- , (South China Sea), .

1

South China Sea, , , , , , . East China Sea, . South China Sea , , , , , . 2

Energy Information Administration, South China Sea, South China Sea 11 , 5.5 . , , 270 , , , 33 . South China Sea , .

7 EIA estimates the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. Conventional hydrocarbons mostly reside in undisputed territory.http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chockepoints, 2014, 7 (energy chokepoints). , 15 . , , , 17 . 3

http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3 7 . 4

site Stratfor, China's Moves in the South China Sea: Implications and Opportunities, 2014, South China Sea , 1/10 .

5 The South China Sea has always had an abundance of natural resources. Although much attention is paid to existing and potential crude oil and natural gas reserves, as well as the possibility of subsea mineral extraction, one of the biggest resource drivers there is marine protein (fish and seafood). By some accounts, the South China Sea accounts for one-tenth of annual global seafood take. Asia's enclosed seas provide plentiful and readily available food resources, but fishing is a constant source of regional tension. Even at times of low inter-regional stress, fishing fleets frequently violate one another's territories, and run-ins with maritime patrols are not infrequent occurrences. These incidents are normally isolated, but if they occur when political sensitivities are heightened, they can quickly escalate into larger diplomatic incidents or even physical confrontations. (Several deadly maritime clashes between the divided Koreas in the past 20 years have been triggered by disputes over the location of fishing fleets.).

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-moves-south-china-sea-implications-and-opportunities South China Sea . , . , , , 9 , the nine dash line map, 90% South China Sea.

Financial Times, Chinese boats fish in dangerous waters, 2012, , 9 . South China Sea, , . 5

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/edb1af28-877d-11e1-865d-00144feab49a.html Huffington Post, Indonesia, America and China's Nine-Dash Line, 2014, 1953, 2010 , . 3 Huffington Post 5 . , , , South China Sea .

3 And yet, as Brown argues, after forcing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang tofleeto Taiwan in 1949, Chinese communists turned the 11-dash map into a nine-dash line in 1953 and claimed ownership. It sat passively until 2010, when Beijing revived the map, assigned historical weight to the concocted line and used it todeclare"indisputable sovereignty" over the same 90 percent area of the Sea. It did so in spite of the fact that huge swaths of the territory are claimed by--andrecognizedby the United Nations as owned by -- five other nations.5 6 Even so, China has used the nine-dash line as justification to make mayhem across the South China Sea. In 2014 alone, it tried tobuilda new oil platform in waters claimed by Vietnam. Itblockedships supplying the Philippine navy. It announced plans to buildlighthouseson land claimed by the Philippines, beganconstructionon islands claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, and issued new rules for access to fishing off its shore that the U.S. hasdescribedas "provocative and potentiallydangerous." In fact, China claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims not only from Vietnam and the Philippines, but also from Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.\And this is not to mention China's continuingclaimin the East China Sea to five islands known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. While the dispute over the uninhabited islands goes back more than a century, tensions flared in 2010 after Japanarrestedthe captain of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming Japanese patrols boats in the waters off the islands. They flared again after Japanpurchasedthree of the islands from a private Japanese owner, and got ratcheted up again last month when Japan quietly gavenamesto the five islands and published them on a maritime website. With Chinese and Japanese ships and planes regularly playing a dangerous game of cat and mouse, credible foreign policy analysts haveaskedif these five tiny islands could spark war.10 This point comes as something of a surprise. What I hear repeatedly in conversations across this island nation is that China might be theonlyAsian country that believes the U.S. will use its influence to deter the ambitions of Beijing here. Despite high-profile joint exercises between the U.S. and local militaries and a markedincreasein U.S. military hardware postmarked for Southeast Asia, many leaders here believe that there is more sizzle than steak when it comes to the U.S.'s highly touted "pivot" to Asia.12 With China's leadership taking a with-us-or-against-us mentality across the region, the burden placed on China's neighbors is excruciating -- particularly when it comes to the U.S. "No one wants to be told by the Americans what to do," a long-time diplomat from the Asian subcontinent tells me, explaining that to be seen as compliant with Washington invites scorn. "There's a negative perception of America over the past few years. We are looking forward to increased interaction with the U.S. after Obama."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stanley-weiss/indonesia-america-and-chi_b_5784342.html Huffington Post, U.S. Alliances Encourage Asian Allies to Be More Antagonistic Toward China, 2014, , . , .1 President Barack Obama's "pivot" to Asia is directed at strengthening U.S. Cold War era alliances to tacitly contain a rising China. However, that means that even minor disputes between American allies and China could drag the United States into a shooting war with a nuclear weapons state. Unfortunately, those minor quarrels are occurring now. Among other nations, China has disputes with U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines over barren uninhabited islands that may have petroleum resources near them. The same is true between China and Vietnam -- except that although relations between Vietnam and the United States have dramatically improved since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the United States has not formed a similar alliance with that nation, thus promising American protection. The differences in how the American Philippine ally and the Vietnamese non-ally are dealing with such disputes with China illustrates the danger of keeping outdated alliances long over the Cold War is over..

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/us-alliances-encourage-as_b_5358379.html , , , . , , , . Financial Times, Construction on the high seas adds to Asian maritime tensions, 2015, .3 Pham Binh Minh, Vietnams foreign minister and deputy prime minister, has demanded China halt work on transforming reefs into small colonies with piers and, in one case, a helipad and large buildings.6 Mr Minh called on countries outside Asia to join the US, which has raised concerns privately with Beijing, in pressing through all possible channels for China to down tools. But he acknowledged it was unlikely to do so.8 Beijings intensifiedbuilding workin the Spratly island chain over the past 18 months represents a change in tack by Beijing in the long-running South China Sea disputes.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3c886a62-d76f-11e4-94b1-00144feab7de.html Spartly, , , . 6

http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/China-claims-Paracel-Spratly-Islands-11.jpg South China Sea East China Sea, , , Senkaku Islands, .EAST CHINA SEA 7

http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs Energy Information Administration, East China Sea, East China Sea . 70 160 , 7 (250 ), .7 8 Hydrocarbon reserves in the East China Sea are difficult to estimate. The area is underexplored, and the territorial and maritime claims in the area of potentially rich oil and natural gas deposits precluded further development.

EIA estimates that the East China Sea has about 200 million barrels of oil (MMbbl) in proved and probable reserves. Chinese sources claim that undiscovered resources can be as high as 70 to 160 billion barrels of oil for the entire East China Sea, mostly in the Okinawa trough. Other sources have not corroborated these reports. Moreover, undiscovered resources do not take into account economic factors relevant to bring them into production, unlike proved and probable reserves.14 EIA estimates that the East China Sea has between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proved and probable natural gas reserves. The region may also have significant upside potential in terms of natural gas. Chinese sources point to as much as 250 Tcf in undiscovered natural gas resources, mostly in the Okinawa trough, although these have not been independently verified.

http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs East China Sea, Okhotsk, Kuril, . , , East China Sea, Senkaku, Kuril Okhotsk Sea. 8

BBC, Kuril islands dispute between Russia and Japan, 2013, Kuril . , .1, 2 3 As Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe holds talks in Russia with President Vladimir Putin, the BBC looks at the background to the long-standing territorial dispute between the two nations.

The island chain known as the Kurils stretches north across the Pacific Ocean from the Japanese island of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula.Four islands - which Russia calls the Southern Kurils and Japan calls the Northern Territories - are the subject of a 60-year-old dispute between the two nations.6 Because of the dispute, Russia and Japan have not yet signed a peace treaty to end World War II.21 The islands are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and are thought to have offshore reserves of oil and gas. Rare rhenium deposits have been found on the Kudriavy volcano on Iturup.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11664434 site Stratfor, Tensions Rise in the East China Sea, 2012, , , - Dokdo.1 2 While the situation in the South China Sea is approaching a tense standstill, controversy is again brewing to the north, in the East China Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. In the run-up to the anniversary of Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, several countries have reasserted territorial claims in the waters around Japan.

South Korean President Lee Myung Bak visited the disputed Dokdo Islands onAug. 10, declaring them part of South Korea's sovereign territory. (The islands, which Japan calls Takeshima,are currently administered by South Korea).Then onAug. 15, a group of Hong Kong-based Chinese activists (from both China and Taiwan) journeyed by boat to the Diaoyu Islands called Senkaku in Japan to reassert China's historical claim there.Meanwhile, over recent weeks Taiwan has renewed efforts to differentiate itself from China even as it echoes Beijing's claims on the islands (while remaining careful not to harm relations with Japan). Even Russiais toughening its stance on Japan's territorial claims, announcingAug. 15that it would send four navy ships to the Kuril Islands, which areadministered by Russia butdisputedbyJapan, betweenAug. 25and Sept. 17.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tensions-rise-east-china-sea Okhotsk, , ( ). . . 9

RT, Torn apart: Russias disputed territories, 2009, , Bering Sea, , . 10

http://rt.com/politics/torn-apart-russia-s-disputed-territories/ Bering Sea. , Northwest Passage ( ).

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, -- - . Northwest Passage . . . . South China Sea , . , . , . , , . South China Sea , , . , , . Times of India, China warns India about taking up Vietnam's offer for oil exploration in disputed South China Sea, 2014, , . .http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-warns-India-about-taking-up-Vietnams-offer-for-oil-exploration-in-disputed-South-China-Sea/articleshow/44960780.cms , . 12

Energy Information Agency, . . . . - , . 13

http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch - , . .

14

http://www.tibettravelplanner.com/mapsoftibet/location.htm , , . . -, , group BRICS, . Business Insider, Here's Why China And India Are Trying To End A Long-Held Dispute Over A Barren Strip Of Land, 2014, . 1962, .

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 Last week, China and India signed a border pact to ease tensions along the disputed border dubbed the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The pact is largely intended to prevent a military conflict, improve communication between the two sides, encourage cooperation on border-related activities such as combating the smuggling of contraband goods, and promote better relations between troops, like joined celebrations of major holidays,reports the Indian Express.Experts aren't too enthused about the pact, viewing it as a temporary fix. "So many of the current problems arise from the line of actual control and both sides have a different understanding which means even after the new agreement is implemented there will still be conflicts and contradictions," Huang Yinghong, assistant professor of Asian and Pacific studies at Sun Yat-sen University,told the Financial Times.China and India went to war in 1962 over disputed territory of Aksai Chin. India claimed this was a part of Kashmir, while China claimed it was a part of Xinjiang.To the east, China and India also fought over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China calls the territory South Tibet.

It is widely believed that India's decision to grant the Dalai Lama asylum during the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule also played a part in the war.

http://www.businessinsider.com/china-india-border-dispute-2013-10 -, , , -, Wall Street Journal, Its Springtime for U.S.-India Relations, 2015.

11 12 On a range of issues, such as the rise of China, the future of Afghanistan and international terrorism, New Delhi and Washington are increasingly on the same page. First and foremost, long-time South Asia watchers see shared concerns about Chinas rise as a cornerstone of Indo-US strategic partnership. There is a noteworthy similarity between Washingtons and New Delhis objectives vis--vis Beijing.Both nations have adopted congagement strategies that seek to gain from economic exchange with China while maintaining sufficient military power to deter threats to their key strategic interests posed by Chinas rising power.14 15 America and India have also both supported the Afghan government and opposed the spread of the Taliban. India desires to see a continued American military presence in the country and the US is increasingly aware of the role that India can play in contributing to stability in that fragile state.Finally, both India and the United States share a concern about terrorist attacks against their homeland or interests overseas. Cooperation between the US and India on counter-terrorism issues has deepened significantly since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and is characterised by frequent exchange visits and intelligence sharing.17 A defence pact signed in 2005 has facilitated the training of military personnel, missile defense collaboration and arms sales, as well as opening the door to joint weapons production. Consequently, in 2013, the US displaced Russia as Indias top weapons suppler.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/sadanand-dhume-its-springtime-for-u-s-india-relations-1422204868 , . TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), , CNN, . Saudis discover new funding channels for Taliban, al Qaeda, 2011, , .

4 5 But the investigation found that hundreds of millions of dollars of Saudi money had been funneled to leading Islamist politicians and political activists overseas. It also found that al Qaeda and the Taliban were still able to use Saudi Arabia for fund-raising, despite numerous measures to choke off those sources of cash.

According to a Saudi source who is not authorized to speak publically, "People close to the senior leadership of the Taliban live in Saudi Arabia and send money back" [to the Taliban].

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/27/saudi.terror.funding/ CBS, , WikiLeaks: Saudis Largest Source of Terror Funds, 2010. wikileaks.

1, 2, 3 4 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged U.S. diplomats to do more to stop the flow of money to Islamist militant groups from donors in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi government, Clinton wrote, was reluctant to cut off money being sent to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan.

"While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority," the memo states.

Progress was cited by the Saudi government (due in part to "intense focus" by the United States) to proactively investigate and detain financiers of concern. "Still, donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."7 Other Arab countries cited as being sources of money for terrorists were Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaks-saudis-largest-source-of-terror-funds/ TAPI ( ) , , , . , -- ( ). -- (IPI) TAPI, South Stream , Turk Stream , Southern Energy Corridor. TAPI --, Southern Energy Corridor (TANAP-TAP) South Stream .http://iakovosal.blogspot.gr/2015/05/blog-post_12.html TAPI PI. 15

----. , . , . , , , . , , . . 1951 , . Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, BP, , -. , . . , , , . . . . +Exxon=Love

http://iakovosal.blogspot.gr/2014/11/exxonmobil-love.html think tank Canadian Policy Alternatives, A pipeline through a troubled land: afghanistan, canada, and the new great energy game, 2008, . , . . 60% , 40% . 16100 101

The Middle East accounts for 60% of the worlds proven oil reserves and 40% of its gas. It is of vital importance. Saudi Arabia alone accounts for 20% of the worlds oil reserves, and the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) another 20%. Iraq accounts for an additional 10%. (Oil and gas data in this article are drawn from the BP Statistical Revie).

104 Where are Irans oil and gas reserves? Some are in the Persian Gulf heavily patrolled by the U.S. navy. But 90 per cent lie in Khuzestan province, just across the Shatt al-Arab River from Iraq. Saddam Hussein crossed the Shatt al-Arab River in the Eight-Year War and tried to seize Irans oil. He destroyed the Abadan refinery, once the largest in the world.

http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2008/A_Pipeline_Through_a_Troubled_Land.pdf , 1953, , , . . 1979 , , . , , . , , , .

90% -, Shatt al-Arab, 104 think tank Canadian Policy Alternatives. 1980, -, .

17

, . , , , . --. 1979, , . , . , , . , . 18

, , , , , , . 1979 , 1979 , . .

, , . , , , , . . . , . , , . , 2001, .

, , , . -. O TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), n IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India). , .

. , , , , , , . - 20 , 21 , , . - , : & .http://iakovosal.blogspot.gr/2015/01/blog-post_13.html - The Diplomat, Is a China-India-Russia Coalition Inevitable?, 2015. , . TAPI , , , , , . 2 3 On the surface it seems that China, India, and Russia are ill-suited to a partnership. Despite being members of the BRICS club, there are many substantive differences between the three countries, particularly between China and India, that will impact how they relate in the decades to come.

Tensions between China and India are obvious. While India is a democracy, China remains an authoritarian regime. Of course, the importance of regime type in interstate relations is debatable. States with different regime types are not necessarily doomed to troubled relations; there is nothing inherent in regime type that inhibits cooperation. Still, many would agree that India, to some degree, sees non-democratic China as a threat; whether or not such a threat perception is grounded in reality is a different issue. The perception alone impacts their relations.4 The biggest problem in China-India relations is still the territorial dispute between them. As serious as this problem is, however, the likelihood that this dispute will be resolved is actually higher than many people might think. It has been confirmed that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit China in May and there is talk that both China and India wouldlike to make a breakthroughon the issue. China also supports greater Indian involvement at international institutions, including the United Nations. These positive signs mean that there is considerable potential for a closer China-India partnership, despite recent hype about India siding with the U.S. to contain China. Most importantly, what will bring China and India together is their shared dream of becoming first-tier developed countries. In this sense, India can benefit from Chinas exports and capital, whereas China can benefit from Indias market and technology potential. It would be a serious mistake for both countries to dismiss their shared long-term interests in favor of present disputes.7 We are unlikely to see a formal coalition composed of China, India and Russia anytime soon, but we should not rule out the possibility over the long term. All three powers are dissatisfied with the current global order to varying degrees. If the U.S. wishes to avoid such a coalition it should think carefully about how to encourage the redistribution of power at the global level. Beginning the process of sharing power with China and India might be a good start.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/is-a-china-india-russia-coalition-inevitable/ ----, The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World, 2012, site Stratfor. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-india-shifting-self-contained-world South China Sea, South China Sea, . South China Sea. .

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-On February 25, 2011, a frigate from China's navy fired shots at 3 fishing boats from the Philippines.

-On March 2, 2011, the Government of the Philippines reported that two patrol boats from China attempted to ram one of its surveillance ships.

-On May 26, 2011, a maritime security vessel from China cut the cables of an exploration ship from Vietnam, the Binh Minh, in the South China Sea in waters near Cam Ranh Bay in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam.

-On May 31, 2011, three Chinese military vessels used guns to threaten the crews of four Vietnamese fishing boats while they were fishing in the waters of the Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago.

-On June 3, 2011, Vietnam's Foreign Ministry released a statement that ``Vietnam is resolutely opposed to these acts by China that seriously violated the sovereign and jurisdiction rights of Viet Nam to its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)''.

-On June 9, 2011, three vessels from China, including one fishing vessel and two maritime security vessels, ran into and disabled the cables of another exploration ship from Vietnam, the Viking 2, in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam.

-On July 22, 2011, an Indian naval vessel, sailing about 45 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam, was warned by a Chinese naval vessel that it was allegedly violating Chinese territorial waters.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-clash.htm South China Sea . , . , , In Asia, old US alliances face new strains amid China's influence, 2014, CNBC. , . , , Joko Widodo, , South China Sea. 10 , 11 . , . 2 Fast-forward to today: as Obama flies to Asia on Sunday, Washington's "pivot" to the region is becoming more visible. It includes deployment of American Marines in Darwin, Australia, stepped up U.S. naval visits to the Philippines and many more joint drills with that nation's armed forces, as well as the lifting of a ban on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam.5 Although several countries, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, have sought closer U.S. ties as a defense against what they see as China's aggression in pursuit of its claims in the South China Sea, other long-established alliances have become less robust.Beijing's increasing economic influence is a major reason. Southeast Asia's trade with China is up four-fold over the past decade to $350 billion last year and is forecast to reach $1 trillion by 2020.7 8 Indonesia, traditionally a leading voice and strong U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, has signaled a foreign policy shift away from international activism following this year's election of a populist President Joko Widodo, who said in his election campaign that his focus would be on domestic affairs.

Rizal Sukma, a foreign policy adviser to Widodo, told Reuters there would be a shift in priorities from high-profile diplomacy, though Indonesia would continue to play a role in the South China Sea and support freedom of navigation and trade.10 11 In Thailand, a military coup in May has shaken up its relationship with the United States. Since the coup, Washington has scaled back diplomatic contacts and reduced joint military exercises.And Malaysia, next year's chair of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has seen a wave of Chinese trade and investment and is working with Beijing on upgrading an ASEAN-China free-trade agreement.16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 22 In April, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a new 10-year security pact allowing for a larger U.S. military presence.

In July, another U.S. ally, Japan, revised its interpretation of a pacifist postwar constitution to allow Japanese troops to assist a friendly state under attack.And Washington has also agreed to boost defense ties with Australia and agreed with India to negotiate a 10-year extension of a bilateral military cooperation deal.

Perhaps most eye-catching of all, nearly 40 years after the end of the Vietnam War, the United States last month partially lifted a long-time ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam to help Hanoi improve maritime security.That followed tensions between China and Vietnam that flared in May after China's state-run CNOOC oil company parked a deepwater rig off Vietnam's coast in what Hanoi said was its exclusive economic zone, sparking the worst breakdown in ties between the two since a border war in 1979.Joint U.S.-Philippine drills and exercises have more than quadrupled in the past two years, the Philippine military said. Its Subic Bay port saw 100 U.S. naval ship visits in the first 10 months of this year, up from 54 in 2011.

The Pentagon says it now has 1,150 Marines in Darwin, in northern Australia, up from an initial 200 in April 2012. It plans to lift that force to 2,500 in two years, pending an agreement with the Australian government.http://www.cnbc.com/id/102167038 U.S. Alliances in East Asia: Internal Challenges and External Threats, , 2010, think tank Brookings Institute. , , . , , . , . , , , 50 , .7, 8, 9, 10, 11 12 In the Philippines, where we had maintained major naval and air facilities for many decades, a combination of domestic political pressure, the destruction of one base by a volcanic eruption rendering it unusable, and a strategic reassessment in Washington resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but the continuation of the defense treaty. In recent years, small numbers of U.S. military advisors have assisted the Philippine armed forces in countering Muslim insurgents in the southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.This was followed a few years later by the New Zealand government's refusal to allow port calls by U.S. Navy vessels, as clearly envisioned in the ANZUS treaty, without a prior finding by the prime minister of New Zealand that the ships in question were not carrying nuclear weapons. This was contrary to our long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard our ships and put at risk our arrangements with Japan. The result was a suspension of our defense relationship with New Zealand and strained relations with this ally for a number of years. When the U.S. Navy revised its "neither confirm nor deny" policy our defense relationship gradually improved. However, as Secretary of State George Shultz stated at the time of the break in 1986, "We remain friends, but we are no longer allies."We do not have a security treaty with Taiwan and do not maintain forces on the island. We sell arms consistent with the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. policy toward Taiwan has assured the people of Taiwan and other countries in the region that the United States takes the security of Taiwan seriously and that only a peaceful, non-coercive resolution of the political issues across the Taiwan Strait would be satisfactory.Under our mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea we deploy sizable ground and air forces to the peninsula to backup ROK defenses in the event of aggression by North Korea. We have made clear to the North that the American commitment to the defense of South Korea is rock solid, and the peace has been maintained. While the U.S. posture has effectively deterred North Korea from a frontal attack, it has not prevented North Korea from mounting provocations, ranging from the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, through the tree-cutting incident in 1976, to the recent apparent sinking of an ROK warship. The biggest challenge posed by North Korea is its determination to acquire deployable nuclear weapons which would threaten U.S. interests throughout East Asia, potentially pose an existential threat to Japan, and create a proliferation problem of vast proportions. Our treaty relationships with Japan and Korea, and our many decades of experience working together, have greatly facilitated our cooperation on this issue.Australia has been a valued ally in a large number of military operations in which the U.S. has engaged over the last fifty years, despite periodic internal opposition to American policy.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/05/east-asia-breer Brookings Institute, The U.S. and Chinas Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity, 2014, 2014 9 South China Sea. Secretary of State , Danny Russel, . , 50% .1 For the first time, the United States government has come out publicly with an explicit statement that the so-called nine-dash line, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan assert delineates their claims in the South China Sea, is contrary to international law. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 5, said, Under international law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land features. Any use of the 'nine-dash line' by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in accordance with the international law of the sea."7 Butthe U.S. does have important interests in the South China Sea. They are:

To ensure freedom of navigation, not as a favor from any country but as an international right in an area through which 50 percent of the worlds oil tankers pass, that is a major thoroughfare of international commerce, and where U.S. military vessels deploy and operate consistent with international law.To prevent use of force or coercion to resolve claims either to territory or to maritime rights.

To advocate for respect for international norms and law for resolving all such issues.

To ensure that all countries, including the U.S., have the right to exploit the mineral and fish resources outside of legitimate Exclusive Economic Zones.

To prevent a U.S. ally, the Philippines, from being bullied or subject to use of force.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader South China Sea, . Southern Energy Corridor , , , , . . 20

The Diplomat, Why Doesnt Russia Support China in the South China Sea?, 2014, South China Sea, , , . , , . , , , , . http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/why-doesnt-russia-support-china-in-the-south-china-sea/ , . , Southern Energy Corridor, , , . , , . South China Sea. site The Diplomat, Should U.S. Allies in Asia Get Their Own Nukes?, 2015, . , , , .11 During much of the Cold War, the credibility of extended deterrence depended on Washington being able to show that it was capable and willing to fight a nuclear war. Hence the deployment of short and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and concepts such as escalation control and damage limitation. The same issues hold true for conventional extended deterrence, except the challenges for U.S. forces in Asia are immense. If the U.S. cannot demonstrate its ability to fight a conventional war with China, then U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia will have to do a whole lot more for their own defense. Nuclear weapons helped prevent the Cold War from turning hot. In Asia they can stop a conventional arms race that is forcing the United States to invest in weapons that can block the Chinese military on its doorstep, thousands of miles from its own. Americas policy of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to be more nuanced. It does not want Iran or Saudi Arabia to get the bomb, but why not Australia, Japan, and South Korea?

http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/should-u-s-allies-in-asia-get-their-own-nukes/ , , , .

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(, , , Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan). , . , , , , . . , , , . . . 22

, . , , . Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) . EEU , . EEU, , , . , , , 20 . , . , . , . Guardian .http://iakovosal.blogspot.gr/2015/05/guardian.html - Can the China-Russia Warmth Last?, 2015.

1 2 Sino-Russian relations appear to be flourishing. As Moscow has become locked in conflict with the West over the crisis in Ukraine, it has moved closer towards its long-time international partner, Beijing. Highlights of Sino-Russian cooperation in 2014 included the conclusion oflarge-scale energydeals, the initiation of ambitious bilateral projects in the economic andfinancialsectors, jointmilitary maneuvers, and the announcement offurther arms deals.

Behind the burnished diplomatic faade, however, many of these projects have in fact been stalled since shortly after their inception. In particular, the massive bilateral gas export agreement reached in May 2014 has madelittle progress towards implementation, and its precise stipulations remain shrouded in mystery.4 But by far the greatest stumbling block for the two countries further rapprochement has been the nature of their interaction in Central Asia. In almost every other field of Sino-Russian relations, the Ukrainian crisis has served to further solidify bilateral cooperation; with regard to Central Asia, however, it has raised various thorny questions. Sino-Russian tensions in the region have been simmering under the surface for a number of years. Through its relentless penetration of the regions economies, China has rapidly broken the economic and political hegemony that Russia had enjoyed there since the mid 19th century. China has already become the largest trading partner of all five Central Asian republics; its total trade with the region is now more than double that of Russia. Flooding the region with investments, China has built major oil and gas pipelines across Central Asia that cut through Russias long-standing stranglehold on the regions energy exports. The Central Asian countries now provide Beijing with around40 percent of its gas imports. Last September, the Tajik and Chinese governments launched the construction of anew gas pipelinethat turned Tajikistan into the latest transit country for Central Asian gas supplies to China.7 8 This is all the more perplexing since the scenario in Central Asia is strikingly similar to that in Ukraine. Like in Crimea, Russia has military bases and troops stationed in the region (in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), which it could easily resort to for invasive or disruptive purposes. The Central Asian republics contain sizable ethnic Russian minorities. Additional Russianlegislationthat was passed in late April 2014 essentially makes all ethnic Russians in bordering states eligible for Russian citizenship, which could possibly be used as a furtherjustification for intervention.

In the case of Kazakhstan, the percentage of ethnic Russians among the population is nearly 22 percent (proportionally larger than in Ukraine). This numberreaches 50 percentin the northern parts of the country. Russian nationalists like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have in the past claimed northern Kazakhstan as part of historical Russia, and there has already been an attempt by pro-Russian separatists to seize an area in the north of the country: In late 1999 and early 2000 a small group of insurgents led by a Moscow residentplanned to take over the local administrationof the city of Oskemen near the Russian border and appeal to Moscow to incorporate the area into the Russian Federation essentially the same scenario that could now be witnessed in eastern Ukraine. Their efforts were nipped in the bud by the Kazakh authorities.10, 11 12 What is more, as in the case of Ukraine Vladimir Putin has expected the Central Asian states to become part of a Moscow-dominated regional bloc modeled after the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was officiallyinaugurated in a lackluster ceremonyin January. Kazakhstan formally joined Putins pet project in May 2014, while Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to join it this month. In the Ukrainian case, disputes over whether the country should join a free trade arrangement with the European Union had been the initial trigger of the domestic political crisis and the conflict with Moscow, which insisted on Kievs inclusion in the EEU joint membership in both formats, including overlapping customs barriers, was considered impossible.

In Central Asia, nearly identical dynamics have been at work. The prospect of creating a deeper economic (and ultimately political) union along the lines envisaged by Putin is increasingly being undermined by the Central Asian states rapidly intensifying economic integration with China (just as, in the case of Ukraine, it had been undermined by the prospect of a deepening economic integration with the EU). This tendency has been further accelerated by Beijings efforts to involve the Central Asian states in an extensive set of plans to develop Eurasian infrastructure, energy, and trade links between Chinas Western provinces and European markets, which was first announced under the label New Silk Road Economic Belt during President Xi Jinpings trip to Central Asia in September 2013. It now forms an integral part of the so-calledOne Belt, One Road initiative, one of Beijings most important foreign policy goals in the near future. Russia was largelybypassed in this initiative, which is aimed in large part at strengthening Chinas ties with the Central Asian states.

Although China has since tried to dispel Moscows concerns, insisting that the plan is not directed against Russia, there can be little doubt that Putins Eurasian Economic Union and Chinas wide-ranging plans to further expand its economic reach in Central Asia are two mutually incompatible projects.14 Russia has so far done little to curb Chinas expansion in Central Asia and to resist its own displacement in the region, but it is doubtful that it will pursue such a passive policy indefinitely. For the moment, Moscow has an interest in accommodating Beijing. But if it ever deems it necessary, Russia could easily and rapidly destabilize the Central Asian states at the expense of China, which now has a huge stake there and tries to keep the peace in the region. Should Russia embark on a Ukrainian-style intervention in Kazakhstan, for instance, this could seriously endanger the security of Chinas overland oil and gas supplies. Since a large portion of Chinas energy imports now pass through Kazakhstan, Russia couldgain controlover these flows. Moscow could also assume control of the volatile border with Xinjiang, where Uighur factions are struggling against Beijings rule. Kazakh diplomats have long reported that Russian officials habituallyremind themthat Moscow could sow serious trouble among the countrys large Russian minority if the government in Astana ever chose to stray too far from Moscows preferred line on various policies.16 17 In subsequent months, however, Astanabacktrackedand appeared to retract its initial recognition of the Crimean takeover. Kazakh concerns about Russias potential future moves were magnified in late August 2014, when Vladimir Putin in response to a question on whether Kazakhstan might experience a Ukrainian scenario in the future madestatements that seemed to question the legitimacyof Kazakh statehood. Kazakhstans President Nazarbayev, he said, had done a unique thing. He created a state on a territory where there had never been a state; the Kazakhs have never had any statehood of their own, he created it. Putin added that he was confident that the Kazakh people recognized that it was beneficial for them to remain in the sphere of the so-called greater Russian world in the medium and long term. Apparently in response, Nazarbayevwarned the following daythat Kazakhstan has every right to withdraw from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Astana will never be part of organizations that pose a threat to the independence of Kazakhstan. Immediately afterwards, during Independence Day celebrations in neighboring Uzbekistan on September 1, Uzbek President Islam Karimovvery pointedly demandedrespect for state sovereignty and borders and a rejection of the use of force, in comments clearly aimed at Russia. The Central Asian leaders concerns about Moscows muscle flexing are prone to further expedite their rapprochement with the new regional power broker Beijing.For the moment, the Wests hostile reaction to Russias actions in Ukraine and the dire economic situation in Russia seem to act as a restraint on Moscows assertiveness in its near abroad. At present, these factors serve to discourage any additional territorial claims the Kremlin might have been tempted to raise. Eyeing further economic expansion in Central Asia, China undoubtedly appreciates this no less than the West does. But once Russia has weathered its current economic crisis, it is likely to eventually reassert its influence in Central Asia in no less forceful a manner than it did in Ukraine. This would run directly counter to Chinese interests in a region that has of late come to be of supreme strategic importance for Beijing.

http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/can-the-china-russia-warmth-last/ . 23

, ( ), Southern Energy Corridor ( ), Turk Stream Southern Energy Corridor. , . , , , . , , . Financial Times, Germany blocks Turkeys bid to join EU, 2013 , , Egemen Bagis get lost. , , 2013.

1 Germany has blocked the start of EU talks withTurkeyin the wake of Ankaras crackdown onmass demonstrationsthis month, a move some Turkish officials suggest could lead to an irreparable break with Brussels.

7 The EU needsTurkeymore than Turkey needs the EU, Egemen Bagis, Turkeys EU minister, said this week. If we have to, we could tell them Get lost. Mr Bagis has also warned that Turkey-EU relations could reach an irreversible point.

10 But Angela Merkel, chancellor, a longstanding opponent of Turkish entry, has described herself as shocked by the crackdown on the demonstrations, which reached a climax last weekend, when Claudia Roth, the co-chairman of Germanys Green party, was tear-gassed among the protesters andpolice used water cannon on Istanbuls German hospital.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2432cc2c-d9c0-11e2-bab1-00144feab7de.html , , . , . ? , -- ---, Southern Energy Corridor. ? , , , . , . . , . , TANAP, 2015, Turk Stream , . , , , , . .

1) 2018, CNBC, Australia to become top LNG exporter by 2018, 2014. . , , .

1 Australia is set to become the largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter by 2018, according to HSBC, as more production comes online.5 Five other projects are due to turn on the taps by 2018, which will see total Australian LNG capacity exceed 80 million tons per annum, beating Qatar's current 77 million tons. The Gulf nation is presently the world's biggest LNG exporter; Australia is the fourth largest.14 Over 90 percent of gas from Australian LNG projects is forward-sold on long-term contracts to Asian markets including Japan, China, India, South Korea and Taiwan. However, a look at the oil pricing formula in the Oxford Institute report shows that current prices are high enough for contracts to remain profitable.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/1021348742) pie charts Energy Information Administration .

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http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch3) Wall Street Journal, Confrontations Raise Stakes in South China Sea, 2014, , .

1, 2 3 A naval confrontation between China and Vietnam over Chinese attempts to anchor a giant oil rig in disputed waters is by far the most serious episode in recent years between the two historically entwined neighbors.

Unlike the Philippines, which has launched a simultaneous challenge to China's assertive behavior in the South China Sea by detaining a Chinese fishing boat and its crew, Vietnam has a potent military.To be sure, the Vietnamese navymuch of it dating from the Soviet erais no match for China's modern fleets. As far back as 1974, Chinese forces were able to grab the Paracel Islands off Vietnam's coast, and another skirmish in the area in 1988 led to the deaths of dozens of Vietnamese sailors. The two countries have the most extensive claims among the disputing parties to the South China Sea and its rich natural resources.6 Still, Vietnam approaches its relations with China with great caution. Its economic ties to its giant northern neighbor are critical to its own prosperity. And there are deep cultural bonds dating back to imperial days when Vietnam was a Chinese vassal. China and Vietnam are now brothers in a dwindling socialist fraternity of nations. Historically, Vietnam was part of the Sino-centric East Asian order: Its elites were steeped in Chinese literary traditions and Confucian ethics.8 The Philippines is a very different case. It is one of the few countries in Southeast Asia that has yet to be pulled decisively into China's economic orbit, partly because the Philippines has focused on services rather than trade. Mutual investment is negligible. That's one reason Manila can afford to stand up to Beijing. And it's done just that by launching a legal challenge to China's nine-dash line at a U.N. tribunal in The Hague, earning the wrath of Beijing, which labels the Philippines a regional troublemaker.11 12 There's no question, however, of the Philippines standing up to China militarily on its own: It has no air force and its vast coastline is virtually undefended save for a handful of World War II-era patrol boats, supplemented more recently by two hand-me-down cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard.

The threshold for military action by the U.S. in the region is high: It has no desire to provoke China or to encourage its Asian alliesincluding the Philippinesto do the same.13 14 On his recent visit to the Philippines, PresidentBarack Obamaassured his hosts that American military support for the Philippines is ironclada point underlined by an agreement concluded hours before he arrived that opened Philippine military bases to U.S. troops on a rotational basis. Yet he left vague whether the U.S. would come to the aid of the Philippines in its island disputes, which involve rights to oil, natural gas and fisheries.

America's military relations with Vietnam are warming: Hanoi bears few grudges from the Vietnam War era. But while Hanoi looks to the U.S. for support against a more muscular China, it is careful to keep its military relations with the U.S. and China evenly balanced.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044311045795477021660403624) BBC South China Sea, Q&A: South China Sea dispute, April 2015http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-137483495) Bangkok Post, Thailand, China bolster military ties as US relations splinter, 2015, .http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/security/468332/thailand-china-bolster-military-ties-as-us-relations-splinter6) BBC, How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties, 2014, - Senkaku.

1 Ties between China and Japan have been strained by a territorial row over a group of islands, known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China.

At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and south-west of Japan's southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are controlled by Japan.

They matter because they are close to important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and lie near potential oil and gas reserves. They are also in a strategically significant position, amid rising competition between the US and China for military primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-113411397) Stratfor, China's Moves in the South China Sea: Implications and Opportunities, 2014, , . South China Sea . , -, .7 In addition to resource exploitation, there is another, more strategic, driver for China's maritime ambitions that is quickly becoming more pressing for Beijing. In the past, China was largely capable of meeting its own needs and sustaining its economy domestically, or via land routes. This is no longer the case, and the significant boom in the Chinese economy has raised the increasing vulnerability of China's overseas dependence to a much higher priority for Beijing. The large shift in Chinese consumption has created a heavy dependence on maritime routes, which high levels of Chinese exports only add to. This dependence has shaped the strategic picture in Beijing: As with any country dependent on maritime supply lines, China will seek to secure those routes, whether from regional competitors, non-state actors or any major maritime power.15 The Philippines has been one of the two countries in the South China Sea, along with Vietnam, that hasnoisily challenged China's expansion. Beijing's actions are the most disadvantageous to Manila and Hanoi, which claim the largest swathes of territory in the South China Sea after China itself and are therefore experiencing the biggest shifts from the status quo as a result of Beijing's expansionism. However, China is confident in dealing with the Philippines because of its disproportionate advantage in their economic relationship and because the U.S.-Philippine security relationship remains strained. The strategic balance between China and the Philippines is tipped heavily in Beijing's favor, giving China far more room to maneuver than Manila. Barring significant U.S. intervention, China will retain this advantage. Ultimately, Beijing is counting on its estimation that the United States won't get tied up in a real confrontation with China over a few unoccupied islands claimed by the Philippines.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-moves-south-china-sea-implications-and-opportunities8) Stratfor, Tensions Rise in the East China Sea, 2012, East China Sea.1 2 While the situation in the South China Sea is approaching a tense standstill, controversy is again brewing to the north, in the East China Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. In the run-up to the anniversary of Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, several countries have reasserted territorial claims in the waters around Japan.

South Korean President Lee Myung Bak visited the disputed Dokdo Islands onAug. 10, declaring them part of South Korea's sovereign territory. (The islands, which Japan calls Takeshima,are currently administered by South Korea).Then onAug. 15, a group of Hong Kong-based Chinese activists (from both China and Taiwan) journeyed by boat to the Diaoyu Islands called Senkaku in Japan to reassert China's historical claim there.Meanwhile, over recent weeks Taiwan has renewed efforts to differentiate itself from China even as it echoes Beijing's claims on the islands (while remaining careful not to harm relations with Japan). Even Russiais toughening its stance on Japan's territorial claims, announcingAug. 15that it would send four navy ships to the Kuril Islands, which areadministered by Russia butdisputedbyJapan, betweenAug. 25and Sept. 17.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tensions-rise-east-china-sea9) Reuters, Indonesian president says China's main claim in South China Sea has no legal basis, 2015, South China Sea . .1 Indonesian President Joko Widodo said one of China's main claims to the majority of the South China Sea had no legal basis in international law, but Jakarta wanted to remain an "honest broker" in one of Asia's most thorny territorial disputes.

3 4 China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan lay claim to parts of the sea, where about $5 trillion of ship-borne trade passes every year.

The territorial dispute is seen as one of Asia's hot spots, carrying risks that it could spiral out of control and result in conflict as countries aggressively stake their claims.8 9 "The 'nine-dashed line' that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any international law," said Widodo.

Maritime lawyers note Beijing routinely outlines the scope of its claims with reference to the so-called nine-dashed line that takes in about 90 percent of the 3.5 million square kilometers South China Sea on Chinese maps.

18, 19 20 The agreement is the latest effort by Tokyo to forge closer security ties with Southeast Asian nations and build a counter-balance to China.

Besides the defense pact, Japan agreed with Indonesia to strengthen cooperation in maritime security and development of marine-related industries. Japan also announced 140 billion yen ($1.17 billion) in official development assistance to help build Indonesia's railway network.

Japan has already bolstered partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, the two countries most at odds with China over the South China Sea. Japan itself is embroiled in a bitter dispute with China over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, further to the north.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/23/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea-idUSKBN0MJ0432015032310) The Diplomat, China's 'New Silk Road' Vision Revealed, 2014, . .

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2 3 TheXinhuaseries promises the clearest look so far at Chinas vision for its Silk Road Economic Belt as well as the Maritime Silk Road. One of the most intriguing pieces released Thursdaywas a mapshowing Chinas ambitious visions for the New Silk Road and New Maritime Silk Road. Its the clearest vision to date of the scope of Chinas Silk Road plan.According to the map, the land-based New Silk Road will begin in Xian in central China before stretching west through Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi (Xinjiang), and Khorgas (Xinjiang), which is near the border with Kazakhstan. The Silk Road then runs southwest from Central Asia to northern Iran before swinging west through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. From Istanbul, the Silk Road crosses the Bosporus Strait and heads northwest through Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Germany. Reaching Duisburg in Germany, it swings north to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. From Rotterdam, the path runs south to Venice, Italy where it meets up with the equally ambitious Maritime Silk Road.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-vision-revealed/11) Bangkok Post, Are US-Thai relations losing their warmth?, 2015, -.

1, 2 3 US-Thai relations have been frosty since the May 22, 2014 ousting of the Yingluck Shinawatra government and that chill deepened after the January visit of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and...

Please credit and share this article with others using this link:http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/485361/are-us-thai-relations-losing-their-warmth. View our policies at http://goo.gl/9HgTd and http://goo.gl/ou6Ip. Post Publishing PCL. All rights reserved.http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/485361/are-us-thai-relations-losing-their-warmth12) Turkish Weekly, Is Eurasian Economic Union Membership Possible for Turkey?, 2015, , . 3 There are geopolitical, economical, political and even sociological aspects surrounding Turkeys possible membership to the EAEU. Together with Turkey's membership, new geopolitical and commercial opportunities will be created for economical integration. The membership of Turkey means the Eurasian Economic Union would reach the Middle East and Mediterranean region. Also, Russia would get the chance to address Turkistan and the far east through Kazakhstan and Eastern Europe through Belarus. Turkey would also provide another way to reach southern regions. In other words, Turkey's membership means new trade routes. The most important of those routes is the Black Sea region as it is the only area through which the community can reach open seas. In this way, the Black Sea region could be a free zone for inbound goods. Secondly, following Turkey's membership, the paranoia of a Soviet Reunion would cease to exist. No matter how much the Eurasian Economic Union exists for economical integration, there is always speculation as to whether or not it could turn into a political system resembling the European Union, or even a Russian hegemony. The membership of Turkey would directly undermine such speculations. This is also one of the reasons why Nazarbayev supports Turkey's membership. At the same time, it is also plausible that Nazarbayev might be thinking that, together with Turkey's membership, Russia could be negated. Turkey's membership may also positively alter the point of view of other Turkic Nations, such as Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.9 The most important part in Turkey's EAEU membership is its relations with the Trans-Atlantic. Turkey and Russia rely on one another, instead of the western World, from time to time. In such times, they can send the western world a message: It should not be forgotten that Turkey still is a member of NATO. Due to this, it's not possible for Turkey to break its bonds with the west. Nations of the European Union make up 50% of Turkey's trading volume. Not to mention, there is the agreement between Turkey and the Customs Unions. This agreement also obstructs Turkey's membership to the EAEU; however, it should be noted that this agreement is more to Europe's advantage and it hurts the Turkish economy because Turkey is directly affected by EU's accords with third parties. At the same time, Turkey's chance of full membership to the EU does not look promising. Turkey has no intention of waiting at the threshold of the EU and is, thus, willing to evaluate several other alternatives. In this aspect, the Eurasian Economic Union is important for Turkey's future vision.http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/182893/is-eurasian-economic-union-membership-possible-for-turkey.html13) site .http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/14) Financial Times, US-Japan defence pact aims to check China, 2015, -.

1 TheUS and Japansigned defence agreements on Monday that allow for greater co-operation between their militaries at a time of risingChinese influencein Asia.

3 For the Obama administration, the improved defence ties with Japan are an important part of its pivot to Asia, which has also seen the US expand military co-operation with allies such as Australia and the Philippines and former enemies such as Vietnam.6 In what appeared to be a veiled reference to China, John Kerry, US secretary of state, said: We reject any suggestion that freedom of navigation, overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea and airspace are privileges granted by big states to small ones, subject to the whim and fancy of a big state.11 A high priority will be planning for how to respond to incidents involving their navies in the East China Sea, where Japan and China have a territorial dispute, but also to work more closely together on intelligence, humanitarian relief, missile defence and in cyber and space. The two militaries will establish a permanent co-ordinating mechanism that will be used to respond to crises.13 The statement from the two governments reaffirms that the US believes the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both Japan and China (which calls them the Diaoyu), are covered by the US-Japan security treaty. It also notes the already stepped-up US military presence at bases in Japan, including the deployment of Global Hawk drones, P-8 patrol aircraft and Aegis ships.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83bffa24-ecf7-11e4-bebf-00144feab7de.html15) Star, Asia's new 'great game' is all about pipelines, 2008, .

3, 4, 5 Recent reports have linked the conflict in Georgia with pipelines that bring oil and gas to Europe but the pipeline rivalry extends far beyond Georgia to the vast oil and gas resources of the Caspian region and Central Asia.

When the countries of Central Asia were part of the Soviet Union, their oil and gas flowed only to the north through Soviet-controlled pipelines. After the Soviet breakup in 1991, however, competing world powers began to explore ways to tap these enormous reserves and move them in other directions.

Pipelines are important today in the same way that railway building was important in the 19th century. They connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power.

http://www.thestar.com/opinion/2008/08/20/asias_new_great_game_is_all_about_pipelines.html16) Stratfor, India: Trans-Afghan Pipeline Participation, 2005, Trans-Afghan. TAPI.India will participate in the trans-Afghan pipeline project, Pakistani Deputy Oil and Gas Minister Ahmad Waqar said July 13 after a session of the Indian-Pakistani working group for energy cooperation in New Delhi. The pipeline will transport gas to India from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan and Pakistan.

https://www.stratfor.com/situation-report/india-trans-afghan-pipeline-participation17) CNN, Is India getting nostalgic over Russia ties, 2015, , . , .

2 3 But despite Obama's warm rhetoric and talk of U.S.-India ties being a "defining partnership of the 21st century," the man of the hour when I was visiting India last month was a different world leader: Vladimir Putin.

"Russia has been India's foremost defense partner through decades. ... Russia will remain our foremost defense partner,"Modi explainedduring the Russian President's visit, adding that the "strategic partnership" between the two countries was "incomparable."

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/opinion/vickery-india-relationship/18) Business Insider, Here's Why China And India Are Trying To End A Long-Held Dispute Over A Barren Strip Of Land, 2014, , . 1962 . , , .1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 Last week, China and India signed a border pact to ease tensions along the disputed border dubbed the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The pact is largely intended to prevent a military conflict, improve communication between the two sides, encourage cooperation on border-related activities such as combating the smuggling of contraband goods, and promote better relations between troops, like joined celebrations of major holidays,reports the Indian Express.Experts aren't too enthused about the pact, viewing it as a temporary fix. "So many of the current problems arise from the line of actual control and both sides have a different understanding which means even after the new agreement is implemented there will still be conflicts and contradictions," Huang Yinghong, assistant professor of Asian and Pacific studies at Sun Yat-sen University,told the Financial Times.China and India went to war in 1962 over disputed territory of Aksai Chin. India claimed this was a part of Kashmir, while China claimed it was a part of Xinjiang.To the east, China and India also fought over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. China calls the territory South Tibet.

It is widely believed that India's decision to grant the Dalai Lama asylum during the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule also played a part in the war.

http://www.businessinsider.com/china-india-border-dispute-2013-1019) Business Insider, This Map Of US And Russian Arms Sales Says It All, 2014, . , , , . , . , . 3 , , , .

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http://www.businessinsider.com/arms-sales-by-the-us-and-russia-2014-820) Huffington Post, U.S. Alliances Encourage Asian Allies to Be More Antagonistic Toward China, 2014, , , .1 President Barack Obama's "pivot" to Asia is directed at strengthening U.S. Cold War era alliances to tacitly contain a rising China. However, that means that even minor disputes between American allies and China could drag the United States into a shooting war with a nuclear weapons state. Unfortunately, those minor quarrels are occurring now. Among other nations, China has disputes with U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines over barren uninhabited islands that may have petroleum resources near them. The same is true between China and Vietnam -- except that although relations between Vietnam and the United States have dramatically improved since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the United States has not formed a similar alliance with that nation, thus promising American protection. The differences in how the American Philippine ally and the Vietnamese non-ally are dealing with such disputes with China illustrates the danger of keeping outdated alliances long over the Cold War is over.3 In contrast, knowing it has the formal backing of the powerful American military, the Philippines has refused bilateral negotiations over maritime disputes with China and has behaved more aggressively. For example, the Philippines has begun legal proceedings against China in a United Nations tribunal over its territorial claims in the South China Sea.5

However, the United States also allies itself with bigger countries than the Philippines vis--vis China -- for example, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. If any one of these countries, behaving more aggressively as a result of its U.S. alliance, got into a major altercation with China, the resulting armed conflict could be more severe and thus be even more likely to drag in the United States.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/us-alliances-encourage-as_b_5358379.html21) The Diplomat, Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, 2014, .

1, 2, 3 4 On April 28, immediately prior to President Barack Obamas arrival in Manila for a state visit to the Philippines, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg signed the long-awaited Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) at Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City.

The EDCA is characterized by both governments as an executive agreement and not a formal treaty. It therefore does not require the consent of the Senate in either country.

The EDCA was the result of eight rounds of negotiations that initially commenced in August 2013. It was originally entitled Increased Rotational Presence Framework Agreement, according to Albert del Rosario, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The change in the title reflects the desire of the Philippines and the U.S. for a more comprehensive agreement that covers the full range of enhanced defense cooperation. Increased rotational presence is just one modality of enhanced defense cooperation.

On April 29, Malacaang released the full text of the agreement. The Agreement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation is a ten-page document containing a preamble and 12 articles. Government spokesmen repeatedly describe the EDCA as a framework agreement that raises the scope of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/22) The Diplomat, Unintended Consequences of US Alliances in Asia, 2014, , , . 0.88% , 2.7%.

, , . , .

3 So what are the second-order effects of U.S. alliances (in Asia), and if they are costs, do they outweigh the first-order benefits? Measuring the possible negatives would be quite difficult, but then the positives listed above are also rarely measured. We just assume, for example, that the U.S. presence halts a spiraling nuclear arms race in East Asia, even though that has not happened between India and Pakistan after they both went nuclear in the 1990s. Neither India nor Pakistan has a strong U.S. alliance, nor are they governed as competently as most East Asian states are, but that has not led to the widely feared nuclear spiral between them, suggesting that U.S. reassurance might not actually be necessary for nuclear responsibility in Asia after all.9 U.S. alliances almost certainly encourage allied free-riding, in both Asia and NATO, so unnecessarily driving up defense costs for U.S. taxpayers. South Korea spends only 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, despite bordering North Korea. Japan spends an astonishing 0.88 percent of GDP on defense, despite Abes tough talk on China. These numbers are one reason my support for the pivot is so mixed. The pivot will almost certainly encourage Asian allies to continue to underspend on defense at American expense. But U.S. defense spending is already in obvious competition with Americas aging populations needs,massive infrastructure underinvestment, and the Tea Partys insistence on smaller government.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/unintended-consequences-of-us-alliances-in-asia/23) Financial Times, Construction on the high seas adds to Asian maritime tensions, 2015, , .

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3 Pham Binh Minh, Vietnams foreign minister and deputy prime minister, has demanded China halt work on transforming reefs into small colonies with piers and, in one case, a helipad and large buildings.6 Mr Minh called on countries outside Asia to join the US, which has raised concerns privately with Beijing, in pressing through all possible channels for China to down tools. But he acknowledged it was unlikely to do so.8 Beijings intensifiedbuilding workin the Spratly island chain over the past 18 months represents a change in tack by Beijing in the long-running South China Sea disputes.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3c886a62-d76f-11e4-94b1-00144feab7de.html24) Financial Times, China treads more cautiously over maritime disputes, 2015, .

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1 Nine months after China dispatched an oil rig to disputed waters off Vietnam, sparking a violent reaction, Beijing has sent dredgers to a disputed reef near the Philippines that it already occupies.5 So far, its new strategy appears to be working. The Philippines has objected to the dredging and other construction activity around Mischief Reef, which follows Beijings assertion of effective control over Scarborough Shoal, another contested area only 120 nautical miles west of Manila. Chinas sovereignty is indisputable, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said on Friday. The relevant activities undertaken by China are within its sovereign rights.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c5ef1614-b296-11e4-a058-00144feab7de.html25) Financial Times, US welcome to use Chinas man-made islands for civilian purposes, 2015, . . , South China Sea, 50% .http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/27dcd7ee-efd2-11e4-ab73-00144feab7de.html