop a method for determining standardsand then arrive at the standards themselves.



A. The Judicial Guidance Provision - The parties here have not addressedthese issues but have merely cited legal authorities from the United States,including decisions of United States federal and state courts, without explainingwhy those authorities are pertinent to these issues before this Court.

The Constitution instructs us that we may not merely assume away, or ignore,fundamental issues on the grounds that these basic issues have previously beendecided in a particular way by other courts in other circumstances and under different governmental systems. The "judicial guidance" provision, art. XI, § 11of the Constitution, tells us that our decisions must be "consistent" with the"Constitution, Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social andgeographical configuration of Micronesia."

[1 FSM Intrm. 213]

The Report of the Constitutional Convention's Committee on GeneralProvisions, which reported out this Judicial Guidance Provision, stated that:

The intent and purpose of this provision is that future Micronesian courts basetheir decisions not on what has been done in the past but on a new basis whichwill allow the consideration of the pertinent aspects of Micronesian society andculture.

The failure to include such a provision in the Constitution may cause the courts tofollow the decisions of past Trust Territory cases or various foreign decisionswhich have dealt with similar interpretive or legal questions. This may beundesirable since much of the reasoning utilized in these various courts may notbe relevant here in Micronesia. Micronesia is an island nation scattered over a

large expanse of ocean. Customary and traditional values are an important partof our society and lifestyle.It is important that this Constitution be interpreted inlight of our customs and traditions. Without such assurance in the Constitution,the words we use may be interpreted to mean other than what we have intended.

SCREP No. 34, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 821, 822 (1975).

Of course, this Court can and should consider decisions and reasoning of courts in the United States and other jurisdictions, including the Trust Territorycourts, in arriving at its own decisions. 2 What is clear from the Constitution,however, is that we are not to consider ourselves bound by those decisions andmust not fall into the error of adopting the reasoning of those decisions withoutindependently considering suitability of that reasoning for the Federated States of Micronesia.

[1 FSM Intrm. 214]

We therefore first look to sources of law and circumstances here to establishlegal requirements in criminal cases rather than begin with a review of casesdecided by other courts.



B. The Reasonable Doubt Standard - We start with the Constitution, the

fundamental governing document of the people of the Federated States of Micronesia. 3 The Constitution contains no language directly specifying thestandards of proof in criminal cases but provides that, "A person may not bedeprived of... liberty ... without due process of law..." FSM Const. art. IV, § 3.

The precise meaning of these words, especially as they may pertain to thestandards of proof for criminal cases, is not self-evident. It therefore ispermissible for us to seek assistance in determining the meaning of those words,and how the framers of our Constitution intended that they would be applied.

Trial division decisions of this Court have noted that the Constitution andJournal of the Constitutional Convention reveal the United States Constitution asthe historical precedent for most provisions in the Declaration of Rights. Tosie v.Tosie, 1 FSM Intrm. 149, 153-55 (Kos. 1982); FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79,83-85 (Pon. 1982). Most concepts and many actual words and phrasesemployed in the Declaration of Rights come directly from the

[1 FSM Intrm. 215]

United States Constitution, especially that Constitution's Bill of Rights. This isdecidedly so in the provisions upholding the right to due process of law. In thetwo constitutions, the language on that topic is nearly identical.

The Due Process Clause in the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia at Article IV, § 3 says: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty,or property without due process of law..." The United States Constitution's Due

Process Clause is contained in the Fifth Amendment together with various other provisions but the due process language itself is practically identical with thewords in the Declaration of rights: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,or property, without due process of law..." These parallels in language leave littledoubt that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is thehistorical precedent for the Declaration of Right's Due Process Clause in our Constitution.

Any remaining doubt is allayed by the Journal of the ConstitutionalConvention. The Declaration of Rights was drafted and reported out by theMicronesian Constitutional Convention's Committee on Civil Liberties. SCREPNo. 23, II J. of Micro. Con. Con. 793-804 (Oct. 2, 1975). In discussing theproposed Declaration of Rights, ultimately adopted substantially as proposed, theCommittee relied principally upon decisions of the United States Supreme Courtand other United States Courts interpreting similar provisions of the UnitedStates Constitution. Id.

[1 FSM Intrm. 216]



The Committee's explanation of its basis for, and the meaning of, theproposed Due Process Clause focused exclusively on United States SupremeCourt decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The obvious lesson is that we are to look to theinterpretative decisions of United States courts concerning the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The framers of this Constitution, and subsequently the voters in ratifying could only have beenaware of constitutional interpretations rendered prior to and at the times of theConstitutional Convention, 4 and ratification of the Constitution throughplebiscite. 5 We should therefore emphasize interpretations in effect at thosetimes.

Others before us have identified historical analysis as a preferred method of constitutional interpretation. Indeed Justice Black of the United States SupremeCourt employed words which seem almost to have anticipated our need here. Of the four words, "due process of law," in the Fifth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution he said:

Some might think that the words themselves are vague. But any possibleambiguity disappears when the phrase is viewed in the light of history and theaccepted meaning of those words prior to and at the time our Constitution waswritten.

[1 FSM Intrm. 217]

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1080, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 383(1970) (Black, J., dissenting). We too shall view the words "due process of law"in "the light of history and the accepted meaning of those words prior to and at

the time" this Constitution was written.

Once having determined the appropriate source of guidance in determiningthe meaning of the words, "due process of law," we can reach our conclusionwith relative ease. At the time of adoption and ratification of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia the meaning of the words "due process of law" in the United States Constitution as they mandate the standard of proof for criminal cases had been determined in In re Winship.

There, a juvenile was appealing from a finding that he was a juveniledelinquent. This finding was based upon proof which the juvenile court judge saidestablished delinquency by a preponderance of the evidence although perhapsnot beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 360, 90 S. Ct. at 1070, 25 L. Ed. 2d at373.

The United States Supreme Court set aside the juvenile court's decision asviolative of due process. The Supreme Court held that a child in a juveniledelinquency proceeding has at stake interests sufficiently similar to those of adefendant in a criminal proceeding to require the same protections concerning



standard of proof. The required standard of proof for all such cases, the courtheld, is mandated by the Due Process Clause:

[1 FSM Intrm. 218]

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonabledoubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects theaccused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Id. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 375. This was the acceptedmeaning of the words "due process of law" in the United States Constitution atthe time those words were inserted by the framers into the Constitution of theFederated States of Micronesia and adopted by the constitutional convention.This was still their accepted meaning under United States constitutional

interpretations when the Constitution here was ratified, and remains the acceptedinterpretation of the United States Constitution to this day. See also Mullane v.Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975); Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977). 6

[1 FSM Intrm. 219]

We may not, however, conclude our interpretative effort simply by determiningthe accepted meaning in the United States of words included in the Constitutionof the Federated States of Micronesia.

As already noted the Constitution's Judicial Guidance Section instructs thatwe may not follow blindly decisions of the United States or other courts. This

cautionary note should be kept in mind even in applying the above method of constitutional interpretation for provisions within the Declaration of Rights.Before accepting an interpretation of United States courts concerning the

meaning of words in this Constitution, we must review the reasoning of thosecourts and determine whether that reasoning and the results reached aresuitable for the Federated States of Micronesia.

In Winship, the court explained why it considered proof beyond a reasonabledoubt as an essential prerequisite to "a criminal conviction. We find each of these reasons suitable for application within the Federated States of Micronesia.

First, the Court pointed to the "virtually unanimous adherence to thereasonable doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions." 397 U.S. at 361, 90 S.Ct. at 1071, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 374. The framers have made clear to us through theJudicial Guidance Section that we are not to consider ourselves bound bycommon law concepts, even perhaps concepts to which there is "virtuallyunanimous" common law adherence. Nevertheless, in our efforts to develop a

judicial system suited for the

[1 FSM Intrm. 220]



people of the Federated States of Micronesia, it is surely useful to consider theexperience, lessons and conclusions of other legal systems.

"Common law" is a label identifying a widespread historical legal processtracing its origins back to medieval England. This is a trial and error process inthat common law judges base current decisions upon earlier precedents but,where those precedents are at odds with current accepted notions of social

justice, the judges are free to modify or overrule earlier precedent. This systemis now employed by numerous independent sovereignties throughout the worldincluding Great Britain, the United States, India andnations in Africa andthroughout the Pacific. If indeed there is "virtually unanimous adherence" to thereasonable-doubt standard among those varied sovereignties and after centuriesof experience with the common law system, we agree with the Winship court thatthis does "reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should beenforced andjustice administered." 397 U.S. at 361-62, 90 S. Ct. at 1071, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 374 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 88 S. Ct. 1444,1451, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 499 (1968)).

A second reason given for the rule in Winship is that the reasonable-doubtstandard and other related rules of evidence are "historically groundedrights...developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, withresulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property." 397 U.S. at 362, 90 S. Ct. at1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 374. The reasonable-doubt standard the court said, is"implicit" in constitutions which "recognize

[1 FSM Intrm. 221]

the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life andliberty" and is a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting onfactual error." Id. at 362-63, 90 S. Ct. at 1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 374-75.

The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immenseimportance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty uponconviction and because of the certainty that he will be stigmatized by theconviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime whenthere is reasonable doubt about his guilt.

* * *

To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses onthe trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on thefacts in issue."

397 U.S. at 363-64, 90 S. Ct. at 1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 375. We state withconfidence that the people of the Federated States of Micronesia "value the good



name and freedom of every individual" and wish to safeguard citizens fromdubious and unjust convictions.

It may conceivably be argued that in island society the risk of "dubious andunjust conviction" is diminished so that the reasonable doubt standard becomesunnecessary. The theory would be that, since so many people on an islandknow each other, everybody "knows" who is guilty and who is not. However,there is no reason to believe that people of islands are more immune fromrumors, prejudice, mob action and hysteria than are people who live on other geographical configurations. Indeed, we have all seen examples of "truths"rapidly accepted in small communities, later rejected as incorrect and unfounded.It appears that the need for a

[1 FSM Intrm. 222]

reasonable doubt standard is at least as great here as in other societies.

Thus, this second Winship reason also has application within the FederatedStates of Micronesia.

Finally, the United States Supreme Court in Winship concluded that thereasonable doubt standard is necessary to earn community respect for thecriminal justice system:

[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respectand confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is criticalthat the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof thatleaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also

important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairshave confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminaloffense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.

387 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1072-73, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 375.

We recognize that there may be times when the community at large issatisfied that a particular accused is guilty and demands nothing more intenselythan that person's conviction and punishment. The reasonable doubt standardmay increase the difficulty of conviction and in some instances may result in theacquittal of guilty persons. We nevertheless believe that the people of theFederated States of Micronesia will hold greater respect for their criminal justicesystem if it proceeds cautiously and respects the liberty of individual Micronesiancitizens rather than responds to the tensions and passions of the moment andsacrifices individuals to the expectations of an inflamed community.

[1 FSM Intrm. 223]

For all of these reasons, we accept the interpretations of the words "dueprocess of law" existing at the time of adoption and ratification of the Constitution



of the FederatedStates of Micronesia. We hold that the Due Process Clause of Article IV, § 3 of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia requiresproof beyond a reasonabledoubt as a condition for criminal convictions in theFederated States of Micronesia. 7

C. Standard of Proof: Alibi - The standard of proof for an alibi defense derivesfrom the constitutional due process rule requiring proof of guilt beyond areasonable doubt as justification for a criminal conviction. Most courts in theUnited States applying the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitutionwho have discussed the standard of proof to be employed in considering an alibihave concluded that the assertion of an alibi may not alter the basic principlesthat the burden of persuasion remains on the Government and that the standardis proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

These courts have held that the trier of fact must consider the evidence in itstotality, including the alibi, in deciding the guilt of the defendant and must bear inmind

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that the burden of persuasion never shifts from the government. If after considering the alibi evidence with all other evidence there is reasonable doubt inthe mind of the trier of fact, the defendant may not be found guilty. Smith v.Smith, 454 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S. Ct. 99, 34 L. Ed.2d 141 (1972); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.1001, 89 S. Ct. 483, 21 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1968); United States v. Harrigan, 586 F.2d860 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1976);United States v. Beedle, 463 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1972).

These conclusions have been grounded in part upon a belief that placing theburden of persuasion upon a defendant asserting an alibi defense is contrary tothe presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to criminal procedure in theUnited States. Stump, 398 F.2d at 116, Smith, 454 F.2d at 579; Johnson v.Spalding, 510 F. Supp. 164, 167 (E.D. Wash. 1981).

More germane to our analysis in this case is the general agreement of thoseother courts that a shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant concerning,any essential element of an alleged crime would be violative of the due processrequirement that the Government must prove all elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt.

This we find directly pertinent to our conclusions about the import of the DueProcess Clause in Article IV, § 3 of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia

[1 FSM Intrm. 225]



The trial court was entitled to rely upon the testimony and observations of theGovernment's witnesses and, drawing reasonable inferences, to conclude that,beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Alaphonso was attempting to cause bodily injuryto the witnesses with a loaded revolver. The trial court did so conclude and wefind that conclusion supported by the evidence.

Similarly, the trial court concluded, that the defense of alibi did not "create areasonable doubt as to the guilt." Tr. 41. To establish the alibi, the defensecalled three witnesses, each of whose testimony suggested that Pako Alaphonsowas on Wonei Island on October 4, 1981. If this evidence had been accepted asestablishing that Pako Alaphonso was indeed on Wonei Island all day on October 4, 1981, this would have negated the possibility that he was shooting at themotorboat just off of Moen Island on that same day. 12 However there are gapsin the alibi evidence. The trial court could have accepted the veracity of all threealibi witnesses yet found their evidence consistent with a finding that thedefendant was guilty.

[1 FSM Intrm. 228]

The defendant's father testified that Pako was in the family house on Woneithe morning of October 4. The father testified that he left for Moen at 9 A.M.,returned to Wonei at about 3 P.M., and after returning again saw Pako on Woneisome time that day. Transcript at 24-27.

State Legislator Casmiro Engichy was on Moen Island on October 4. Hemerely testified that when on Moen, the defendant normally stays at CasmiroEngichy's house. Since Mr. Engichy did not see the defendant on Moen that day,he assumed he was on Wonei. Id. at 34-36.

Those two witnesses obviously had no direct knowledge of Pako Alaphonso'swhereabouts at approximately 1 P.M. or 2 P.M. on October 4, when he wasallegedly shooting at Junior Bossy, William Bossy and Tano Meini.

The defendant's sister testified that the defendant was "around at our areaand our house" in Wonei all of October 4. Id. at 22. Yet, even her account of Pako Alaphonso's location that day was general. She was away from the houseto attend church for about three hours in the morning. There was no attempt toestablish that she was physically with the defendant throughout the day or eventhat she could account for all of his time that day. Even if taken at face value andbelieved entirely, neither the sister's testimony nor that of any other defensewitness precluded the possibility that the defendant may have departed fromWonei in the early afternoon hours and was in the waters off of Moen Island atthe time of the shooting incident.

[1 FSM Intrm. 229]

Of course even if the alibi evidence had effectively accounted for thedefendant's time throughout October 4 so that the trial court would have been



confronted with inconsistent testimony, the trial judge would have been permittedto reject the alibi evidence if he concluded that evidence was not credible. Sucha finding would not seem unreasonable when weighed against the directeyewitness testimony of three witnesses who say they saw the defendant committhe crime.

After hearing all the evidence and observing the demeanor of the witnesses,the trial justice concluded that the alibi defense did not create a reasonable doubtas to guilt. While it might have been useful to our analysis to have knownwhether this conclusion of the trial court was based upon gaps in the alibitestimony, upon a determination that some or all of that testimony lackedcredibility, or upon some combination of these factors, we nevertheless concludethat the finding of the trial court is supported by the record in this case.

Late Filing

The Government has also moved under this Court's Rule 31(c) for dismissalof this appeal on the ground that appellant has failed to file his brief within thetime provided. Rule 31(a) of this Court's Rules of Appellate Procedure statesthat an appellant "shall serve and file his brief within 40 days after the date onwhich the record is filed." According to the court's appeal docket, the record wasfiled on March 4, 1982 and was mailed to the parties on March 8. Appellant's

[1 FSM Intrm. 230]

brief should have been filed on or before April 13. Instead the brief was filed onJune 1, 88 days after the record was filed and some 78 days after appellantscounsel received his set of the record, assuming 6 days' mailing time fromPonape to Truk. See FSM App. R. 26(c). 13

Although our Rule 26(c) provides for enlargement of time for filing of briefsupon a showing of good cause, no such motion was filed by the appellant. Nor did appellant offer to this Court any explanation for tardiness, either in responseto the Government's motion or when the brief was submitted. This constitutes anindependent ground for dismissal of this appeal.

Conclusion The appeal is dismissed and the judgment of the trial division is affirmed.

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So ordered this 20th day of December, 1982.

/s/ Edward C. King

EDWARD C. KING Chief Justice

/s/ Alfred Laureta ALFRED LAURETA



Judge, United States District Court for theCommonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands

(Designated Justice)

/s/ Herbert Soll

HERBERT SOLL

Judge, Commonwealth Court, Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands

(Designated Justice)

Footnotes:

1. Both parties waived oral argument. This decision is based upon the briefs and record.

2. See, for example, I J. of Micro. Con. Con. 419-21 (Oct. 25, 1975Sess.) http://fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/vol1/2

3. We find no statute or rule of court prescribing the standard of proof for criminal cases in theFederated States of Micronesia.

4. The Micronesian Constitutional Convention adopted the Constitution for the Federated Statesof Micronesia on November 8, 1975. I J. of Micro. Con. Con. ii, vii-xxxii (1975).

5. The Constitution was ratified by the people of the Federated States of Micronesia in aplebiscite held on July 12, 1978. Lonno v. Trust Territory (I), 1 FSM Intrm. 53, 56 (Kos. 1982).

6. It is perhaps ironic that Justice Black's method of constitutional interpretation yields a resulthere contrary to that advocated by him in Winship. Justice Black argued that the United StatesSupreme Court should look to the United States Constitution's English historical antecedents. Hecontended that in England prior to adoption of the United States Constitution the words "due

process" did not mandate a standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for criminalconviction. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with Justice Black's reading of English history. 397 U.S. at 372 n.5, 90 S. Ct. at 1074 n.5, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 377 n.5.

In any event, under Justice Black's approach, we look to United States constitutionalinterpretations "prior to and at the time our Constitution was written". These are United Statesdecisions as of 1975 through 1978, not English law of the 18th century, to which Justice Blackwas looking.

7. Our adoption of the reasonable-doubt standard works no substantive change in the law as itexisted in this geographical area under the Trust Territory Government. The Trust Territory HighCourt consistently applied the reasonable-doubt standard. See Flores v. Trust Territory, 1 TTR377 (Palau 1958); Uchel v. Trust Territory, 3 TTR 578, 581 (App. 1965); Trust Territory v. Miller, 6

TTR 193, 203 (App. 1972). 8. This too seems substantially similar to the previous Trust Territory High Court positionconcerning alibis. See Trust Territory v. Ngirmang, 6 TTR 117, 122 (Palau) (1972) ("the burdenof proving an alibi is on the one claiming it...but it need not be by either the preponderance of theevidence nor beyond a reasonable doubt").

9. A person commits the offense Of assault with a dangerous weapon if he attempts to cause or purposely causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous weapon." 11 F.S.M.C. 919(1).

Alaphonso v. FSM

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