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REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN ND PAKISTAN, M RCH 2011During h i s March 27, 2009, speech announcing our s t ra t egy

for Afghanis tan and Pakis tan , Pres ident Obama s a id goingforward, we wi l l not b l ind ly s t ay the course . Ins tead , we w i l ls e t c l e a r metr ics to measure progress and hold ourse lvesaccoun tab le . This r epor t o u t l i n e s the process underway tof u l f i l l t ha t d i rec t ive and provides the Admin i s t ra t ion ' s mostrecent assessment . This assessment h igh l igh t s both pos i t ive andnegat ive t rends in the implementa t ion of our Afghanis tan andPakis tan s t r a t e g y and i d e n t i f i e s i s sues t h a t may c a l l fo r po l i cyadjustments over t ime.Background

At the Pres iden t ' s reques t and fo l lowing h is March 27,2009, announcement of a new pol i cy fo r Afghanis tan and Pakis tan ,the Nat ional Secur i ty Sta f f NSS) and depar tments and agenciesdeveloped a s t r a t e g i c implementa t ion plan and a se t ofperformance measures, or met r ics , to t r ack progress in meetingthe Pres iden t ' s goals and ob jec t ives . These metr ics weredeveloped with the inpu t from both congress ional and academicexpe r t s .

The Admin is t ra t ion p resen ted i t s f i r s t formal metr icsdocument to the Congress on September 24, 2009, in accordancewith Publ ic Law 111-32, sec t ion 1117a. That document providedthe Congress with a s ta tement ou t l in ing the ob jec t ives of theU.S. po l icy for Afghanis tan and Pakis tan , and the met r i cs usedto asse ss progress toward achieving these ob jec t ives .

Publ ic Law 111-32 a l so inc ludes a r epor t ing requirement toprov ide an assessment of our s t ra t egy to the Congress s t a r t i n gMarch 30, 2010, and in lBO-day i n t e rv a l s the rea f te r . Thisr epor t i s the t h i rd in t h i s s e r i e s . As metr ics co l l ec t ion inthe f i e l d occurs quar te r ly , the assessments of each objec t iveare div ided i n to two separa te per iods , June 1 - September 30,2010, and October 1 - December 31, 2010. For each ob jec t ive , at h i r d post repor t ing pe r iod i s included in order to provide ani n t e r im assessment fo r the January 1 - March 2011 por t ion of themost recent quar te r .Goal and ob jec t ives

Following the August 2009 na t iona l e lec t ion in Afghanis tan ,Pres ident Obama l ed a s t r a t e g i c review of the overa l l U.S.po l icy fo r Afghanis tan and Pakis tan . On December 1, 2009, in aspeech a t West Point , New York, the Pres ident reaf f i rmed h is

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goal in Afghanistan and Pakis tan to disrupt , dismant le , andde fea t a l -Qa ida and i t s ext remis t a l l i e s and prevent t h e i rre tu rn to e i t he r country. In December 2010, the NSS completedan annual review of our progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan.The f indings from t h i s Afghanistan and Pakis tan Annual ReviewAPAR) are included as the f i r s t pa r t of t h i s assessment .

In suppor t of our overarching goal , the re a re e igh tob jec t ives t ha t form the framework for our quar t e r lyassessments . The e igh t suppor t ing ob jec t ives , along with thelead respons ib le departments , are :1 . Disrupt t e r ro r i s t networks in Afghanistan, and espec ia l ly

Pakis tan , to degrade any a b i l i t y they have to plan andlaunch i n t e rna t iona l t e r ro r i s t a t t acks . (Di rec to r ofNat iona l In te l l igence (DNI))2. Please see the c l a s s i f i ed annex for de t a i l s concerning t h i s

ob jec t ive .3 . Ass is t e f fo r t s to enhance c i v i l i an con t ro l and s t ab le

cons t i tu t iona l government in Pakistan. (Department ofSta te (S ta te ) )

4. Develop Pak i s t an ' s counte r insurgency COIN) c a pa b i l i t i e s ;cont inue to suppor t Pak is tan ' s e f fo r t s to de fea t t e r ro r i s tand insurgent groups. (Department of Defense DOD))

5. Involve the i n t e rna t iona l community more a c t i v e l y to forgean i n t e rna t iona l consensus to s t ab i l i ze Pakistan. (Sta te)6. In Afghanistan, reverse the Tal iban ' s momentum and bu i ld

Afghan Nat iona l Secur i ty Forces ANSF) capac i ty so tha t wecan begin to t r ans i t i on r e sp o n s i b i l i t y for secur i ty to theAfghan government and decrease our t roop presence by July2011. DOD)

7. St r a t e g i c a l ly bu i ld the capac i ty of the Afghan governmentwhich enables Afghans to assume r e s pons ib i l i t y in thefour-s tep process of c lea r -ho ld -bu i ld - t rans fe r . (Sta te)

8. Involve the i n t e rna t iona l community more a c t i v e l y to forgean i n t e rna t iona l consensus to s t ab i l i ze Afghanistan.(Sta te)Class i f i ed Annex

Deta i l s concerning progress in our f i r s t ob jec t ive todi s rup t t e r ro r i s t networks in Afghanistan and, espec ia l ly

Pakis tan to degrade any a b i l i t y they have to plan and launchi n t e rna t iona l t e r ro r i s t at tacks are included within thec l a s s i f i e d annex. Objec t ive 2 i s c l a s s i f i ed en t i r e l y and fu l l ydiscussed in the c l a s s i f i e d annex.

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Overview o the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual ReviewDecember 16 2010Our overarching goal remains the same: to d i s rup t , dismant le ,

and de feat a l -Qa ida in Afghan is tan and Pakis tan, and to preventts capac i t y to threaten America and our a l l i e s in the fu ture. / I

Pres iden t Barack Obama West Point , December I , 2009Overa l l Assessment

The core goal of the u . s . s t ra t egy in the Afghanis tan andPakls tan t h e a t e r remains to d i s rup t , dismant le , and even tua l lydefea t a l - Q a i d a in the reg ion and to preven t i t s r e tu rn toe i the r count ry .

Spec i f i c components of our s t ra t egy fo r Afghanis tan andPakis tan are working well , and t he re a re notab le ope ra t iona lga ins . Most impor tan t , a l - Q a i d a s sen io r l eade rsh ip inPakis tan i s weaker and under more sus t a ined pre ssure than a t anyothe r po in t s ince t f l ed Afghanis tan in 2001. In Pakis tan , weare l ay ing the foundat ion for a s t r a t e g i c pa r tne rsh ip based onmutual respec t and t r u s t , through increased dia logue , improvedcooperat ion , and enhanced exchange and ass i s tance programs. Andin Afghanis tan the momentum achieved by the Tal iban in recen tyears has been a r r e s t e d in much of the count ry and reversed insome key a rea s , a l though these gains remain f r a g i l e andr ev e r s ib l e .

While the s t ra t egy i s showing progress across a l l t h reeassessed areas of a l -Qa ida , Pakis tan and Afghanis tan thecha l l enge remains to make our gains durab le and sus ta inab le .With regard to a l -Q a ida s Pakis tan-based l e ade rsh ip and cadre ,we must remain -focused on making fu r the r progress toward ourul t ima te end s t a t e , the even tua l s t r a t e g i c de fea t of a l - Q a i d ain the reg ion , which w i l l requ i re the sus t a ined den ia l of thegroup s sa fe haven in the t r i b a l areas of western Pakis tan ,among othe r f ac to r s . And in Afghanis tan we a re confronting theinherent cha l l enges of a war- torn na t ion working to r e s to r ebas ic s t a b i l i t y and secur i ty in the face of a r e s i l i e n tinsurgency t h a t f inds sh e l t e r i n a neighboring sanc tuary . Morebroad ly , we must con t inue to place the Afghanis tan and Pakis tancha l l enges in l a rg e r and b e t t e r i n t eg r a t ed p o l i t i c a l andregiona l contexts .

The acce le ra ted deployment of u.S. and i n t e rna t iona lm i l i t a ry and c i v i l i an resources to the reg ion t h a t began inJu ly 2009 and con t inued a f t e r the P re s i d e n t s pol i cy rev iew l a s t

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f a l l has enab led progress and heigh tened the sense of purposewith in the United Sta tes Government, among our c o a l i t i o npar tne r s , and in the reg ion . As a r e s u l t , our s t r a t e g y inAfghanis tan i s s e t t i ng the cond i t ions to beg in the respons ib lereduc t ion of U.S. fo rces in Ju ly 2011. This rev iew a l sounderscores the impor tance of a s u s t a i n ed long-term commitmentto the reg ion in Pakis tan , by way o f our growing s t r a t e g i cpa r tne rsh ip ; and in Afghanis tan , as r e f l e c t e d by our ownlong-term commitment, as wel l as the Lisbon North Atlan t icTrea ty Organiza t ion NATO) Summit 's two outcomes: the goal fo rAfghans to assume the l ead fo r s ecu r i t y across the count ry by2014, and NATO's endur ing commitment beyond 2014.Summary of Findings1. A l-Q a id a

Our secur i ty i s a t s take in Afghanistan and Pakis tan This i sthe ep icen ter o f v io len t extremism pract iced by al -Qa ida . I ti s from here tha t we were at tacked on 9/11 , and t i s from herethat new a t tacks are be ing p lo t t e d s speak /I

Pres iden t Barack Obama, west Poin t , December 1, 2009Our s t r a t eg y fo r Afghani s t an and Pakis tan i s cen te red on

di s rup t ing , dismant l ing , and defea t ing a l - Q a i d a in the t h e a t e rand preven t ing ts capac i ty to t h r e a t e n America, our c i t i z e n s ,and our a l l i e s . While t w i l l t ake t ime to even tua l ly d e fea ta l -Q a i d a , we are t ak ing s t eps to preven t t e r r o r i s t groups fromregenera t ing over t ime o r r ee s t ab l i s h in g a sa fe haven in thereg ion t h a t would pose a s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t to the U.S. Homelandand to our a l l i e s and i n t e r e s t s abroad.

There has been s i g n i f i c a n t progress in d i s ru p t i n g anddismant l ing the Pakis tan-based l e ad e r s h i p and cadre o f a l -Q a i d aover the pas t year . A l -Q a id a s s e n i o r l e ad e r s h i p has beendep le ted , the g rou p s sa fe haven i s smal le r and l e s s secure , andi t s a b i l i t y to prepare and conduct t e r r o r i s t opera t ions has beendegraded in important ways.

We remain r e l e n t l e s s ly focused on Pak i s t an -b ased a l -Q a i d abecause of the s t r a t e g i c n a t u re of the t h r e a t posed by i t sl eadership , and in pa r t i c u l a r the g roup s con t inued pursu i t ofl a r g e - s ca l e , ca ta s t roph ic an t i -Wes tern a t t a ck s and ts in f luenceon globa l t e r ro r i sm. We be l i eve core a l - Q a i d a con t inues toview the U.S. Homeland as ts p r in c ip a l t a rge t , and even ts overthe p a s t year ind ica te some of i t s a f f i l i a t e s and a l l i e s a l soare more aggre ss ive ly pursu ing such a t t a ck s . Although the g lobala f f i l i a t e s and a l l i e s o f a l -Q a i d a a l so t h r e a t e n the U.S.

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Homeland and i n t e r e s t s , Pakis tan and Afghanis tan con t inue to bethe ope ra t iona l base for the group t ha t a t t acked us on 9/11.The presence of nuclear weapons in the region a l so lends to i t sd i s t i n c t s t a t u s , h igh l igh t ing the impor tance of working withreg iona l par tne r s to preven t ext remis ts , inc lud ing core a lQa' ida , from acqu i r ing such weapons or mate r ia l s .

The compounding l os se s of a l -Q a ' i da ' s l e ade rsh ip cadre havedimin i shed but not ha l ted , the g roup ' s a b i l i t y to advanceopera t ions aga ins t the United Sta tes and our a l l i e s andpar tne r s , o r to support and i n s p i r e reg iona l a f f i l i a t e s .Indeed t e r r o r i s t p l o t t i n g con t inues aga ins t the United Sta tesand our a l l i e s and par tne r s . Al-Qa ' ida ' s even tua l s t r a t e g i cde fea t w i l l be most e f f e c t i v e l y achieved through the den ia l ofsanc tua r i e s in the reg ion and the e l imina t ion of the g roup ' sremaining l e ade rsh ip cadre . Even ach iev ing these goa l s ,however w i l l not complete ly e l imina te the t e r r o r i s t t h r e a t toU.S. i n t e re s t s . There a re a range of othe r groups inc lud ingsome a f f i l i a t e d with a l -Qa ' ida , as wel l as i nd iv idua l s in sp i redby a l -Qa ' ida , who aim to do harm to our Nation and our a l l i e s .Our pos tu re and e f f o r t s to counter t h s ~ t h r e a t s wi l l con t inueunabated.

e remain committed to deepening and broadening ourpa r tne rsh ips with Pakis tan and Afghanis tan in a way t h a t br ingsus c lo s e r to the de fea t of a l -Qa ' ida and preven t s t e r r o r i s tgroups t ha t pose a s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t to our Homeland our a l l i e s ,and our i n t e r e s t s from r ees tab l i sh ing sa fe havens in the region.2. Pakis tan

In the pas t w too o f ten def ined our re la t ionsh ip withPakistan narrowly . Those days are over . Moving forward, w arecommitted to a par tnersh ip wi th Pakistan t ha t i s bu i l t on afoundat ion o f mutual i n t e r e s t mutual respec t and mutualt r u s t .

Pres iden t Barack Obama West Point , December 1 2009Pakis tan i s cen t ra l to our e f fo r t s to de fea t a l -Qa ' ida and

prevent i t s r e tu rn to the reg ion . e seek to secure thesei n t e r e s t s through cont inued robust coun te r t e r ro r i sm andcounter insurgency cooperat ion and a long-term pa r tne rsh ipanchored by our improved unders tand ing of Pak is tan ' s s t r a t e g i cp r i o r i t i e s , increased c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a ry ass i s tance , andexpanded publ ic diplomacy.

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Progress in our re l a t ionsh ip with Pakis tan over the l a s tyear has been subs tan t i a l , but a l so uneven. We worked j o i n t l yin the l a s t year to d i s rup t the t h r e a t posed by a l -Qa ida , andPakis tan has made progress agains t ext remis t safe havens t ak ingac t ion in s ix of seven agencies of the Federa l ly Adminis teredTribal Areas FATA). These ga ins came a t grea t cos t , asPakis tan has endured thousands of c a su a l t i e s i n t he i r m i l i t a ryranks and among t h e i r c i v i l i a n popula t ion from t e r ro r i s ta t t acks . There was improvement in our secur i ty ass i s tance , withincreased t ra in ing coopera t ion more support for Pak i s t an sm i l i t a ry opera t ions , and grea te r border coordina t ion .

In 2010 we a l so enhanced the United Sta tes -Pak is tanre l a t ionsh ip through the St ra teg ic Dialogue. The Dialoguedeveloped mutual t r u s t , prompted a t t e n t ion to reforms c r i t i c a lto long-term s t a b i l i t y , and addressed development ob jec t ivesimportant to the people of Pakistan. Civ i l i an ass i s tanceinc reased with more a id f lowing through Paki s t an i i n s t i t u t i ons ,improved c i v i l i an s t ab i l i za t i on a c t i v i t i e s , the development ofc r i t i c a l energy and other in f ra s t ruc ture , and a robust f loodresponse and recovery e f fo r t , which NATO d i rec t l y ass i s ted . Webe l i eve our renewed b i l a t e r a l par tne r sh ip i s help ing promotes t a b i l i t y in Pakistan. I t c lea r ly communicates U . S. commitmentto a long-term re l a t ionsh ip tha t i s support ive of Pak i s t an si n t e re s t s and underscores t ha t we wi l l not disengage from theregion as we have in the pas t .

The review a l so h igh l igh t s pa r t i c u l a r areas in our s t ra t egyfor Pakis tan t ha t requ i re adjustment . Spec i f i c components ofthe s t ra tegy , taken ind iv idua l ly , ind ica te we a re headed in ther i gh t d i rec t ion , both in terms of U.S. focus and Pakis tanicooperat ion . However be t t e r balance and i n t eg ra t ion of thevar ious components of our s t ra t egy wi l l be requi red to reach ourob jec t ives . For ins tance , the denia l of ext remis t safe havenswi l l require grea te r coopera t ion wi th Pakis tan along the borderwith Afghanis tan . Furthermore the denia l of ext remis t sa fehavens cannot be achieved through m i l i t a ry means a lone but mustcont inue to be advanced by e f f e c t i v e development s t r a t eg i e s .

In 2011 we must s t rengthen our dia logue wi th both Pakis tanand Afghanis tan on regiona l s t a b i l i t y . Toward t ha t endSec re t a ry Cl in ton plans to host fore ign minis te r s from bothcountr ies in Washington for another se ss ion of theUnited Sta tes-Afghanis tan-Pakis tan Tr i l a t e ra l dialogue. Onb i l a t e r a l i s sues , we must support the Government of Pak i s t an se f fo r t s to s t reng then i t s economy improve governance andsecur i ty , and respond to the development needs of the Pakis tani

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people . We wi l l cont inue the uni ted Sta tes -Pak is tan St ra teg icDialogue, and sus ta in sen io r l eve l engagement.3. Afghanis tanWe wi l l pursue the fo l lowing ob jec t i ves with in Afghanis tan emust deny al-Qa' ida a sa fe haven e must reverse the Tal iban 's

momentum and deny t the ab i l i t y to overthrow the governmentAnd we must strengthen the capac i ty o f Afghan i s tan ' s secur i tyforces and government so tha t they can take the leadr e spons ib i l i t y for Afghan i s tan ' s fu ture .

Pres ident Barack Obama, West Point , December 1, 2009The U.S. ob jec t ives in Afghanis tan are to deny safe haven

to a l - Q a i d a and to deny the Tal iban the a b i l i t y to over throwthe Afghan government. We seek to achieve these ob jec t ives bydegrading the Tal iban insurgency, thereby providing t ime andspace to bu i ld s u f f i c i e n t Afghan capac i ty .

As a r e su l t of our in teg ra ted e f fo r t s in 2010, we a res e t t i ng the condi t ions to begin t r ans i t i on to Afghan secur i tyl ead i n ea r ly 2011 and to begin a respons ib le , condi t ions-basedu.S. t roop reduc t ion in Ju ly 2011. Moreover, a t the recent N TOSummit in Lisbon, we forged a broad Afghan and i n t e rna t iona lconsensus, agree ing on a pa th to complete t r ans i t i on by the endof 2014. Beyond these t a rge t s , and even a f t e r we draw down ourcombat forces , the United Sta tes wi l l cont inue to supportAfgh anis tan s development and secur i ty as a s t r a t e g i c par tne r ,j u s t as the NATO-Afghanistan par tne r sh ip aff i rms the broader andenduring i n t e rna t iona l community support to Afghanis tan .

In Afghanis tan , substant : ia l i n t e rna t iona l resources havebeen assembled from 49 a l l i e d and p a r tn e r countr ies to implementa focused, in teg ra ted c iv i l i a n -m i l i t a ry approach. In te rna t iona lsupport i s evidenced by the growth in the NATO-led coa l i t ion ,inc reased Musl im-major i ty country support in the region, and thecont inued prov i s ion of c r i t i c a l i n t e rna t iona l resources . TheUnited Nat ion s U.N.) l eadership , inc luding on c i v i l i a nass i s tance , has helped garner renewed and s t rengthened supportfor key i n s t i t u t i o n bui ld ing e f fo r t s . United Sta tes c i v i l i anand mil i ta ry i n t eg ra t ion has s ign i f i c a n t ly improved, withcoord ina ted e f fo r t s now occur r ing a t every l eve l .

The surge in c oa l i t ion m i l i t a ry and c i v i l i a n resources,along with an expanded spec ia l opera t ions forces t a rge t ingcampaign and expanded loca l secur i ty measures a t the vi l l agel evel , has reduced overa l l Tal iban inf luence and a r r e s t e d the

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momentum they had achieved in recen t years in key p a r t s of thecount ry . Progress i s most evident in the ga ins Afghan andc o a l i t i o n fo rces are making in c lea r ing the Tal iban hea r t l and ofKandahar and Helmand provinces , and in the s ign i f i c a n t lyincreased s i ze and improved capab i l i ty of the ANSF.

The Afghan Minis t r i e s of Defense and In t e r io r , with helpfrom the N TO Training Mission-Afghanistan, have exceeded ANSFgrowth t a rg e t s , implemented an expanded ar ray of programs toimprove the qua l i ty and i n s t i t u t i ona l capac i ty of the ANSF andsharp ly improved t h e i r t ra in ing ef fec t iveness . TheI n t e r n a t i o n a l Secur i ty Assis tance Force ISAF) and the Afghangovernment have a l so adopted a robust pa r tne r ing plan t h a t hasacce le ra ted t ac t i ca l - l eve l development of Afghan fo rce sleadership and un i t s , a l though s i g n i f i c a n t developmentcha l l enges remain. Effor t s a re a l so underway to support andencourage f u r th e r development of local . pol i ce fo rces to promotesecur i ty and s t a b i l i t y across the country , es p ec i a l l y in ru ra la rea s . Emphasis must con t inue to be placed on the developmentof Afghan-led se c u r i t y and governance with in areas t ha t havebeen a focus of m i l i t a ry opera t ions .

While the momentum achieved by the Tal iban in recent yearshas been a r r e s t e d in much of the count ry and reversed in somekey areas , these ga ins remain f r a g i l e and r ev e r s ib l e .Conso l ida t ing those gains wi l l requ i re t h a t we make moreprogress with Pakis tan t o e l imina te sanc tua r i e s fo r v io l en text remis t networks. Du rab i l i t y a l so requ i re s con t inued workwith Afghanis tan to t r a n s fe r c lea red area s to t h e i r se c u r i t yforces . We are a l so support ing Afgh an i s tan s e f f o r t s to b e t t e rimprove na t iona l and sub-nat ional . governance and to bu i ldi n s t i t u t i o n s with increased t ransparency and accoun tab i l i ty toreduce corrupt ion - key s t eps in sus ta in ing the Afghangovernment. And we have supported and focused investments ini n f r a s t ru c t u re t h a t w i l l give the Afghan government and peoplethe too l s to bu i ld and s u s t a in a fu ture of s t a b i l i t y .

As Pres iden t Obama emphasized in 2010, our c i v i l i a n andm i l i t a ry e f f o r t s must support a durab le and favorable p o l i t i c a lr eso lu t ion of the c onf l i c t . In 2011, we wi l l i n t e n s i fy ourreg iona l diplomacy to enable a p o l i t i c a l process to promotepeace and s t a b i l i t y in Afghanis tan , to include Afghan-ledr eco n c i l i a t i o n , t ak ing advantage of the momentum c rea t ed by therecent se c u r i t y gains and the i n t e rna t iona l consensus gained inLisbon. As we s h i f t to t r a ns i t i on , a major chal lenge w i l l bedemonstrat ing t h a t the Afghan government has the capac i ty toconsol ida te gains in geographic areas t h a t have been c lea red byISAF and ANSF.

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BackgroundThe APAR was d i rec ted by Pres ident Obama in December 2009

to be a NSS-led assessment of our s t ra t egy in Afghanistan andPakis tan . The Pres ident fu r the r d i rec ted tha t the annual reviewbe diagnos t ic in na ture .

The 2010 annual review began with a da ta co l l ec t ion phaseconducted from October 12 through November 10, 2010. A se r ie sof e igh t working group and deputy l eve l meetings were convenedfrom November 16 through December 1, 2010, to discuss var iousi npu t s i de n t i f y f indings and assess the t r a j e c to ry and pace ofprogress . A dra f t c l a s s i f i ed r epor t which took i n to accounts igni f icant comments from departments and agencies , was reviewedin a se r ie s of formal Deput ies Committee, Pr inc ipa l s Committee,and Nat iona l Secur i ty Council meet ings he ld from December 3-14,2010.

Inputs to the review carne from across the un i ted S ta tesGovernment. An interagency team v i s i t ed Afghanistan andPakis tan from October 25 through November 4, 2010, to discussthe s i t ua t ion with key l eaders in the f i e l d and witness elementsof the s t ra t egy f i r s thand . In addi t ion the review b u i l theavi ly on the outcomes of the November 2010 NATO Summit held inLisbon. Fina l ly in coordina t ion with the u.S . Embassies inPakis tan and Afghanistan, the u.S. Mission to NATO and theDepartment of Sta te the review inc luded consu l ta t ion with keya l l i e s and par tne r s on the s i tua t ions in Afghanistan andPakis tan .Semi-Annual Assessment of Progress Against the Eight Object ivesMarch 2010Object ive 1: Disrupt t error i s t networks in Afghanistan andespec ia l ly Pakis tan to degrade any ab i l i t y they have to plan andlaunch internat ional t error i s t at tacks DNI)Deta i l s of progress on t h i s ob jec t ive can be found in thec l a s s i f i ed annex.Object ive 2: Deta i l s on t h i s ob jec t ive can be found in thec l a s s i f i ed annex. State)Object ive 3: Ass i s t e f for t s to enhance c i v i l i an control ands table const i tut ional government in Pakistan. State)

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Ju ly 1 - September 30, 2010, Repor t ing Per iod: Overa l l ,i nd ica to rs and metr ics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive remained s t a t i cduring t h i s repor t ing per iod .During t h i s quar te r , the s t a b i l i t y of Pak i s t an s c i v i l i angovernment was suscep t ib le to i n t e rn a l p o l i t i c a l cha l l enges andfaced f resh obs tac les posed by exogenous fac to rs . His to r ic andunprecedented f looding t ha t began in l a t e July placedPrime M inis te r Gi lani , Pres ident Zardar i , and the c i v i l i anbureaucracy under heavy c r i t i c i sm for i t s underperformance inthe f lood response. This pressure was bo ls te red by a growingconf ron ta t ion between the Supreme Court and the government oversanc t ions to prosecu te Pres ident Zardar i and o ther top l eadersfor corrupt ion . Negot ia t ions on t h i s i s sue cont inued throughoutthe r epor t ing per iod , but no c lea r consensus on a pa th to changethe government emerged.Evolving p o l i t i c a l t ens ions were inf luenced by a s tagnant andf r a g i l e economic s i t ua t ion . Record f looding slowed economicgrowth, espec ia l ly in the agr icu l tura l sec to r and causedb i l l i ons of do l l a rs worth of damage. The World Bank and AsianDevelopment Bank es t imated damages a t 9.7 b i l l i o n andrecons t ruct ion cos ts a t 7.7 to 9.1 b i l l i on - cos ts t ha tinc reased Pak i s t an s dependency on fore ign ass i s t ance andfu r the r exposed the c i v i l i an government 's capaci ty problems.The government at tempted to implement s t ruc tu r a l reforms to putthe economy on a pos i t ive t r a jec tory ; for example, t made someprogress in r a t i o n a l i z i n g energy pr ices t h i s quar te r byi nc rea s ing e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e s as p a r t of a January 1, 2010,agreement with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.However, p o l i t i c a l pre ssure s prevented implementa t ion ofimpor tant reforms, such as much needed tax-reform l e g i s l a t i on ,which remained s t a l l ed a t the end of t h i s r epor t ing per iod . Asa resu l t , the In te rna t iona l Monetary Fund IMF) t emporar i lypaused i t s Stand-By Arrangement with Pakis tan , withholding thetwo remaining t ranches ( to t a l ing 3.6 b i l l i on ) un t i l meaningfulreforms are implemented.The government 's e f fo r t s to address the severe humanitar ianc r i s i s resu l t ing from the summer f loods a f fec ted inves tment inpeop le s welfare dur ing t h i s repor t ing per iod . Many ongoingPaki s t an i and i n t e rna t iona l e f fo r t s to inves t in l ivel ihoods andsocio-economic development were d iver ted o r suspended to addressemergency f lood r e l i e f , as mil l ions of Pakis tanis were displacedthroughout the country .

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We cont inued to deepen our re l a t ionsh ip with Pakis tan duringt h i s repor t ing per iod . The hal lmark of t h i s par tne r sh ip i s theUnited Sta tes -Pak is tan St ra teg ic Dialogue, a means for improvingmutual t ru s t , promoting long- term s t ab i l i t y , and support ingdevelopment ob jec t ives impor tant to the people of Pakistan.Sec re t a ry Cl in ton and then-Fore ign Minis te r Qureshi convened am in i s t e r i a l - l e ve l se ss ion of the United Sta tes -Pak is tanSt ra teg ic Dialogue on Ju ly 19 in Islamabad, during which theyreviewed progress of working groups focused on defense, economicdevelopment, energy, soc ia l i s sues , and water . The UnitedSta tes a l so unvei l ed 17 new pro jec t s valued up to 690 mil l ion ,inc luding s ignature pro jec t s in energy, water , and hea l th .United Sta tes diplomat ic engagement a l so helped to br ingIslamabad and Kabul c lose r toge ther , as evidenced by Pak i s t an sr a t i f i c a t i o n of the Afghanis tan-Pakis tan Trans i t TradeAgreement.October 1 December 31, 2010, Repor t ing Per iod: Overal l ,i nd ica to rs and metrics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive remained s t a t i cduring t h i s r epor t ing per iod .P ak i s t an s c i v i l i an l eadership cont inued to face p o l i t i c a l ,economic, and secur i ty chal lenges during t h i s quar te r . Publ icdialogue focused on po ten t i a l changes in the na t iona lgovernment. While t ens ions between the Supreme Court andPres ident Zardar i cont inued over cor rup t ion cases r e l a t e d to theNat ional Reconc i l ia t ion Ordinance NRO) the Supreme Courts topped a c t i v e l y pursuing t h i s i ssue by the end of the repor t ingper iod . The Pakis tan People s Par ty (PPP}-led ru l ing c oa l i t i onfaced cha l l enges from c oa l i t i on par tne r s and the oppos i t ion oni s sues of corrupt ion , government performance, and economicreform. In an e f fo r t to address some of these concerns , thegovernment cont inued plans to e l imina te severa l Federa l - levelmini s t r i e s whose funct ions could be devolved to provinces underthe 18th Amendment; f ive mini s t r i e s were devolved in ea r lyDecember and a dead l ine of June 30, 2011, was se t for complet ionof the devolut ion process . Also, Prime Minis te r Gi lani in ea r lyNovember announced t ha t he would reshuf f l e h i s cabine t inDecember.The government c oa l i t i on remained i n t ac t a t the end of therepor t ing per iod , but not without chal lenge from c oa l i t i onpar tne r s and opposi t ion leaders on economic i s sues , such as thereformed General Sales Tax (RGST). The IMF mission t r ave led toPakis tan from October 27 to November 5 to discuss progress onreforms the government pledged to make as par t of i t s Stand-ByArrangement (SBA). During t h i s repor t ing per iod , the governmentdid increase petroleum pr ices and power t a r i f f s , but t

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cont inued to face severe gas and energy shor tages , and pos t f lood economic growth momentum remained adverse ly af fec ted ,espec ia l ly in the a gr i c u l tu r a l sec to r . While the cabine tapproved the RGST during t h i s repor t ing per iod , the Par l iamentwas unable to pass i t , given lack of support from both theMuttahida Quami Movement MQM) and Pakis tan Muslim League-NawazPML-N) .Heated publ ic debate on Pak is tan s blasphemy law dominated theheadl ines when Aasia Bibi , a Pakis tani Chr i s t i an woman, wassen tenced to dea th for defaming the Prophet Mohammed and wasscheduled to be hanged in November. Pres ident Zardar i reques tedt ha t the Min i s t ry of Minori ty Affa i r s conduct an i nves t iga t ionin to the case and Punjab Governor Salman Taseer met with Bibipersona l ly . Other c i v i l soc ie ty ac t iv i s t s urged the Lahore HighCourt to t ake up an appeal and PPP Par l iamenta r ian Sherry Rehmant ab led amendments to the law in Parl iament . The publ ic debateon t h i s i s sue re f lec ted d iv i s ions in Pakis tani soc ie ty on ther igh t s of re l ig ious minor i t i e s , i nc rea s ing pre ssure ongovernment e f fo r t s to inves t in peop le s wel fa re and improvehuman r igh ts .Although we have begun l ay ing the foundat ion for a s t r a t e g i cpar tne r sh ip based on mutual respec t and t r u s t through inc reaseddia logue , improved cooperat ion , and enhanced ass i s t anceprograms, Pak i s t an s dec is ion in October to t emporar i ly s top theflow of NATO and ISAF suppl ies in to Afghanis tan in response toNATO and ISAF he l i cop te r incurs ions t ha t k i l l ed th ree Pakis taniFron t ie r Scouts r e f l e c t the s t i l l - f r a g i l e na ture of ourpar tne r sh ip . The United Sta tes -Pak is tan St ra teg ic Dialogue inOctober in Washington led to improved re la t ions , and the newst ha t Pres ident Obama would v i s i t Pakis tan in 2011 was warmlyreceived.January 1 - March 2011, Post -Report ing Period: Pol i t i ca ldevelopments during t h i s repor t ing per iod r e f l e c t thegovernment s i n a b i l i t y to achieve p o l i t i c a l consensus on keyeconomic reform i ssues . PPP t ens ions with c oa l i t i on par tne r scame to a head i n e a r l y 2011 when the Q l e f t the government inprotes t agains t proposed fue l h ikes . The Q re turned to thec oa l i t i on a week l a t e r when the government reversed the fue lpr ice increase . Prime Minis te r G i la n i s beleaguered governmenti s st ll bese t by demands from the opposi t ion to address a rangeof governance, economic, and j ud i c i a l i s sues .The Pakis tani government cont inued to go through severa lp o l i t i c a l changes dur ing t h i s per iod . In l a t e February,Prime Minis te r Gi lani r eshuf f led the cabine t , as promised, and

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in the process removed Shah Mahmood Qureshi as theForeign Minis te r . The s l o t remains vacant , with Gilanitemporar i ly assuming the por t fo l io . I t i s unc lear who wi l lassume r e s pons ib i l i t y fo r the next round of the United Sta tes Pakis tan St ra teg ic Dialogue.As a r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l gr id lock, the government cont inues tobe unable to develop consensus on d i f f i c u l t economic and f i sca lreforms t ha t are urge nt ly requi red , inc luding sys temic taxreform. There has been no progress in cu t t ing subs id ies tosta te-owned en te rp r i ses and continued government borrowing fromthe cen t ra l bank and pr iva te sec to r sus ta ins Pak i s t an s economiccha l lenges . Government spending continued to ou t s t r i p revenues,and the f i sca l de f i c i t may h i t 8.5 percent of GDP by the end ofthe f i sca l year in June. During the pos t - r epor t ing per iod ,Pak is tan s Finance Minis t ry engaged in t a lks with the IMF inhopes of reviv ing IMF disbursements . The d e t e r i o ra t i o n ofPak is tan s economy and slow progress on economic reforms posesthe g re a t e s t th rea t to Pak is tan s s t a b i l i t y over the mediumterm.Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was assas s ina ted in January by oneof h i s secur i ty guards who opposed Taseer s s tance on the needto reform P ak i s t an s blasphemy law. In March, Minori ty Affa i r sMinis te r Shahbaz Bhat t i was assass inated , a l so for support ingchanges to the blasphemy law. The Pakis tani government sresponse to the evolving blasphemy law debate cont inues to bemuted, and in turn , has inc reased the p o l i t i c a l space forext remis t voices to dominate the publ ic debate.Pres ident Obama and Pres ident Zardar i met in Washington inJanuary to discuss the b i l a t e r a l re l a t ionsh ip - a meeting t ha twas welcomed by the Pakis tani government and seen as a pre ludeto Pres ident Zarda r i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t to the United Sta tes l a t e rin 2011, as well as r e s i d e ~ t Obama s in tended v i s i t to Pakis tanl a t e r in the year. The inc ident involving the shoot ing deathsof two armed Paki s t an i men in Lahore by U.S. o f f i c i a l RaymondDavis on January 27 dominated the re l a t ionsh ip for much of t h i sper iod , while the United Sta tes and Pakis tani governmentsdisputed the mat te r of Davis s dip lomat ic immunity. Davis wasre leased from Pakis tani custody on March 16.Object ive 4:capabi l i t i e st error i s t and

Develop Pakistan s counterinsurgency COIN)continue to support Pakis tan s e f for ts to defeatinsurgent groups. DOD)

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Ju ly 1 - September 30, 2010, Repoyting Per iod: Overal l ,i nd ica to rs and metrics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive remained unchangedduring t h i s r epor t ing per iod .Pak i s t an s COIN opera t ions dur ing t h i s repor t ing pe r iod weredrama t i ca l ly impacted by the unprecedented monsoon f looding t ha tcovered one - f i f t h of Pak is tan s land area from the end of Julythrough ea r ly October. The f loods impeded Pak i s t an s m i l i t a rycampaign agains t Tehr ik -e-Tal iban Pak i s tan TTP) elements in theFATA and Tehr ik-e-Nefaz e Shar ia t e Muhammad TNSM) m i l i t a n t s inKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP). As an example, smal l -scaleopera t ions tha t were ongoing in Orakzai Agency were cur t a i l ed .Pak i s t an s m i l i ta ry immediately recognized the d i s a s t e r r e l i e fimperat ive and sh i f ted about 70,000 Pakis tani se c u r i t y fo rces tof lood r e l i e f func t ions . Many of these fo rces were a l ready inf lood- impacted areas and were re-miss ioned in place . Them i l i t a ry a l so a l loca ted v i r t u a l l y a l l of the a i r a s se t s in theborder reg ion to f lood r e l i e f , depriv ing them of a s se t s t ha tf a c i l i t a t e c lose a i r suppor t and the i n se r t i o n and ex t rac t ion ofground fo rces for of fens ive ac t ions . (Weather condi t ions a t thet ime would have l i ke l y impacted offens ive m i l i t a ry opera t ions inthe same manner as they impeded r e l i e f f l i gh t s , regardless ofthe need to address urgent humanitar ian requirements on theground. )Paki s t an i forces worked e f fec t ive ly with u.S. forces a t aceh t ra l l og i s t i c s hub a t Pakis tan Air Force PAF) Base Chakla laand two of Pak i s t an s forward r e l i e f bases (Ghazi A ir f i e ld inthe nor th , and Pano Aqil Cantonment in the south) , f a c i l i t a t i n gthe movement of over 26 mil l ion pounds of r e l i e f suppl ies ,inc luding de l ive ry of over 436,000 ha la l meals within the f i r s t72 hours , and a l so t r anspor t ing over 44,000 s t randed people fromf lood-af fec ted areas . The United Sta tes provided over

110 mil l ion in as s i s tance , inc luding 596 mil l ion of emergencyr e l i e f and 95 mil l ion of i n -k ind ass i s t ance . Pak i s t an sm i l i t a ry f ac i l i t a t ed the temporary deployment of u .S . m i l i t a ryC-17 and C-130 t r anspor t a i r c r a f t and 30 he l i cop te rs of var ioustypes and provided naviga t iona l ass i s tance to u.S. r escuef l i gh t s . While not exp l i c i t l y r e l a t e d to the ongoing COINopera t ions , e f fo r t s by the m i l i t a ry to provide d i r e c t suppor t toan imper i l ed popula t ion have pos i t ive e f f e c t s on ves t ing thepopula t ion with the na t iona l government, espec ia l ly when thoseimpacted c i t i z e ns a re in areas t ha t are a l so facing th rea t s frominsurgents .

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The ne t e f f e c t of the f lood, however, was t ha t the of fens ivem i l i t a ry opera t ions Pakis tan had envis ioned for KP and the F Tin the second ha l f of 2010 were over taken by events . Mil i tan t swere impacted by the f loods as well , so we did not observes ign i f i c a n t of fens ive act ions on t h e i r s ide , but as Pakis taniforces ceased offens ive opera t ions , ex t remis ts extended t h e i rcontro l to areas without s u f f i c i e n t Pakis tani cen t ra lgovernment-provided secur i ty and governance. This h igh l igh t s al a rg e r cha l l enge Pak i s tan i s facing. As India cont inues todominate t h e i r s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t percept ion , la rge elements ofPak i s t an ' s m i l i t a ry remain committed to mainta in ing a r a t i o ofPaki s t an i to Ind ian fo rces along the eas te rn border . Thisdeprives the Pakis tani COIN f igh t of s u f f i c i e n t forces toachieve i t s clear ob jec t ives and suppor t the hold e f fo r t s ,while encouraging pre-engagement ae r i a l bombardment t ha tinc reases the number of displaced persons, and causing ava i lab leArmy fo rces to be bogged down with hold a c t i v i t i e s becausethe re are i n s u f f i c i e n t t ra ined c i v i l i an law enforcementpersonne l to assume t ha t respons ib i l i ty .October 1 December 31, 2010, Report ing Period: Overal l ,i nd ica to rs and metr ics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive remained unchangeddur ing t h i s r epor t ing per iod .Pakis tani secur i ty fo rces remained l a rge ly s t a t i c dur ing t h i srepor t ing per iod , genera l ly focusing on mainta in ing the secur i tyof prev ious ly cleared areas in the F T and KP 'and cont inuing tosuppor t f lood r e l i e f opera t ions . There were smal l but notablesecur i ty opera t ions in November and December in Orakzai Agencyand Dir Di s t r i c t , but no major opera t ions . Nat iona l a t t en t iondur ing the repor t ing per iod focused on the need for continuedf lood r e l i e f and the s t a r t of ea r ly recovery e f f o r t s . Them i l i t a ry served as a force of s t a b i l i t y dur ing the monsoons,ensuring t ha t Paki s t an i and i n t e rna t iona l emergency resourceswere ava i lab le for rescue and r e l i e f opera t ions . The Pakis tanArmy, Air Force, and Navy committed la rge numbers of personneland resources to the f lood r e l i e f opera t ions throughout Octoberand November. Their involvement continued a t a reduced l eve lthroughout the month of December as f lood waters f i na l ly s t a r t e dto recede from 618,511 acres of land submerged by f lood water a tthe end of November to 284,846 acres of land submerged by f loodwater a t the end of December. The c iv i l i a n -m i l i t a ry na ture ofthe Nat iona l Disas te r Management Author i ty f ac i l i t a t ed e f fec t ivecooperat ion with U.S. and other i n t e rna t iona l r e l i e f personnel .The c i v i l i an government 's response su f fe red from a lack ofcoordina t ion and re f lec ted broader shortcomings in thegovernment 's a b i l i t y to execute the c i v i l i an hold and buildphases of COIN. In addi t ion , there were well -publ ic ized ( though

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smal l in scope) ins tances where re l ig ious groups some withext remis t a f f i l i a t i o n s f i l l e d the vacuum and es tab l i shed t he i rown r e l i e f e f fo r t s . Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa leveragedt h e i r extens ive network in Punjab and Sindh in t h i s manner,s imi la r to the ro le they played dur ing the 2005 ear thquaker e l i e f e f fo r t .By law, Pak i s t an ' s m i l i t a ry i s a f i r s t responder for disas te r sof t h i s s i ze and t led the way for conduct ing f lood r e l i e fopera t ions in coordina t ion with NDMA which es tab l i shed thep r i o r i t i e s for r e l i e f and ea r ly recovery. Furthermore, NDMAcha i red da i ly f lood coordina t ion meetings with sen io rrep resen ta t ives from the Pakis tan mil i t a ry , governmentmini s t r i e s , nongovernmental organiza t ions (NGOs), donors, andi n t e rna t iona l organ iza t ions . In addi t ion , the Provinc ia lDisas te r Management Author i t i e s , while g re a t l y underresourced,worked d i l i g e n t l y to pa r tne r with the Army Corps Headquarters int h e i r respect ive areas to coord ina te the l og i s t i c s of the r e l i e fand recovery e f fo r t s .Cooperation between United Sta tes and Paki s t an i m i l i t a ry forces,as well as between Pakis tani forces and ISAF in RegionalCommands East and South in Afghanistan, cont inued dur ing therepor t ing per iod . Improved coordina t ion between the Pakis tanim i l i t a ry and t h e i r ISAF counte rpar t s resu l t ed in continuedincrementa l progress in complementary opera t ions t ha t began in2010, and enabled successful ISAF i n t e rd i c t i on of insurgentsf l ee ing Paki s t an i m i l i t a ry opera t ions i n to Afghanistan. Also,Secur i ty ass i s tance focused on COIN continued to f low. But thel a s t quar te r of 2010 saw no progress on e f f e c t ive ly execut ingthe COIN cycle in KP and the FATA.There were some setbacks to the overa l l re l a t ionsh ip in the l a s tquar te r of 2010. On September 30, an acc iden ta l engagement byan ISAF he l i cop te r aga ins t a Fron t ie r Scouts un i t re su l t ed in atemporary pause in mil i ta ry cooperat ion as the inc iden t wasinves t iga ted ; t ens ions aba ted r e l a t i ve l y quickly . Whilereg re t t ab le , the r eac t ion from the sen io r Pakis tan m i l i t a ryl eadership was fa r l e s s dramat ic and severe than in previousc ross -borde r mishaps and created an oppor tuni ty to discussb i l a t e r a l l y how to prevent s imi la r inc iden ts in the fu ture .Mi l i t an t s a l so used the temporary cessa t ion of U.S. t r a f f i c a tthe Torkham border cross ing to a t t ack NATO supply shipments t ha twere awai t ing passage to Afghanistan.Sec re t a ry Clinton announced a s ign i f i c a n t enhancement to thesecur i ty and re l a t ionsh ip dur ing the Washington meeting of theUnited Sta tes -Pak is tan St ra teg ic Dialogue in October: a new,

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mult i -year u.s. commitment to seek secur i ty a ss i s t ance fundingfor Pakis tan from the Congress. The foundat ion of t h i scommitment i s the progress made dur ing 2010 through theExchanges on Defense Planning, in which Pakis tan has developed as t r a t egy - to - t a s ks - t o - capab i l i t i e s approach to planning andprogramming i t s defense requirements . The commitment inc ludes areques t to the Congress for 2 b i l l i on in Foreign Mil i t a ryFinancing FMF) and 29 mil l ion i n In t e rna t iona l Mi l i t a ryEducat ion and Training IMET) funding over a 5-year per iod(F iscal Years 2012-2016). FMF provides the foundat ion forPak i s t an s long- term defense modernizat ion. In addi t ion , theIMET commitment wi l l al low Pakis tan i mi l i t a r y personnel theoppor tuni ty to t r a i n alongside t he i r u.s. counterpar ts , whichwi l l he lp c rea t e deepened personal re l a t ionsh ips and enhance ours t r a t eg ic par tne r sh ip . IMET funding was suspended along witho the r secur i ty ass i s t ance during the decade- long per iod ofPress l e r Sanct ions , depr iv ing a genera t ion of Pakis tan i of f i ce r sof an oppor tuni ty to a t t end courses in the United Sta t e s t ha timpart our values for c i v i l i a n contro l of the mil i t a ry , humanr igh t s , mi l i t a r y organiza t ion , and opera t ional planning, amongo the r th ings . In add i t ion to FMF and IMET, the commitment toseek Pakis tan Counter insurgency Capabi l i t i e s Fund PCCF)resources based on on- the-ground requirements i s an impor tantenabler in our e f f o r t to he lp Pakis tan with the t r a i n ing andequipment t ha t i s most re levant to the COIN chal lenges theyface.qanuary 1 - March, 2011 Post -Report ing Per iod: As highl igh tedby a s t r ing of se r ious a t t acks on Pakis tan i secur i ty forces andiri publ ic ga ther ing p laces inc luding markets and schools , thesecur i ty s i tua t lon in the FATA and KP has de t e r i o r a t e d s ince theresumption of f igh t ing in the l a s t pa r t of 2010.In January, Pakis tan mi l i t a r y and parami l i t a ry un i t s beganOperat ion BREKHNA an e f f o r t to c l ea r mi l i t an t s from MohmandAgency using 6,000 Pakis tan i s e c u r i t y forces along withIn t e l l i gence , Survei l l ance , and Reconnaissance (ISR) asse t s andISAF ground t roops and f i r e suppor t on the Afghanis tan s ide ofthe border . This e f f o r t expanded to include some opera t ions inneighbor ing Bajaur Agency. I t i s impor tant to note t ha t t h i s i sthe t h i rd t ime in the pas t 2 years tha t the Army has had toconduct major c lea r ing opera t ions in the same agency; a c l ea ri nd ica tor of the i nab i l i t y of the Pakis tan mi l i t a r y andgovernment to render c lea red areas r e s i s t an t to insurgentre turn. Similar ly , Paki s t an s mi l i t a r y he l i copte r f l ee t , a keyCOIN enabler , remains bese t by low opera t ional readiness r a tesexacerbated by Pakis tan i r e luc t ance to accept U.S.-providedhe l i copte r maintenance teams. While Phase I of BREKHNA has

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c lea red some areas , the opera t ion has ye t to proceed to thec r i t i c a l hold and bui ld phases of COIN.Operat ion BREKHN h igh l igh t s a few of the recur r ing cha l l engesassoc ia t ed with conduct ing COIN in Pakis tan . The m i l i t a ryo r i g i n a l l y in tended the opera t ion to be completed in a fewweeks, but has s ince extended the t imeframe i n to a t l e a s t Apr i l .Adversoe weather , underes t imated m i l i t a n t r e s i s t an ce ,re se t t l ement of i n t e rna l ly disp laced persons (IDPs), and thed i scovery of seve ra l l a rge caches of improvised explos ivedev ices (IEDs) have a l l hampered ongoing opera t ions , but whatremains vexing i s the lack of any ind ica t ion of hold and

bui ld p lann ing or s t ag ing e f fo r t s to complement ongoingc lea r ing opera t ions . As such, t he re remains no c l e ~ pathtoward de fea t ing the insurgency in Pakis tan , desp i t e theunprecedented and sus t a ined deployment of over 147,000 fo rces(up from around 80,000 in 2001-2003) . Pak is tan ' s secur i tyfo rces made t remendous human s a c r i f i c e s (2 ,575 k i l l e d in ac t ionand over 8,500 wounded s ince 2001) .As noted in the 2010 APAR, the den ia l of ext remis t sa fe havensin Pakis tan cannot be achieved through m i l i t a ry means a lone , bu tmust con t inue to be advanced by e f fec t ive developments t r a t e g i e s . One of the key cha l l enges for Pakis tan wi l l be toensure t h a t adequate c i v i l i an law enforcement personnel a reava i lab le t o f ree up the Army to pursue f l ee ing m i l i t a n t s .Pakis tan a l so needs to conso l ida te the gains t ha t t has made inprev ious c lear e f fo r t s in Khyber, Orakzai , and Kurram Agenciesand r e s e t t l e IDPs.In s p i t e of s t r a ins on the r e l a t i o n s h ip stemming from thede ten t ion of u.s. o f f i c i a l Raymond Davis in Lahore, b i l a t e r a lm i l i t a ry cooperat ion con t inues on a p o s i t i v e t r a j e c t o ry . Recente f f o r t s have focused on ensuring t h a t m i l i t a ry opera t ions byPak is tan ' s 11th Corps in the Northern F T a re coord ina ted withISAF and ANSF opera t ions designed to ca tch f l e e ing m i l i t a n t s asthey cross the border i n to Afghanis tan . Simi la r ly , we have seenpos i t ive coord ina t ion between ISAF opera t ions in RegionalCommand-South and corresponding ac t ions by Pakis tan Army 12thCorps l e ade rsh ip . Unfortunately , desp i t e the success of thefour Border Coordinat ion Centers BCC) in Afghanis tan , we st llhave not seen a funct ioning BCC es tab l i shed on Pakis tanit e r r i t o r y (as pledged in the May 2009 j o in t s ta tement of thel a s t t r i l a t e r a l meeting between the United Sta tes , Afghanis tan ,and Pakis tan) .

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Object ive 5: Involve the intern t ion l community more c t ive lyto forge an intern t ion l consensus to s t b i l i z e Pakistan(S ta te )J u l y 1 - September 30, 2010 Report ing Period: Overa l l ,ind ica to r s and metr ics aga ins t t h i s objec t ive increased s l i gh t l ydur ing t h i s repor t ing per iod .The Government of Pak i s tan GOP) and donors demonstra tedconsensus on the objec t ive s of i n t e rna t iona l ass i s tance andshowed some progress in a l ign ing budgets with GOP p r i o r i t i e s ,but Paki s t an i p o l i t i c a l w i l l cont inued to r e s t r a i n progresstoward coord ina t ion of ass i s tance and a sus ta inab le impact onPak is tan s economic, p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty cha l l enges . Forexample, the GOP did not respond to reques ts from Tokyo donorssuch as the United Arab Emirates UAE) and Turkey for p r o j ec tproposals t h a t would f a c i l i t a t e the disbursement o f Tokyopledges .The GOP engaged key donors, as demonstra ted by the workinggroups to fol low up on the Uni ted Sta tes -Pak is tan S t ra teg icDialogue, the August 19 and September 19 spec ia l se ss ions onPakis tan f loods a t the Uni ted Nations (U.N.) in New York,P ak i s t an s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the Friends of Democratic Pakis tan

FODP) meet ing in Brusse l s , and the GOP's dec i s ion to host thePakis tan Development Forum in November. At the reques t of theGOP, the U.N. in September t e rmina ted the con t rac t of Spec ia lEnvoy Riper t , and with in a week rep laced him with a Turkishdiplomat , Engin Soysal . Soysal immediately v i s i t e d Pakis tan ,inc lud ing the f lood-a f fec t ed regions , and began coord ina t ingwith the EU on the agenda fo r the FO P meet ing t h a t was to t akep lace wi th in 3 weeks of h is appointment .Headed by i t s capable and exper ienced Chairman, formerLieu tenan t General Nadeem Ahmed, the Nat ional Disas te rManagement Author i ty e f f e c t i v e l y coordinated p r i o r i t i e s tof a c i l i t a t e the e f f i c i e n t use of ass i s tance from donors dur ingthe f lood c r i s i s .

In response to the h i s t o r i c f loods t h a t s t a r t e d in l a t e Ju ly ,the U.N.' presen ted an ea r ly recovery p l an and an adjus tment oft h e i r Pakis tan Floods Emergency Response Plan, announced onSeptember 17 and i s sued a f l a sh appeal for 2 b i l l i o n in r e l i e fand ea r ly recovery support from the i n t e rna t iona l community.Separa te from the f lood appeal , the U.N. a l so rev i sed i t sPakis tan Humani tar ian Response Plan (PHRP), which appealed tothe i n t e rna t iona l community to support programs fo r c o n f l i c t a f f ec t ed i n t e rna l ly displaced persons and re tu rnees . The

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appeal , which i n i t i a l l y ca l l ed for 5 3 7 ~ 8 mil l ion , was re issuedin Ju ly to reques t a t o t a l of $663.1 mil l ion fo r pro jec t sthrough December 2010. On September 28, the U.N. i ssued a

Pr io r i t i z a t i on Statement to expla in the re l a t ionsh ip betweenthe PHRP and the Pak i s tan Floods Emergency Response Plan. TheHumanitarian Country Team, a group of U.N. and humanitar ianorganiza t ions opera t ing in country , i de n t i f i e d about 2.6 mil l ionpeople in two broad benef ic ia ry groups - displaced persons in KP(about 1 .1 mil l ion out s ide of camps and about 65,000 in camps)as wel l as re turnees (about 300,000) and those who s tayed (about1.1 mill ion) in F T - to be pr i o r i t i zed under the PHRP. As ofmid-September, about 4 percent of the needed funding had beenpledged to the PHRP. The United Sta tes Government cont inues tobe the l ead donor for humanitar ian ass i s tance in Pakis tan andhas con t r ibu ted almost 49 percent of the PHRP con t r ibu t ionsrece ived thus fa r . The United Sta tes Government has been vocalin c a l l i ng on i n t e rna t iona l donors to con t r ibu te to thehumanitar ian r e l i e f , recovery, and r econs t ruc t ion e f fo r t s forf lood-a f fec ted persons , as wel l as c onf l i c t - a f f e c t e d persons .Donors have made some progress toward conveying a common messageof the p o l i t i c a l and economic reforms the GOP must implement foras s i s tance to be e f fec t ive . The i n t e rna t iona l community sent as t rong common message on the need for reforms during theSeptember 19 meeting on the margins of the U.N. General Assemblyin New York. However, there cont inues to be littl progress bythe GOP in genera t ing the i n t e rn a l consensus necessary for thereforms to progress .Follow-up from a j o in t United Sta tes-Japanese demarche to donorc a p i t a l s to l ea rn the s ta tus of Tokyo pledges ind ica ted progressin designing and de l ive r ing ass i s tance plans . In f ac t somedonors are now de l ive r ing as s i s tance beyond the pledges theymade a t the conference. Likewise, the World Bank Mult i-DonorTrust Fund, designed to suppor t loca l and prov inc ia l governmentspending in KP FATA and conf l ic t -a f fec ted areas ofBalochis tan , has repor ted a sum of $130 mil l ion in commitmentsfrom donors; however, many donors had not t r a n s fe r r e d t h e i rcon t r ibu t ions by the end of the ra t ing per iod . Theimplementa t ion of Tokyo pledges i s l i ke l y to remain gradual ,espec ia l ly as donors t r y to work with slow GOP bureauc ra t i cmechanisms. In many cases Tokyo pledges are l i ke l y to bedisbursed for f lood r e l i e f , recovery, o r recons t ruct ion , r a t h e rthan for t h e i r or ig ina l ly in tended purposes . We have made aconcer ted e f f o r t to a l ign FYI0 ass i s tance with the GOP budget ,and roughly 50 percent of U.S. ass i s tance wi l l be channeled v iaPaki s t an i implementers respons ib le fo r de l ive ry of key se rv icessuch as hea l th and educat ion, support ing pro jec t s tha t are on

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the Federa l and prov inc ia l budgets . As noted in the AnnualReview, our ass i s tance c l e a r l y communicates the U.S. commitmentto a long- term r e l a t i o n s h ip t h a t i s support ive of P ak i s t an si n t e r e s t s and underscores t h a t we w i l l not disengage from theregion as we have in the pas t .Cooperat ion between Afghanis tan and Pakis tan showed some s ignsof progress t h i s quar te r . M i l it a ry - t o -m i l it a ry r e l a t io n simproved with good in fo rmat ion shar ing on opera t ions occur r ingon both s ide s of the border . While engagement between theAfghans and Paki s t an i s on the c i v i l i an s ide remains i r r e g u l a r ,A fg h an i s t an s 1 mil l ion con t r ibu t ion of a i r support to thef lood r e l i e f e f f o r t was a p o s i t i v e development in there l a t ionsh ip . There was work ing- leve l cooperat ion betweenAfghan and Pakis tani c i v i l i an o f f i c i a l s in some areas of mutuali n t e r e s t , such as j o i n t mini s t e r i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a t the WorldFood Summit in Des Moines.October 1 - December 31, 2010 Report ing Per iod: Overa l l ,ind ica to r s and metr ics aga ins t t h i s objec t ive dec l ined dur ingt h i s repor t ing pe r iod .During t h i s qua r t e r , the United Sta tes Government disbursed over

206 mil l ion in c i v i l i an ass i s tance and over 82.4 mil l ion inm i l i t a ry ass i s tance to Pakis tan , cont inuing a modest upwardt r end on the c i v i l i an s ide . As of December 2010, the U.S.Embassy repor ted t ha t in t o t a l , the United S t a t e s Agency fo rI n t e r n a t i o n a l Development USAID) has disbursed 877.9 mil l ionin c i v i l i an as s i s t an ce s ince the passage of Kerry-Lugar-Berrnanl e g i s l a t i on in f a l l 2009, not inc lud ing emergency humanitar ianass i s tance . While some new programs a re underway, t w i l l t aket ime fo r o the r pro jec t s , pa r t i c u l a r ly l a rge i n f r s t r u c t u r ~pro jec t s , to be fu l l y implemented.The United Sta tes Government, pr imar i ly USAID, channeled about50 percen t of FY10 Kerry-Lugar-Berman funding d i r e c t l y throughGOP i n s t i t u t i ons , which suppor t s Pakis tani p r i o r i t i e s while a l sobui ld ing loca l capac i ty . Cont inual dia logue between theMin i s t ry of Finance and the Embassy r e s u l t ed in a d e t a i l e d planfor a l ign ing U.S. FY10 ass i s tance with P ak i s t an s budget ,a l though some 310 mil l ion wa.s r ed i rec ted to suppor t f loodrecons t ruc t ion . In add i t ion , 190 mil l ion was pledged to supportthe GOP's C i t i z e n s Damage Compensation Fund, i t s highes tp r i o r i t y f lood recovery program. The United Sta tes a l sode l ive red approximate ly 516 mil l ion in emergency humanitar ianf lood r e l i e f .

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Major i n t e rna t iona l par tne r s held two conferences in t h i squar te r - the FO P hosted by the European Union in October, andthe Pak i s tan Development Forum in Islamabad in November. Themeet ings marked the t r a ns i t i on from emergency r e l i e f from thesummer f looding to a r e tu rn to long- te rm development andeconomic reform p r i o r i t i e s . Day-to-day ass i s tance coord ina t ionimproved through the e f f o r t s of the new U.N. Specia l Envoy RaufEngin Soysal . Ambassador Soysal prev ious ly served as theTurki sh Ambassador to Pakis tan and as Ambassador Holbrooke 'sTurki sh counte rpar t as Specia l Represen ta t ive fo r Afghanis tanand Pakis tan SRAP) , and so he has s t rong working r e l a t i o n s h ip swith the GOP, donors, and major i n t e rna t iona l organ iza t ions .These improved coord ina t ion mechanisms r e s u l t ed i n concreteprogress over t h i s per iod , inc lud ing the conclus ion of a

180 mil l ion so f t loan from South Korea and cont inuingcon t r ibu t ions to the Mult i -Donor Trust Fund, now a t

140 mil l ion .The IMF s tandby agreement with Pakis tan has been on hold s inceAugust 2010 due to P ak i s t an s f a i l u re to implement neededrevenue and power s ec to r reforms, with the IMF withholding3.6 b i l l i o n un t i l progress i s made on meeting programbenchmarks inc lud ing Federa l and prov inc ia l t ax reformimplementa t ion; implementa t ion of e l e c t r i c i t y s ec to r reform; andimproved budget d i sc i p l i n e to reduce the f i s c a l d e f i c i t .Consis tent i n t e rna t iona l engagement he lped the GOP under takeimpor tan t p o l i c y e f fo r t s , inc lud ing Cabinet approva l of theAfghan i s tan-Pak i s tan Trans i t Trade Agreement APTTA) onDecember I , 2010, and cons t ruc t ive dia logue on f i s c a l reform.A Department of Sta te survey showed t ha t 66 percen t o fPaki s t an i s s a id they want to see t h e i r count ry make e f fo r t s toimprove r e l a t i o n s with Kabul, and 57 percen t o f Paki s t an i sagreed t h a t Pakis tan and Afghanis tan share a common i n t e r e s t inf igh t ing t e r ro r i sm. However, only 47 percen t o f Paki s t an i s werein favor of Pakis tan and Afghanis tan working t oge the r to f igh tt e r ro r i sm, with 36 percen t opposed.

~ a n u a r y 1 - March 2011 post-Report i .ng Per iod: USAID has madee f f o r t s to focus U.S. ass i s tance e f f o r t s on a few key programst h a t wi l l a l low t to inc rease i t s r a t e of execut ion; however,secur i ty concerns con t inue to hinder implementa t ion.Discuss ions a re ongoing with the GOP on how t o f u r th e r a l i g nU.S. programs with P ak i s t an s p r i o r i t i e s and inc rease the amountof funds going through the GOP budget process and be ingimplemented by Pakis tani organiza t ions .

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The GOP wi l l al low f lood r e l i e f opera t ions to cont inue w h ~needed, even a f t e r having announced t ha t the r e l i e f phase of thef loods response ended on January 31, and i n s t ru c t i n g the U.N.Off ice for the Coordinat ion of Humanitarian Affa i r s OCHA) toreduce i t s foo tp r in t in Pakis tan as of March 30.Pakis tan and Afghanis tan agreed to delay the implementa t ion ofAPTTA for 4 months because of a disagreement on the prov i s ion ofbank guarantees for Afghan goods, and to al low fo r add i t iona lt ime to implement l og i s t i ca l safeguards .Object ive 6: In Afghanistan, reverse the Taliban s momentum andbui ld Afghan National Security Forces ANSF) capac i ty so that wecan begin to tr ns i t ion responsibi l i ty for securi ty to theAfghan government and decrease our troop presence by July 2011.DOD)

Ju ly 1 - September 30, 2010, Report ing Period: Overa l l ,i nd ica to rs and metrics aga ins t t h i s ob jec t ive improved modest lydur ing t h i s repor t ing per iod .This quar te r marked the e f f e c t i v e complet ion wi th the except ionof one headquarters element) of deploying the add i t iona l U.S.forces the Pres ident ordered to Afghanis tan , enabl ing ISAF andi t s -Afghan par tne r s to achieve new gains in con tes t ing keyinsurgent s t rongholds , pa r t i c u l a r ly in Helmand and KandaharProvinces. As of September 30, with the surge near ly complete,the re were approximately 97,000 U.S. fo rces and approximately49,000 o ther i n t e rna t iona l fo rces in Afghanis tan . This includedmost of the add i t iona l 30,000 U.S. t roops and approximately77 percent of the pledged 9,700 add i t iona l non-U.S. personnel .As an an t i c ipa ted r e su l t of the inc reased fo rce l eve l s andaccompanying inc reased opera t iona l tempo, v io len t inc iden tsinc reased overa l l through the repor t ing per iod , with l eve l s ofvio lence varying across the coun t ry s d i s t i nc t regions , butgenera l ly remaining 40-70 percent above 2009 l eve l s for t h i squar te r . The se c u r i t y environment in Afghanis tan improved insome areas , s t a b i l i z e d in some, and worsened in others , mostnotably in the nor th .Increased Spec ia l Operat ions Forces SOF) a c t i v i t i e s degradedinsurgent command and con t ro l and s t ra ined t he i r a b i l i t y toconduct e f fec t ive a t t acks . The cumulat ive e f f e c t of theseopera t ions was to reduce the overa l l amount of area where theinsurgency maintained s t rong inf luence . The Afghan Local Pol ice

ALP) program, formal ly approved by Pres ident Karzai in July ,

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a l so con t r ibu ted to t h i s e f fec t , demonstrat ing the po ten t i a l toimprove secur i ty in rura l d i s t r i c t s , degrade insurgent inf luencein key areas , and connect loca l popula t ions to the d i s t r i c t andprov inc ia l government.On August 19 COMISAF i ssued COMIS F Tact ica l Direct iveRev is ion 1, providing guidance and i n t en t for the employment offorce, s pe c i f i c a l l y regarding f i r e contro l measures wherec i v i l i ans may be present . The r ev i s ion c l a r i f i e s tha tsubordinate commanders are not author ized to r e s t r i c t theguidance fu r the r without approval and t ha t nothing in theguidance i s in tended to hinder an i nd iv idua l s r i gh t ofse l f -de fense . Overa l l , the d i r e c t i v e seeks to minimizeinc iden ts of c i v i l i an c a su a l t i e s CIVCAS) while mainta in ingforce pro tec t ion .Despite the inc rease in c oa l i t i on forces and a continued r i s e inviolence , c oa l i t i on -a t t r i bu t e d c i v i l i an c a su a l t i e s dec l ined by24 percent in t h i s quar te r , while i n su rgen t -a t t r ibu ted c i v i l i anc a su a l t i e s inc reased 77 percent . However, Afghans do notgenera l ly d i s t ingu i sh between coa l i t ion - and insurgent -causedcasua l t i e s , and in s tead tend to view vio lence wri t l a rge as ther e su l t of c oa l i t i on presence and ac t iv i ty .Overal l , the ANSF demonstrated mixed progress but improveds l i gh t l y during the quar te r , remaining genera l ly dependent onc oa l i t i on support for planning and complex opera t ions . In ea r lyAugust, an Afghan National Army ANA) ba t t a l i on conducted anindependent opera t ion without t h e i r mentors) in LaghmanProvince and su f fe red cons iderab le c a su a l t i e s in a Tal ibanambush. However, in l a t e August, the ANSF opera ted much moree f f e c t ive ly with ISAF in Malajat , Khandahar. The ANSF a l soperformed well and dea l t e f f e c t ive ly with most of the vio lenceduring the Par l iamentary e lec t ions of September 18, r e f l e c t i ngsome improvement in capab i l i ty .ANSF growth continued to be on t r ack t h i s quar te r , enabledthrough inc reased rec ru i t ing , reduced a t t r i t i o n , and improvedre t en t ion . In July , the ANA and the P.fghan Nat iona l Pol ice

~ ~ P ) both met t h e i r 2010 Jo in t Coordinat ion and MonitoringBoard JCMB) growth goals of 134,000 and 109,000 personnel ,r espec t ive ly , 3 months before the October 31, 2010, goal . Atthe end of the repor t ing period, the ANA and ANP s t r eng ths wereapproximately 139,000 and 120,000, r espec t ive ly , r e f l e c t i nggrowth of over 66,000 personnel from 1-year pr io r .At the i n s t i t u t i ona l l evel , ISAF has taken a number ofi n i t i a t i v e s to improve ANSF qua l i ty . Some of the major

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under tak ings include i nc rea s ing the number of t r a ine r s in thet r a i n i n g base to improve the qua l i ty of bas ic i n s t ruc t ion ,i nc rea s ing the number of l i t e racy t r a ine r s , and working with theGovernment of Afghanistan to s tandardize and ra i se pay andmodify pol ic ie s to improve re t en t ion . Leadership development i sano ther pr i o r i t y , and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan NTM-A)has i n s t i t u t e d severa l non-commissioned of f i c e r NCO) andof f i c e r l e ade rsh ip courses to inc rease profess iona l i sm withinthe force . NTM-A has b u i l t branch schools to provide spec i f i cs k i l l t r a i n i n g for the ANSF in areas such as combat arms,l og i s t i c s , engineering, and i n t e l l igence . As a r e s u l t of thesei n i t i a t i ves , the number of ANA of f i c e r and NCO personne lt r a i n i n g throughput has dramat ica l ly increased, which hasimproved the r a t i o of l eaders across the ANA. To make continuedga ins in the t r a i n i n g base, the i n t e rna t iona l community and theUnited Sta tes wi l l need to ill ISAF Combined Jo in t Statement ofRequirements CJSOR) commitments fo r NTM-A re la ted resources ,espec ia l ly t r a i ne r s .A major miles tone t h i s quar te r was Pres ident Karza i s s igning ofa decree for the Minis t ry of In t e r i o r MOl) tha t inc ludes anac t ive duty serv ice ob l iga t ion t ha t commits ANP of f i c e r s ande n l i s t e d p e ~ s o n n e l to spec i f i c ob l iga t ions fo r t ime in s e rv ice .This should help reduce a t t r i t i o n in the MOl forces and i s amajor s tep in Mor i n s t i t u t i ona l development.Of concern, ANA recru i tment of southern Pashtuns t rended downfrom 3.4 percent in January 2010 to 0.6 percent in September .In response to t h i s i ssue ; Minis te r of Defense Wardak dispa tcheda de lega t ion to implement severa l new i n i t i a t i v e s to inc reasesouthern Pashtun rec rui tment . These i n i t i a t i v e s include i n i t i a lt ra in ing a t loca l t r a i n i n g cen te r s and assignments in the southfor the i n i t i a l enl i s tment . The ANP l a rge ly r e c ru i t sregional ly , and it has been r e c ru i t i n g la rge numbers of southernPashtuns for the Afghan Uniformed Pol ice AUP) , as well as theAfghan Border Pol ice ABP). Since March 2010, near ly 50 percentof the r e c ru i t s in the south were Pashtun.The ISAF Generat ion ~ o n f e r e n e convened a t Supreme HeadquartersAll ied Powers Europe SHAPE) on September 22-23 with 50 na t ionsin a t t endance . The conference ob jec t ive was to gene ra t e fo rcesin response to the 1,417 unf i l l e d t r a i n e r requirementsi de n t i f i e d with the r e lease of ISAF CJSOR ve rs ion 10.these t r a i ne r pos i t ions requ i re spec ia l ty s k i l l se t s ,l og i s t i c s , i n t e l l igence , and engineering, in order to

Many ofsuch ashe lp bu i ldthe ANSF in fu ture years . The conference genera tedapproximate ly 600 add i t iona l i n s t i t u t i ona l t r a ine r s , f ive Pol iceOpera t iona l Mentor Lia i son Teams POMLTs), one Operat ional

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Mentor Lia i son Team OMLT), and 80 c r i t i c a l enabl ing personne l ,wi th 163 U.S. t r a ine r s inc luded among the 600. Of the remainingt r a i ne r sho r t f a l l , 442 pos i t ions are assessed as c r J t i c a lt r a i n i n g capab i l i t i e s .On September 27, the Jo in t Afghan-NATO nteqal ( t ransi t ion )Board JANIB) met for the f i r s t t ime to discuss t r a ns i t i on . Thet imel ines proposed ( to s t a r t t r ans i t i on in e a r l y 2011) werei n i t i a l l y cons idered to be ambit ious , but subsequent commitmentand planning has yie lded a process for t r ans i t i on tha t remainson- t rack with t h i s t imel ine .October 1 - December 31, 2010, Report ing Period: Overal l ,i nd ica to rs and metr ics agains t t h i s object ive improvedmoderately dur ing t h i s repor t ing per iod .With the a r r i va l of the 10th Mountain Divis ion headquar te rs inl a t e October in Regional Command RC) South, the U.S. forcesurge was completed, and the c oa l i t i on had broadly a r r e s t e dTal iban momentum and even reversed t h e i r momentum in someimportant areas . Coal i t ion opera t ions fu r the r leveraged theadd i t iona l resources of the surge, making add i t iona l progress indiminish ing Tal iban con t ro l and inf luence throughout the south,eas t and west . These gains displaced insurgents , causedtemporary and loca l i zed supply shor tages , and degraded insurgentcommand and con t ro l . However, and despi te these setbacks , theinsurgency remained r e s i l i en t , mainta in ing a high l eve l ofopposi t ion and violence , and redoubling e f fo r t s to counte rc oa l i t i on progress and Afghan confidence in t he i r governmentthrough a concer ted murder and in t imida t ion campaign.Overa l l , Afghan percept ions of secur i ty improved in t h i squar te r . In Kandahar Province, opera t ions focused on holdingc lea red areas in Dand, Zharay, and Panjwa i Di s t r i c t s ,d is rup t ing insurgent s t rongholds , freedom of movement, andsupply l ines , and somewhat degrading insurgent inf luence wi th inthe province . With more l imi ted inf luence and freedom ofmovement, the Tal iban inc reased the use of lED a t tacks and highpro f i l e a t t acks such as suic ide bombings. The insurgency a l soincreas ing ly used assas s ina t ions and t a rge t ing of Afghano f f i c i a l s and loca l co l labora to r s in an e f fo r t to erodel eg i t imacy and support for the Afghan government. In HelmandProvince, ISAF opera t ions continued to hamper the Tal iban ' sa b i l i t y to be e f f e c t i v e , al though the Tal iban maintaineds u f f i c i e n t capac i ty and freedom of movement to ca r ry out l imi tedopera t ions . The loca l populace suppor t ing ISAF was subject tov io len t in t imidat ion , espec ia l ly in southern Marjeh.

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In the eas t inc reased ISAF and ANSF pa r tne red COIN opera t ionsin Logar and Wardak Provinces, in the Pakt ia Pakt ika, andKhowst P2K) region, and in Southern Ghazni continued to d i s rup tf a c i l i t a t i o n nodes l ead ing i n to Kabul Province and c i t y .Although these opera t ions y ie lded pos i t ive e f f e c t s in keyloca t ions p a r t i c u l a r l y in P2K, the insurgency has a l so shown tobe r e s i l i e n t in many of these areas .The ALP program continued to expand, degrading insurgent freedomof movement and bo l s t e r ing publ ic conf idence . The ef fec t ivenessof t h i s program was evident in reducing Ta l iban inf luence whereappl ied in more ru ra l areas beyond the reach of r egu la r ANP andc oa l i t i on un i t s . The program continued to face a number ofr i sks and cha l lenges to include th rea t s from insurgents seekingto undermine i t s ef fec t iveness and the need to provide care fu lovers ight and management of the program as t expands.The percentage of the popula t ion s t a t i ng tha t secur i ty in t h e i rcommunities was good inc reased 6 percent from l a s t quar te r to51 percent in December 2010, with a por t ion of t h i s inc reaseposs ib ly due to the onset of winter . The percentage of thepopula t ion s t a t i ng secur i ty i s good was up 2 percent fromDecember 2009. The percentage of Afghans t ha t perce ive secur i tyin t h e i r area as b e t t e r than 6 months ago inc reased to42 percent from 34 percent l a s t quar te r .While the se c u r i t y gains in t h i s quar te r were notable moreneeds to be achieved for those gains to be made durab le .Spec i f i ca l ly work remains to t r a ns f e r c lea red areas to the ANSFand to place emphasis on the development of Afghan-led secur i tyand governance within a reas t ha t have been a focus of m i l i t a ryopera t ions . Fur ther dura b i l i t y wil l requ i re a p o l i t i c a lprocess - to include reconc i l i a t ion and acce le ra ted regiona ldiplomacy - t ha t can take advantage of the momentum created bythe recent secur i ty ga ins .The ANSF continued to improve t h i s quar te r par t i cu l a r l y theANA Overa l l the ANA s a b i l i t y to conduct independentopera t ions i s gradua l ly improving, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the re i s ac lose par tne r sh ip with c oa l i t i on f o r c e ~ Of note the re weremore c oa l i t i on force par tner ing/mentor ing teams than the re wereANA un i t s . Some ANA un i t s were pa r tne red with more than one

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c oa l i t i on force un i t while o ther un i t s due to t he i r loca t iono r mission requirements , were not pa r tne red see Figure 1below) .

RCWe\ct 14 4 16 0 : 5 1 0RC ::\ orth 15 4 17 0 :; 2 0RC o u t h w ~ ~ t 18 4 24 0 16 3 3 0 0RC South 16 28 3 0 19 5 0 0

Figure 1. ANA Par tner ingAbsenteeism and a t t r i t i on continue to pose a r i s k to the qua l i tyof the ANSF, and other cha l l enges such as i l l i t e r a c y and poorl e ade rsh ip remain. While aggregate end-s t reng th goals arecons i s t en t ly achieved, there remains a l e ade rsh ip d e f i c i t witha cur ren t shortage of 4,326 of f i c e r s and 10,824 NCOs. Theof f i ce r de f i c i t i s expected to remain r e l a t i ve l y cons tantcance l l ing out losses due to a t t r i t i on while keeping pace withnew force growth requirements . The NCO de f i c i t should cont inueto shr ink over the next year due to new t r a i n i n g capac i ty andinc reased emphasis a t command l eve l s .ANA rec rui tment cont inues to exceed goa ls . In December 2010,ANA schools were f i l l e d to 90 percent capac i ty with 18,635 of20,798 ava i lab le sea t s f i l l ed . This ill r a t e i s up 10 percentfrom l a s t quar te r . Minis t ry of Defense MOD) and ANA l eadershave placed spec ia l emphasis on sending more NCOs and po ten t i a lNCOs to school in order to address the shortage of t ra inedl eaders in f i e lded forces . The ill r a t e for NCO schools hasinc reased from 47 percent 825/1,750) l a s t quar te r to 75 percent3,029/4,020) , with of f i c e r schools f i l l e d to 95 percentcapac i ty 3,000/3,147) . ANA re t en t ion i s within the requi red

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goa ls , while ANP re t en t ion improved through t h i s quar te r (seeFigures 2 and 3 below)

Figure 2. ANA Retent ion

Od-tO 332 53 179 7(J 46.0%:"0\"-10 140 93 47 60- 66.4%~ l ODec-l0 66 54 ]2 60- 81.8%7( %Source: NTM A CJI - Mol PERSTA TData as .,f 6 Jauuary 1

Figure 3 . ANP Retent ionThi r ty percent of the popu la t ion be l ieves the ANA most l i ke l y o rc e r t a in ly wi l l de fea t ant i -government e lements in the next fewyears , a 2 percent decrease from September 2010. Twenty-twopercent of the popula t ion th inks the ANA i s capable of opera t ingwithout the ass i s tance of Coa l i t i on forces, an i nc rea se of3 percent from September 2010. The percentage t ha t thought theANA requi red the fu l l support of Coal i t ion fo rces dropped from28 percent in September 2010 to 26 percent in December 2010.Regarding Trans i t ion , the Afghans, NATO and ISAF mades igni f icant progress a t the planning l eve l s ince the endorsementof the Jo in t nteqal (Trans i t ion) Framework document a t the July2010 Kabul Conference. The November 19-20 NATO Summit in Lisbonhighl ighted t h i s progress , underscor ing NATO's enduringcommitment to Afghanis tan and agreeing t ha t prov inc ia lt r ans i t i on should begin in ea r ly 2011, and endorsing Pres identKarza i ' s goal t ha t t r ans i t i on to Afghan secur i ty l ead (ANSFassume fu l l r e s pons ib i l i t y for secur i ty across the whole ofAfghanis tan) wi l l be completed by the end of 2014.January 1 - March, 2011, Post-Report ing Per iod: A recent r i s ei n h igh-p ro f i l e su ic ide a t tacks sugges ts t ha t the 2011 f igh t ing

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season has begun and t ha t vio lence wil l aga in begin to inc reasefrom the r e l a t i ve seasona l l u l l of January and February. Inaddi t ion , t h i s t r end could r e f l ec t a sh i f t in Tal iban t ac t i c sagains t s o f t e r government, ANSF, and c i v i l i an t a rge t s . Whateverthe reason, t h i s sh i f t has resu l t ed in a spike in c i v i l i anc a su a l t i e s i n recent weeks.In addi t ion , the s h i f t in the Tal iban s grea te r use of murderand in t imida t ion t ac t i c s re f l ec t s an insurgency under thepre ssure of a more subs t an t ive c oa l i t i on m i l i t a ry campaign,p a r t i c u l a r l y with the fu l l complement of surge forces in place .That sa id , there are a l so ind ica t ions t ha t the Tal iban remainsconf iden t of i t s s t ra t egy and resources, and heavy f igh t ing i sexpected to resume t h i s spr ing .ANSF growth and q u a l i t y i n i t i a t i v e s cont inue , wi th both the ANAand ANP on t r ack to meet the FY11 goal of 305,600 t o t a l forces .NTM A i s mainta in ing the process of profes s iona l iz ing the ANSF,with near ly 35,000 so ld ie rs and po l ice in var ious t r a i n i n gcourses . The ALP program a l so cont inues i t s expansion, with theongoing va l ida t ion by the MOl of new s i t e s and the demonstra t ionof i nc rea s ing c a pa b i l i t i e s of ALP fo rces in the f i e ld .The Afghan-led process of Trans i t ion i s se t to begin t h i squar te r , with the announcement of the f i r s t t ranche of provincesand munic ipa l i t i e s by Pres ident Karzai on March 21. OnFebruary 22, the Jo in t Afghan-NATO n teqa l (Trans i t ion) Board

JANIB) f ina l i zed the recommended f i r s t t ranche , which wasendorsed by NATO ISAF Defense Minis te rs in a March 10-11meeting. The beginning of the t r ans i t i on process wi l l berespons ib le and gradual , al lowing for the beginning of U.S.force reduc t ions in Ju ly 2011. This progress i s cons i s ten t with- - and wi l l enable the Lisbon summit goal of fu l l yt r a n s i t i o n i n g to Afghan l ead for secur i ty and completing thet r ans i t i on process by the end of 2014. The NATO-Afghanpar tne r sh ip dec la ra t ion agreed to a t Lisbon a l so gave us aframework for an enduring commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014.Object ive 7: Strateg ica l ly bui ld the capac i ty o f the Afghangovernment which enables Afghans to assume respons ib i l i t y in thefour s tep process of c lear ho ld bui ld transfer . (Sta te)Ju ly 1 - September 30, 2010, Report ing Period: Ind ica to r s andmetr ics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive were s t a t i c overa l l , and in needof fu r the r improvement dur ing t h i s repor t ing per iod .While the Afghan government made advances in i t s capac i ty andef fec t iveness a t the na t iona l l evel , t i s st ll l ack ing a t the

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sub-na t iona l l eve l . Accountabi l i ty a t a l l l eve l s remained weak.S t i l l , the Afghan government continued to advance i t s na t iona l l eve l capab i l i ty as i l l u s t r a t e d by the Kabul Conference,inc reased revenues, and progress on the Afghan is tan Peace andReintegra t ion Program (APRP). Afghan capac i ty a t the subna t iona l , and espec ia l ly d i s t r i c t , l eve l remained weak, butshowed s igns of improvement. The implementa t ion of t h e i r SubNational Governance Pol icy progressed s lowly. A key componentfor implementation, the Pres iden t i a l Decree on the CabinetCommittee on Sub-Nat ional Planning and Finance, was s igned t h i squar te r . In addi t ion , the mer i t -based appointment process wasin place with 18 d i s t r i c t governors approved.The Afghan-led Ju ly 2010 Kabul Conference marked an importants tep toward the governm ent s improved capac i ty to adminis te rdevelopment ass i s tance and serv ices through na t iona l p r i o r i t yprograms. The Afghan government improved i t s a b i l i t y to c o l l e c trevenue from 7 percent of gross domestic product GDP) 2 yearsago to 9 percent during the repor t ing per iod . However, theAfghan government remained unable to cover i t s opera t ingexpendi tures and continued to have t roub le execut ing i t sdevelopment budget. The n e a r - f a i l u re of Kabul Bank in Augustand September demonstrated the f r a g i l i t y of the f inanc ia l sys temamid widespread f raudulent a c t i v i t y by p o l i t i c a l l y connectedbank shareho lders in the absence of an e f fec t ive regula toryframework. Progress on the APTTA s igna led improved t radere la t ions between the two nat ions . S t i l l , the f inanc ia l l inksbetween the na t iona l and sub-na t iona l l eve l s need to be improvedand the re are no robust overs ight and t ransparency mechanisms a tthe prov inc ia l l eve l .Afghans cas t 4.3 mil l ion va l id votes in the September 18par l iamenta ry e lec t ions . While r e s u l t s and e l e c t i o n complaintswere not ye t fu l l y processed by the end of the r epor t ing per iod ,the Independent Elec t ion Commission s (lEC) l e ade rsh ip mades t r i des in implementing f raud mit iga t ion measures, inc luding acomputer ized t racking system to a l e r t IEC o f f i c i a l s when f raudt r i gge r s were ident i f i ed , enhanced t racking and contro l ofsens i t ive mater ia l s , and the barr ing of approximately6,000 e lec t ion workers who engaged in e l e c to r a l f raud in 2009.Enhanced t ransparency and f raud mit iga t ion measures resu l t ed inthe lEC s i nva l ida t ion of approximately 1 .3 mil l ion i l l e g i t im a tevotes ; resu l t ing in the 4.3 mil l ion f igure for v a l i d votes .U.N. Ass i s tance Mission to Afghanis tan UNAMA) pra i sed the IEC,c i t i ng s ign i f i can t improvements in the management of the pos t po l l ing day process . The impact of vio lence in t h i s year ' se lec t ion was s ign i f i c a n t ly lower than l a s t ye a r ' s p r e s ide n t i a le lec t ion , due in par t to the inc reased capac i ty of ANSF.

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Elec to ra l reform in areas such as the Single Non-TransferrableVote system, p o l i t i c a l par ty r ep resen ta t ion , vo te r r e g i s t r a t i on ,and e l e c t o r a l - d i s t r i c t demarcat ion remain much-needed.Despite some smal l improvements in the t r a i n i n g of judges,Jud ic ia l Secur i ty Unit Pol ice , and the hold ing of publ ic t r i a l s ,progress in the j ud i c i a l sec to r was overshadowed by se r iousques t ions about the Afghan government 's p o l i t i c a l commitment tof ight corrupt ion . Following the a r re s t in Ju ly of DeputyNat iona l Secur i ty Advisor for Adminis t rat ion Salehi on suspic ionof cor rup t ion and h i s subsequent r e lease , coopera t ion betweenAnti -Corrupt ion Unit ACU) prosecutors and i n t e rna t iona l mentorswas suspended and remained on hold throughout the r epor t ingper iod while an agreed manner of cooperat ion was es tab l i shed .At the same t ime, the Afghan Attorney General ordered an end tothe i n t e rna t iona l community 's top-offs of ACU prosecutors 'sa l a r i e s (which are very low) while pay and rank reform remainsto be done. The Supreme Court ended the use of polygraphs fo rjudges in the Anti-Corrupt ion Tr ibuna l ACT) and a l so ordered aha l t to sa la ry top offs because of recent pay inc reases forjudges . The High Off ice of Oversight made some progress inpubl i sh ing asse t s of government employees, but the re was l imi tedmovement on ve t t ing the asse t dec la ra t ions of the top35 government employees.The Afghan government made advances toward the imp1ementation ofthe Afghanistan Peace and Reintegra t ion Program APRP) with thees tab l i shment of the High Peace Council . Afghan suppor t for the

p e ~ e and re in teg ra t ion processes remained high.October 1 - December 31, 2010, R e p o r t i n ~ p e r i o d Ind ica to r s andmetr ics agains t t h i s ob jec t ive were s t a t i