Post on 08-Aug-2018
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
1/39
Firdausi Abbas et al vs The SenateElectoral Tribunalon January 22, 2012
Political LawInhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the
following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature- is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if
not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote
with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the
contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
2/39
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
3/39
Bondoc vs. Pineda Case DigestBondoc vs. Pineda201 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 97710
September 26, 1991
Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the FourthDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House ofRepresentatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and CongressmanCerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, CongressmanCamasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP forallegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedlyinviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of thepromulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing theTribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representativesdecided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasurato the HRET.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominantpolitical party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart thepromulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pendingtherein
Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commissionwas to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests tolegislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge theirfunctions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independencefrom the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach ofparty discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Inexpelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote infavor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of theballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representativescommitted a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
4/39
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representativesis that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of theHRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A membermay not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proofthat he has formally affiliated with another.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
5/39
Codilla vs. de Venecia
G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, theproclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to
review its validity
Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate
FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the
position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for
disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus
Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City
Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing
or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still
pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In
fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner
was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he
was found guilty and ordered disqualified.
Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly
elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed atimely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment
of Locsins proclamation.
ISSUES:
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
6/39
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a
Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the
legally elected Representative
RULING:
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion
for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has nojurisdiction in the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has
not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
7/39
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the
House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the
issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.
This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of
the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility
of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in
question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident thatrespondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.
She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a
patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity
for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her
via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but
nevertheless unproclaimed candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
8/39
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course oflaw. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350
votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by
respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body
with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed
by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign
of chaos and confusion.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
9/39
Pimentel, et al. v. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal
GR 141489, November 29, 2002
Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments
GR 141490
Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in
accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included,
for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations
whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse!
Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives
to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also
elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently,
the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these
two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the
political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).
From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the
party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the
CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA
were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political
parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring
of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January
2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the
same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date,referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in
http://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr141489.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr141489.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/jurisprudence/gr141489.html8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
10/39
the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February
2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11
February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to
implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both
motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions
on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET.[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber ofCongress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective
electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of
the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the
House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise,
the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left
alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the
election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11
May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
11/39
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the
election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up
to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary
recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power
to reconstitute themselves.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
12/39
Raul Daza vs Luis Singsonon November 25, 2010
Tribunal and its Composition
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the
new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected
by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it
that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT
the court.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
13/39
COSETENG V MITRA
13MAR
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives
under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal a request backed by nine
congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen
to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the
Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a
party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political
realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary
Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the
Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members
null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats
and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that
she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the
Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question,
hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonancewith the proportional
representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the
Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a
political question but because revision in House representation in CAwasbased on
proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in
the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up
10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties.
KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices.
http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/http://lazylegalboneswilldigest.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/coseteng-v-mitra/8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
14/39
Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than
1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats
in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong.Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been
nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their
floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled inDaza vs Singson in that the
Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by
the other government branches.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
15/39
Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzaleson November 25, 2010
HRETs Composition Rounding Off
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement
that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the
traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for
NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the
majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8
and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is
also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and
one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He
alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the
CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
16/39
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
17/39
Tio Vs. Videogram Regulatory Board Case DigestTio Vs. Videogram Regulatory Board151 SCRA 208G.R. No. L-75697June 18, 1987]
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operatorsadversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the VideogramRegulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended theNational Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tapecassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding anyprovision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) ofthe purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or dispositionof a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent(50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, andthe other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by theCity/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulatedcirculation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or anytechnical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations ofmovie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline
in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in thecollection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting insubstantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum fromrentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
18/39
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million intaxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of
the movie industry.
Issue:
Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need forregulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrantviolation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the taxremains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncingPresidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlyingobjective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no questionthat public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competitionposed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public broughtabout by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containingpornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that theactivities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor'spermit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
19/39
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voterfor the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's
resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in
two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality ofBuldon in the Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality ofParang, also in
theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in
the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is torefrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the
bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
20/39
"breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In
fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of suchprecision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body
of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy isnot essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from
the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projectsthe impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Notthe slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the
province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
5.
Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did notapprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
21/39
Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Parason November 23, 2010
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the TitlePolice Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No.
84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz
averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the
said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are
healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO
he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for
it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police
power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived
of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise
of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on
its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the
title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
cabarets.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
22/39
Tobias vs Abalos - A case digest
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675
with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality
by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the
conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in
effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill
rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress
to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced
justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
http://www.mylegispinoy.com/2009/07/tobias-vs-abalos-case-digest.htmlhttp://www.mylegispinoy.com/2009/07/tobias-vs-abalos-case-digest.html8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
23/39
CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered FourThousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), byPD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalizethe Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and GuaranteedLoans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automaticappropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution whichmandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it
being higher than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the ConstitutionCongress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, itdoes not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as todeprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and forthe attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt isnot only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. Moreespecially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the processCongress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the shareallocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriationcannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
24/39
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
9MAY
GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed
and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA. Andthat appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/philconsa-vs-enriquez/8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
25/39
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific
Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers
5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augmentpension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR,
the Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service
and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.
HELD:
Locus Standi
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d
1307 [1973]).
Veto of the Provisions
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done
in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when
the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
26/39
and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.
No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, thespecial provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item
(Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative
veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the
validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of
laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered
into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
27/39
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful ExecutionClause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the
ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
28/39
TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE Case DigestARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THECOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE1994 Aug 25G.R. No. 115455235 SCRA 630
FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goodsand properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% ofthe gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered orexchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that theimposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to theeffectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment ofcontracts.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contractclause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of theVAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to theeffectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment ofcontracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to saythat the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment,fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws readinto contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation ofessential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate ofthe legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace andgood order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as alimitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a taxexemption has been granted for a valid consideration.
Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it tomake this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its taxexemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal andsubstantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up,the Court holds:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with byCongress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes -beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by theprinciple of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
29/39
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to aneducation; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law isregressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected underthe Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective
relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
30/39
Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City [GRNo. 144104 June 29, 2004]Post undercase digests,TaxationatTuesday, March 20, 2012Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock
and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No.1823. It is the registered ownerof the land on whichthe Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected.
A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is beingleased to private parties, for canteen and small storespaces, and to medical or professional practitionerswho use the same as theirprivate clinics. Also, a big
portion on the right side of the hospital is being leasedfor commercial purposes to a private enterpriseknown as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessedboth its land and hospital building for realproperty taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines
filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is acharitable institution with a minimum of 60% ofits hospital bedsexclusively used for charity patientsand that the major thrust of its hospital operation is toserve charity patients. The claim for exemption wasdenied, prompting a petition for the reversal of theresolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which deniedthe same. On appeal, the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed thelocal boards decision, finding that Lung Center of thePhilippines is not a charitable institution and that its
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Taxationhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Taxationhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Taxationhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/Taxationhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/search/label/case%20digestshttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.htmlhttp://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/2012/03/lung-center-of-philippines-vs-quezon.html8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
31/39
properties were not actually, directly and exclusivelyused for charitable purposes. Hence, the presentpetition for review with averments that
the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitableinstitution under Section 28(3), Article VI of theConstitution, notwithstanding that it accepts payingpatients and rents out portions of the hospital buildingto private individuals and enterprises.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a
charitable institution within the context of theConstitution, and therefore, exempt fromrealproperty tax?
Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is acharitable institution. To determine whether an
enterprise is a charitable institution or not, theelements which should be considered include thestatute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes,its constitution and by-laws, the methods ofadministration, the nature of the actual workperformed, that character of the services rendered,the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use andoccupation of the properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to beentitled to exemption from real property tax, theremust be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
32/39
charitable institution and (2)its real properties areACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used forcharitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are
used for treatment of patients and the dispensation ofmedical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased toprivate individuals and enterprises.
Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to theexclusion of others, debarred from participation or
enjoyment. If real property is used for one or morecommercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for theexempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
33/39
Tan vs Del Rosario
9MAY
G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
FACTS:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the
Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it
imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers
adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation.
ISSUES:
1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled,
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289)
2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not
uniform and equitable.
3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships?
HELD:
The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are
to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs.
Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the
standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization
is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative
intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the
http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/05/09/tan-vs-del-rosario/8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
34/39
income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global
treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be
arbitrary and inappropriate.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due processclause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
35/39
Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretaryon November 16, 2011
Political LawCongress Authorizing the President to Tax
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,
an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on
all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.
In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be
taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not
assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional
permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and
other duties or imposts . . . .
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
36/39
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim
[GR 119775, 24 October 2003]
En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no partFacts:
Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of MilitaryReservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for other
purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the government
to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of
the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America
Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well
as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of
Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA),
vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the
ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared
government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free
Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a
proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic
SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized
financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President tocreate through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas
covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San
Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd.
(TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private
corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to
the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and
Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months
later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint
Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture
company known as the Baguio International Development and Management
Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the
purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
37/39
originally envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The
Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to
the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By
Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City
officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within
Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its
development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian
sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the
home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military
reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian
adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp
John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of
development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for
Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the
city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the
previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for
local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the
sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition
precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11
May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the
determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties
of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian
in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the
sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's
property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More
than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of
1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then
President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectaresof the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with
this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for
consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued
Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area
covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone
pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
38/39
filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25
April 1995 challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation
420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture
Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the
validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise
of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutionalquestion is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of
the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas
in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of
concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on
them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation
420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest
in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the
people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G.
Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local
governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall andYaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255
(Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420,
have legal standing to bring the present petition.
8/22/2019 Abbas Fabian
39/39
Teresita Fabian vs Honorable AnianoDesierto & Nestor Agustin
on November 16, 2011
Political LawAppellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin
was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the
offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the
Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Sheeventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which
eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to
the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.]
pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court