以价值为导向的企业战略规划

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以价值为导向的企业战略规划. 。. 我们对企业战略规划的基本观点. 企业的高层管理者,受股东和其他权益所有者的委托,充当价值管理者的角色。高层经理对于企业进行战略规划的过程,也就是通过价值管理,创造价值的过程 战略规划应首先从挖掘具体业务的价值驱动因素着手,选取对企业价值敏感度最高而又切实可有作为的主要杠杆;然后制定明确的行动计划和相应的业绩衡量指标,以保证战略的贯彻执行 战略规划应对企业未来三年的目标、机遇和挑战做出详细的分析。总部和业务单元交互式的规划过程可以保证集团公司总体战略的一致性 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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    As we will see later in the document, a company needs many ideas in 3 to build a few businesses in 2. Naturally, with new ideas, the uncertainty is high. Most ideas just wont work. Some companies have determined that it takes 100 ideas to arrive at 1 feasible business. This ratio is quite different than the one most companies anticipate when they consider continuous growth. They think they can use a pipeline of ideas, putting a few more ideas in the front end than they will need at the back end. What we have learned in our research is that this pipeline should, in fact, be a funnel. And a funnel requires a dramatic increase in the idea generation capabilities of most organizations.

    Intangibles provide companies with a new way to competethe capital-light way. In the old economy, a capital-heavy approach meant that market access was gained through capital investment. In the global new economy, market access is gained instead through superior value arising from a capital-light, intangible-heavy approach. Rather than owning everything, reliance on alliances and web-based business systems allows for a reduction in the unwise use of financial capital. While a capital-heavy approach generates returns at or below the cost of capital, a capital-light, intangible-heavy approach generates high returns relative to the capital invested. In addition, the capital-heavy approach presents relatively high financial risk, while the intangible-heavy approach presents little financial risk. Finally, a capital-heavy approach is slow and inflexible, while the capital-light method allows for an enormous degree of flexibility with regard to responses.Take Gillette, which has sustained high growth for more than a decade. Its activities across the three s in 1986 and 1995 (see next page), illustrate the importance of continuous idea generation for growth.In 1986, Gillette was actively investing in 3 activities across all divisions. While this exhibit shows no 3 activities at the highest level, top management was likely heavily involved in major level moves such as entering new countries with razors and blades or preparing to acquire Waterman pen.Nine years later, Gillettes s 2 and 3 have almost completely been regenerated to continue fueling growth across all five businesses. Activities such as the Sensor razor development in 1986 (see previous page) have become core 1 businesses. And, Gillette has a new set of ideas for future growth businesses in 2, at both the and the corporate level. This organization has not stood still.Growth ideas were not restricted to new products. Rather, Gillette has sought growth across multiple degrees of freedom. Comparing the 1986 and 1995 three snapshots reveals that Gillette has derived its growth not only from new products, but also from new and existing customers, new geographies, and new arenas.//////

    Returns can range from a simple accounting return on equity to complex, cash flow based return on investments.