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PAGE THE GENER

he nvasion ofRA Cultural Strategic Analysis

By Mark Saha and Mark Irwin

When the German General Staff receivedinstructions to begin preparations for the inva-sion of Russia in the coming spring of 1941, itwas no real surprise. It was probably quite ashock, to realize that at last the time had come.The very size of the operation was sobering;enough to stagger the imagination and shake theconfidence of even the most fearless of theserecent conquerors of France. S o it must havebeen quite a shock, yes but hardly a sur-prise.The fact is that Hitler had made it quite clearto his generals since the time of his coming topower in 1933 (and, to many, even before that)that he was turning his eyes to the east-andHitler w s Germany. He followed his wordswith actions; he suspended the warm relationsthat had existed with Russia in the 1920's andinitiated a secret ten year rearmament programcalculated to climax in a Russo-German warsometime in 1943 or 1944-at latest, 1950.Meanwhile, efforts were made to promotepeaceful relations with France and England,and the unfortunate "bumper states" betweenRussia and Germany were slowly andmethodically swallowed up in to the "new"Germany in preparation for the great clash. Italways frustrated and enraged Hitler, right tothe very end, that England and France nevergrasped his intentions; and that , as a result, thewar came at the wrong time and under cir-cumstances much different than had been an-ticipated. The Problem of ermany

But Hitler's coming to power in 1933 was initself only the culmination of yet anothertrend-the rise of Prussian, and finally, Germanmilitarism. This must also be understood,because in a sense there is an almost Hegelianhistorical necessity in the rise of this newmilitary power. First, Germany was a relativenewcomer in the family of European nations,having united its various independent provincesslowly and painfully over the centuries. Second-ly, from an overall strategic standpoint, Ger-many was (and still is) militarily indefensible; itis her bad luck to be geographically located in amilitarily hopeless situation. Consider, if youwill: France, protected by mountains and sea;Italy, the same; England, an island fortress;

Russia, limitless space for retreat. Germany,alone, of the major European powers, wassurrounded on all sides by potential enemies;and these enemies had time and again nibbled ather borders on various sides over many longcenturies.So it becomes quite reasonable and un-derstandable, really, once you see this, thatGermany should require a larger standing armytha n the rest of the nations of Europe. She hadmore borders to defend . and it was really assimple as that. The rest becomes a bit morecomplex, in that it includes a cultural andeconomic acceptance of this condition, but itnonetheless also followed quite naturally: thedashing young cavalry officer, in the romanticliterature of the period, who brags of hisexploits and makes the ladies swoon; the rise ofindustralism with anemphasis on weaponry andarmaments; the reserve system, which madepossible the calling to arms of large numbers oftrained men on short notice.Fina lly. wo other things followed quitenaturally, although they were not so obvious atthe time. (1) If Germany had a standing armylarge enough to defend all her borders at once,that same army could with little difficulty crushany one neighbor by massing an overwhelmingforce against it. 2) This point is a little moresubtle but unfortunately also true: it is a fact ofhuman nature that if you place aninstrument ina man's hands, he's going to be strongly temptedto use it-if only to "see if it works." TheFranco-Prussian war of 1870 demonstrated forall the world to see that Germany had perhapsthe finest and most sophisticated militarymachine of the time. Can you not imagine thefrustration of the men in command of somagnificent a machine when told they mustsimply s t on it? The career men especially, whorealized all too well that power and influenceand promotion come quickly in war, but slowlyif at all in peacetime The restlessness of thatdashing young cavalry officer, flirting with theladies, anxiously looking forward to the daywhen he will lead his first charge?The glamor of the Napoleonic legend was farfrom forgotten, and as it was in Germany so itwas in most of Europe. It was the romantic thingthen to be a soldier, especially an officer, just as

in later times it would become the fashion tnovelist, or a movie star, or a rock singernineteenth century was the time of the dayoung cavalry officer; even looking back tthe era has not quite lost its romantic lusUnfortunately, none of this was to diminany degreethe point already made-that dher dash, daring, spirit, and military excelthe situation of Germany always wasremains strategically hopeless. This demonstrated with dramatic force in the w1914-18; cut off from therest oft he world British naval blockade and the Russian Germany was already starving as early as Black erstaz butter made from coal tar wcommon household use; coffee and chocsimply disappeared from the market;soldiers had no rubber for waterproofinboots or tents. The plain fact was that Gerwas not a self-supporting country, and himport such basic commodities as butter,and grain to feed her population and closed her borders for any length of timewould collapse. Germany at war is inposition of a wind-up clock. The clock only run for a certain length of time, windown and growing weaker by the hour, ustopped. Germany at war must always wbold and swift decision or lose slowlsurely and with great pain and sufferingfailure of the Schlieffen plan in 1914 dicthat the war would be a long one. . . a1918 the clock ran out.

Why RussiaThis, then, was the problem of Germanyit was the problem Hitler set upon himssolve when he came to power in 1933. Hknew, as did most people, that if Germanever to rise again as a world power, shehave enough land and resources to make hself-supporting as a nation indefinitely. accomplished, she would be immune to a Bblockade, and could pursue a war witenemy for as many years as complete vimight require. The question, then, was wwas this additional land to come from? Fmight seem a likely candidate, but Hrejected that for good reason: the French

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THEGENERAL PAGEexisted as a nation for centuries, and nooccupation force could ever get her to acceptdissolution even if conquered. England was notworth attacking, Hitler declared, because intwenty years she would lose her colonies andbecome a third rate power anyway (and historyhas proven him exactly correct).But in the East, things were very different: thedictator Stalin was not popular, and that vastland offered a prize of almost unlimitedresources in food and raw materials. Moreimportantly, Hitler predicted (again correctly)that within twenty years Russia would havendustralized and converted these resources intoa military power that would make her amongthe strongest on earth. Europe was on thedecline as a world power, while the Russiangiant was just now awakening. Hitler knew thatif Russia was to be defeated and her empiredismembered, it must be done quickly; and so heset up the ten year rearmament plan and hopedto strike as early as 1943 or 1944. He probablyactually believed it-he was quite sincere-when he referred to himself as the last hope andsavior of Western civilization.Thus, despite the many political intrigues andpretexts, and the many immediate tacticalobjectives, the grand strategic pattern of theexpansion of Hitler's Germany from 1935-39 isclear-always he is moving east, absorbing thebumper states and moving into position fo r thegreat wa r. while Germany's unemployedmasses are put to work in illegal manufacture ofarmaments for the day of invasion.Unfortunately for Hitler, the West was not allthat anxious t o witness Germany's swift (andillegal) reemergance as a world power-notafter the bloody 1914-18 struggle they hadundergone to dismember that same power.There was strong Western disapproval of thecruel Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, to besure; but Germany was after all in the heart ofEurope, and so, the more immediate threat.After numerous attempts to contain Germanyby negotiation, England and France took astand on the issue of Poland. Hitler invadedPoland on September 1, 1939-and, to his utterastonishment, three days later England and thenFrance declared war on him.Stalin had actually been quite as alarmed asthe West at Germany's swift rise and expansion,and was much relieved to see Hitler now at warin the west, opposite the direction he hadintended to move. But Stalin's relief was short-lived; for, in the Spring of 1940, before the eyesof an astonished world, France collapsed undera swift and brilliantly executed Germanblitzkrieg.

Curiously, it was here that the GermanGeneral Staff was discovered to have made itsfirst big mistake-and a strange one for them.The last sort of thing you'd expect t o catch theGermans on; for, if they're known for anything,it is the thoroughness of their staff work. Theyplan for every contingency and it's difficult topresent them with a surprise once they go intoaction. But they missed something when they hitFrance. The plain truth is that they werejust asastonished-if not more-as the rest of theworld when France simply collapsed. They hadno contingency plan for this event and, as aresult, had absolutely n o idea what to d o aboutit They might have invaded England, but theyhad no special forces or amphibious vesselsready and waiting for this purpose. Francooffered them free passage through Spa in to take

Gibraltar, but Hitler declined on the groundthat the war was over anyway. When Englandfailed to surrender, Hitler reconsidered butby then Franco reneged, saying they could havepassage on commencement of the invasion ofEngland (after which Gibraltar would no longermatter anyway).Thus, what should have been a great victoryturned out to be a victory in the wrong direction,and a large part of the German army wasabsorbed in the occupation of Denmark,Norway, Belgium and France. Further, Hitlernow found that he was having the most troublewith, of all people, his own allies Franco wouldnot give him passage through Spain toGibraltar, and Mussolini insisted on the honorof kicking the British out of Africa himself (withGermany supplying planes and tanksfor Italiansoldiers, of course). Both Franco and Mussoliniwanted French territory on the continent orAlgeria, which Hitler was reluctant to grantsince it would drive the Vichy government rightinto the arms of Churchill. Astonishingly, Hitlerwas prevented by his own allies from bringingoperations in the West to a swift and decisiveconclusion-and with friends like these.

Motorcycle unlts played a very important role in the easterncampaign The~r reat mobility usually meant that they had to bearthe brunt of Soviet breakthroughs. Usually crack troops theGermans had to rely more and more heavllyontheserecon unitstostuff gaps torn in German lines by Russian offensives

Unable to deal with his friends, Hitler return-ed attention to the last and greatest of hisenemies. Russia. True, conditions were notwhat he had anticipated: (1) it was still two tofive years before Germany was ready for theplanned Russo-German war of 1943-50, 2) vastportions of his armies were absorbed in Westernoccupation duties, and (3) he was still at warwith England. But Germany's situation wasrather unpleasant, and could get desperate-because as long as hostilities continued in theWest, Hitler was almost wholly dependent onRussia for crucial supplies of food and essentialraw materials. Stalin had his hand on the waterfaucet; he could shut off the water any time hepleased especially if tempted to do so byChurchill. And this only reveals an additionalhazard to a German assault on Russia: Hitlerwould be in effect attacking his only remainingsource o supply Clearly, he could not affordthe planned Russo-German war; what he musthave is another blitzkrieg like the one thatbrought France to ruin. Anything lessthan that,any degeneration of a blitzkrieg attack into aprolonged war, would simply set the wind-upclock of 1914 to ticking again.

Fall BarbarossaSo take out your S T A L I N Ggameboard, andlet'shave a look at the proconfronting the OKH staff in planninoverthrow of Russia, and the reasons foparticular solutions they arrived at. Surprly, I find the S T A L I N G R A D board more for this purpose than most geography maonly because it oversimplifies and sets inprofile most of the features of military int

Star t with Moscow; being the capitacapture would be of great political propaganda value. However, notice it's alsrail center of the country; so long as Moscin Russian possession, they have the effeinterior lines. If Moscow falls, it is the Gerwho have this advantage. True, the Rurailroads were of wider gauge than stanEuropean track, but even this could bGerman advantage; for, as they advanced, only necessary for German sappers to movrail in a little closer to the other and cut oextra length of crosstie. If the Germans sever have to retreat, Russian sappers inwould have to replace every single crossagain widen the track. S o the railroads important, especially in a country of abominable roads. Moscow was of gmilitary value now than in Napoleonic timLeningrad was also of propaganda since it was named after the founder Bolshevism tha t Hitler so bitterly detestedno other reason, Hitler was determined thcity should be utterly razed. But there weany number of reasons for makingit a legimilitary objective: the Russian Baltic fleebased there; it was a center of armamanufacture; it was the main rail link to tfree port of Murmansk. Finally, Leningraan ideal spot for the Russians to anchonorthern flank of their line; as a glance gameboard reveals, the Moscow-Leningra

consists mostly of rivers, swamps, lakes, arough terrain of the Valdai hills ideal sive terrain. The fall of Leningrad would outflank this line to the north, and therereally good place for the Russians to everanchor a flank. At the same time, Leniwould give the Germans an excellent anchtheir own flank, as well as a port t o shortensupply lines. Leningrad, then, was defianother major military objective.Stalingrad, in the south, was of nimportance in itself, but because a debattle occurred there it may be taken tobolize the many things of military and ecovalue in the area. First, the entire region

Donets basin, including the city of Staliwas a major center of industrial and mmanufacturing. Second, the Volga rivermain artery of riverboat traffic through supplies from England and America coushipped all the way to Moscow; althougfact was not fully appreciated at the tiplanning, it became obvious later in thepaign. Third, Rostov-gateway toCaucasus, and Russia's only overland ra(via Persian Gulf) with Great Britain. Fwhat was perhaps most obvious at the tplanning, the valuable oil fields at BatuGrozny in the Caucasus, which would falGermans by default if they advanced Volga.

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P GEThere were other objectives of value not soobvious on the gameboard whichshould also bepointed out. First, the Ukraine-roughly thearea just south of the Pripyat marshes, betweenthe Prut and Dnepr rivers-the so-called breadbasket of Russia that would assure Germany aplentiful supply of grain for the duration of anywar. Sevastopol and the Crimea were not soimportant as was thought at the time, but Hitlerwas anxious that they should be seized as

quickly as possible. Sevastapol was a majorfortress and port for the Russian fleet in theBlack Sea; the Crimea itself Hitler described asan unsinkable aircraft carrier from whichbombers could be launched against his preciousoilfields at Ploesti (about 20 miles fromBucharest). Finally, Hitler believed the fall ofthe Crimea would be a strong political induce-ment for Turkey to enter the war on the side ofGermany.Murmansk The

r a_.

ye, etsam

Planning & Operations 1941So much for the objectives. Now comes theproblem of planning and execution of a militaryoperation best designed t o seize these objectivesin a quick and decisive fashion. Of course,inherent in any such operation is one furtherobjective: destruction of the enemy armedforces. How to best bring this about?Again, a glance at the gameboard revealssomething that came to theimmediate attentionof the OKH planners: what was soon to be thefront would be its shortest length right at theRussian border, where it was a bare 930 milesfrom the Baltic to the Black Sea. Moreover, this

distance was rendered even shorter by thepresence of the Pripyat marshes in the verycenter of operations. Fortunately, much of theRussian army happened t o be deployed right onor very near this border. It was here, then, thebest chance for a quick and decisive victory wasto be found. The Germans were looking forjustthat sort of lightning armored breakthroughand envelopement that had worked so brilliant-ly in France. If they should fail to reach such adecision on or near the Soviet frontier, they sawas clearly as you that there would be problems:as you advance deeper into Russia, the frontquickly widens and you even lose the shorteningeffect of the Pripyat. It could quickly and easilyopen up to 2,500 miles or more, and OKH wasfully aware they had not nearly the troops tomaintain a continuous front across such adistance. Hopefully, then, a military or politicaldecision could be forced before such a situationarose.But where then, t o strike? Where on the 930miles of frontier to concentrate the main effort?Needless to say, plan after plan was discussedand considered and reconsidered, and lastminute changes continued to be made right upto and (unfortunately) after the day of invasion.However, much detail and trivia can be filteredout, and the evolution of the final plan ofinvasion traced through three basic proposals:If you're an avid STALINGRAD player,you're probably already familiar with theearliest since it's likely the one you use yourself.This plan was submitted by the OKH staff, andconsisted mainly of a major effort in theUkraine, south of the Pripyat. There were manyreasons for this recommendation, but one wasoutstanding: the flat, open terrain of the southwas ideal for panzer operations and henceoffered the best chances for success of thecontemplated armored thrust and envelope-ment. Moreover, the greater part of Stalin'sarmy was deployed along this border, and sooffered the opportunity for the greatest catch.(Ironically, Stalin had deployed here because healso recognized the Ukraine as panzer countryand wished the strongest possible defense.)Finally, an attack here would yield an im-mediate gain of the Ukranian bread basket.Hitler rejected this plan for what he con-sidered good reasons. First, as you can see, theattitude of Hungry was still uncertain at thistime, so the attack would have to be brokenintotwo parts-one from Rumania, the other fromPoland. Furthermore, the attack from Rumaniawould run into a series of rivers across its front,and a possible reverse and counterattack herewould again threaten Hitler's precious oilfieldsat Ploesti (Bucharest). Finally, it would be farmore difficult to supply a major effort in thesouth rather than center or north (a point Hitlerwas to forget the following year). Thus, Man-stein was later to lament . how run-downour Panzer Corp had become in country whichwas most unsuitable for armored troops . . .while the Ukraine down south . . was idealtank country, but unfortunately (we) had notanks.

The next plan, offered by Halder, consistedmainly of a direct thrust to center. The thrust tobe composed of two coordinated armoredprongs , and they were t o penetrate andenvelope all major Russian forces in the area ina series of pockets. All resistance was to havebeen crushed by the time they reachedSmolensk. Then it would be a straight drive

THEGENERalong the so-called Orsha-Smolensk land(the dry watershed area between Divina/and Dnepr; especially hexes S-24 to S-Moscow. But again Hitler was not satisfiwas afraid the Russians would fight stubbto hold the Baltics-digging in behinDivina-and launch a counterattack oflank and extended supply lines. He drelish the thought of a Napoleonic defMoscow, and anyway (although thisgenerally known) Hitler was never throuthe war particularly excited about capMoscow. He placed a much higher priormany of the other objectives mentionedindeed, Russia was a land so huge and rictempting military objectives that one scknew where to begin.The final plan, as it was eventually hamout and adopted, was really quite goodopinion, and if it had been strictly adheprobably offered the best chance of succwas actually in many ways a sophisticatioembellishment of the second plan, in thatthe main armored thrust was to be madecenter at Smolensk-although it wadefinitely decided the drive would cofrom there to Moscow.

German heavy artillery such as thls 15cmgun wereoftethe Germans could use on Denetratlna Russian forces frbypassed strongpolntsThe crucial key to this plan, the onethinmade it indeed intelligent and workablmethodical approach to the dismembermthe Soviet Union, was that it recognizelimitations of what the quantity and qua

German forces at hand could realisticaexpected to achieve. All the military objeoutlined above simply could not be seionce, simultaneously. Therefore, theyhave to be taken individually one after anin a carefullyworked out sequence accorda crucial t imetable of events that would rethe conquest of Russia before the onwinter. Moreover, it was the gradual frittaway and ultimate loss ofsequence shallshow, that was really more fatal (since it werror of the highest strategic level) than anspecific decision made in this campaign (swhether or not to drive on Moscow, and wThe plan called for three main thrustsmade into Russia, by Army Groups NCenter, and South. Starting at the top,

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THEGENERAL PAGGroup North was under the command of FieldMarshal von Leeb. Serving under him wasGeneral von Manstein, the brilliant tankstrategist and tactician who planned thesuccessful invasion of France and was to gaineven greater distinctions in Russia. They wereassigned to advance up the Baltic coast, break-ing the river position of the Divina at Riga and,if possible, take the valuable bridge at Daugav-pils intact. Then, a lightning strike at Leningradwould be possible. Finland agreed to enter thewar after the first week or so of invasion, andwould isolate Leningrad from the north. Thefinal assault on the citadel would probably bemade with armored reinforcements fromCenter, which should by then be available.Thus, the clearing of the Baltic and fall ofLeningrad would (a) eliminate from the verystart any possible threat of a Russian counterat-tack from the north on German flanks (b) givethe German flank a solid anchor at Leningrad(c) Finnish t roops released by the fall ofLeningrad could now cut the Murmanskrailroad, while a German expedition fromPetsamo marched on the ~ o r ttself.

Guderlan, often found In the front lines In hjs armored Scoutcar, was the prlnclple backer of the Ge rman wtnter drive onMoscow His forward units managed to reach the ctty s suburbs,only miles from the Kreml ~n.

But the main German effort was to be madeby Army Group Center under the command ofField Marshal von Bock. He had the largestconcentration of armor and the services of thedistinguished panzer leader, Heinz Guderian,conaueror of France. Their initial assignmentremAined pretty much the same as in thesecondplan; the main body of the Russian army wastobe trapped and destroyed in a series of mobilebattles between the frontier and Smolensk.Then, they were to await developments and sendaid if necessary for the capture of Leningrad.That accomplished, they would return withManstein's additional armor and, depending onthe situation, make a final decision aboutMoscow. Notice, however, that at the momentof this decision the German position would bequite secure: Leningrad taken, and its use as aport for German supplies at least potentiallyavailable (although Hitler had no such specificintention), resulting in a considerably shortenedsupply line and secure flank.

Finally, there was Army Group South, theweakest of the three, under the distinguishedvon Runstedt. He was to attackjust south ofthePripyat marshes, along that strip of clear terrain1 refer to on the gameboard as the Ukrainianslot to Kiev; from there, he was to plungedownward to the sea, encircling all Russianforces in the Ukraine. The Rumanians were alsoto attack from their own country, lightly rein-forced by the Germans, and advance along thecoast to Odessa. If they took Odessa, Hitlerpromised that Rumania could have it. But thiswas little more than a pinning operation,insignificant in the overall scheme of things.These, then, were the objectives of the initialthrust, after which it was thought Stalin'sgovernment would surely fall. If it did not, thereseemed little doubt the Germans could easily fanout to what came to be called the AA(Astrakhan-Archangel) line. This would leavethem in occupation of the greater portion ofEuropean Russia; the country beyond that wasso primitive it was hard to believe that a hostilearmy of any size could continue to exist there,much less carry out military operations. Even if1 have to use sixty divisions (along the 'ANline), Hitler remarked in conversation, thatwill be less than 1 now require a long the Polishfrontier. And it would place the resourcesof European Russia at his disposal.This was the overall historical plan forOperation Barbarossa as it was finally decidedupon. The main objection has already beennoted-that panzers were beingconcentrated inthe Center and North, where terrain was mostunfavorable for their use. However, it must beremembered that just because the terrain wasunfavorable made them all the more unexpectedthere-as they had been unexpected in theArdennes in France. Once again, they wouldgain surprise by attacking in the wrong place.Moreover, an attack here had the advantage ofshorter supply lines-and the recent conquest ofGreece further reassured Hitler that his panzerscould handle the roughest of terrain. Mostimpor tant , this plan assured that they would beeverywhere in sound position with flankssecure. The Germans would never let theirarmies become lost in the vast expanses ofRussia and subject to Napoleonicdefeats provided only that they adheredstrictly to sequence and timetable, and did notlet early success go to their heads

nvasionThe invasion of Russia began at H-hour 03 15,June 22nd, 1941; with the first light of dawn onthe longest day of the year, German artilleryopened up from concealed positions behind thefrontier. and the opening barrage rolledsouthward along the 930 miles of front ier withthe dawn. The Russians were caught almosteverywhere by surprise. Many of the bridgesalong the border were seized by shock troopsbefore the Soviet guards could react andwhere there were no bridges, crossings wereforced by assault boats and rubber dingies, andengineers quickly threw together emergencybridges. German armor was in action on Sovietsoil in a matter of hours, often brushing pastpickets and unmanned defenses to drive intoRussian troop assembly areas.The German surprise remains controversialto this very day. It's hard t o imagine that theycould have assembled three million troops along

the frontier without detection; one geimpression that the only people in the unaware of the impending assault werSoviet frontier guard. Stalin had been wrepeatedly by the British and Americanalthough he did not trust them, hisconsiderable intelligence service verifiedreports again and again. Apparently, he wterrified of the impending attack- like a of a snake, as Krushchev recalls-that henot alert his frontier for fear of provokinGermans. Even when the German baopened, he refused permission to return thin alast desperate hope that it was all a misThere was no mistake. Stalin was so lyzed with fear that he was unable anything, and went into hiding and waheard from by the Russian populatioseveral weeks. The initial confusion aborder was taken advantage of by Sovietand press to announce to the people thaFascist bandits have been knocked on theand there was talk of retaking Brest and dinto Poland. But such optimism was shortGerman spearheads quickly overran the fralmost everywhere, and fanned out into Rin a series of the most brilliant and fanmilitary operations of all time.Success

Since this is a strategic and not tactical we will be concerned with tactical battlesinsofar as they influenced strategy-especthe strategic timetable and sequence oBarbarossa plan we've already referred first, this timetable went like the clockwork-except in the south. The spectacular gains were made in Center, the twin prongs of Guderian's and Hpanzer armies encircled four Soviet armthe Minsk pocket and drove ahead to caSmolensk by 16th July. Just as in FGuderian was the driver, the pusher, preforward so hard and fast that German inwas soon left far behind. It was a dmaneuver, for he was operating far benemy lines and if forced to stop for fuel oother reason he could immediately be surred and annihilated by advancing Rureserves.But there was method to his madness: hable to drive again and again into asseareas fo r new Soviet defense lines and penthem before they had been completed. operations always hang by a silver threadunhappy Kluge moaned but invaGuderian had his way.A desperate Soviet counterattack to rSmolensk was smashed, and by 26th July Group Center had achieved it's initial objin record time: all Soviet resistance in thhad been crushed between the frontieSmolensk; there was now nothinsignificance between them and Moscow, amore than 200 miles away. Should theydrive on the capitol, or should reinforcembe sent to Leningrad first, as planned?Meanwhile, things had gone so wellArmy Group North that the promisedforcements were not even needed. SubstSoviet forces had been trapped before(where he bridges had been blown prematand destroyed. And, what was even important, the impossible had been achthe bridges a t Daugapils, 155 miles frofrontier , had been captured intact by ruse and held until additional forces

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PAGE THE GENERadvance to secure it. T h e ro a d t o Len ingrad wasnow open.But th e opportun i ty th a t this presented, o n asilver platter as it were, was p ro m p t ly fritteredaway in a series of tactical blunders, highc o m m a n d bickering, a n d delays. Basically, wha tit came d o w n to was tha t O K H h a d a preor-dained p lan fo r th e tak ing of Len ingrad by firstf lank ing it to the southeast, but th is approachbogged d o w n against heavy Russian resistancein the sw a m p y lower Luga. Nonetheless, theswift G e rm a n advance had s o surpr ised theRussians th a t Len ingrad itself was virtuallyundefended, a n d a n opportun i ty p resen ted itselft o drive straight in to the city.

Few people re lize the Importance cavalry held as late as the1940 s Horse-drawn transport remalned essent~alo the Wehr-macht throughout the war, especi lly In wlnter when lorrles wereoften useless Above, SS cavalry advances In the Ukra~ne

T h e G e rm a n high c o m m a n d insisted o nadher ing t o their o r i g n a l plan, a n d it was m a n yweeks before permission cou ld be obtained f o rthis adjustment. Then , just before th e assaultwas t o be made , th e Russians coun te ra t tackedsou th of lake l lmen a n d achieved a decisivebreak th rough . T h e assault o n Leningrad waspostponed, and Manste in sen t t o th e l a k e wherehe delivered a shattering a t t a c k o n these Rus-sian forces and annhi la ted them. H e thenreassembled for th e final assault o nLeningrad-which the Russians had by thist ime managed t o fortify a n d reinforce. T h e reseems little doubt the a t tack would havesucceeded anyway, but a t the last minute-onS e p te m b e r 17th-Hitler called it off, andordered Manste in s o u t h fo r "operationselsewhere."

Sequence LostT h e decision not t o take Len ingrad just a t themoment when it was ready t o fall in to hishands-after weeks of frust ra t ing maneuver-was p ro b a b ly th e most single fa ta l decision tha tHitler made in th e first year of th e war . T h ed a m a g e it caused t o the overall opera t ions i nRussia was even greater t h a n the prior strategicstudies had indicated: (a) fo r the re m a in d e r ofthe war , the G e rm a n northe rn f lank was left"dangling" in a n area difficult fo r th e m t osupply, b u t easy for the Russians t o supp ly forfrequent and costly counterattacks; (b ) T h e useof Len ingrad as a port t o sh o r t e n the desperatelyoverlength and inadequa te G e r m a n supply lineswas denied; (c) F inn ish forces were pinned in th esiege of the city t o the north , which com-promised their efforts t o cut the Mu rm a n skrailroad (This was m o re se r ious t h a n an-ticipated, fo r th e expedition against Mu rm a n skf ro m P e t sa m o [Opera t ion P la t in u m F o x ] was afiasco: when it got underway , it was d iscoveredtha t th e do t ted lines o n Russian m a p s of theprimitive te rra in were not secondary ro a d s bu ttelegraph lines-there were n o roads ) ; (d )

finally, heavy G e rm a n forces were pinned d o w nhere in siege, which dragged out until b roken bythe Russians in 1944. These t ro o p s weredesper i te ly needed elsewhere. I n fact, a seconda t tempt by Manstein t o take Leningrad had t obe called off in 1942when Pau lus was trapped a tStalingrad.T h u s , someth ing very sub t le but of highests t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e h a dhappened sequence a n d timet ble of Bar-ba rossa had been violated; the northe rn flankwas not secured, and A r m y G r o u p North wasno t released to join Cente r fo r conc lud ingopera t ions of the campa ign .

Decision Moscow?Meanwhile , remember , A r m y G r o u p Cente rhad seized Smolensk a lmost t w o m o n th s earlier,o n Ju ly 26th. Since N o r th was do ing qu i te wella t the t ime , reinforcements were not sent there.A b o u t t w o weeks were spen t in emergencyrepairs and overhauling of engines, and thequest ion was raised: wha t next? There was n od o u b t in the minds of G u d e r i a n and Bock-Moscow They could not believe it when theylearned Hitler had other plans, and preciousweeks of good c a m p a ig n wea the r were lost in

bitter a n d fruitless a rg u m e n t . And , a l thoughthe re was a lmost no th ing left between t h e m andth e capital to o p p o se th e m , they u l t ima te lyfollowed o rd e r s and pursued a differentobjective-Kiev.

Von Runsted was glven the weakest force (Army Group South)w ~ t h h~chofacethe Russ~an sstrongesttroopconcentratlonstH~tler s rders, emphas~swas sw~tchedo the south to reinforcehlm, grantlng the defenders of Len~ngrad n 1 t h hour reprleveT h e prob lem sp ra n g f r o m the desultoryperfo rmance a n d misfo r tunes of A rm y G r o u pS o u th . T h e highly capable bu t unlucky vonR u n s te d t had the d u b io u s h o n o r of c o m m a n din g th e weakest of the three a rm y groups-against the strongest concen tra t ion of Sovietforce, including most of their a rm o r . H e was s obadly o u tn u m b e re d th a t his assigned"breakthrough" was impossible , and in the firstten days of invasion had pushed the Sovie tsback a bare sixty miles. Progress after th a t wasdescribed as "slow but sure," but losses wereheavy a n d h e was under constan t coun te ra t tack ,especially by Soviets th a t withdrew in to thePripya t until he passed a n d th e n s t ru c k a t hisflank a n d rear. Worse yet, th is desultory

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THEGENER L P Gprogress de layed the exped i t ion from Ruman ia ,which was no t supposed t o s ta r t un ti l Runsted twas well under way. Needless to say, he was alsothe first to encounter the dreaded T-34s.Hitle r' s dec is ion to tu rn away fro m Moscowto c lean up the s i tua t ion in the sou th has o f tenbeen described as the worst mistake of thewar. It may very well have been a mistake:th is dec is ion , and the subsequen t abando nmentof Leningrad threw the entire operational plan-ning and logic of B arbarossa t o the winds. But,a t the same t ime , the re were some ve ry soundmilitary grounds for the decision:(I) Guderian ' s l igh tn ing advance in cen te rhad ou t run the f lank p ro tect ion o f bo th No rthand Sou th, as well as his own infantry. If he werea l lowed to fu r the r ex tend th is exposed posi t ionwith a drive on Moscow, the sizable armies inthe Kiev area would be sitting right on his flankfor a coun te ra t tack t o smash h is supp ly l inesand put him out of business. It would beespec ial ly dangerous in the coming win ter , t ohave such an a rmy in your rea r-and Runsted tdid not seem capable of dealing with it .(2) Guderian and Hoth a rgued tha t theRussians w ould ra lly to save Moscow and sobring on the " showdown" ba t t le of the cam-paign. They m ay have beenr ight. But Hitler wasa lso go ing a f te r a s izable a rmy; and , if th is is th ecriterion, you can ' t argue with the result. Thebattle of Kiev was prob ably the greatest militaryvictory in the his tory of warfare . If tha t failed t owin the war, it 's difficult to imagine w hat wouldhave been required at Moscow.If Hitler's decision ca n be criticized, thi nk itis more for grand strategic reasons; the reallyfatal c l incher , to me , was the subsequen tSep tember 17 th abandonment o f Len ingrad .Sequence and t ime tab le were fo rgo t ten , andsuddenly Hitler had his armies splitting up andscrambling for objectives everywhere. Especial-ly, he seems suddenly to have changed his mindabout th ings and sh ifted emphasis o f the en t i reinvasion from north t o sou th . S udden ly he wastelling Guderian th at captur e of Sevastopol, theCrimea , and Rostov (ga teway to the Caucasus)was more im portan t than Moscow and tha tfor political and economic reason s these must betaken before the onset of winter. Overall, heseems to have overreac ted to Runsted t 's foo t-dragging in the Ukraine.Finally, one last point has occurred to me inthe playing of FR A N C E, 1940-I'd like to offerit as a hypothesis worth thinking about. If youh a p p e n to h a v e th e g am e , o p e n u p th e b o a rd a n dtake a loo k . Imagine the Ardennes to be thePripya t . Seden to be Smolensk , and Par is a sMoscow. And Guderian, of course, sitting atSeden /Smolensk with h is panzer a rmy. Well ,wha t d o you do? Do you dr ive st ra igh t ahead fo rthe capitol-or swing dow n and right to encirclethe main en emy force fro m their rear? Now, I 'mnot say ing Kiev was a deliberate a nd consciousreinactment, on Hitler 's part, of the campaign inFrance. N onetheless, the resemblance isstriking and it certainly seems to fit with hisgrowing tendency to repeat the lessons of pastexperiences.

MoscowStalin no t only refused to le t Soviet armies irthe Kiev area withdraw-he actua lly reinforcedthem Th e result was tha t, when th et ra p closed,over a million men and thousands of pieces ofequ ipment were taken . I t was, beyond ad ou bt ,one of the great military victories of all time.

This accomplished, many of' the Germangenerals wanted to call it quits fo r the season; itwas high time, they felt , to start digging in forthe winter and bring up supplies of blankets,heavy clothing, anti-freeze. A nd Hitler wasnot opposed to the idea. It was Bock, Hoth , andGud erian w ho continued to press most forceful-ly for a final drive on Moscow. They felt therewas still t ime, and this on e last effort would bethe blow to b ring abou t the collapse of Russia .Ther e was no questio n the cou ntry was reeling;the Soviets were no longer capable of main-ta in ing a con t inuou s f ron t anywhere , and theidea of ending it now was tempting. Finally,Hitler gave in; the assault on Leningrad wascalled off and Manstein reassigned to ArmyGroup South (which was to a t tempt , un-successfully, its original objectives of Rostovand Sevastopo l be fore win te r) . The con-siderable forces deployed for the Leningradassau l t were now recal led to Smolensk fo r thelast big push-on Mosco w.

The Germans got thelr flrst taste of the Rus s~an eather whenmud made unpassable morass out of th e few secondary roadswhich prjrnittve Russla had to offer.

The result of the last great German drive ofthe Barbarossa campaign is history. Certainly,the Germans were s t i l l s t rong enough to dothe job, especially since there were onlyremnants o f Sov iet fo rces to op pose them.Distance was the enemy; distance, especially,fo r ba t te red and worn-ou t equ ipment on mis-e rab le roads f rom Leningrad and Kiev toassembly in the Smolens k area-where theykicked off for Moscow. Even this they ac-c o m p li sh ed . B u t t h e n c a m e m u d . a n d th e nsnow. T he effect of these was t o limit theGerm an dr ive to ve ry na rrow fron tages on thefew passable roads (basically a Smolensk-to-Moscow assault, with encircling thrusts a tKalinin and Tula). Meanwhile , Stalin hadlea rned from h is in former in Japan tha t theJapanese p lanned to a t tack America , and no tthe R ussian rear. He gambled desperately thatthis information was true, and stripped hisPacific frontiers of Siberian tro ops an d pouredthe m in at M oscow. These last minute arrivals,and the wea the r, and the na rrow fron tages ofthe G erm an assault, just barely proved to beenough.

Winter isasterAnd i t was the Germans w ho now had to pay ,for another gamble that failed. The collapse ofthe weath er brought with it collapse of overex-tended su pply lines that the Ge rma n had alreadyoutru n anyway. Worse , they had abso lu te ly noprovisions of any significance for the suddensub-zero temperatures . Inf antry lost fingers andtoes by the thousands t o f rostbi te; guns wouldnot fire because lubricants froze; planes andtruck s had to have their engines heated by blow-to rc h , i n a n o f t e n v a in a t t e m p t to m a k e th e msta r t .

The 3 7 m P K was greatly undergunned in comparisoSovlet heavy tanks they were expected to deal wlth. The sweapons often needed several h ~ t st point blank range toadvancing T34. Only the inexperfence of Soviet tankprevented complete disaster In the early years of the warSta l in saw in th is ca tast rophe ach ance fsudd en and tota l victory tha t Hitler had soHe deployed his experienced Siberian trooa badly coordinated but nightmarish countack intending nothing less than destructit h e e n t i r e G e rm a n A rm y G ro u p C e n te r. was n o longer a questio n of a Ge rma n "frthey were restric ted to the few roads thatpassable , and outposts sometimes watchhorror a s Russian sk i t roops in the d isswept gracefully an d silently past their postoward the supp ly depo ts in the rea rward The harshness of this brutal winter fors ides is b rought home i n a fan tast ic ep isodoccurred to a German un i t snowed in narrow road; they looked up, and saw Rucavalry o n the rise , ready t o charge. Theylost. for they knew there was nothin gthey d o to de fend themselves bu t the cawai ted fo r more than an hour , and d idattack . Finally, they could bear it no longesom e of the men c l imbed t o the top o f thThey d iscovered, t o the ir a s ton ishment , thentire cavalry detachment-men and halike-had froz en solid like statu es, preparing for the charge. A n attlempt was t o photog raph this bizarre spectacle , bueven the camera shu t te r would work iintense cold.It is said that Hitler 's hairtu rned w hitedthese trying months. Nonetheless, he remever afterwards convinced that his "standorder had prevented a disasterous Napolde fea t and saved the Germ an a rmy. Thgood reason to suppose he was right, foretreat had been attempted under suchcumstances a fatal panic was extremely li

By the time the Russtan wint er offenslvesstruck Germanunits were pract~cally ~th out perationaltanks. Onlyassaulike the above Stuk 4 0 W 4 8 shown above were availablew ~ t hRuss~an rmor. The knee deep snow shown aboactually light in comparison to other areas of the fronttemperatures dlpped below -50 degrees centigrade.

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PAGE THE GENERHowever, once aga in , t h e lessons of th i scostly defensive victory were t o be even m o r eexpens ive in t h e c o m i n g years, w h e n Hitlerwould t r y t o a p p l y t h e m t o other , inappropr ia te ,c i rcumstances . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e successfulairlifting of suppl ies t o 100,000 t r o o p s in t h eD e m y a n s k pocket ( a b o u t t w o hexes nor thwes tof Kalinin) would lead h i m t o believe h e c o u l dsupply 300,000 t r o o p s in t h e S t a l i n g r a d pockett h e fo l lowing year. A n d , m o r e disasterously, h e

was t o insist o n t h e s a m e hedgehog defense ofA r m y G r o u p Center once a g a i n in 1944-thist ime in summer .But t h o s e h o r r o r s l a y yet i n t h e fu ture ; a n d t h ewinter of 19411 4 2 was caviar, i n c o m p a r i s o n , t owhat was yet t o come.T h e S p r i n g t h a w of 1942 b r o u g h t a n end t ot h e Russ ian counterof fens ive , b u t it a l s orevealed t h a t the v a u n t e d G e r m a n W e h r m a c h thad virtually ceased t o exist . T h e t w o a n d a halfyears of c o n s t a n t warfare , t h e t h o u s a n d s of h a r dmiles o v e r bru ta l te r ra in , t h e weather , a n d fierceRuss ian res i s tance h a d finally g r o u n d t h e md o w n t o a mere t raves ty of their f o r m e r mighta n d glory. Nonethe less , in t h e process, t h e y h a d

m a n a g e d t o d o m u c h t h e s a m e t o most of the i renemies, a n d there w a s n o rea l a r m y o n t h ec o n t i n e n t t o o p p o s e t h e m . Still, O p e r a t i o nB a r b a r o s s a h a d failed. G e r m a n y a n d Russ iawere n o w a t war , a n d Russ ia h a d i n a d d i t i o n t oher o w n cons iderab le resources t h e indus t r ia lmight of Amer ica a n d G r e a t Brit ian-her n e wallies. Now, m o r e t h a n ever, it w a s necessary f o rG e r m a n y t o s o m e h o w rally s u p p o r t a n dr e s o u r c e s f o r o n e f ina l e f for t t o t o p p l e t h eRuss ian gian t while it w a s still d izzy . f o r t h eclock of 1914 was t ick ing aga in . - M a r k S a h aB~bl~ography

Bullock, Hrtler Study m TyrannyCarell. Hitler Moves East, 1941 43Gehlen, The SernceDeWeerd. Lecturesof HarveyA DeWeerd, prlvate notestaken by

the author In DeWeerd s classes at UCLA. 1963 Harvey ADeWeerd IS a res~dent onsultantand former long-tlme senlorstaff member at RAND He IS a major contr~butorto theEncyclopaed~aBr~tannlcaon WWI and WWll and has con-tr~buted to other scholarly journals Of course. thls S not toImply that he would agree w~ thwhat I have wrltten. allstatements, optnlons, and errors are my respons~bll~tylone

Hart, StrategyH~lter, ~Ner sSecret ConversatronsManste~n, ost Vrctor~esGuder~an.Panzer LeaderPayne, Lrfe Death of Adolph H~tlerRudel, Stuka P~lotSeaton. The Russo-German War, 1941 45Speer, Inside the Th~rd erchMannerhelm. Memo~rsKhruschev.KhruschevRemembers

efenseinMark Irwin s article is a throwback t o the days

when the GENERAL reprinted the best articleso f other magazines from time t o time. Althoughwe are n o t resorting to that policy again, w e feltIrwin s article merited a li t t le better graphicpresentation than i t got in it s first printing.DEFENSE IN S TALINGRAD first appeared inthe INTERNATIONAL W ARGAM ER. We grate-fully acknowledge their kind permission t oreprint the article here.

The German lnvaslonof Russ~aaredwell untll the Russlanwlnter hs Germantroopsweretosuffergreathardsh~psfrom~aproper wlnter equipment Wlthout wlnter lubr~cantsmachlnegunsjammed, wlthout felt boots thousands lost toes and fefrostbite, w~thoutur helmet h e r s men slmplyfroze to death Lootlng of Russ~an eadfor Items of wlnter apparel was accepractlse Many d~dn t ven have camouflagesmocks as worn by the troops shown aboveWhy another Stalingrad article?, many of 18 attack factors to make a 3-1 attack you ask as you read this title. The main reason is requires at least 3 units. If it is stacked with athat I d o not see enough articles concerning unit and protecting only one square thedefense for any of the popular AH games. Some other unit must be soaked-off against leavinmay feel that Stalingrad is too simple a game to two units to attack the 2-3-6. Howeved o a major defensive study on. I will admit that tactic is to be shunned due to the fact th4-6-8 Stalingrad is so imbalanced that a good force needed t o make an attack a t slightlydefense is not needed. also concede that 4-5-6 odds is so small that the German can easiStalingrad is still weighted in favor of the the loss.Russians. But consider an opponent who wouldlike to have a German Replacement rate of 8 perturn. Actually, a good Russian player can make agood fight of this and possibly win. However,

there can be no mistakes. As an aside, I havenoticed that in 4-5-6 Stalingrad the Russian canafford to make about two bad mistakes whichthe German takes advantage of. To test your ownperfection, here is a short quiz question: Isthere any difference between two doubled 7-10-4units protecting three squares and a doubled6-9-6 with a doubled 7-10-4 doing the same?Well, there is a vast difference. The two 7-10-4units are not vulnerable to 3-1 attack while a 3-1attack, could be made against the 6-9-6 while the7-10-4 is soaked off against. It is this type ofdifference which can lose a game. And it is thetype of difference that a beginner will not realizefor many painful defeats.The primary goal of a defensive line is to makea line of zones of control of units which may notbe attacked at 3-1 odds. Any line which does notmeet this requirement cannot be considered a realdefensive line, bu t only a group of doubled units.Rather than fall back to such a situation it isbetter to use only the portion of the line whichcan be made 3-1 proof and protect the remainderof the line o n open terrain. This applies only ifyou are subsequently going to be able t o makethe remainder of the line 3-1 proof.Different units, of course have different capa-bilities in respect t o making a position 3-1 proofand I intend t o explain these differences. The2-3-6 can almost be disregarded for this purposebut they can be used if the situation calls for it.A 2-3-6 if stacked with another unit can protectone square from 3-1 attack. The German needs

Although the 4-6-4 is twice as large2-3-6, its general usefulness in this role islightly larger. The German only needs 36factors for 3-1 and should the 4-6-4 be protthree squares this force can be pure inWith a front of two squares the German mua little of his Panzers but very little. Exampsuch forces are: 4 5-5-4's 2 8-8-6's; 3 4-43 8-8-6's; 4 8-8-6's a 4-4-4; 3 8-8-6's6-6-6's. As the last two examples show, thiscan be mounted using just five units. Thisthat another unit could make a soak-offfrom one of the attack squares and thisit can still be attacked at 3 - 1 T ~ h e 6 - 4usefulness is in protecting one square whcan d o quite well since even a 1-1 attack rifactors. Of course, situations will arise wh4-6-4 can protect two or even three sHowever, extreme care must be taken whenthis tactic. You will be able t o use the 4-this capacity only because the German ist o bring enough units t o bear, bu t

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remember that a m o n t h o r t w o later he may beable t o bring up enough force. Therefore, y o umust be able t o correct the situation by using amore suitable unit o r lose the line. This applies t oall units that are used in positions which theycannot protect under all conditions. T o improvey o u r care in this area always assume tha t theGerman has purposely allowed the situation andplans t o take advantage of y o u placing anunsuitable unit in an impor tan t position.The 5-7-4 does n o t seem much larger than the4-6-4, bu t it is immeasurably more useful fo rdefensive lines. A 3-1 a t tack against this unitneeds 4 2 a t tack factors. This means tha t even

when a 5-7-4 is protecting three squares a lot o f5-5-4's and some panzers are needed. But t h emain use of the 5-7-4 is in protecting t w osquares. There are only five different forceswhich can make a 3-1 a t tack against a 5-7-4 andthe German can only raise one of these forces a ta time. They are: 4 8-8-6's 2 5-5-4's; 3 8-8-6units 2 7-7-6's a 4-4-4; 3 8-8-6's 3 6-6-6units; 3 8-8-6's a 7-7-6 a 6-6-6 a 5-5-4; 28-8-6's 2 7-7-6's 2 7-7-6's 2 6-6-6's. Theonly o ther combinations are larger and areformed by using units larger than necessary suchas a 6-6-6 instead of a 5-5-4. Note the largeamount of Panzer units needed. This is a deter-rence in itself because of the high cost o f anexchange. The possible forces available shows avery important point, which is tha t six units areneeded and this leaves none for a soak-off. Thismeans tha t t w o 5-7-4's protecting two squares aren o t vulnerable t o 3-1 attack. In addition, anyunit which forces a soak-off a t tack from one ofthe squares used t o attack the 5-7-4, wi thou tbeing susceptible to 3-1 attack itself, will 3-1proof the 5-7-4. Thus we can see tha t the 5-7-4 isthe mainstay of the defense. I urge tha t this bekept in mind especially when taking replace-ments. Myself, I prefer t o wait a m o n t h for a5-7-4, than have a 4-6-4 immediately. Of course,the 5-7-4 is superior t o the 4-6-6 for protecting

The 6 9 - 6 is a relatively powerful unit since itcan protect one o r two squares by itself. How-ever, when it is used t o protect three squares, itcan often be susceptible t o a 3-1 attack. Such ana t tack will use a lot o f Panzer units, bu t onemust always keep in mind tha t the force can beraised and in fact it can be done with eight unitsleaving one fo r a soak-off (e.g., 4 8-8-6's 27-7-6's 2 5-5-4's). This is impor tan t whentrying to use t h e 6-9-6 alone or with a 7-10-4. Asis always the case, the 6-9-6 may often be able toprotect three squares from local German forces.The fear of losing 18 factors in an exchange willalso deter an a t tack and under the most favorableconditions y o u may be able t o force t w o soak-offs and t h u s make the 6-9-6 3-1 proof.Although, as stated, the 5-7-4 is the mainstayof a defensive line, the 7-10-4's are essential t omost lines. Their use is, o f course, in protectingthree squares. In most circumstances their verypresence will either mean tha t the German doesno t have enough Panzer units in the area t o makea 3-1 attack o r he will be t o o afraid t o risk thedevastating effect o f an exchange. T h e 7-10-4 issuperior t o the 6-9-6 for defensive purposes dueto the fact tha t although an a t tack force can beraised it must use nine units leaving none for asoak-off. A great many river positions whichprotect three squares have a common character-istic which is a square adjacent t o the 7-10-4,which forces a soak-off f rom a square used t oattack the 7-10-4, and a unit o n this square canonly be attacked from the square for attackingt h e 7-10-4. This means the 7-10-4 can often bemade 3-1 proof and since most river positionshave a t least one spot which must protect threesquares, this is essential.

UNIT VULNERABILITY TO 3 1 ATTACKUNIT A.F. M.U. A.S. 3-1 1 3-1 2 3-1 3

Now tha t I have gone over the various units Ihave included a short chart to review them. T h ecodes are as follows: A.F. is the number ofattack factors needed for a 3-1 attack; M.U. isthe minimum number o f units needed for a 3-1attack; A.S. is the average strength of the unitsneeded (M.U.); 3-1 1 is the vulnerability t o 3-1a t tack from o n e square; 3-1 2 is f rom twosquares; 3-1 3 is f rom three squares; N.P. meansnot possible; N.P.* is conditional requiringanother unit to force a soak-off; Diff. is that theunit is usually vulnerable t o 3-1 attack unless twosoak-offs can be forced but in any case it will bedifficult t o raise t h e force; Vul. is tha t the unit isusually vulnerable t o 3-1 attack; Easy is that theunit is almost always vulnerable; N.P.** notpossible if in combination with another unit bu tis still ill-advised; Very is very easy and needsnegligible force t o attack.

Forward Defense LinesIn Part I of this three part s tudy on defense inSTALINGRAD, I examined the defensive capa-bilities of the various Russian units. In this, Part11, I will examine, in detail, all t h e forwarddefense lines. My deployment of forces for eachline shall be only what is needed. T h a t is, otherdeployments will d o just as good a job, b u t willusually use more force. The Russian just does no t

P GEhave enough force to waste it o n over-protMy deployments will a t tempt t o make ea3-1 proof, if possible. I will, however,suggestions o n what t o d o if t h e line canmade 3-1 proof o r if you do n o t have thneeded. A t most stages in the game, youmake all lines 3-1 proof, primarily becausshortage of 7-10-4's. This makes it impor talines be defended to their op t imum evenare no t 3-1 proof.

Nemunas RiverInitially, the Nemunas River must beconcern t o the Russian Commander. Thieasily defended line, although t o protewhole line, the two 7-10-4's are needed. Itan impor tan t line tha t it should only beby being outf lanked to t h e sou th o r by loattacks. I t should never fall victim to a 3-1and if it does, have someone rap your knIn most set-ups, the entire line is seldom ucan be narrowed down t o two squares if thdelaying units o n X-16 and U-18. Thsquares are protected by a 5-7-4 on S-184-6-4 o n R-18 will 3-1 proof t h e 5-7-4.seldom used because it means y o u must s

a unit which need n o t be sacrificed. Atypical line uses a 7-10-4 o n S-18 with a 4R-18 t o 3-1 proof the 7- 10-4 t o protect thNorthern squares. A 4-6-4 o n S-20 protec3-1 proofs the nex t southernly square. Thof unit used o n V-19 is dependent upont y p e of delaying ac t ion is used betweNemunas and the Bug. There are two majoof delaying action used in this area. Onplace a sacrifice unit o n Y- 15 and strong uY-17. With this t y p e there are three squarewhich the German can a t tack and therefomust use a 7-10-4 with a soak-off 4-6-4 oor y o u can use the 6-9-6 o n V-19 and 4-each of U-20 and W-19 t o force two soaT h e other method of delay is t o place a sunit o n X-16. This means V-19 has onsquares t o protect and a 5-7-4, 3-1 proofe4-6-4 will d o the job. With this defense,tudefense will be the same as turn one (defense for the first method .Both these defenses have the advantagehaving t o use a 7-10-4 o n V-19 immediateladvantage in this is tha t it staves off a lowseries of attacks. Of ten when the German iwith a 3-1 line a t this stage in the gamstage is critical as h e has n o other rou te tin the north), he will make two 1-2against V-19 and S-18. If y o u have 7-10these squares then the a t tack can be verytive. This is because the 7-10-4 is totallysary for each square (at least after a fewand therefore we must give a victoryGerman if he gets an exchange as well as wgets D back 2. This gives him a chance of vof 55.6 F T F and 64 PBM. If howevcannot attack b o t h of them then the chanlowered t o 44.4 F T F and 48 PBM.

When X-18 becomes the most southernposed square, y o u must have a 7-10-4 fowith the 4-6-4 3-1 proofing from U-20. Ao n X-19 seals the line. When the Germaenter Y-18 but no t 2-18, the 4-6-4 mustover t o Y-19 and be replaced by a 5-7-4.he can enter the swamp square (2-18), themust b e pulled o u t of the line and anothemust go t o X-19 t o make the line comple3-1 proof. Do n o t get sloppy o r give ubecause the German will soon break your l

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PAGE THEGENERyou allow a 3-1 attack the German will gain amonth. In addition, the German may be repulsedif he is sloppy in his out-flanking maneuver.

As an aside, I will explain how y o u might beable t o repulse the German. T h e German units o nthe swamp square will move t o Y-19 t o attackX-19 in conjunction with forces o n the river.These units will usually be only infantry becausewith the slow progress he has made he will havesent the Panzers south. If he does n o t p u t moreunits in the swamp, you have a possible oppor-tunity. His attacks against X-19 will usually takethe form of a high odds a t tack against one 5-7-4and a soak-off against t h e o ther forces (it is o f tenwise t o add another 5-7-4 t o the stack the thrnbefore he makes his crossing). T o give himselfbetter o d d s o n the soak-off, he will usually useone of the units o n Y-19. This will leave onlytwo units east o f the river and , as stated, theywill usually be weak. If y o u soak off against theforces o n t h e river and make a strong attack o nthe two units east o f the river, the German willbe faced with a 3-1 proof line again and will havelost two months. This situation may n o t ariseoften b u t when it does, make use of it . Be sure- t o add a devilish grin as his mouth falls open.

invasion site a t 9BUG RIVER

The Bug River defense depends o n Brest-Litovsk and the defense of Brest-Litovsk dependson the delaying action between the Nemunas andthe Bug as described in discussion o n defense ofV-19 o n the Nemunas. If t h e first method isused, tha t is, delaying units on Y-15 and Y-17then Brest-Litovsk only protects t w o squares andis easily defended by 2 5-7-4's. This leaves the7-10-4 for V-19. If the second method is used (adelaying unit o n X-16), then V-19 does no t needthe 7-10-4 and i t can be used o n Brest-Litovskwhere it protects three squares and is 3-1 proofedby a 4-6-4 o n 2-16, With Brest-Litovsk secure, astack of 2 5-7-4's are placed o n CC-15 t o protectthe nex t t w o squares. The Bug defense does no talways ex tend t o the end for the initial set-up,but if i t does then place 2 4-6-4's o n EE-15. I tshould be t w o rather than one 4-6-4 here becauseany penetration by the German can be disasterous

and well wor th his risk of a low odds attack. Weface this same danger in placing a 7-10-4 inBrest-Litovsk, bu t whether it is a serious threat o rno t depends on relative t roops nor th and southof the Pripyat swamps and whether o r no t youuse reserves. If y o u fear a split then it is best toensure n o penetration rather than 3-1 proof theposition. Units o n BB-15 would also be doubledif y o u can withdraw from Brest-Litovsk in to thatsquare. How far the Bug defense should ex tend isdependen t o n whether o r n o t y o u delay betweenthe Bug and the Hungarian mountains. If there isno delay then it must be extended t o the end inthe manner I suggested. If there is a delaying unitused a t all, it is usually on EE-12. In this casey o u need only the stack o n CC-15. Whendefending t o the end of the Bug i t is imperativetha t there be those t w o 4-6-4s o n EE-15, even ify o u have 2 5-7-4's o n DD-15. The reason for thisis the German's possible use of an advancingretreat, which I d o not believe has been outlawedin STALINGRAD yet. F o r if you have units onDD-15 and not o n EE-15, he can stage a 1-3a t tack against DD-15 and fill all squares t o thewest t o capacity. Then if you have to retreat himyou have no opt ion b u t t o place him behind y o u rlines.

Example of a 1 3 advancing retreat. T h e Germanhas n o where t o go but forward.Hungarian Mountains

T h e defense of the Hungarian Mountains isvery simple in the first tu rn o r two. T o the nor ththere are t w o options. If the delay mentioned indiscussing the Bug is used, then 2 5-7-4's shouldbe placed on GG-11. If it is no t used, then theyshould be o n GG-12. GG-12 closes the gap withthe Bug defense. For t h e delay opt ion GG-I I isused because it keeps German troops f rom ad-vancing in to GG-10, which is t h e jump-off po in tfo r t roops t o a t tack GG-12 the following turn. Inmost cases the 2 5-7-4's o n GG-I 1 will have t owithdraw t o GG-12 o n turn one because of athreat o f t roops arriving from Hungary. Howeverif there is n o threat and another delay is desiredand possible, then they can remain o n GG-1 1.The second delaying unit is placed o n FF-12 o rEE-13 and in any case the 2 5-7-4's only protectt w o squares. The possibility of a delay dependso n how strong your first was and how bright theGerman is. If you use a 2-3-6 and he senses y o uwill delay again, his best move is t o a t tack itf rom EE-11 and DD-12. This makes the 2-3-6doubled and he gets an advance which mdans nofurther delays. Therefore, if y o u have t w o delaysin mind y o u should use a 4-6-4 which he daresnot try the same tactic with. When there is aserious threat f rom Hungary, G G 1 2 should onlyhave one unit o n i t because the other will be

caught when the German surrounds the poand makes a 3-1 with a soak-off. Thereforeuse an initial delay, as described, d o not2-3-6, as a German advance means y o u hachoice bu t t o have t w o units o n GG-12. Astage y o u should have a good size stacHH-12 t o force a large soak-off fromcoming from Hungary. In the south, you shave 2 4-6-4's o n JJ-12. They need n5-7-4's, because any German who places anumber of Panzers in the sou th is a fool adefeat of these units is not very important.these units are threatened with being surrouthey should be withdrawn behind the(north). This is n o t always possible, howeyou are threatened a t GG-12 and wish tot r o o p s o n HH-12. HH-12 can easilsurrounded by Germans advancing into Gand by an attack from the south. In thileave a sacrifice unit o n JJ-12 (no t 11-12].

Prut-Siretul River ComplexDefense of this area takes two main formfirst is the simplest and it is t o just dbehind the Pru t River. This cannot be ma

proof a s N N 1 4 can always be broken. The becan d o is t o make the soak-offs expensivrest of the river should be defended by 2o n KK- 15 and 2 4-6-4's o n 11-15. 4-6-4's aras you d o not fear his panzers in this ar11-15 is used t o protect the one square as t o p an advancing retreat as described fBug. No advance can b e allowed i n t o 11-15,The alternative to this defensive is t o pdelaying uni t o n NN-13. Again you makeoffs as expensive as possible, especially foman units o n 0 0 - 1 3 . He must place un0 0 - 1 3 , if he is t o break the Prut line firsThe rest of the line is defended by 2 4-6-KK-14 behind the Siretul River. This tydefense has the advantage of using less uniit also reduces German strength in noRumania t o six units as they can only stMM-12 and LL-12.As Tyrone Bomba demonstrated in hisThe Set-Up of t h e Thing, this area comade almost impregnable. This, however, rea gread deal of units, which usually canafforded. In any case, if and when the Pbroken in the area of NN-14, there may bpossible reactions. You can delay again et h e P m t o r drop back t o the Dnestr-Prutdelay will be very difficult if y o u have allowadvance i n t o NN-14. Speaking of delays, Itha t you will find it very expensive if yothem very much during the opening stages.they are more expensive than realized.example, some people feel tha t NN-14 cobest defended by a 2-3-6 o n 0 0 - 1 3 and ao n NN-13. But in reality, they mustsacrifice more o r they have wasted theunits. Both of these squares can b e consdoubled if attack comes from certain s(e.g., PP-12 against 0 0 - 1 3 ) . A German forc6-6-6's can easily win the battle and adThen the delay units have died for nought.make the sacrifice greater then you los4-6-4's to delay, fo r o n e month , an attackPrut. This I don't feel is wor th it and I urt o examine very closely all delaying tactics.

Dnestr-Prut Defense LineThis is one of t h e finest and simplest lRussia, Squares LL-17, JJ-17, HH-16 and

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THE GENERAL PAGEall protect only two squares each and are doubledpositions. The main factor which makes this lineso great is tha t you know the exact Germanstrength which can be deployed against you . Youmust calculate the strength he can p u t in fiveunits and in six units. With this knowledge and.the lessons y o u learned in Part I o f this study,y o u can decide what size and how many unitswill be needed t o defend two squares. This line ishinged o n the Hungarian mounta ins and it is o nthem tha t it depends for its usefulness. This areamust be held as long as possible, in order thatGerman forces d o not , have lateral movementnor th and south. Once his forces can move northand south in this area, there are t w o conse-quences. First of all, y o u have t o fall back fromthe Prut and defend o n the Dnestr. This line isnof as easy t o 3-1 proof, because HH-16 mustnow protect three squares. If possible, a 6-9-6 or7-10-4 should be available for this position.Either can be made 3-1 proof with appropriateforced soak-offs and the German will usuallv no t

force you need especially if y o u are retreatingtoward the Luga during the winter. Make abso-lutely sure tha t y o u can raise the force eitherf rom the retreating units o r f rom replacementsand d o not risk the units in open terrain if youcannot replace them.Leningrad

As I said, Leningrad can protect itself, t o someextent. Unfortunately, this can only be done wellduring summer. During summer, 2 5-7-4's o nLeningrad will protect it. During snow months ,the best thing t o d o is place the largest unitspossible in Leningrad and try t o delay t h eoutflanking, as long as possible. In addition, ify o u ever want t o counter-attack during the game,this is the place. I t is especially effective if y o ucan retreat him o n t o lakes which will thaw o nthe nex t turn. Remember tha t after a thawLeningrad becomes very powerful and therefore ify o u have t o risk drowned troops t o save it , it willbe wor th it.

attack one of these, in any case, fo r feaexchange. He is slowly advancing up theDnestr plain, anyway, and this means thenot wor th it. For this position andpositions of three squares, whenever y o uuse a 6-9-6 o r 7-10-4, all y o u can d o isexpensive t o attack. Try n o t t o let 4-attacked, use 5-7-4's instead. T h e second conse-quence is tha t y o u must re-assess the Germanstrength. You must correct fo r his greaterstrength, if possible. This may entail replacing a4-6-4 with 2 5-7-4's, bu t y o u must make everyeffort t o have a 3-1 proof line.

Rear Defensive LinesIn Part I of this study, I discussed the use ofthe Russian units. Part I1 dealt with the defenseof the forward defense lines. I t is o n the forwarddefense lines, tha t t h e German should be de-feated. However, he will n o t be stopped. He will

push o n towards y o u r replacement cities. If y o uhave done a good job early in the game, he willbeeweak. and in fact defeated. O n the other hand ,you may have done a poor initial job o r may beplaying some variation. In this case, he may bestrong and this means he will drive all the harder Volkhov Riveragainst your cities. Therefore in this, Part 111, I ~h~~~ are several situations which can bringdiscuss the defense of t h e rear defensive lines. about the defense of the vo lkhov ~ i ~ ~ ~ ,f youThese lines vary in their usefulness. Some are are defending the east bank and hold Leningrad,strong like the Luga River and others are terribly then you need only a 5-7-4 on M-32 and a 4-6-4weak like the City line. A t any rate, I go over on 0-31 . If o n the other hand, y o u d o n o t holdalmost all o f them. I have le f t ou t such things as Leningrad, y o u must use either a 7-10-4 defensethe defense of the Kama River. Generally y o u o r a 6-9-6 defense. Defense. o n the west bank,will find a description o f the defense o f all lines when you are defending the Lugs is never securewhich normally can come in to play. T h e Proper as M-30 can b e surrounded and attacked fromdefense of the Forward Defensive Lines should four squares the best you can do is place a 6-9-6defeat the German and t h e proper defense of the or 7-10-4 on M-30 and stacks of 2 5-7-es onRear Defensive Lines should s t o p him. L-30 and L-3 1. This means he must use consider-able force and if he wishes t o surround M-30 h eLuga River must make t w o soak-offs of five factors a t 1-6. If

T h e Luga River is an extremely good defense Y O U are defending t h e west bank but are n o tline. Of course, it is only useful part o f the year, threatened at the you have a 5-7-4b u t when it is useful y o u can make it very On N-30, 3-1 proofed by a 4-6-4 o n M-30. 2strong. In fact, y o u can hold the Luga 3-1 proof 5-7-4's be n L-31. This is a littlewith t h e same forces that hold the Divina weakly. over-protected b u t You cannot risk any penetra-All y o u need is 2 5-7-4's o n L-30, a 7-10-4 o n tion.M-30, and a 4-6-4 o n N-31. You must fo rm u pthis force, as soon as possible, and if y o u d o n o t Ilmen Mountainshave the correct force, You ust have the 2 This area, too , is quite variable. As already5-7-4's o n L-30. penetration here, as good as no ted , when defending the Divina and wishing t otakes Leningrad and Leningrad does have the join it t o the upper Volga, a 5 - 7 4 is placed o nability to defend itself. Always keep in mind the Q-30 and 3-1 proofed by a 4-6-4 on Q-29, upon

the breaking of the Divina, 4 - 3 0 shoureinforced with another 5 - 7 4 , You shoul4 - 3 0 until there is a threat of the German eP-30. He cannot d o this without enteringexcept in winter. 4 - 3 0 should be held tothe front of the upper Volga. It means tunit o n the upper Volga must defendsquares, and while Q 3 0 is itself attackablthree squares, it will n o t be penetratedhave two units there and we can dropwithout giving u p the Volga line. When wu p Q-30, either because of a threat o r ana 5-7-4 should be on P-31. A 4-6-4 can 3-1this f rom 0 - 3 1 if it is needed. I t may nneeded if it is summer when the Germanadvertise an attack. Most o ther situationscall fo r the defense of this area, will haveplanned o n their own merits. T h e main thbe concerned a b o u t in their defense isallow penetration as you cannot hocounter-attack effectively in this area.

Svir RiverT h e defense of this river can takevariations. When defending the north ban

need 7-10-4 o n 1-35 and a 5-7-4 o n H-37.are b o t h 3-1 proofed by a 4-6-4 onUsually, y o u will n o t immediately need alt roops as the German must advertise his aas he moves in to t h e swamps. Defendins o u t h bank, y o u need a 7-10-4 o n 5-365-7-4 o n K-34. Both of these are 3-1 prooa 4-6-4 o n K-35. When defending the southbut only wishing t o delay, it is best just t oa 4-6-4 on each of K-33 and 1-38, These sare easily reached and retreated from. ThRiver is seldom very impor tan t b u t it shodefended in order tha t the German b e slowI t is more impor tan t if y o u are defendinor th bank and should be 3-1 proof ifpossible.City Defense Line

I have already mentioned this line and ththa t i t is very weak. I t s weakness lies in ththa t every city of this line can be surroThis includes Dnepro-Petrovsk, KharkovKursk. I t is therefore impossible to make th3-1 proof. However, it should delay the Gor even s top him if he is low enough o n uthis area. The gap between Dnepro-PetrovsKharkov is closed by the zoc's of the respcities, and the defense of Dnepro-Petrovsalready been discussed. There is nothing y od o t o delay the vulnerability of Dnepro-Pet o being surrounded. The gap between Khand Kursk is n o t closed by these cities alonthis is a blessing in disguise. The size of thallows for delaying ac t ion which keeps thesafe for a while. A delaying unit on DD-2mean they can only be attacked fromsquares and 2 5-7-4's should be in Kharkova 7-10-4 occupies Kursk. The 7-10-4 shouused, if a t all possible. I t can be lacking thib u t should be available for the next. On thturn y o u can delay with a unit o n DD-29means the t w o cities can be attacked fromsquares. You cannot delay o n DD-28. If youthe 2 5-7-4's o n Kharkov and 3-1 proo7-10-4 o n Kursk with a 4-6-4 o n AA-30 y ohave the best defense for that turn. Thference in the defense of these two citdictated by the terrain behind them. Thnothing behind Kursk excep t the distant

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PAGE 3 THE GENERRiver and therefore it must be held as long aspossible. At Kharkov our main concern is in notallowing a penetration so that we can fall backone square to a position behind th e Donets River.This part of the Donets River is considered partof the "City" defense and on the next turn yourdelaying actions cease as a 4-6-4 takes its positionon DD-30 behind the Donets. At this t ime, bothcities can be surrounded and the only adjustmentis to d rop one 5 7 4 'back fro m Kharkov toFF-28.I also consider Stalino as part of this line andits defense comes about with the breaking ofDnepro-Petrovsk or Kharkov. It protects three.squares and should be given whatever strengthyou can afford. A strong force should be put onKK-27 to prevent out-flanking. If Dnepro-Petrovsk was broken, then troops on Kharkovshould withdraw t o FF-28 . Do not drop behindthe Oskol River until you need to. This is to stopGerman lateral movem ent which is very difficultand needed at this t ime. This method of defensewill give you the best out of this poor line. Keepan eye on German strength and keep the neededtroops coming. Since the Kerch Straits are at thislevel and since they are usually threatened rightafter the fall of Dnepro-Petrovsk, I would like tomention them now. On the fall of Dnepro-Petrovsk, you should put all units defending theDnepr back towards Stalino. Do not try to fightin the Crimea as it is a waste of units. Rememberthat AH has ruled that there is no supply acrossthe straits and have it t imed out so that youplace a unit on 0 0- 25 just before he is able tomove from PP-23. In this way, he may wastemore force than you.

Upper Oka RiverThis is the continuation of the city defenseline and runs from Kursk over to the forks withthe Ugla River. This line is as important as Kurskand must be held as long as Kursk. Actually Ihave already used it when I 3-1 proofed the

7-10-4 in Kursk. Tha t same 4-6-4 o n AA-30should 3-1 proof a 7-10-4 on 2-30 (I amassuming the German is campaigning in this areaand does not have enough force to seriouslythreaten you elsewhere). The rest of this l ineshould be held b y a 5-7-4 o n each of Y-31 andW-32. And these are both 3-1 proofed by a 4-6-4on X-32. Parts of this line can be held afterKursk falls and should be in order that the DonRiver is not out-flanked.Ugra River

In th is discussion, I use Ugra River to describethe river l ine from the tip of the Dnepr to theforks of the Moskva and Aka rivers. This lineusually will not hold long due to the Rzhev gapbetween it and the upper Volga. But if you holdhim off in the open terrain this line is verysound. It cannot be easily m ade 3-1 proof but i tcan be very strong. Place a 5-7-4 on T-31 and a7-10-4 on each of U-31 and U-33, and you willhave a strong line. If yo u still hold th e upper O kaor are not yet attackable east of the upper Oka,place the largest unit possible on U-3 1 and forcea good size soak-off with t roop s on U-32. If yo uare being attacked along the whole line and aredaring, this is an excellent spot for a trap. Youmay want to use this trap if you have been ableto conserve your strength but can't seem to stopor damage the German. Simply place a 5-7-4 or a4-6-4 on U-32 between the two 7-10-4's. He willattack this at three to one with two soak-offs and

will advance. This isn't his favorite way olbreaking lines but he will take it at times. It inow time to clobber him. Bring in every unit yocan spare for this surrounded attack. Only putyour soak-off units next to the Ugra, and put therest on the Moskva River. You kill one unit withyour attack and the two remaining must usesome force on the units on the Moskva. Leavinglit t le to attack one of the 7-10-4 's to undouble it .I f y o u ha ve , e n ou & f o ~ c e - < y o uan des t roy twcunits on the attack and he is helpless to save theother. Make sure you have a lot of force if youtry this. Yo u should try t o pull in at least 24factors in addition t o the 14 from the 7-10-4units and soak-offs.

Upper VolgaI only discuss the defense of this river down toMoscow because the rest is self-evident and is notvery useful, in any case. If 4-3 0 is held, then 25-7-4 's o n Q 3 2 and a 4-6-4 on Q-34 will do thejob. If you don't hold it, then the 2 5-7-4's mustbe replaced by a 7-10-4 backed by a 4-6-4 onP-32. This line should be held a littleover-strength if possible as its fall will bring abo uta collapse of the Moscow defense and the

Leningrad defense in time.Moskva River Moscow-Oka River Defense

On this line depends the fate of Moscow andrest assured tha t even when you're back t o there,

Moscow..Any units here should be large, stacked,and n ot susceptible to attack fro m T-33. Moscowshould never come under 3-1 attack until theupper Volga or the Moskva-Oka has been broken.By proper delaying actions, it should be vulner-able to attack from only S-33 and T-33. 2 5-7-4'scan then protect it. The following turn it will beattackable from S-33, T-33, and T-34. However, aunit o n S-35 should not be attackable from T-35,only T-34. This enables you to use a 7-10-4 inMoscow 3-1 proofed by a 5-7-4 on S-35. On thefollowing turn Moscow should have 2 .7-10-4's andthe Oka should be defended by a 4-6-4 on S-36 anda 5-7-4 on each of T-36 and U-36. U-36 and therest of the Oka should be defended with what youhave in an attemp t to force the German far to t eeast. 6

AH Philosophy continued h mcrease the play-balance. AFRIKA Kwill also get the rewrite job eventalthough changes he rew ill be made sooutlaw some of the ridiculous supply rumade in bygone years by the A.H. anman. Both the revised AFRIKA KORPWATERLOO rules wi ll be made availabthe same 25C charge plus shipping co

One game where we w i l l b e making achanges wi ll be BLITZKRIEG Dave Ris handling what amounts to an entireldesign of this game which at one ansame time will clarify the games ambiguities and install some real bl i teffect sintoth e gamesystem. The chanthe naval and air rules are especianovative. We are quite excited aboutthese rules do for thi s old favorite. Mamistake about it these rules wi ll reBLITZKRIEG into an entirely new and better game. Again, all you'll need to uyour version wi ll be the rules-all components remaining the same. Thebined rules and battle manual will se$1.00 plus 5C shipping chargeshonestly recommend that all owneBLITZKRIEG update their version these rules become available. Don't orders for any of these rules yet. We'll lknow wh en they are finished.

Response to t he proposed ma il ordehas been very encouraging. Interest ining extremely high in both THIRD Rand PANZER LEADER THIRD REICHgenerated a lot of excitement sbecause of it s scale. No other game haoffered a corps level simulation of thissIn such a highly playable format, utboth air and naval forces as well. Onethings whic h stands out about THIRD Ris the high skill level required in playSome very wild things can happen players deploy their forces incorrectly,smart player has a countermove for eventuality. We've had playtesters prothat such and such a country just dostand a chance. Then we sit in, replasame situation with a different deploymand presto-that side win s easily. TREICH has a very high skil l factor andgame where the players makedecisions-and are not dictated to preordained historical series of eventsthe same outcome every time. But we've observed the same kin d of react1776. Several supposedly expert reviehave come out and said the Americansstand a chancewhile our playtestersfovery difficult to win with the British.comes from people making suppoauthori tative statements about a game1 or 2 playings. In plain truth, they areplain playing badly. If faced by a opponent wi th experience i n the gthey'd be surprised how easily they'd loth e British. We expect thesametypeof response to THIRD REICH but good plwill soon findthey c anw in with either sis a game we are extremely pleased Hopefully, next issue we 'll be able tonounce its availability to you.

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THE GENERAL PAGEI WITH THE FREN HA Comprehensive Look a t France 1940 2 he must keep the Maginot line intact, or these units, that requires precious timeby Harold Totten lacking the Maginot, he must prevent a German much as two or three turns. And in the Ard

Being a realistic game, t h e historical version ofF R A N C E 194 leaves l i t t le prospect for a n Alliedvictory. This lack o f play balance was noaccident , being inherent in the design concept . T ogain a n y th in g approaching play balance th eoptional scenarios m u s t be selected.Y e t , we are always running across people wh oget their k icks b y doing things th e hard way.Trying t o win as th e French wi th th e historicalOrder o f Battle would be ta n ta mo u n t t o such aphilosophy. Although his discourse which fo llowsis more than a h o w t o win as th e Frenchblurb , Harold To t ten defin i te ly seems to fit th ewe try harder mo ld .

FRANCE '40 is a radically different AvalonHill game, and because it is unlike any other AHgame it can be difficult to grasp at times. Themain intention of this thesis is to give the gamera rather broad knowledge of the game, its aspectsand its quirks. This is not easy for a game such asFRANCE '40 and has taken quite a bit of devel-opment.In a way, FRANCE '40 is readily comparablewith 1914. The play can end up in a stalematedposition. That will be a good deal of whatintend to concentrate on how n o t to stalematethe game. FRANCE '40 differs from 1914 in thesense that there is a great deal more mobility;plus superior German attrition abilities and air-power make for an active game. One factor thatalmost guarantees an extremely mobile battle isthe lack of the Maginot Line, giving the Frenchplayer a larger area to defend and the German alarger area to attack.Before actually discussing the play of the game

will first go into the mapboard and its terrain.The board, by its very nature, divides into fourbasic lines of attack. The first three of these arein Belgium: the northern forest/Antwerp area, thecentral plain (Aachen, Brussels, Namur triangle),and the infamous Ardennes forest. The fourth isthe Maginot line area of southern France.Belgium is rather good defensive terrain, where-as the southern area without the Maginot is not.There is also the Dyle Line across the centralplain along what is really the Demer Riverskirting Antwerp and Namur. Terrain in FRANCE'40 is not really all that crucial (with theexception of the Maginot Line) because thedefensive quality can be offset by airpower.With armor it's a different story and theaspect is not defensive or offensive ability, butthe crucial problem of mobility. In order to ,moveinto or out of a unit's ZOC it requires theexpenditure of movement points, and thepresence of forests further hinder armor'smobility. This will be an important factor indealing with understanding massive armor battlesin the Ardennes.

FRENCH STRATEGYThe French player is basically defense oriented,at least strategically. Tactically the French playercan go on the offensive, but he must be carefulthat he doesn't leave any units exposed to deadlyGerm an counter-attacks. The French game

problem boils down into the following points: 1)he must defend Belgium for some length of time;

flanking movement; 3 he must have lninimunlosses; 4) he must inflict maximum losses on theGermans; 5) he must protect Paris. Around thesebasic points the French player must build hisdefense.The first problem which occurs in every gameis the defense of Belgium. But in order tounderstand the strategy for Belgium, we mustfirst expound upon the broad strategy the Frenchplayer will be using. As mentioned before,movement through ZOC's cost movement points,three movement points for entering and twomovement points for leaving. Thus, to movedirectly from one enemy controlled hex toanother you expend one to enter the terrain (ortwo if the unit is armored and it is enteringforest or swamps), two to leave the ZOC andthree to enter the ZOC, at a total cost of six(seven for armor). This makes for interestingmovement characteristics within the game. Thismeans that units may move rapidly over openterrain as long as they are unopposed. However,they cannot close with the enemy after a longmarch due to a lack of the movement pointsneeded to enter a ZOC. Also, units can be pulledoff the front line much more easily than it canapproach the front. The total result of this is aunit may voluntarily retreat its full movementfactor away from the front line, and due to theZOC movement costs, the attacker (usu