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7/17/2019 Hanns Joas
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1
WHAT IS
THEORY?
of theoretical and empirical knowledge.
Popper
himself
-
in his defence -
certainly recognized this difficulty: There
are
no pure
obseryations:
they
are
pervaded
by
theories and
guided
by
both problems and theories,
(Popper,
Logik der
Forschung
p.
76;
original emphasís).
1
He too
emphasized
that
every
account of
an
observation, every statement about an event, every basic state
ment ,
uses
concepts that cannot
be
corroborated
by unmediated
sensory data.
He was thus also of the opinion that every
attempt
to
test a
theory must con
elude
or
begin with sorne sort
of
basic statements
upon
whose
correctness
researchers
must
agree on the basis of
convention
or
by
mak.ing a
decision.
Scíence, for Popper, is
thus not
built u
pon
a rock,
but
in
a
certain sense on (pro-
visional) dogmas,
on
conventions
or
scientists, (more
or
less)
arbitrary
deci
..
sions to recognize as correct
basic
statements
about observations.
But
this was no
great problem for
Popper
since
he
was ofthe
opinion that
we
may in
turn - ifany
doubt
arises as to
their
correctness-
subject these basic statements
to scrutiny)
that
is,
test
them
As
it turned out, philosophers ofscience and
scientists
carrying out
research
on
how
scientists actually work were dissatisfied with
this
Popperian defence
of the method of falsification. One book, which
was
to become almost
as
famous as Popper s Logic carne
to play
a particularly
important
role
in
this
debate:
Thomas S.
Kuhn s
The Structure of
Scientific
Revolutions from 1962.
Kuhn
(1922-96),
an
American
originally
trained
as a physicist)
investigated
the
process
of
research
in his home
discipline
in quasi-sociological
fashion,
7/17/2019 Hanns Joas
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SOCIAL
THEORY: TWENTY
lNTRODUCTORY LECTURES
a
t ~ p o r a r y
puzzle, an ·anomali withina proven theory. Kuhn documented a
~ u l t t t u d e oí such or ~ ~ cases in th.e history of c i e n c e ~ drawing our atten
t i ~ n to the
fact -
and
this 1s
the key
potnt -
that
this adberence to the old the
o n ~ s
was
by no rneans
an
expression of dogmatism or irra.tionality. Again and
aga1n. tbere
have been good
reasons for
this
conservatism:
the
old theories
have r o v e d their worth in the past; it may be possible to integra e the new dis
covenesby further
developing the old
theories, by
means
of
auxiliary hypoth
eses
e x a ~ p l e ;
the
new theory
has not
yet
been
fully
worked
out
and
is
often
deficJent or 1ncomplete; it is possible
that we
are dealing merely with faulty
measurements rather than genuine falsification,
and so
on.
n
r i e f ~
in
the con
text of cientific practice. ther e has often been a complete lackof clear criteria
by which
to
ascertain
when
a tb eory should be considered falsified.
Kuhn,s
book
deals exdusively with the history
of
the natural sciences. But
very similar accounts of the research process
can
of course al
so
be found in
the humanities
and
social sciences. where it seems to be even more difficult
to
destroy a theory,
that
is,
to
falsify it as a whole, by means
of an
empir
ic.al
observation. We need
only
think of the history of Marxism. As a social
scientific theory, Marxism
can
of course -
and it
itself demands no less - be
tested against social reality. Now, many of the theoretical statements formu
lated or defended by Marx
or
Marxists, to
put
it
carefully, conflict
with
empir
ical reality. Much
of
what Marx predicted never happened: the polarization of
the population into a rich capitalist class on the one hand
and
a numerically
proletariat on the otber failed to occur; the socialist revolutions forecast
by Marx and Engels
did not
take place or at least
not
where they were sup
posed
namely in the industrially advanced countri es unde r the leadership
of the working
dass;
successful revolutions too k place at best on the global
peripheries
and
with a significa.nt role being played by the peasantry. that is,
the
wrong'
group
ofpeople;
the
dissolution
of
all particularistic ties. predicted
by
Marx
and Engels
in t.he
Communist Manifesto
supposedly propelled by
the economy- among other things,
they predicted
that
nation-states would
d i s p ~ r
-
did
not h p ~ n
either.
In
fact, the late nineteenth
and
twentieth
unturies
turned
the
assumptions
of
Marx
and
Engels
upside down: this
was
the great
age of
nationalism
and
nation-states.
If
one adhered to the Popperian
principie of falsifkation. all these observations would have inevitably led to
conclusive refutation of Marxism
and
thus its defi.nitive rejection. But this
did not occur. Those convinced of the vaüdity of Marxism as
an
approach to
research aJways managed to persuade themselves, and dearly others too, of
the productivity of the Marxist paradigm
by
means
of
a series
of
auxiliary
b y p o t h ~ s e s The proletarianization of tbe majority of the population in the
highJy industriaüud countrie- ,
so
the argument goes, failed to occur becaus.e
capitaJj m managed to
relieve
poverty •at
home·
by
intensifying exploitation
{ the
iñi ld
Workf; this was also the reason
why
revolutions failed
to
take
place
in
the Western countries,
in which
theworkers
were
(bought'
by
'capital',
f
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WHAT IS THEORY?
13
through welfare benefits for example, but took place instead in the countries
of the impoverished and exploited Third World; and Marx
and
Engels m
indeed ha
ve
been too
quick
to forecast the end of he nation-state, but today- In
the
age
of globalization -
things
were happening precisely
as
they had always
predicted, and so on. In brief, Marxian t ~ e o r is said . to
be
wrong, but
merely to require adaptation to changed histon cal condittons. .
You can decide for yourselves what you make of this defence of Marx1sm.
For
our purposes,
all
that
rnatters
is
the
insight
that
the
natural and social
sciences in general, and by no means only Marxism, appear to entall a fairly
large number of defensive lines from which the proponents of a theo
ry
c
an
shield it against empirical falsification. In fact, theories
in
the social sciences
have in sorne ways proved even more resistant to unambiguous falsificati on
than in the natural sciences.
The
former not only feature disagreements o
ve
r
preciselywbat falsification entails, but even about what exactly a theory is say
ing. While natural
scienti.fic
theories are for the most part relatively clearly
formulated, the social sciences and humanities are more often ·confronted with
the problem that there is no real agreement over precisely what the content of
a theory is. You may be familiar with this phenomenon from your seminars on
the dassical sociological authors or from reading the secondary literature on
them. What did Marx, Durkheim, Weber, etc.
really
say?
What
is
the correct ,
once-and-for-all interpretation of the theories of Marx, Durkheim, Weber,
and others? But a theory whose very content is contested is, logically, sc
ar
cely
amenable to unambiguous empirical falsifi.cation.
But let us return to Kuhn and his book
Th
e tru
cture ofScientific Revolutions.
According to him, in the natural sciences at any rate, there are no compelling
logical arguments against a theory; there
can
be no
unamb
iguous falsification.
And, Kuhn suggests, we should not be s urprised
ifthe
daily routine of esearch
passes off without much sign of criticism. Exlsting theories are used for long
periods without being scrutinized, precisely because scholars are convinced
of heir fundamental fruitfulness. This routinized type of research Kuhn calls
'normal science
'.
Puzzling or contradictory oc
curr
ences, problematic experi
ments, etc. are not regarded as falsification
in
th
e co
ur
se
of
n o r m a l
sdence
',
but r a t h e r to repeat, as anomalies, which one hopes to be able to remove or
resolve
at so
rne
point
with existing th eoretical means. 'Normal science, is
research
firmly based upon one or m
ore
past scientific achievements, achieve
ments that sorne particul
ar
scientific community acknowledges for a
time
as supplying
the
fu
und
ation for its fu r ther practice
(Kuhn,
Structure. p. 10)
Further, the history of science, ac
cording
to Kuhn,
only
very ra.rely features
instances of
individual
sdentists suddenly embracing a new theoretical
edi·
fice
in
response to a persu
asive
argument or impressive experiment.
The
7/17/2019 Hanns Joas
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... . . , ._ . . . . . . . • u w v n ~ ' . c . N 1· y
lNTROOUCTORY
LECTURBS
In any case, Kuhn's works were the point
of
departure for a vehement debate
within the philosophy of science on the status of science, particularly in the
1 9 ~ 0 s
and 1970s.
While sorne criticized Kuhn
for giving
free rein to relativism
(hts
of
the c o m m e n s u r ~ b i l i t i
of
theories,
whose
quality could not be
estabbshed tmplrtcally was sa1d to place science on tbe same Ievel as any old
world view, making ratíonal discussion impossible}, others welcomed the rela
tivistic
conclusions
which - so they
beiieved - could
be
drawn from Kuhn's
analyses. The 'anarchistic'
and
for a time highly fashionable philosopher of
science Paul Feyerabend stated, for example, that neither their methods nor
results
legitima e
the ambitions
of
scientists: 'Science
is
one [i]deology among
many' Science in
a
Free Society,
p.
106), tbat is, merely one form ofknowledge
among
others
(such as rnagic) .
But both the orthodox defenders of science and their anarchistíc crit
ics interpreted Kuhn wrongly or at least in a very individual fashion. Kuhn
did n.ot assert
that
competing paradigms constitute totalities or
world
views
hermetically sealed off from one another, between which, and with respect to
their empirical fruitfulness,
it
is impossible to rationally choose, but
in
which
one could at best profess o n e ~ s faith- as with different religions. He merely
argued that
in
many cases no truly clear
empirica/
criterion exists enabling us
to decide why we have to choose one paradigm rather than another. This is,
however, not the same
as
saying that no arguments at
all
may
be
put forward
for accepting or rejecting a theory on this line of reasoning, see Bernstein>
The
Restructuring
o Sodal and
Political Theory,
pp. 152-67).
By
no means did
Kuhn launch a frontal attac.k on the rationality of science' in his account of
the history of science.
In bis
view, the transition from one theory to another
is neither
an
unfounded choice.between vocabularies
nora
mysterious shift
from one theoretical discourse to another. There certainly are reasons why
it
is necessary to adopt a new paradigm. lt
is
possible to
discuss rationally
the
paradigm shift to which one aspires or which one rejects; the pros and cons of
the
particular theory can be weighed up, even
if we
must give up the hope that
there is one ·crucial experiment, that will make the decision for us.
What
is
more) Kuhn·s analyses of he history of science- though his radical
and problematical notjon of the 'inc ommensurabiliti of paradigrns appears
to exdude this - almost
always
show that paradigms overlap substantiaUy.
The various theoretical edifices are connected
y
many corridors. In reality,
not just the history ofthe natural sciences, but
also
that ofthe social sclences,
shows that certain tmpirical findings are unanlmously endorsed
y
the rep·
resentatives
o
dílfering pandigms, and that even a fair number of
theorttical
statements meet with general approval beyond the boundaries of paradigms.
What does
alJ tbis
mean for the social sciences
or
for social
theoryf
We
can
draw
two
'onclualons
from
our discuasion of the
philotophy
of sclence
so far.
particulady from the Kuhnian
analyaea,
whieh are
of
great
significance
to the
foUowi.na
lecturea.
First:
the
fact
that thc current theoretical landsc:ape
o
he
WHAT IS THEORY?
7
social sciences appears confusing, the fact that many dífferent social theoríes
or paradigms exist, some of which are at extreme variance with one a n o t ~ e r
does not mean tbat these theories or their theorists are incapable of engag1ng
in a rational debate. In the níne teen lectures to come
we
will
be
introducing
you
to
an arra
y
of theories.
Yo u will see
- and this
is
one of he central theses of
this lecture series - that the various theorists communicate with one another,
that they make critical reference to one another, such that their theoríes ove:
lap, resemble and complement one another to sorne d ~ g r e e . ~ e fact that soct
ology,
for example, is not based on
one single
parad1gm arnved at through
abstraction
as
applies, for example,
to
economics, in which a spedfic theoreti
cal school
is
dear ly dom.inant or hegemonic), the fact that a much lamented,
confusing theoretical diversity prevails within sociology, does not mean that
the subject is fragmenting, or
is
bound to fragment, into a collectionofdiscon-
nected approaches.
For you
, who are now being introduced
to
the world of modern social
theory, this leads to one inescapable
conclusion
You will not, presumably,
become experts on all the theoretical schools presented here dur ing the course
o your studies; no one could expect
yo
u to, especially
since
yo
u
would be hard
pushed to find a professor of the social sciences who is truly up to speed with
all these theoretical currents.
But
do not escape from this confusion by taking
refuge
in
the
fi.rst
theory that takes your fancy.There are already too many stu
dents who know only one single theory really well and who are so enthusiastic
about it that they disdainfully ignore all other approaches. Unfortunately, a
fair number ofyour professors, who have not infrequently specializ.ed in one
and only one theory and consider all other theories in principie bad
'
or use
less, are also a living example of such behaviour. As we have said, the vari·
ous approaches that exist within sociology have much potential for mutual
exchange. For this reason we advise yo u toengag e in dialogue with different
theoretical schools as you proceed with your studies. This will help you
avoid one-sidedness and blindness to other perspectives. Given that, as we
have shown, empirical and theoretical knowledge are very much connected,
these are pitfalls that would surely rub off on your empírica work.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the 'debate, between Popper and
Kuhn is directly relevant to the following lectures.
f
t is true that theoretical
issues cannot be settled solely with empirical means, that the leve
ls
of empir
ical and theoretical knowledge cannot be
clearly separated, tha t - as Figure
1.1
on page 10 produced y
Jeffrey
Alexander elucidates - we must work on the
assumption that empirical and metaphysical environments are ranged along a
continuum, then
lt is also
clear that theoreti
ca
l work
within th
e social
sciences
must be more than the mere creation and falsificatlon of
law
s or universal
statements,
as
should be the case acco.rding to Popper and
th
e rational choice
theorJsts.
Social theory must also concern itself
with
what are called
'general
presuppositions' in l e ~ a n d e r · s diagram
.
Theore ti
ca
l
issues thus range from
7/17/2019 Hanns Joas
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/hanns-joas 5/5
SOCIAL THIO&Y: TW NTY INT.IOD\JCTO&Y L.ICTUitES
aenuaüzations
to iaterptetive s y s t ~ n l S
wbicb
link
basic b i ~ i c L metapbyskal. political
and
moral ·
attitu&s
to the world..
A.n)OOt wishin¡ to bt
put
of the social sdentific worJd cannot. t h e r e f o ~ .
enps.inl
in
critial ~ t ~ oo all thts(' ltwols.
Th0$e
hoping to stick with
purdy tmpricaJ
will
bt
disappointtd. (lt
i$
surdy unnecessaryfor
us
to
repeat
apio lhat out conaptioo oftheory Js not unconttsttd.
As
Wle
havc
said. c h u • t e ~ of ationaJ choice h e o r i ~ s would not describe many of heo thc·
ories pnsented
in what
follows
u
' t h ~ i e s '
in first place.
Should you
wish
ro
tW.
•
look
at
tbe
conttoversy
sua
rounding queltioo 'What
u
(sodal)
t.beorr.·.
)'0'1 are a d v i ~ to compart tht fint chapter
of }eft'rt')'
Alexander's
book l W f ~ t r y Ltctt4ns: Sociolotfcal11ttory
sirtct
World War JI with the com·
nxnu m·
<k
·by Hartmut Esser. one
of
Ge.rmany'slndlni rational choice thco
riJts, in bis book
Soziologit AllgtJtttiltt.
GrvndiRgtn. chs . 3 and4.)
Jf
wr • k ~
as
our
basis
thls broad concept oftheory. dots this
QOt mtan
th•t
tbe debate must ntuuari ly run out .of control. with
t\ttry
scholar
biS
.own
t h ~ l d l n and nothinJ stand n¡ jn the way of an arbitra.ry n c r t ~
in
tht
tu1mber
o
thtorifd Quitf a i m p l y ~
tbc
anawtr b - n o ~ It
hu
in
fut
~
a p p a ~ n t witbin t.M
socJal
sdenti6c
disdplines- and
this
brings U
badt to
our
fint
roncl:ulion- that
d t ' s p l t ~
t b ~
areat tht-oreUcal divenUy, scholan
art
Ja.ratly
Jn
a¡rerment
about wbat
thc
fundamental
or
cott
rrsearch topica
ve.
And tt la posuble
to
i<WnUfy t ht'se. Wt
btllew th·
at tht thtorftict)
~ v t l o p m ~ n t
of
the aocial
a c i t n c ~ a can be undet¡tood
asttvolvln¡
atound tbrte \'ery
sp t
·
cific
qutsUons. Thcsc
art 'What
11 actlonf'; 'What b
aocial
ordert·: and
·wh•t
dtttrn1Jnes
IOclal
changef'
AJI
thtorbtl
.. and
thls
applics to
both tht
dt$·
s i c ~ J I authora o ICX'iolo¡ic&l thfllt)' u wellaa modtrn social thtorista - h&vt
taktn up thtae thret qutaUon¡. Weshould ldd that theae artol
count
always
cJOtely Unktd:
thf
tuttons ofhuman bflnas are nevet tntinly random. oclíd
ordu alwaya J o p .
and ~
a r ~
tubject to hlttorical
chanp.
Though cbt
wrttinga
of
the h e ( ) ~ Ú t a
dbcu•ud in
what (ollowa
approach thtae
qutstlona
ln markedly d i . f h r ~ n t way•
-
tornr '"re more lnteretted in actfon tban order,
many wtrt O ( : ~ u p i e d mQrt with
aocjaf
atablUty than social change - theae
muhUJJy
entwined questions ha\'e
aJwayt
bern
preunt.
What
m a k ~ s
these
question110 particuJarly Jntercsting u tbe ftct that the proceas of anawerlng
tbtm almoit
inevttably
leadl thtorlsta to makt ccrtain dtagnoaea
eftbefr timt.
The various
theori1u'
oft.en hithJy abttract idea• about social action, tocial
order
and
social
tha
.np
find
exprewon - howtvtr dlrectly or indfrectly - in
vtry
conc:rttt
appralsab of
tht
state of conttmpor•ry sodttics,
thelr
future
'devdopmmtaJpctht'
and
ewnof htir
putt.
Getting to grip1 wJth theu thrte
quettiona ia thUI not a purely fom,alistic tutc i f or an end in UeJf. but
leada
' ctrai¡hr to
tbt htut
of
be ficld
of actívíty
which maktJ
the sodalaciencea
10
intdlectuaUy ltimulazing and anractlve to a broad publk:
thdr
atrtvins to
e o d e t ~ a aod detect future tremb.
·
. ..
WHA'l' IS THEO&T
"Ibis
vuy
fac1 furDL\bts us W.ith
a basis
<JO
wbdl to tbe followi"'
k ~ Our tbesis
is
that the o
modeJ n social
the:ory be
understoOd
a.s an
unttasing search
fur aftssJUs
to tlw
1b1ee q1Kstions
a:wa·
tiooed
above a.nd that
tbe
coowquent
M-bateo
-. . moved to a m tbt
l930s
by
a great Ame-rican
sodolosist"
to ra-bom succe«ÜDJ
tbe«ists ~ p e e t
edly reíu - implkitlyor
explkitly.
qprovinsly . ; ~ i t i c a l l r -
to
thi.s day.
\\·e
~ rtfwin¡ to Tlkott
Patsoos; in
J.isbt o l ~
·
si&
· ·
oi his. work i lc
nlodern social
theoey
the next thf«<
l« tuns
~ ' r o t e ' d
to
lb<- b i s t ~
.
ofthe
r«eption
ofl'lkott
Panons
· work
d l o ~ S
"•ith
th<-
u t ~
d v t ~ ·
. be
point
'"bich
W< h a \ ~ a l ~ a d ) ' tout"hed upon and
r l i n Ñ a b o ' ~
b ~ ·
no
mtans has socioJosy
simp.l)
·
i s i n t ~ g n t ~ into
various v e t k a l nor
h•s
tbis bffi\ its
C.tt.
Ratbt.r. it b a dtscipline in
"--hidt the
i k , ~ m l
olthc«y W.$
propell«l
tbrw·ard
h r o u ~ h romnl\lnkati\'\J\.. r.ttl\."\NJ d i ~ t t ' < '
..
m(nt 1nd c o n t r o , ~ r s . i a l d ~ b t t < - $ Arnong otht:r
t h i ~
~ h o b t $ t ~ n . k n c ~ ·
~
constalltly
~ ~ r
b.Kk to th(' S}'$t('nl of ~ u a h t
l ' f \ ~ \ k ~ b ~ ' Ta"'""')tt
~ l O s
Clftttd tht unit)t
whicll
\ \ ~ n ~ ) W - d ~ p i c t b\ tht s u ~ ~ t n i ~ ~ n
l ~ t u r o s
Wt $hall ' n ~ y to you·in
A
n'lU\1\ d ~ t 1 i l a . th<
{\tt <1\\
~ ~ ~ t • l ~ ~ ~ ~
Parsoos undtrstuod S t . x l ~ l a c t h . ) n , h(\w
h(l
\ ~ ~ h ~ "\ . s«i•l
\ 1 ' \ l ~ t \
"'h•t
had
ro t•y
about
$udal \ a ~ , how ht n ~ r p f f t ~ ' h t $ ~ f l l o ,nJ
h\'w•nJ
tht othtr thtortUtaJ W\ools <-ontrtsttd i ~ h hi$
i t ~ ·
' ~ a l $ \ ' a h ~ l\)
hrw1h
1
•
lntrod\l(< you t()
tht anost lmpt"tt<\nl u \ h \ ' ~ t h ~
fuunJ<.rs
\ ) f t ~ vttk,..a$
r t t l ~ a l
s(hools.
\1../e int.tnd
t() ¡lVt
you tn QVt
.
ra\l ~ \ f t h t 1 \ ~ \ . j ~ ~ \ f tl\\l'\tk•t
~ s t & t ( h in
whkh the vtrlQus t h e o ~ t k
S<hools
WtN M$t
• h l ~
t\)
d t \ ~ , ' \ ~
t·htir particular t ~ n ¡ t h l , b\lt also
t . h ~ ~ c
that
elt¡x\Std ~ ' r
w t t k n ~ s s t l 1hu
last sht')Uld
bt
ofptrtleular
int-erest
to
thost o()\lU
whost inttrtst'
ttnJ at
wíU
ultlmately t.end towards thf
empirkal.
lt wiU br.tng t n ~ to
you
<>n<t
~ é i i l
é
putnt haw addrt&std on several o c c a s b . 1 n &
tht
ulthnatt i t n p o s ~ i b i l i t y út
drawlng a ~ a r d vld.ln¡ ltnebetwetn en1pirkal
and
~ o ~ t . i c a l know\tdgt.