A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture 단국대학교 컴퓨터 보안 및 OS...
Transcript of A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture 단국대학교 컴퓨터 보안 및 OS...
A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture
단국대학교컴퓨터 보안 및 OS 연구실[email protected]
임경환
2015. 04. 16
Thuy D. NguyenMark A. GondreeThe 2010 Military Communications Confer-ence
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ContentsContents
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INTRODUCTION
OVERALL ARCHITECTURE
Security Features
Security policy
Conclusion
Reference
Q & A
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INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
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Extended version of MYSEA(Monterey Security
Architecture)
This is designed to address the inefficient exchange of information in
military “silo” environment.
Supporting a cloud of cross-domain service.
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INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION
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Multilevel secure(MLS) system
Manages information of different security and enforces a mandatory security policy to
control both information access and information flow.
MLS policy enforcement mechanism
Access to information in an MLS system is governed by the classification level of the in-
formation, the security clearance of the requester and whether the requester has a need to
access the information. Need-to-know
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OVERALL ARCHITECTUREOVERALL ARCHITECTURE
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OVERALL ARCHITECTUREOVERALL ARCHITECTURE
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MYSEA Cloud Servers Federated Services Manager
• user sessions, service availability
Authentication Server• I & A supporting policy
Dynamic Security Service Manager• service management mechanism
Application Server• web browsing, wkiki, email, … service
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OVERALL ARCHITECTUREOVERALL ARCHITECTURE
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Special Purpose Trustworthy Components Trusted Path Extension(TPE)
• acts as a gate keeper between the workstation and the MYSEA cloud.
Trusted Channerl Module(TCM)• serves as a multiplexer that labels incoming network traffic from single-level
service.
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Security FeaturesSecurity Features
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Secure connections to classified network
Centralized security management
Use of adaptive security techniques to provide dynamic security services
High assurance trusted path and trusted channel techniques for managing access to the MLS cloud
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SECURITY POLICIESSECURITY POLICIES
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MYSEA controls access to resources using both mandatory
access control and discretionary access control.
lattice-based confidentiality
Bell and L. LaPadula, Biba
Identification and Authentication( I & A), Audit.
I & A, the MYSEA Server ensures that users are afforded a trusted
communication path between the user and the MYSEA Server, and that
the user’s claimed identity and authentication credentials are validated
before a user session is established.
Audit, the MYSEA Server accounts for all users actions, either taken di-
rectly by the user (e.g., trusted path invocation) or by software acting
on the user’s behalf (e.g., a web server process).
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Dynamic Security ServiceDynamic Security Service
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The DSS design follows the standard policy management paradigm policy input point (PIP) policy repository policy decision point(PDP) policy enforcement point(PEP)
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ConclusionsConclusions
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Cloud computing promotes agility, scalability, collaboration, and sharing of resources across domains/organizations but inherits the same security risks
MYSEA integrates support for cloud computing functionality with the strong security properties.
MYSEA’s security features include strong cross-domain access controls, protection of system assets with different security classification.
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ReferenceReference
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[1] CNSS Instruction No. 4009, “National information assurance (IA)glossary,” Committee on National Security Systems, Revised June2006.[2] M. Bailey, “The unified cross domain management office: bridgingsecurity domains and cultures,” CrossTalk magazine, vol. 21, no. 7, pp.21–23, July 2007.[3] D. E. Bell and L. LaPadula, “Secure computer system: unifiedexposition and Multics interpretation,” Technical Report ESD-TR-75-306, The MITRE Corporation, Hanscom AFB, MA, 1975.[4] K. J. Biba, “Integrity considerations for secure computer systems,” Tech.Report ESD-TR-76-372, The MITRE Corporation, 1977.
감사합니다 .